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While successful, behavioural nudges have often been one-size-fits-all, inducing different 
behaviours from different people despite both people being nudged in the same way. This is 
called the problem of heterogeneity, and one proposed solution is to personalise behavioural 
nudges. 
One area where personalised nudges may be of pertinent interest is the online political 
advertising space. In recent years, concerns regarding the use of social media sites as part of 
highly targeted political campaigns have grown. For any personalised nudging programme, 
this is area of social significance. 
This thesis investigates two strategies for personalising nudges using an experimental 
approach. Following an RCT experimental design (n = 962), the effect of impersonal nudges 
embedded into hypothetical political advertisements are first examined. The first part of this 
study finds limited evidence that impersonal nudges can influence decision making. 
In the second part, two strategies for personalising nudges are used to investigate if 
personalisation renders nudging more effective in this domain. These strategies involve 
personalising the type of nudge shown to a participant (so-called delivery personalisation) and 
personalising the outcome which a participant is nudged towards (so-called choice 
personalisation). 
Across all personalisation strategies (choice, delivery, and both combined), this thesis finds 
personalised nudges are statistically significantly more effective at influencing political 
decision-making than impersonal nudges and not nudging at all. Furthermore, data from the 
personalisation stage suggests further refinement of this experiment is possible, and so the 
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The word apocalypse finds its origins in ancient Greek, with a literal translation being 
“uncovering” or a revelation of knowledge… according to Wikipedia. Adopting this very literal 
interpretation of the term, one may be tempted to describe a doctoral thesis as an apocalypse 
of sorts. 
The notion of apocalypse has an intriguing place here – besides the tenuous link to revelation 
of knowledge – as I wrote this thesis, for the most part, during a global pandemic. I do not 
want to linger too much on this, mostly because I find it boring. I am self-aware enough to 
know that locking myself away in a room to write the best part of 100,000 words on a subject 
in minute detail was not because of a pandemic. It more comes with the territory of doing a 
PhD. But I think, as a note to myself if nothing else, it is important to remember the strange 
times during which this piece of work was born. 
To really hammer home the idea of apocalypse, however, I suppose I must propose a 
candidate for quite what knowledge is being revealed here. Personalised nudging has an odd 
place in my heart. I remember reading page 1871 of Cass Sunstein’s Storrs Lectures where 
he briefly discusses personalised nudges. I had had to leave the house because prospective 
buyers were viewing it, and so I sat in the car directly across the street as I read. 
Anyway, I think like all nascent ideas, I had no clue where to really begin with it. I wrote some 
stuff, all of which was bad. I set the idea aside, occasionally returning to write more stuff… 
which was also bad. Eventually, I kind of gave up with the idea, and started working on other 
things. But I am nothing if not consistent, and my struggles with those other things caused me 
to give up on them too, and in a state without direction or optimism (an intellectual apocalypse 
in the more common sense of the word, perhaps?) I just started reading things. 
I don’t even remember how I discovered the idea of hypernudge, or what led me to Eyal Pe’er’s 
then working paper on personalised nudges. I read that latter paper in July; it had perhaps 
only quietly arrived onto the internet a few months (if not weeks) earlier. But I loved the latter, 
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and with Karen Yeung’s hypernudge concept, I suddenly found myself back to personalised 
nudging. That, more or less, is how this thesis began. This story is not so much a tale of what 
knowledge has been revealed, but more of how knowledge sometimes gets revealed. 
Perhaps, in these strange times, the how will provide us with more comfort than the what. 
I should apologise at this point. I have rambled far too long, basically trying to disguise the fact 
that at the point I am meant to dispense some wisdom about life, the universe and everything 
I have little to say. I should, then, get into the main purpose of this part of the thesis. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“When you act, you are” – Slavoj Žižek, on Hegel. 
“Melancholic and fascinated, such is our general situation in an era of involuntary 
transparency” – Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (1981) 
“Am I out of touch? No, it’s the children who are wrong” – Seymour Skinner, Principal, 
Springfield Elementary, The Simpsons, Season 5, episode 20. 
 
The story of behavioural theory begins with the realisation that humans often diverge from the 
rational, utility maximising model of human behaviour (Thaler, 2015). To many humans, rather 
than so-called econs (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), this fact is tremendously evident. People 
rarely have perfect knowledge of any particular situation or decision, rarely have sufficient 
cognitive capacity to meaningfully analyse this information even if they did have it, and are 
rarely equipped with the tools to conduct an analysis which is sufficiently detailed and accurate 
(Simon, 1955). 
The notion of nudging involves, at its heart, two aspects of behavioural theory. The first is that 
humans exhibit behaviour which diverges from the utility maximising model of human 
behaviour, and thus interventions which reduce such diversions may lead to better outcomes. 
The second is that people often diverge in a systemic fashion, allowing behaviours to be 
understood through an expansive taxonomy of biases (Gigerenzer, 2018; Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008). Nudging as an outgrowth of behavioural theory holds that because people 
exhibit systemic biases which cause them to diverge from a utility maximising (or even utility 
increasing) path, small changes to so-called choice architecture (i.e. the landscape through 
which choices are posed and decisions are made) can be used to nudge them to make 
decisions which will leave them “better off” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 5; Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2003, p. 175). 
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1.1 – Two Perspectives on Personalised Nudging 
 
Behavioural nudges have become a popular feature of the policymaker toolkit (Oliver, 2019; 
Sanders, Snijders and Hallsworth, 2018; Halpern, 2015). The premise – to affect significant 
and predictable changes in behaviour without imposing significant economic (dis)incentives 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) – has been a tempting and appealing prospect, prompting a slew 
of research and application (Sanders, Snijders and Hallsworth, 2018). 
Along with this enthusiasm, however, has come frequent criticism (Rebonato, 2014; 
Gigerenzer, 2015). One common criticism is that many nudges take a one-size-fits-all 
approach (Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; Peer et al., 2019; Yeung, 2017; Sunstein, 2012; Carroll 
et al., 2009). This typically means that the same nudge is used for all members of a target 
population, despite the fact members of this population likely differ in meaningful ways, 
meaning the result of the nudge can produce very different – and potentially harmful – 
outcomes (Sunstein, 2012). This problem is known as the problem of heterogeneity (Sunstein, 
2012), where heterogeneity describes individual differences between people. 
Since the relative infancy of nudge theory, there have been those that have criticised nudging 
because of the problem of heterogeneity (Rizzo and Whitman, 2009; Carroll et al., 2009), as 
well as proposals to rectify the problem of heterogeneity (Sunstein, 2012, 2013a). One 
proposed solution is personalised nudging (Mills, forthcoming; Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; 
Peer et al. 2019; Sunstein, 2012, 2013a). By personalising nudges such that every individual, 
or every significantly different group of individuals, are nudged in such a way as would be 
expected to respect their heterogeneity, the problem of heterogeneity might be resolved. 
This is one perspective on personalised nudging. Another comes from the perspective of 
information technology and digital nudging (Benartzi, 2017; Yeung, 2017; Weinmann, 
Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016; Thaler and Tucker, 2013). Here, the discussion follows that 
information technologies enable the collection of ever-more data about individuals, with digital 
choice environments expanding the range of choice architecture available to those who would 
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seek to nudge others (i.e. choice architects). In addition, these environments are often highly 
personal spaces, resolving an implicit problem associated with personalised nudging: that of 
targeting (Benartzi, 2017). For advocates of digital nudging and digital choice environments, 
the growing ability to combine individual-level data with behavioural insights will produce a 
world inhabited by ever-more personalised nudges (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019; Yeung, 
2017). This is not so much a response to a problem, but an embrace of an opportunity. 
Both of these perspectives are valid, and often appear interconnected. For instance, it has 
often been noted that the past and present challenges of personalised nudging have been 
access to data and methodologies capable of analysing these data (Mills, forthcoming; 
Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014; Sunstein, 2013a; Thaler and Tucker, 
2013). As the information era develops, several of these challenges – notably targeting (Liu, 
2020; Zuboff, 2019) – are being addressed. At present, however, there is a lack of a consistent 
theory of personalised nudging, as well as empirical examination of personalised nudging. 
When one says ‘personalisation,’ what is actually being personalised? When one states 
‘heterogeneity,’ what does this actually mean, in the context of nudging? And when one talks 
of ‘integrating heterogeneity,’ what, on a practical level, does this entail? Furthermore, and 
perhaps most importantly of all, does personalisation actually deliver on the promise of 
resolving the problem of heterogeneity and producing more effective behavioural nudges? 
This is the central question which motivates this work. 
1.2 – Beyond Targeting 
 
In 2018, revelations about the role of the psychographics firm Cambridge Analytica and their 
role in several elections in 2016 came to light (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018). The 
firm was found to have harvested Facebook data from some 87 million users of the social 
media platform and combined these data with sophisticated data analytical procedures to 
micro-target political advertisements at users (Chang, 2018).  They had, however, harvested 
these data without the permission of Facebook and – arguably more importantly – the informed 
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consent of users (Lapowsky, 2019). The ensuing furore led to the collapse of the firm (Chang, 
2018) and investigations by elected officials in both the UK and the US (Cadwalladr, 2019). 
In developing such sophisticated micro-targeting techniques, Cambridge Analytica (and a 
whole slew of other technology companies at the time; Liu, 2020) had solved one of the key 
problems associated with personalised nudging, namely, knowing whom to nudge (Peer et al., 
2019; Sunstein, 2012). But as Liu (2020) – a former start-up founder whose company 
specialised in micro-targeting advertisements on social media – argues, targeting is only half 
of the objective when trying to persuade someone. While targeting can identify an individual, 
knowing what to target them with to affect behavioural change can be rather different (Liu, 
2020). 
Personalised nudging emerges as a prime candidate for this ‘what,’ and in turn re-emphasises 
the timeliness of research into personalised nudging. Furthermore, it calls for research into 
personalised nudging in a very specific domain – namely, political decision-making. It is this 
domain which this thesis investigates. 
1.3 – The Structure of this Thesis 
 
 
This thesis is split into four Sections, with each Section containing multiple Chapters. This 
structure is adopted to assist the reader. Section 1 is titled Background and Theory and 
contains Chapters 2 and 3, which review the literature and propose a theory of personalised 
nudging, respectively. 
In Chapter 2, the existing literature on personalisation is analysed. This discussion is broken 
into four parts. Firstly, the problem of heterogeneity is considered, with evidence from multiple 
studies which identify a problem in nudging arising due to heterogeneity discussed. This 
informs a discussion of how heterogeneity should be understood, and when heterogeneity 
should be rejected. Secondly, literature from the fields of marketing and consumer decision-
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making which investigate personalisation without nudging are considered. This research 
largely serves as a forerunner to the literature on personalised nudging which is currently 
emerging. Thirdly, said emergent literature is reviewed. Finally, the literature on digital nudging 
as it pertains to personalisation is examined, before a brief literature summary. 
In Chapter 3, the central theory of this thesis is presented. This theory is dubbed the 
choice/delivery framework, and largely expands on the same framework proposed in Mills 
(forthcoming). The notions of choice personalisation and delivery personalisation are shown 
as clearly manifest in the literature, and the implications of this framework in relation to nudge 
theory are offered, as well as the hypotheses examined in this thesis. 
Section 2 is titled Methodology, and – as the title suggests – concerns the method and 
methodological approach adopted in this thesis. This Section contains seven chapters. 
Chapter 4 considers the methods adopted by previous studies which are most relevant to this 
thesis. Chapter 5 presents an introduction to political advertising and decision-making before 
discussing the nudges examined in this thesis. Chapter 6 discusses the psychometric 
measures selected and proposes a psychometric map from which later results can be 
compared. Chapter 7 describes the process of constructing the political advertisements used 
in this thesis, and some of the experimental implications of these design choices, including 
the use of a randomised controlled trial (RCT) experimental design. Chapter 8 discusses data 
collection methods, as well as introducing two potential analytical approaches, matching and 
moderation analysis. Chapter 9 presents a power analysis of the proposed statistical tests and 
a discussion of sampling considerations and other factors which may impact the data 
collected. Chapter 10 provides a summary of the previous six chapters. 
Section 3 is titled Results and consists of four chapters. Chapter 11 reports the findings of an 
initial pilot study, which is used to evaluate the experimental and analytical approach and 
adjust where necessary. These adjustments are offered in Chapter 12, and in Chapter 13, the 
findings of a second pilot study following these adjustments are presented. Chapter 14 
provides the results of the main experiment in this thesis. 
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Finally, Section 4 is titled Discussion and Conclusion, and contains two chapters which discuss 
the results from Chapter 14 and provide concluding remarks, respectively. Chapter 15 
discusses the results of Chapter 14 and the wider implications of this research. Firstly, the 
hypotheses proposed in this thesis are re-evaluated, with the first hypothesis being accepted 
and the second hypothesis being rejected. Secondly, explanations as to the relative 
performance of the personalisation strategies utilised in this thesis are offered, as well as 
proposed experimental adjustments to any future research. Thirdly, the results of this thesis 
are compared to those of previous research, with the apparent conclusion being that this 
research is broadly in-line with recent studies. Finally, a discussion of the wider implications 



















Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
 
Behavioural nudges have become important tools in the fields of public policymaking (Oliver, 
forthcoming; Sanders, Snijders and Hallsworth, 2018; Halpern, 2015), marketing (Akerlof and 
Shiller, 2017; Thaler, 2015) and widely used in the private-sector (Akerlof and Shiller, 2017; 
Lavi, 2017; Beggs, 2016; Sunstein, 2013a). 
However, nudges are often criticised for their one-size-fits-all approach (Peer et al., 2019; 
Yeung, 2017; Sunstein, 2012; Carroll et al., 2009). For instance, Thunström, Gilbert and 
Jones-Ritten (2018) find that nudges which encourage saving behaviour can have a negative 
impact on individuals who already over-save. Sunstein (2012, 2013a) argues such 
phenomena occur because populations are heterogeneous – individuals and groups are 
different from one another, and these differences may result in different welfare outcomes 
from the same nudge (Sunstein, 2012). 
Sunstein (2012) calls this, “the problem of heterogeneity” (Sunstein, 2012: 6) and argues, in 
many circumstances, it is desirable to respect heterogeneity. One solution may be to 
encourage active choices, but these can also be burdensome. An alternative, therefore, is 
personalisation and personalised nudging. 
This chapter reviews the literature concerning the problem of heterogeneity, personalisation, 
and personalised nudging. In part 2.2, the problem of heterogeneity is examined. Following a 
brief synopsis of the difficulties of measuring heterogeneous populations, several behavioural 
studies which demonstrate unexpected and unintended results – and which show strong 
evidence of being explained by heterogeneity – are reviewed to evidence the problem of 
heterogeneity. These studies also inform the critique of Sunstein’s (2012) relevancy principle, 
which seeks to conceptualise the broad concept of heterogeneity so that it may be useful 
within nudge theory. 
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In part 2.3, the existing body of literature on message personalisation in the fields of marketing 
and consumer decision-making is examined, before the relatively smaller body of literature on 
personalised nudging is considered. Significant evidence suggests that personalising or 
tailoring messages to match the cognitive styles of heterogeneous populations improves the 
likelihood the message will promote its intended consequence, bolstering the idea of 
personalised nudging.  
The origin of this idea is then examined, turning to the original arguments of Sunstein (2012, 
2013a) and the subsequent discussions about personalised nudging within the legal domain 
(Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014), before more contemporary empirical studies of personalised 
nudging are examined (Guo et al., 2020; Page, Castleman and Meyer, 2020; Peer et al., 2019; 
Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019). As with the personalisation literature, these contemporary 
works show early evidence of the effectiveness of personalised nudging.  
Finally, part 2.3 of this chapter considers the conceptions of personalisation and personalised 
nudging which have been developed in conjunction with the emergence of information 
technologies, automated systems and big data (Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; Benartzi, 2017; 
Yeung, 2017; Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016). In this review, it is argued that, 
while these sophisticated technological strategies facilitate personalised nudging, and will 
bring about sophisticated, personalised nudges, so-called crude personalised nudges (Porat 
and Strahilevitz, 2014; Sunstein, 2012, 2013a) demonstrate personalised nudging should be 
thought of as a response to the problem of heterogeneity, and not as an outgrowth of 
information technology.  
This chapter concludes with part 2.4. 
2.2 – Does Heterogeneity Matter? 
 
It is worth considering whether heterogeneity matters, which necessitates an exploration of 
the effects of heterogeneity. A contentious argument around heterogeneity and nudging is that 
because nudges should not prevent a person from pursuing their own preferences, individuals 
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should always be able to identify when a nudge is potentially harmful to their interests and 
adjust their behaviour accordingly. However, for this argument to be valid, it would 
simultaneously invalidate the purpose for nudging in the first instance; if decision-makers were 
evaluative enough to determine whether their specific preferences required them to exercise 
agency over the nudge, it seems reasonable to believe they also will be evaluative enough to 
make an optimal decision without requiring any nudge. Since most nudge theorists and 
behavioural economists reject the latter proposition,1 it seems viable, if not necessarily 
intuitive, to suppose that whether or not individuals could avoid the potentially harmful 
consequences of nudges and go their own way, they do not do so. 
Reasons for this behaviour may be speculated upon. For instance, a person who is relatively 
uninformed of, say, pension plans and so is inclined to follow a default option nudge will 
probably be uninformed of how their personal circumstances may mean the default plan is not 
right for them. This person, despite being significantly heterogeneous, may not go their own 
way, and thus the problem of heterogeneity emerges. In this part, evidence of the problem of 
heterogeneity will be presented. The question of what heterogeneity means will also be 
considered. 
2.2.1 The Myth of the Average Person 
 
The so-called problem of heterogeneity arises because people have individual characteristics, 
circumstances and preferences; they do not conform to a single set of specifications. While 
the belief in, say, assuming a population average is representative of a whole population can 
be traced to the emergence of population2 data collection and social statistics in the 19th 
 
1 Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein’s (2003) whole argument for nudges and behavioural interventions is that people 
often don’t exhibit optimal behaviour. 
2 There is no standard method of evaluating a population down to a single representative individual in 
behavioural economics. The use of averages is a common strategy, particularly with social norm nudges 
(Schultz et al., 2007), but other less structured strategies can also be used (for instance, Butt et al. (2018) find 




century – notably to the Belgium statistician Adolphe Quêtelet (Sposini, 2019) – the validity of 
this belief has also been challenged.  
One notable example is the work of anthropologist Gilbert S. Daniels (1952) and his study of 
the average man within the U.S. Airforce. Daniels (1952) found that as the number of 
variables3 used to discern the average man4 increases, the number of observations (which is 
to say, people) which can be adequately represented by this average rapidly declines to zero. 
As Daniels (1952) writes as an introduction to his work, “The tendency to think in terms of the 
“average man” is a pitfall into which many persons blunder” (Daniels, 1952: 5).5 This same 
tendency, and blunder, might be applied to the fields of behavioural science and nudge theory 
specifically6 (Peer et al., 2019; Sunstein, 2013a). 
2.2.2 The Heterogeneity Problem in Action 
 
While the problem of heterogeneity in nudge theory has been a noted criticism of nudges for 
some time (Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014; Sunstein, 2013a; Johnson et al., 2012; Carroll et al., 
2009), this discussion has largely been the reserve of theorists (Sunstein, 2013a). Only 
recently has the study of nudges sort to highlight the unintended and potentially harmful side-
effects of some nudges (Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten, 2018; Beshears et al., 2016; 
Beshears et al., 2015b; Haggag and Paci, 2014; Schultz et al., 2007). This literature is 
explored to present evidence of the problem of heterogeneity within nudge theory. 
Furthermore, with an eye to heterogeneity, a critique of the effectiveness of nudging can also 
be made.7 
 
3 In this instance, bodily features (weight, height etc.). 
4 Daniels’ (1952) work was restricted solely to men. 
5 Quêtelot’s work, for example, led him to believe nations and races could be understood through comparison 
of their average man, and his work – according to Sposini (2019) – contributed somewhat to the legitimising of 
the fields of phrenology (skull measuring) and eugenics. 
6 For instance, averaging in the social norm nudge (Schultz et al., 2007). 
7 For instance, heterogeneity may lead many people to follow the nudge, and so from a non-heterogenous 
(homogenous) perspective the nudge can look highly effective. However, when considering some of those 
following the nudge are being negatively impacted due to heterogeneity, the effectiveness of the nudge (from 
a welfare perspective (Oliver, 2019; Sunstein, 2013b)) comes under question. 
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2.2.2.1 Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) 
 
Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) investigate the use of a salience nudge to 
encourage people to reduce spending.8 They define two groups within their target population, 
the so-called “tightwads” and “spendthrifts” (Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten, 2018: 268). 
As these names suggest, these are individuals who spend too little and individuals who spend 
too much, respectively.9 Participants were offered the opportunity to buy locally produced 
honey, but were also informed (nudged) before making any purchase that said purchase would 
reduce their ability to buy alternative items in the future. 
Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) find that for those who felt they spend too little 
(tightwads), this salience nudge was highly effective at discouraging them from spending 
more. However, for those who felt they spend too much, the salience nudge had no impact on 
their spending behaviour.10 Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) therefore conclude 
that for tightwads who may have benefited from spending, the nudge actually reduced their 
welfare, while for those who would have benefited from following the nudge and not spending, 
the nudge did not enhance welfare. 
Tightwad and spendthrift classifications represent an attempt to capture heterogeneity within 
the target population.11 This is not necessarily typical of comparable nudges,12 but having done 
so, Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) reveal additional insights about the nudge 
which would otherwise have been lost. For instance, without this heterogeneity information, 
 
8 Salience nudges typically highlight information which may otherwise be missed or not appropriately 
appreciated. Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) specifically use a reminder nudge. 
9 Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) define these categories around self-reported spending habits. In 
other words, those who believe they either spend too much or too little. 
10 Perhaps because spendthrifts already had a lot of experience facing opportunity cost information and were 
thus less sensitive to this information. 
11 This was a primary research objective of Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018), and not simply a 
curious result. As they note, “[the] distributional effects of nudges are largely unknown” (Thunström, Gilbert 
and Jones-Ritten, 2018: 267) 
12 Examples include the UK Government’s decision to encourage retirement saving by making workplace 
pensions opt-out rather than opt-in (Service, 2015), or Thaler and Benartzi’s (2004) ‘Save More Tomorrow’ 
similarly designed to encourage retirement saving. In neither example is the heterogeneity of the target 
population considered. Evidence from Bourquin, Cribb and Emmerson (2020) and Beshears et al. (2016), 
respectively, suggest this may be an oversight. 
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the effect of the nudge may have been interpreted positively because the nudge did reduce 
overall spending across the sample.13 However, because some heterogeneity within the 
sample has been collected, it is possible to understand for whom the nudge was effective, and 
re-evaluative whether the nudge was successful in enhancing welfare (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2003, 2008) or was – in the words of Tor (forthcoming) – a “successful but undesirable” nudge 
“that should fail” (Tor, forthcoming: 1). 
2.2.2.2 Butt et al. (2018) 
 
Butt et al. (2018) argue a priori that heterogeneity may result in default employee retirement 
saving schemes not being suitable for many members. They adopt a mixed-methods 
approach, collecting various survey data14 from over 1,000 employees of various Australian 
companies, before interviewing 28 executives from the same companies who are charged with 
establishing default retirement saving schemes for their respective companies. 
Butt et al. (2018) find that schemes which are set as the default option do not reflect 
heterogeneity within the workforce. Of those who accepted the default plan, “the 18-34 years 
(youngest) age group is over-represented… as are women, singles, people with low education 
and low to middle income earners” (Butt et al., 2018: 553). This leads Butt et al. (2018) to 
argue that the over-representation of these groups suggests they are more susceptible to the 
default option.15 Yet the default option is often not designed with these specific groups in mind 
and is instead designed to reflect – as best as possible – the whole workforce population.  
Butt et al. (2018) offer another interesting observation, namely, that where attempts are made 
to tailor the default option scheme to individuals, they tend to rely only on those characteristics 
that can be easily observed or inferred: “Executives said that they designed their plan’s default 
 
13 Of course, this interpretation reveals something of a normative perspective on the relationship between 
welfare and saving. One might speculate about the welfare of those reliant on businesses now denied 
additional income, for instance. 
14 Survey data ranged from basic demographic information (age, sex, income level, education level) to 
information about risk preference, attitudes to decision making, and attitudes regarding the participant’s 
retirement scheme. 
15 Also see Beshears et al. (2015a) 
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investment strategy for passive members. At the same time, they acknowledged that they 
know little about them. Executives know the age, gender, plan account balance and insurance 
status of members, and can identify the martial status of some. By using the mandatory 
contribution rate as a guide, they can estimate members’ incomes” (Butt et al., 2018: 553). 
Butt et al. (2018) argue that this reliance on easy to access information leads executives to 
ignore other important heterogeneous information such as risk preference, and further, 
through this ignorance, hinders their ability to interpret what the easy to access information 
implies about their staff. For instance, when investigating the risk preference of default plan 
members compared to the actual risk-level of their plans, Butt et al. (2018) find significant 
mismatching. This pattern was repeatedly found when they compared other survey metrics 
such as propensity to delegate or saving goals. 
2.2.2.3 Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) 
 
Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) investigate the long-term behavioural change in 
consumption resulting from a small charge being placed on plastic shopping bags. The use of 
a small charge is a famous nudge discussed by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), with the charge 
designed not to be significant enough as to constitute an economic disincentive, but salient 
enough as to remind consumers about the wastefulness of plastic bags and nudge them to 
use reusable alternatives. 
Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) document several uses of the small charge nudge 
around the world and subsequent studies which attest to the success of the nudge.16 However, 
they argue that, “many of these studies are flawed because they lack adequate temporal and 
geographic controls” (Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young, 2017: 153). To resolve these 
flaws, they use a natural experiment arising from the Canadian city of Toronto between the 
years of 2006 and 2013. In that time, Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) report, a 
 




small charge was introduced on disposal plastic bags while not being introduced anywhere 
else in the country. This charge was eliminated following the election of a new mayoral 
administration. Using the rest of Canada as a control group, Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and 
Young (2017) evaluate whether the introduction of the charge in Toronto produced short- and 
long-term behavioural change in the consumption of plastic bags. 
Overall, they find that the nudge did affect behavioural change, with an overall 3.4% increase 
in the use of reusable plastic bags.17 However, given the detail of the data, they also find, “the 
levy was highly effective in encouraging people who already used reusable bags to use them 
more frequently, while having no effect on infrequent users” (Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and 
Young, 2017: 153).18 Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) argue this result can be 
explained by the heterogeneity within the population. When the effectiveness of the nudge is 
analysed along household income, they find consistent evidence to suggest those with high 
household earnings change their behaviour following the nudge, while those in lower 
household income brackets show no significant adjustment in their behaviour.19  
They link this heterogeneity result to the idea of nudge transparency, suggesting that those 
who have higher incomes are positioned to be more informed about the policy and the 
potential harms of disposable bag use, and thus are more susceptible to being nudged 
compared to those with lower incomes who may, for a variety of socio-economic reasons, not 
 
17 The data examined by Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) is survey data that captures household 
consumption on a Likert scale measuring frequency of use of reusable plastic bags. Therefore, they report 
increases in reusable plastic bags, not decreases in disposable plastic bags. This may be disadvantageous in 
some discussions. However, Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) argue the nature of the data (that it 
can be compared with households across the country unaffected by the charge) makes this a worthwhile 
compromise. 
18 This finding is possibly explained by the nature of the nudge itself. If, as Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young 
(2017) argue, the small charge nudge works by reminding consumers that disposable bags should be avoided, 
those who have already accepted this message (i.e. those who already use reusable bags) will benefit from 
being reminded, while those who have not accepted the message (i.e. those who have no impetus to use 
reusable bags) may find themselves, in a manner of speaking, protected from the nudge. This explanation is 
similar to that found by Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018). 
19 Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) do note a curious result in the middle-income bracket ($40,000-
$60,000), where the propensity to use reusable bags actually fell when the nudge was introduced. They do not 
elaborate on why this might be. 
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be as informed.20 This explanation may thus reveal a slightly different perspective on the 
problem of heterogeneity. Where heterogeneity is often characterised as resulting in harm for 
some individuals (Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten, 2018; Beshears et al., 2016), the 
effectiveness of the nudge itself may also be subject to heterogeneous factors. For instance, 
should the hypothesis of Rivers, Shenstone-Harris and Young (2017) regarding lower-income 
households be correct, it may be a prudent observation that for some groups either a different 
nudge21 or a different policy program entirely, is desirable.22 
2.2.2.4 Beshears et al. (2016) 
 
Beshears et al. (2016) present evidence of an unintended behavioural response which may 
be explained by the presence of heterogeneity in their study of present bias nudges designed 
to increase retirement saving. Beshears et al. (2016) re-examine Thaler and Benartzi’s (2004) 
classic work on the present bias nudge and their proposal for a present bias retirement saving 
scheme known as ‘Save More Tomorrow.’ The present bias suggests individuals would rather 
receive gains immediately, while putting off losses until sometime in the future (O’Donoghue 
and Rabin, 2015; Laibson, 1994). Believing that people are reluctant to forgo present 
consumption in order to save, but more than willing to put off a ‘loss’23 until the future, Thaler 
and Benartzi (2004) utilise the present bias to nudge workers to commit to saving part of their 
future income. They report that the ‘Save More Tomorrow’ plan significantly increased the 
number of workers saving for their retirement. 
Beshears et al. (2016) also find a positive impact from the present bias nudge. However, while 
they find that many participants pre-committed to saving, they also find that a notable number 
of participants reneged on that commitment. Beshears et al. (2016) argue that this behaviour 
 
20 Of course, other explanations may persist. For instance, those on lower incomes may see the purchase of 
reusable plastic bags, which are often more expensive in the short-term, as a luxury or excessive cost. 
21 Say, a small subsidy on reusable plastic bags which appeals to the economic interests of lower earners. 
22 Say, free public service information on the harms of disposable plastics to the environment. 
23 While not a loss, it can be useful when considering the present bias nudge to describe income forgone in the 
form of savings as a loss of income which could have been used for other activities. 
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was the result of a phenomenon known as information leakage (Sher and McKenzie, 2006; 
McKenzie and Nelson, 2003; Madrian and Shea, 2001).  
Information leakage occurs when decision-makers infer additional information about a choice 
based on the framing and choice architecture of the choice. For example, Sher and McKenzie 
(2006) offer a thought experiment involving two statements, A and B. First, they establish that 
the likelihood of A being used to nudge is contingent on some condition C being met. Second, 
they suggest that the choice architect (the “nudger”) and the decision-maker (the “nudged”) 
have access to some common information.24 Based on these criteria, Sher and McKenzie 
(2006) argue that despite the fact that, at any time both statements could be presented 
(regardless of the actuality of condition C), based on what statement is presented (A or B), the 
decision-maker will always be able to infer some additional information about the choice and 
condition C.25 
Beshears et al. (2016) offer information leakage as an explanation of the failure of some 
workers to fulfil their commitment to begin saving. They argue that the use of the present bias 
unintentionally leaks a message to some participants that saving commitments can always be 
deferred into the future. As such, when the time came to begin saving, this message allowed 
some participants to renege on that commitment.  
The role of heterogeneity in this study is revealed by the fact that only some participants 
reneged, while others didn’t, with Beshears et al. (2016) seemingly unable to find an 
alternative explanation which would explain these observed behaviours. For instance, it may 
have been the case that only low-earners reneged on their commitment. However, even 
allowing this to be true – and rejecting the information leakage explanation – this would still 
 
24 For instance, that saving money is generally considered a good habit, and something to encourage others to 
do. 
25 For instance, if the nudge encourages saving, and the decision-maker knows that generally saving is 
considered a good habit, the decision-maker can infer that the choice architect wants them to save more. 
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be evidence of heterogeneity within the target population resulting in harm and/or undesirable 
behaviour from part of the target population. 
2.2.2.5 Beshears et al. (2015b) 
 
Not to be confused with Beshears et al. (2016), Beshears et al. (2015b) investigate the effect 
of providing individuals with information about the workplace pension saving behaviour of their 
peers, and in turn, nudging individuals using a social norm nudge. They investigate uptake of 
401k programs by employees in a large American manufacturing company and distinguish 
between two groups of employees not contributing at a baseline contribution rate. The first 
group are those who are not enrolled in the scheme at all, and so are said to have a 
contribution rate of 0%.26 The second group are those who are enrolled in the scheme but are 
contributing less than the typical contribution rate for that scheme, which Beshears et al. 
(2015b) state is 6%. This second group are said to be those contributing less than 6%, but 
more than 0%. 
After providing these employees with information about their peers who were meeting the 6% 
baseline contribution rate, Beshears et al. (2015b) find significant increases in saving amongst 
those already enrolled in the program (the  less than 6% group), confirming their hypothesis 
that a social norm nudge can be used to effectively increase employee retirement saving. 
However, for those not enrolled in the scheme (the 0% group), they find the social norm nudge 
produces a significant, negative reaction compared to the behaviour of a control group.27 
Beshears et al. (2015b) write, “discouragement from upward social comparisons seems to 
drive this [negative] reaction” (Beshears et al., 2015b: 1161). 
Beshears et al. (2015b) dub this phenomenon, “oppositional reaction,” (Beshears et al., 2015b: 
1166) and posit that individuals who are highly and negatively divergent from the social norm 
 
26 It is implied that these employees have no retirement provision, though it may be the case that some have 
some private provision. However, it is unlikely all have a private plan. 
27 Beshears et al. (2015b) argue this negativity manifests as a reluctance to even consider saving at all, as these 
employees feel they are already so far behind they cannot possibly catch up to the norm. 
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become discouraged from ever achieving the social norm when provided with this information 
about their divergence, so much so that they give up and begin to exhibit behaviour which is 
counter to expectations,28 in this instance, not enrolling in the saving scheme. 
Once more, the heterogeneity in the target population seems to explain the observed 
phenomenon. As with Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018), by examining the social 
norm nudge with a measure of heterogeneity already established (non-savers vs. low-savers 
vs. baseline-savers), Beshears et al. (2015b) can describe more detailed behavioural 
manifestations. Without a measure of heterogeneity, the social norm nudge appears to be 
highly effective because – across the targeted population – employees are encouraged to 
save more. But by distinguishing between low-savers and non-savers, it can be discerned that 
the welfare effects of the nudge29 may in fact be negative for non-savers; ironically, the group 
most in need of saving. 
2.2.2.6 Haggag and Paci (2014) 
 
Haggag and Paci (2014) investigate the use of the default option nudge on customer tipping 
of taxi drivers in New York City. In this natural experiment, customers who chose to pay using 
a credit card were presented with a payment system offering three (default) tip values. 
Customers could also, should they choose, manually enter any value they wanted as a tip. 
For journeys costing less than $15, the default tip values were set at $2, $3, and $4, while for 
journeys costing more than $15, default tip values were calculated at 20%, 25%, and 30% of 
the journey cost.  
Haggag and Paci (2014) assume that because both customers who pay in cash and those 
that use credit cards regularly tip and have the same freedom to choose how much to tip, 
these groups are comparable.30 They suggest that the default tips shown to credit card 
 
28 Namely, conformity and convergence towards the norm. See Bernheim (1994) and Schultz et al. (2007). 
29 Assuming increased retirement saving does indeed enhance welfare. 
30 There may be some arguments to suggest that these groups aren’t comparable (Prelec and Simester, 2001). 
For instance, a person’s propensity to use cash or card may be indicative of their financial situation. 
Furthermore, the method itself may induce different behaviour. For instance, a credit card payment may be 
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customers will nudge these customers into tipping, and thus credit card customers will tip more 
than their cash equivalents.31 This initially appears to be the case, with credit card customers 
tipping higher values than cash customers. However, Haggag and Paci (2014) also find that, 
as the value of the default tip increases, the likelihood of a customer leaving no tip also 
significantly increases.32 
To explain this phenomenon, Haggag and Paci (2014) introduce Brehm’s (1966) theory of 
reactance. Following Brehm (1966), reactance is said to occur when an individual responds 
to a suggestion or an attempt at coercion by demonstrating behaviour which is opposite to the 
behaviour being desired. Haggag and Paci (2014) speculate that as the recommended value 
of the default tip increases, some customers respond to the prompt to leave a larger-than-
expected tip by tipping significantly less than they would have had they not been prompted at 
all.33 
Initially, such a finding does not seem explicable in terms of heterogeneity. For instance, it 
seems reasonable to believe that all customers have a maximum absolute tip value which the 
default tip could potentially exceed. Under this circumstance, it would be expected that 
participants revise the default down when they come to leave a tip.34 However, even if this 
behaviour could be expected to occur in all people, the value at which this behaviour would 
be exhibited likely varies between people, and so this behaviour could be described in terms 
 
more convenient than a cash payment, and in turn tipping may be more convenient. Equally, cash customers 
may see tipping as a chance to dispose of burdensome change, for example. Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
their study, Haggag and Paci (2014) assume such arguments are not significant. 
31 It is possible that greater tips are wholly attributable to the tendency for people to tip more if they are using 
a credit card (Prelec and Simester, 2001). However. Haggag and Paci (2014) find a significant jump in tip 
amounts, compared to a competitor, at the default tipping amounts, leading them to conclude it is the default, 
and not the medium of payment, which is responsible for the higher tips. 
32 As might be expected, this result is observed significantly more for journeys costing more than $15, as the 
absolute value of these tips can grow to significantly greater values than the set values shown to customers 
with journeys costing less than $15. 
33 While Haggag and Paci (2014) do not discuss it, it is worthwhile to consider whether at some tip values the 
value moves from an insignificant economic cost usually permissible under nudging, to a more significant 
economic cost typically associated with shoving (Oliver, 2015). If so, one might expect people to demonstrate 
more resistance to these interventions, prompting the observed backlash. 
34 Such a response would not necessarily be reactance either, merely seem to be reactance. If one tips a value 
less than a default because they cannot afford the default value or cannot justify it, they are not necessarily 
reacting to the default value, but instead behaving in accordance with their economic beliefs/limitations. 
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of heterogeneity.35 Furthermore, assuming this is not true, the cost of individual journeys is a 
piece of heterogeneity information which the default tips do not respect, and as such an 
unintended behaviour due to this heterogeneity occurs. Finally, accepting the reactance 
hypothesis, reactance may also be heterogeneous within the population (Brehm, 1966). 
2.2.2.7 Schultz et al. (2007) 
 
Schultz et al. (2007) examine the use of a social norm nudge within the household energy 
market. Specifically, they investigate how a social norm nudge could be used to reduce 
household energy use. Schultz et al. (2007) argue that while many social norm interventions 
have been successful, social norms also have a tendency, “[to act] as a magnet for behaviour 
for individuals both above and below the average” (Schultz et al., 2007: 430).36 They suggest 
that this tendency towards the norm means not only will positive results be observed when 
nudging those currently exhibiting undesirable behaviour (high energy usage), but negative 
results may be observed from those currently exhibiting desirable behaviour (low energy 
usage). 
Schultz et al. (2007) investigate this phenomenon by providing households with social norm 
information regarding average household energy use and measuring the energy use of those 
households after the nudge has been implemented. Initially, they find that providing high 
energy use households with information regarding average energy use leads to a significant 
reduction in energy usage by these households. However, Schultz et al. (2007) also find that 
this information produces a significant increase in the energy use of households which were 
previously low energy use households (below the average). Thus, they argue that the 
tendency for social norm nudges to lead decision makers to converge on the norm is correct 
within an energy market context. 
 
35 Which is to say, the value a person is willing to tip, and/or the value they are able to tip, are heterogeneous. 
36 While Schultz et al. (2007) use the word “average,” other authors (Beshears et al., 2015b; Allcott, 2011) 
suggest social norms act more as frames or reference points for decision makers, and thus it may be more 
accurate for Schultz et al. to state the word ‘norm’ rather than ‘average.’ Nevertheless, the principle of the 
statement remains the same. 
40 
 
Schultz et al. (2007) do believe social norms are useful and do produce some positive effects. 
For instance, they report that the reduction in energy use by high energy use households was 
slightly greater in both the short- and the long-term than the comparable increase by low usage 
households. Thus, the net effect of this norm was positive despite the nudge encouraging 
undesirable behaviour from some households. However, by providing all households with the 
same social norm information and not respecting the heterogeneity between households 
(energy usage), the size of the positive benefit produced by the nudge is reduced. 
2.2.3 The Relevancy Principle 
 
As shown, the problem of heterogeneity can be found across a variety of nudges, populations 
and policy goals. In many circumstances, the nature of the heterogeneity which explains the 
undesirable behavioural response also varies, from propensity to spend (Thunström, Gilbert 
and Jones-Ritten, 2018) to the duration of one’s taxi journey (Haggag and Paci, 2014). 
Introducing heterogeneity, therefore, produces an important problem. 
Namely, it is plausible that a great many results could be re-analysed with respect to a large 
number of measures of heterogeneity and some evidence of significant heterogeneous 
differences be found. Eye colour, for instance, would not be expected to influence spending 
behaviour, but given such data, it is possible such a statistical quirk might be found. 
Furthermore, allowing the number of heterogeneity criteria to increase, as Daniels (1952) has 
shown, quickly suggests that a single, one-size-fits-all approach will not adequately satisfy 
anyone within a target population.37 This is to say, without a clear understanding of what 
heterogeneity means within a given context, appeals to heterogeneity could easily be used to 
undermine a great many policies, behavioural or otherwise. 
Sunstein (2012) recognises this problem and makes efforts to limit any discussion of 
heterogeneity within nudges by stipulating that heterogeneity be relevant to the context that 
 
37 This may be a particular issue for social norm nudges (Beshears et al., 2015b; Schultz et al., 2007) that must 
generate a single standard to nudge a population. 
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the nudge is being used. For instance, leaving aside the many anthropological measures such 
as height and body-mass, propensity to spend and duration of one’s taxi journey 
independently appear to reflect relevant heterogeneity in different contexts, namely reducing 
spending and tipping for taxi journeys, respectively. Within the context that heterogeneity is 
measured, propensity to spend and duration of one’s taxi journey are relevant heterogeneity 
data.38 Yet, it is harder to justify the relevance of these examples of heterogeneity information 
when the contexts are switched. Of course, there may be some reason to speculate at 
relevancy, and often choice architects (i.e. nudgers) may not know what information is relevant 
to their nudges until after-the-fact (Yeung, 2017; Rizzo and Whitman, 2009). But, on the whole, 
the use of these measures of heterogeneity is subject to their relevance within the context that 
the nudge is being used. 
Sunstein (2012) offers further arguments to support the relevancy principle. He argues that 
acquiring heterogeneity information could be very costly because of the added level of detail 
which is required. Because of this, collecting any additional heterogeneity information beyond 
what is immediately required39 to personalise the nudge reduces the potential net benefits 
produced by the nudge. Furthermore, because heterogeneity may often take the form of 
personal information and data, Sunstein (2012) argues relevancy is crucial to ensuring the 
privacy of individuals is not infringed. Following this argument, Sunstein (2012) suggests that 
acquiring heterogeneity information that is not relevant to the nudge being implemented 
unnecessarily violates the privacy of the target population and may therefore be unjustified. 
Sunstein (2013a) offers some additional thoughts on the nature of heterogeneity which further 
inform the relevancy principle. Invoking Mill ([1859] 2015), Sunstein (2013a) acknowledges 
that allowing individuals to pursue their own interests can be important to identity formation 
and learning and suggests that a factor in determining the relevancy of heterogeneity should 
be whether ignoring heterogeneity would limit these opportunities. This argument is a 
 
38 See Thunström et al. (2018) and Haggag and Paci (2014). 
39 Which is to say relevant. 
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departure from the arguments of Sunstein (2012) which have generally focused on welfare 
maximisation and cost benefit comparison.40 
Sunstein (2013a) also suggests, though does not explicitly state, that the type of nudge being 
used may also be an important factor when determining if heterogeneity is relevant or not. For 
instance, large variances in apparent discount rates have been found in investigations of the 
present bias and hyperbolic discounting (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002), 
with Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) concluding it is unlikely there is any 
natural or common rate at which people discount future events.41 While the range of possible 
discount rates can vary significantly between people,42 lending greater importance to 
heterogeneity, the range of possible selections when, say, a default option is used is limited 
to the number of options available. In some circumstances, such as workplace pension 
schemes, these options may be as simple as opt-in or opt-out (Service, 2015). Therefore, 
because some nudges have more ability and reason to accommodate heterogeneity, while 
others do not, the nudge itself may be a contingent factor when evaluating the relevancy of 
heterogeneity. 
The relevancy principle, then, reconciles two aspects of heterogeneity. By requiring any 
heterogeneity information to be relevant only to the context that the nudge is being used, it 
leaves choice architects (i.e. nudgers) free to think about heterogeneity in a way that is 
representative of the multiplicity of the concept. But equally, by demanding relevancy, it stops 
this multiplicity being used to overly complicate or unhelpfully undermine policies such as 
nudges. In this sense, the relevancy principle provides a helpful focus to the notion of 
respecting heterogeneity by allowing some irrelevant heterogeneity to not be respected.  
 
40 It could be argued, depending on how one defines it, that enabling identity formation and learning is also 
maximising welfare. However, it is worthwhile here to consider these ideas as distinct to the concept of 
welfare discussed previously. 
41 Sunstein (2013a) uses these as examples in his discussion of heterogeneity, writing, “different discount rates 
can reasonably be chosen by people who are in different life circumstances,” (Sunstein, 2013a: 1870). 
42 And based on the work of Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) would be expected to do so. 
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Further exploration of the relevancy yields additional insights also. Where the costs of 
gathering heterogeneity information are high, relevancy may be a pressing principle. However, 
where the costs are reasonably low, relevancy could seem less significant, until one considers 
the potential privacy implications associated with personal information.43 Obvious costs44 may 
also not be a sufficient metric by which to assess relevancy, as some choices may be 
important to personal development, and thus justify respecting heterogeneity, even if an 
immediate cost-benefit analysis would not support this conclusion.45 Finally, it may be easier 
to integrate heterogeneity into some nudges compared to others, suggesting that nudges may 
also mediate the relevancy principle.46 
2.3 – Personalised Nudging as a Concept 
 
Personalised behavioural nudges are offered as a means of integrating heterogeneity 
information about a target population of decision-makers into behavioural science, and as 
such, ameliorate47 any harms or unintended behaviours which result from impersonal nudging.  
The concept of heterogeneity has already been explored, with Sunstein’s (2012) specification 
of “relevant” (Sunstein, 2012: 4) heterogeneity serving as a reasonable touchstone. This 
section considers the existing literature on personalisation, which can broadly be split into four 
 
43 It is worthwhile to recall that this privacy argument is made by Sunstein (2012), a vocal advocate of cost-
benefit analysis in public policy. However, cost-benefit analysis is potentially difficult and subjective when 
concerned with notions such as individual data privacy. 
44 Such as the costs of collecting heterogeneity information via surveys or developing choice architecture to 
embed heterogeneity. 
45 One such example may be choosing from a restaurant menu. For those seeking to improve their diet, 
nudging diners towards healthy options via menu design may be a worthwhile strategy. However, meal 
selection remains a choice subject to tremendous personal taste, and while it might be costly to gather 
heterogeneity information on diners, and while the welfare-maximising outcome may always be to have a 
salad, there is scope to try and marry a nudge towards generally heathy options with personal taste which may 
diverge somewhat from the healthiest option. 
46 I.e. where it is easier to integrate heterogeneity into a nudge, the ‘burden’ of relevancy may be less so. 
47 The word ameliorate is used here as opposed to, say, eliminate, for two reasons. Firstly, it is unlikely any 
choice architect could reliably determine that all side-effects resulting from heterogeneity have been 
eliminated, simply because it may not be possible to measure all potential side-effects (Dolan and Galizzi, 
2015). For instance, how could we possibly know all the inferences which result from information leakage 
(McKenzie and Nelson, 2003)? Secondly, there is likely a marginal cost to personalisation (Sunstein, 2012), and 
as such, it is likely the cost of any personalisation which would eliminate all the side-effects of heterogeneity 
(theoretically) would quickly exceed any calculable benefits received. For these reasons, it seems more 
appropriate to view personalisation as a reduction of sorts, rather than an antidote. 
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categories, reflecting the key strands of thought between authors and aiding the structure of 
this part of this chapter. These categories are i) personalisation without nudging; ii) 
personalised nudging; iii); empirical investigations of personalised nudges; and iv) 
personalised nudging as an outgrowth of technologies.48 
2.3.1 Personalisation Without Nudging 
 
Personalisation exists as a broad idea external to nudge theory and finds its roots largely in 
the fields of consumer psychology and marketing (Matz et al., 2017; Dubois, Rucker and 
Galinsky, 2016; Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012; Cesario, Higgins and Scholer, 2008; 
Cesario, Grant and Higgins, 2004; Moon, 2002). For this reason, it is first appropriate to 
consider the concept of personalisation as distinct from the sub-concept of personalised 
nudging, before exploring how nudge theory may integrate with personalisation. 
Matz et al. (2017) investigate how social media advertisements for several products, from 
beauty products to mobile game applications, can be targeted to users who exhibit various 
psychological characteristics. Using a repository of Facebook profiles and matching 
personality data, they identified which Facebook ‘likes’ most frequently corresponded to users 
who exhibit highly introverted and highly extroverted personality types. Then, using 
Facebook’s advertiser interface, Matz et al. (2017) targeted individual Facebook users with 
adverts corresponding to their expected personality profile given their Facebook likes.49 
Across several advertisements, Matz et al. (2017) find significantly higher click-through-rates 
(CTR) and purchase rates from those targeted with an advertisement matched to their 
personality profile.50 
 
48 These categories are somewhat arbitrary and have been designed to reflect the key ideas which reoccur 
within the literature. As such, one should not presume no cross-over between these categories, nor should 
one take these categories as definitive. 
49 As Matz et al. (2017) note: “As of now, Facebook advertising does not allow marketers to directly target 
users based on their psychological traits. However, it does so indirectly by offering the possibility to target 
users based on their Facebook likes” (Matz et al., 2017: 12715) 
50 CTR is the ratio of how many users saw the advertisement compared to how many clicked on the 
advertisement, while purchase rate is the ratio of how many users ultimately bought/downloaded the product 
compared to how many clicked on the advertisement. In both instances, a high ratio is desirable. 
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Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky (2016) investigate how matching perceptions of power between 
a communicator and an audience affects the persuasiveness of the communicator. They 
identify several scenarios in which an imbalance of power can easily be seen.51 For instance, 
in a charitable advertisement, Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky (2016) argue the persuasiveness 
of the message will vary depending on whether a senior executive at the charity is delivering 
it, or an individual who benefits from the charity’s work.52 
Like others (Matz et al., 2017; Cesario, Grant and Higgins, 2004; Moon, 2002), they 
hypothesise that audiences are likely to be more persuaded by messages when the power-
level of the communicator matches that of the audience. To test this hypothesis, Dubois, 
Rucker and Galinsky (2016) assigned participants roles as either communicators trying to 
persuade audience members to join a new gym-facility, or audience members listening to the 
communicators. To imbue a sense of power (or lack thereof), all participants were asked to 
complete a sentence scrambling task, with participants trying to form sentences from a 
scrambled set of words. Half of the participants were given a high-power set of words, while 
the other half were given a low-power set of words.53 Following this task, communicators were 
asked to persuade audience members, before the persuasiveness of the communicator was 
measured via audience feedback. 
Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky (2016) find that audience members were significantly more 
persuaded when the communicator’s power-level matched that of the audience, compared to 
when power levels did not match. To check the robustness of the result, they considered 
whether the assignment of roles (communicator and audience member) itself imbued a sense 
of power imbalance but found no significant effect from this consideration. Furthermore, after 
 
51 Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky (2016) define power as, “asymmetric control over valued resources in social 
relationships” (Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky, 2016: 69). 
52 According to Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky (2016), this dynamic can also mean the message itself could be 
varied between actors with different levels of power, with a high-power actor unlikely to appeal to emotional 
‘warm’ sentiments, but very likely to appeal with calculated, factual sentiments. 
53 I.e. sets of words which when combined would make statements imbuing a sense of high or low power. 
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measuring the feelings of power using a manipulation check,54 Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky 
(2016) find that the gap in feeling of power scores between communicators and audience 
members was lower when the power-level matched than when the power-level did not match. 
This would be expected only if the power-level framing task successfully imbued a sense of 
power (either high or low) in participants.55 The implication, from a nudging perspective, may 
be that matching participants with nudges which frame decisions in a manner congruent with 
how the participant makes decisions (i.e. personalisation) may make the nudge more effective. 
Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) investigate a specific model of personality in their study of 
regulatory fit. Cesario, Higgins and Scholer (2008) define regulatory fit as, “a goal-pursuit 
theory that places special emphasis on the relation between the motivational orientation of the 
actor and the manner in which that actor pursues the goal (Cesario, Higgins and Scholer, 
2007: 444-445, original emphasis). Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) relate the concept of 
regulatory fit to several hypothetical campaigns designed to persuade individuals to change 
their behaviour.56 They suggest that if the messaging contained within the campaign57 
matches with the way people are motivated to act, then the messaging would be more effective 
at encouraging action than messaging that doesn’t match because it would have a better 
regulatory fit.58 
Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) frame the language of the campaigns around what they 
dub eager and vigilant language, with the former promoting the potential benefits/gains from 
accepting the subject (changing behaviour/adopting the policy), and the latter promoting the 
potential harms/losses of not accepting the subject (not changing behaviour/adopting the 
 
54 A typical device in surveys used to test whether the participant has become aware of the phenomena being 
examined; do they know they’re being manipulated? As well as Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky (2016), Moon 
(2002) also employs a manipulation check. 
55 Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky (2016) also considered whether the medium of communication (in this case 
oral) had an effect by repeating the study using written persuasion messages. They find similar results in this 
this written study. 
56 These were 1) eating more fruit and vegetables; 2) accepting a new regulatory policy; and 3) acceptance of a 
new after-school program. 
57 Following Cesario, Higgins and Scholer (2008), the manner in which the actor pursues the goal. 
58 While not referred by Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004), this effect might be tied to confirmation bias – the 
tendency to view favourably information which reinforces a person’s pre-held beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). 
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policy).59 After assessing the regulatory fit of participants using a variety of questionnaires,60 
Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) showed participants campaign material written to 
emphasise either eager or vigilant language, before finally measuring how persuaded 
participants felt by the material, such as how likely they were to subsequently eat more fruit.  
They anticipated that those with an eager regulatory fit would be more persuaded by appeals 
to benefits/gains, and those with a vigilant regulatory fit would be more persuaded by appeals 
to harms/losses. As expected, where the framing of the material matched the regulatory fit of 
participants in each study, participants reported being more persuaded by the material. Again, 
the implication, from a nudging perspective, may be that matching the framing (if not the 
mechanism) of a nudge to that of a decision-maker (i.e. personalisation) may render the nudge 
more effective. 
In a similar study to Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004), Moon (2002) investigates message 
persuasion style and individual personality. While Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) 
investigate eager and vigilant personalities, Moon (2002) investigates one of the personality 
types found in the Big Five personality scale,61 specifically extraversion. This personality type 
is selected over the four alternatives because, “not all of the dimensions [of the Big Five] are 
equally salient… The most ‘psychologically prominent’ factor is the dominance and 
submissiveness (“extraversion”) dimension” (Moon, 2002: 314). As this statement suggests, 
Moon (2002) splits the extraversion personality types into the two manifestations of 
extraversion – dominance (high extraversion) and submissiveness (low extraversion) – and 
 
59 It is interesting to note that the language used by Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) follows closely with the 
language used by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their study of risk-taking in the domain of gains and losses. 
Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) seem aware of the work of Kahneman and Tversky, citing their 1973 paper 
on the availability of information, but do not establish a connection between the use of gain/loss framing in 
regulatory fit and the use of the same framing in what would later develop to be the loss aversion nudge. Thus, 
it may be unreasonable to conclude that Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) adopt the gain/loss framing 
because of the behavioural phenomena previously identified regarding this framing. However, the closeness of 
these techniques may be a worthwhile observation. 
60 Cesario, Grant and Higgins (2004) measured regulatory fit differently depending on the context of the study. 
This is because a person’s motivations about, say, diet, may be very different to their motivations about, say, 
regulation. 
61 A commonly used personality scale that splits human personality into five personality types. 
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investigates the persuasiveness of messages which match these personality styles. Moon 
(2002) conducted two studies, each of which involved an automated computer program 
randomly showing participants messages framed either with dominant language, or 
submissive language.62 Prior to conducting either study, Moon (2002) collected personality 
data from participants to measure their individual extraversion. 
In the first study, participants were asked to rank a set of cars from best to worst using 
whatever criteria the participant saw fit to use. The ranking was then inputted into a computer 
program which was pre-programmed to always offer a slightly different ranking of the cars.63 
Therefore, regardless of how participants ranked the cars, the computer would always offer 
an alternative ranking that was identically transformed across participants. Finally, the 
computer would then provide the participant with messages explaining why it had ranked the 
cars differently, with either dominant or submissive language used throughout the messages.64 
After being given some time to process the messages, participants were then invited to re-
rank the cars any way they wanted. 
In the second study, participants were shown various entertainment content, such as news 
headlines, music, cartoon strips and health tips. While all participants were shown the same 
content, prior to being shown, some participants received a framing message using dominant 
language, and others received a message using submissive language. After processing the 
content, participants were then asked to evaluate each piece of content.65 
 
62 Moon (2002) writes, “In the dominant message condition, all of the messages contained strong language 
consisting of assertions and commands. This manipulation was consistent with the theoretical definition of 
dominance as being the tendency to command and direct others to take certain actions. Conversely, in the 
submissive message condition, all of the messages contained weaker language consisting of questions and 
suggestions” (Moon, 2002: 316). 
63 For instance, whatever car the participant ranked in the 4th position, the computer would always rank as the 
1st position. 
64 These messages would contain information about the cars which the participant had been made aware of. 
However, the messages would use this information in a conversational style, rather than intermating to the 
participant that they had used the wrong criteria to rank the cars. For instance, a typical dominant message 
was, “The Dodge Neon is definitely ranked too low,” but this would then be followed with the information, 
“The Neon is one of the most affordable cars on the road” (Moon, 2002: 316). 




Consistent with the findings of other authors reviewed here, Moon (2002) finds significant 
evidence of more effective outcomes when a participant’s personality type matches the 
framing of the message. In the first study, those whose personality type matched the framing 
of the message were significantly more likely to be persuaded by the messages and 
subsequently change their ranking to match that of the computer, compared to those whose 
personality type didn’t match the messaging. Similarly, in the second study, those whose 
personality type matched the messaging were significantly more approving of the various 
entertainment content shown to them, compared to those whose personality type did not 
match the messaging. Moon (2002), therefore, concludes, “the matching of message style to 
the personality style of the recipient increases the effectiveness of messages” (Moon, 2002: 
322). 
So far, all the reviewed work has analysed individual personality using a dichotomous variable. 
For instance, dominance and submissiveness (Moon, 2002) or eagerness and vigilance 
(Cesario, Grant and Higgins, 2004). Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) argue this 
approach means much of the personalisation literature has failed to “systematically [relate 
psychological characteristics] to a comprehensive model of personality traits” (Hirsh, Kang 
and Bodenhausen, 2012: 578).66 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) attempt to “systematically [relate psychological 
characteristics] to a comprehensive model of personality traits” in their study of personalised 
advertisements and the so-called ‘Big Five’ personality aspect scale, expanding on the work 
of Moon (2002) who only considers one aspect of the ‘Big Five.’ They showed participants one 
of five fictional advertisements for a mobile phone. The advertisement slogan was varied in 
each advert so that one slogan corresponded to each of the five personality types.67 After 
 
66 Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) were writing prior to the work of Matz et al. (2017), and so are not 
talking directly to the latter’s work, but to the general tendency of the personalisation literature which Matz et 
al. (2017) later continue. As such, the criticism remains valid. 
67 For the reader’s immediate benefit, these are: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, 
and Openness. An example slogan included – for extraversion – “with XPhone, you’ll always be where the 
excitement is” (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012). 
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randomly showing participants these five advertisements, participants were then asked to 
complete the Big Five personality aspect scale. 
Across all five advertisements, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) find statistically 
significantly higher product approval ratings for those whose personality trait matched the 
personality type embedded within the advertisement slogan compared to those who did not. 
Thus, the conclusion of Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) is similar to that of Moon (2002), 
namely that “tailoring messages to match recipients’ personality characteristics appears to be 
a promising technique” (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012: 581). 
Following Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), Egelman and Peer (2015) investigate the 
‘Big Five’ personality scale in their study of privacy and security systems. Egelman and Peer 
(2015) approach this subject from a slightly different perspective to previous literature. Instead 
of matching messages such as advertisements to personality types, they investigate the 
predictive power of previously used personality scales (notably the ‘Big Five’ personality scale) 
to critique whether such scales are best placed to capture heterogeneity in target populations. 
Egelman and Peer (2015) use the same ‘Big Five’ scale used by Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen (2012)68 and administer a privacy attitude scale69 to participants to measure 
their desire for privacy.70 Egelman and Peer (2015) then test how successfully the ‘Big Five’ 
personality types predict the desire for privacy of participants. Across all five personality types, 
 
68 Several scales which proport to capture the Big Five personality types exist, with Egelman and Peer (2015) 
and Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) using the ten-item personality index (TIPI), a scale that measures 
each personality type using two questions. 
69 Specifically, Egelman and Peer (2015) use four privacy scales, namely the Strahan-Gerbasi version of the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS), the Affirmative Admissions Rate (AAR) scale, the privacy 
concerns scale (PCS) and the Internet Users Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) scale. 
70 Desire for privacy is inferred from two of the privacy scales examined (SDS and AAR). The SDS measures the 
propensity for a person to reveal information about themselves, and Egelman and Peer (2015) argue a person 
who demonstrates a low propensity to reveal their information greatly desires privacy (and vice versa). The 
AAR measures peoples’ willingness to admit behaving immorally or unethically, and again Egelman and Peer 




they conclude the ‘Big Five’ personality scale is only a weak predictor of privacy behaviour, 
with no individual personality type being a consistent predictor.71 
Egelman and Peer (2015) therefore argue that the ‘Big Five’ scale may be a useful scale in 
broad contexts but is relatively weaker when used in very specific contexts, such as privacy 
attitudes. They suggest it may be more effective to utilise specific personality or psychometric 
scales which capture personality traits which can be reasonably expected to relate to the 
specific context.  
In a second experiment, Egelman and Peer (2015) evaluate the predictive power of several 
specific psychometric scales and contrast these results with the results found for the ‘Big Five’ 
personality types. They examine three scales: the General Decision Making Style (GMDS) 
scale, which captures ways of thinking specifically about decision-making; the Need for 
Cognition (NFC) scale, which captures propensity for cognitive tasks; and the Domain Specific 
Risk Attitude (DoSpeRT) scale, with measures risk attitudes. They continue to measure 
privacy attitudes using the PCS and IUIPC scale, though do not use inferential privacy scales 
such as the SDS or AAR.72 
Supporting their hypothesis, Egelman and Peer (2015) find that these more specific 
psychometric scales are significantly better predictors of attitudes towards privacy than the 
more general ‘Big Five’ personality scale. They then enter into a discussion about the 
implications of these findings and offer two broad conclusions. Firstly, that the findings of 
previous work may be enhanced by embracing a context-specific measure of individual 
personality.73 Secondly, building from this, Egelman and Peer (2015) speculate on how the 
effectiveness of decision-making tools such as nudges and choice architecture could be 
 
71 The best performing personality type was found to be openness, followed by conscientiousness, while all 
others failed to demonstrate predictive power. 
72 Egelman and Peer (2015) provide no explanation for this decision. 
73 For instance, while Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) report significant results in their work matching 
advertisements with personality types in the ‘Big Five,’ they also describe the effect size of these results as, 
“modest” (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012: 580). The findings of Egelman and Peer (2015) may be one 
explanation of this modesty. 
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similarly enhanced by embracing, “a more ‘targeted’ nudging approach” (Egelman and Peer, 
2015).74 Drawing a parallel which is similar to the heterogeneity discussion found within the 
nudge literature, Egelman and Peer (2015) argue that – like they have shown in the 
personalisation literature – more personalised nudge strategies could lead to more effective 
nudges. 
In a very recent study which seeks to tie nudging and behavioural interventions into this 
literature, Lipman (forthcoming) investigates small financial incentives and employee-health 
outcomes. Lipman (forthcoming) tasks participants with selecting one of four financial 
incentive schemes, each of which is expected to deliver the same reward, but in a different 
way.75 Participants are told the incentive is be used by their employer to encourage them to 
improve their health by part-taking in exercise. Participants, however, are free to choose how 
they would like to be compensated using any criteria they see fit. 
This freedom to crucial to Lipman’s (forthcoming) investigation. Following their selections, 
participants are then asked to complete several behavioural questions designed to measure 
behavioural characteristics such as their present bias and their risk preferences. Lipman 
(forthcoming) argues that a significant concentration of behavioural characteristics within a 
given incentive group76 would suggest that people who exhibit the concentrated characteristic 
would be best nudged using that given incentive. However, contrary to expectations, Lipman 
(forthcoming) finds no significant difference in the behavioural make-up of any of the groups, 
leading Lipman (forthcoming) to conclude that, while the behavioural theory surrounding 
personalisation and heterogeneity would suggest individual differences should matter, the 
empirical evidence suggests this is not the case. 
 
74 One might speculate that this conclusion relates to the notion of relevancy and heterogeneity. Following 
Egelman and Peer (2015), less targeted (i.e. more general) measures of personality capture less relevant 
heterogeneity, owing to their relatively lower predictive power. 
75 For instance, a lump-sum reward versus a staggered pay-out. 




Lipman’s (forthcoming) result appears to be an exception. Overall, there is compelling 
evidence that matching message frames with various individual criteria (i.e. personalisation) 
produces more effective messages.77 Variation in these studies can be found. For instance, 
some authors investigate power dynamics (Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky, 2016) or 
dominance/submissiveness (Moon, 2002), while others investigate goal-setting (Cesario, 
Grant and Higgins, 2004) and introversion/extraversion (Matz et al., 2017). Yet, across these 
variations – and across the different contexts in which each of these authors conduct their 
research – compelling evidence of the effects of personalisation persists.78 
While not contradicting this conclusion, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) stand out as an 
example of personalisation which goes beyond a dichotomous measure of individual 
personality. To an extent, this may not be surprising; previous authors – most notably Moon 
(2002) – have investigated specific individual personality types captured by the Big Five 
personality scale examined by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012). Thus, if various studies 
find these personality types – when examined individually – demonstrate the potential of 
personalisation, then an examination of all five personality types is likely to produce a similar 
result.  
This is not to downplay the significance of the work of Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012); 
with perhaps the exception of Matz et al. (2017), there is little clear reason beyond particular 
intellectual curiosity to investigate some personality types and ignore others. While the Big 
Five personality scale may lack some detail and be inferior – in terms of specificity – to more 
specific measures of personality (Egelman and Peer, 2015), Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012) can still attest to examining a reasonably broad and comprehensive range of 
personality types. In this sense, the corroborating evidence provided by Hirsh, Kang and 
 
77 As measured using several criteria. 
78 The term personalisation may imply these authors were intentionally matching participants to messages 
which appealed to their personality types, which in several instances (Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky, 2016; 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012; Cesario, Grant and Higgins, 2004; Moon, 2002)  was not the case. The use 
of the term personalisation in this instance is simply meant to represent the idea of matching message frames 
with personality types. 
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Bodenhausen (2012) when personalisation is examined across a range of personality types 
strengthens the legitimacy of contemporary results stemming from analyses utilising more 
specific personality classifications. 
In many ways, rather than criticising Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), Egelman and Peer 
(2015) build from their work to provide additional valuable insights. While acknowledging that 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) are right to investigate a complete range of personality 
types, Egelman and Peer (2015) demonstrate that the personality types investigated should 
be reasonably related to the context in which the investigation is being conducted.79 Further, 
Egelman and Peer (2015) demonstrate the benefits of utilising more detailed measures of 
personality. Finally, Egelman and Peer (2015) begin to relate the ideas of personality and 
message-matching within the personalisation literature to concepts such as heterogeneity and 
choice architecture within the nudge literature. 
2.3.2 Personalised Nudging 
 
While Egelman and Peer (2015) establish a relationship between nudges and personalisation, 
they are neither the first to make such a proposition (Sunstein, 2012, 2013a; Thaler and 
Tucker, 2013; Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014) nor do they present an especially detailed analysis 
of what might be called a theory of personalised nudging. At best, they reformulate the problem 
of heterogeneity previously identified in the nudge literature as an opportunity, suggesting, 
“nudges should be tested on various different populations, and once a nudge is revealed to 
have higher potency among specific populations, a more ‘targeted’ nudging approach could 
be employed, and [would be] expected to produce better results” (Egelman and Peer, 2015). 
This section considers additional theories of personalised nudging. 
 
79 A perspective reminiscent of the relevancy principle. 
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Perhaps the most prominent exploration of the concept of personalised nudging is found in 
Sunstein’s (2012)80 discussion of personalised default options.81 Sunstein (2012) contrasts the 
advantages and disadvantages of active choices, impersonal default options, and 
personalised default options. In doing so, he returns to the problem of heterogeneity. On the 
one hand, an active choice can resolve the heterogeneity problem by requiring each individual 
to actively choose whatever option they want, removing any need for pre-selection criteria.82 
On the other hand, Sunstein (2012) argues active choices can be burdensome,83 with some 
people unwilling or unable to make an active decision in a variety of circumstances.84 
Sunstein’s (2012) initial conclusion is that often the costs of not respecting heterogeneity and 
removing some active choices are less than the costs of respecting heterogeneity and 
mandating active choices.85 Following an implicitly utilitarian approach (Sætra, 2019; Itai, 
Inoue and Kodama, 2016), Sunstein (2012) concludes that the use of impersonal default 
options is frequently desirable. 
However, Sunstein (2012) argues that active choosing need not be the only way to resolve 
the problem of heterogeneity. He posits that collecting information about individuals would 
provide choice architects with enough of an understanding of the heterogeneity in the 
population to create personalised default options. These personalised default options would, 
“offer most (not all)86 of the advantages of active choosing without the disadvantages” 
 
80 Sunstein (2013a) also considers personalisation and nudging, but largely reiterates the arguments made in 
Sunstein (2012) or focuses on ideas surrounding the problem of heterogeneity rather than personalisation. 
81 The default option nudge is a common behavioural nudge. The default option is said to be the option a 
person receives if they do nothing. Behavioural economists have shown that changing the option which is set 
as the default option can have a significant impact of the outcome which is selected (Brown and Krishna, 2004; 
Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Madrian and Shea, 2001). 
82 Which is to say, because no nudge is being used, no assumptions which may ignore the heterogeneity in the 
population are being made. 
83 Sunstein (2012) writes, “if active choices were required in all contexts, people would quickly be 
overwhelmed” (Sunstein, 2012: 1). 
84 For instance, it may be hard for many people to choose from several dozen options available, each with a 
dozen specifications that need to be negotiated. This is often the case when selecting from various financial 
products (Sunstein, 2012). 
85 The term ‘cost’ is often used by Sunstein (2012) as a catch all term for what alternatively may be dubbed 
welfare or utility. 
86 Sunstein (2012) argues that personalised default options, “might be burdensome and expensive and might 
also raise some serious questions about privacy” (Sunstein, 2012: 1). 
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(Sunstein, 2012: 1) by respecting heterogeneity within the population while retaining the 
relative ease of a default option. Sunstein (2012) does not go so far as to argue personalised 
default options are always superior to either active choosing or impersonal defaults, choosing 
to ground his assessment firmly in terms of costs versus benefits. For instance, Sunstein 
(2012) invokes his relevancy principle, arguing, “when the relevant group is not diverse, and 
when an impersonal default rule will satisfy the informed members of that group, it is generally 
most sensible to select that default rule” (Sunstein, 2012: 41).87 Yet Sunstein (2012) is also of 
the belief that personalised default options have significant advantages and potential, writing, 
“personalized default rules are the wave of the future. We should expect to see a significant 
increase in personalization as greater information becomes available about the informed 
choices of diverse people” (Sunstein, 2012: 41).88 
However, Sunstein (2012) is less forthcoming about the practicalities of personalised nudging. 
On the question of heterogeneity, he establishes the important idea of relevancy which has 
already been discussed. He also argues that the form heterogeneity information takes, and 
the means of personalising defaults, could vary significantly. For instance, Sunstein (2012) 
argues pension schemes could be personalised using only demographic information,89 but 
also recognises that tracking technologies could provide significantly more information to 
choice architects (i.e. nudgers), who in turn may be able implement more sophisticated 
personalised defaults.90 Thus, heterogeneity information could be quite basic (e.g. 
demographic information) or complex (e.g. individual health data), with personalisation also 
being quite basic (e.g. setting pension contribution rates based on age) or complex (e.g. 
 
87 As Sunstein (2013a) quips, “with respect to one-size-fits-all approaches, universal scepticism is itself a one-
size-fits-all approach, and a bad one” (Sunstein, 2013a: 1870). 
88 Sunstein (2012) broadly proposes a rule of thumb regarding active choices, impersonal defaults and 
personalised defaults where cost is not an issue. If heterogeneity is not significant, an impersonal default is 
best. However, where heterogeneity is an issue and it is possible to personalise the default, personalisation 
should be adopted. However, where it may not be possible to personalise, or where privacy is of concern, an 
active choice is the best option. 
89 What Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) call “crude” (Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014: 1465) personalised defaults. 
90 See Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke (2016) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) on digital nudges, 




adjusting personalised defaults throughout the day in accordance with bodily rhythms). Yet, 
these discussions lack significant detail, and wander rather into the realm of speculation, when 
compared to the empirical personalisation research examined previously, notably Matz et al. 
(2017) and Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012).91 
It is also important to note that Sunstein’s (2012) analysis does not extend beyond 
personalising the default option nudge and remains grounded largely in the dynamics of 
default options versus active choices. Thus, Sunstein’s (2012) work contributes to the 
literature regarding personalised nudging, but does not itself cover a broad program of 
personalised nudging.92 
A similar criticism could be levied at the work of Porat and Strahilevitz (2014), who build from 
Sunstein’s (2012) work to conceptualise how personalised default rules might be incorporated 
into contract law.93 Further, it is less clear if Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) seek to contribute to 
a personalised nudging programme, or whether their contribution is largely one which adopts 
a legal perspective on default rules, which happen to share a platform with behavioural 
science.94 Regardless, Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) do provide some additional insights worth 
considering. 
Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) consider how individuals could be incentivised to disclose 
heterogeneity information, potentially resolving the problems of cost and privacy violation 
associated with heterogeneity outlined by Sunstein (2012). In their discussion of contract law, 
they consider the idea of a minoritarian or penalty default rule.95 Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) 
explain, “the penalty default rule is not aimed at mimicking the contractual term most parties 
 
91 While Sunstein (2012) may be excused as these works are relatively recent, the concept of matching 
personality traits and psychometrics with messages has been shown to be quite established far before 2012. 
92 Though certain discussions such as privacy concerns and data access do extend beyond personalised default 
options. See Thaler and Tucker (2013) and Yeung (2017). Also see Sunstein (2013a), who is more willing to 
discuss personalised nudges as a general concept, albeit rather briefly. 
93 Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) do not disguise the influence Sunstein’s work has had on their own thinking, 
writing, “We agree wholeheartedly, and regard his [Sunstein’s] contribution to the literature as significant” 
(Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014: 1452) 
94 The latter is likely the case. 
95 See Ayres and Gertner (1989) 
58 
 
prefer but instead at penalizing the party who has private information that the other party does 
not have. Such a penalty is designed to incentivize the party with private information to reveal 
that information to the party without it” (Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014: 1428). To explain this 
idea further, Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) consider the legal concept of foreseeable losses, 
and argue that because an aggrieved party stands to lose out by not making unforeseeable 
losses foreseeable,96 they are therefore incentivised to disclose all possible losses to the other 
party. 
Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) relate this idea to personalisation. They argue that individuals 
may be incentivised to disclose information about themselves, because if they don’t, they 
would be subjected to an impersonal default rule which may produce a less equitable outcome 
than a personalised default rule.97 There is a potentially significant implication arising from this 
proposal. The cost of individual privacy itself is likely to be heterogeneous (Barton and Grüne-
Yanoff, 2015).98 Therefore, even when choice architects believe a personalised nudge will 
confer significant welfare benefits onto an individual, a given individual may still believe their 
privacy to be more valuable than these benefits. As Porat and Strahilevitz’s (2014) argument 
emphasises the disincentives of impersonal defaults, the cost of privacy as determined by the 
choice architect is revealed.99 Therefore, individuals have more information from which to 
decide whether or not to reveal information about themselves.100  
Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) also offer some commentary on heterogeneity information itself. 
Not unlike others (Sunstein, 2012, 2013a; Thaler and Tucker, 2013; Yeung, 2017), Porat and 
Strahilevitz (2014) argue that the growth in data and digital technologies such as big data will 
propel the growth of personalised default options and will empower choice architects (i.e. 
 
96 Insofar as unforeseeable losses for one party are sometimes foreseeable to the other party. 
97 It is likely this altered framing may induce a different behavioural response to the decision to disclose private 
information. For some emerging research on how psychology and behavioural economics can be incorporated 
into models of privacy and disclosure, see Dinev, McConnell and Smith (2015). 
98 I.e. different people may attach different values to their individual privacy. 
99 I.e., the cost of privacy is equal to or less than the cost of impersonal defaults. 
100 This idea may follow the mechanism of information leakage described by McKenzie and Nelson (2003) and 
Sher and McKenzie (2006). 
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nudgers) relative to the decision-maker (i.e. the nudged). However, much like Sunstein (2012, 
2013a), Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) also argue that personalisation can be achieved without 
the use technologies such as big data.101 They argue that personalisation requires 
heterogeneity information, but as with Sunstein (2012), Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) 
acknowledge that basic heterogeneity information such as age or gender could be used to 
create personalised default options.102 They call these basic personalised defaults “crude” 
personalised defaults (Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014: 1465), and distinguish crude 
personalisation from what might be called sophisticated personalisation strategies which 
utilise tracking software (Yeung, 2017), dynamic choice architecture (Weinnman, Schneider 
and vom Brocke, 2016; Benartzi, 2017; Yeung, 2017; Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019) and 
big data technologies (Thaler and Tucker, 2013; Yeung, 2017).103 This topic is returned to in 
part 2.3.4. 
In a further, recent contribution to the personalised nudging discussion, Ruggeri et al. 
(forthcoming) argue personalised nudging may be well suited to the world of medicine. 
Following the arguments advanced by Sunstein (2012), Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) argue that 
despite some nudges and other behavioural interventions being effective overall, often those 
who exhibit heterogeneous preferences are not considered by policymakers. In the case of 
medical care, they suggest this may be impermissible, and thus the use of personalisation 
may be justified simply by consideration that everyone ought to receive appropriate medical 
care.104 
 
101 A distinction Yeung (2017) does not make in her discussion of nudges and big data. 
102 See Butt et al. (2018), for instance. 
103 Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) do not suggest that sophisticated personalised nudges must utilise all of these 
technologies. Instead, crude personalisation is defined as the absence of these technologies. See, for instance, 
Butt et al. (2018), who find managers often rely on heterogeneity information which is immediately and easily 
available to them. 
104 This perspective contributes another aspect of the relevancy principle, one that supposes even when the 
costs of personalisation may outweigh the benefits, the social or contextual background of the personalisation 
may justify the expense. On the one hand, this may challenge Sunstein’s (2012) cost/benefit perspective in 
regard to the relevancy principle. On the other, it may be argued that the social or contextual background can 




Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) further argue medicine represents a unique domain for 
personalised nudging, as a person’s medical condition and thus required treatment is almost 
certainly different to that of other people. The importance of frequent check-ups, regularly 
taking medication, and diet can all be expected to be highly specific activities which could 
benefit from the use of personalised behavioural interventions. 
2.3.3 Empirical Investigations of Personalised Nudges 
 
It may be helpful to try and reconcile some of the strategies employed in the broad 
personalisation literature with the strategies outlined by those who have explicitly considered 
personalised nudges. Two key distinctions emerge between the two. Firstly, while the 
personalisation literature has focused on personality and psychometrics,105 conceptual ideas 
surrounding personalised nudging – perhaps leaving aside Egelman and Peer (2015) – have 
broadly discussed crude criteria such as demographics, and sophisticated criteria arising from 
the spread of information technologies. As such, while both literatures consider how 
personalisation might manifest, each demonstrates divergent thought concerning how to 
measure heterogeneity. 
Secondly, while authors within the personalisation literature have examined a broad range of 
contexts, all focus on the question of how the framing of the messages can be altered to match 
individual characteristics. By contrast, discussions of personalised nudges have thus far 
remained grounded within the default option nudge. Where there has been divergence from 
this ground, it has largely benefited a discussion other than personalised nudging,106 or has 
mimicked but not necessarily synthesised the ideas raised in the personalisation literature.107 
 
105 As Egelman and Peer (2015) attest, personality captures how one thinks broadly, while psychometrics 
captures more specific ways of thinking. 
106 For instance, Sunstein’s (2013a) consideration of discount rates in his discussion of heterogeneity. 
107 For instance, Thaler and Tucker (2013) and Busch (2017) consider personalised information disclosure, 
which very much borrows from the language of behavioural science and nudging, but insofar as it could be 
compared to the idea of personalising messaging frames found in the personalisation literature, the latter is 
far more developed conceptually and practically than the former. 
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While the work of Peer et al. (2019) is primarily empirical, and so offers important practical 
insights into personalised nudging, Peer et al. (2019) also offer (quite modestly) an important 
conceptual contribution to the idea of personalised nudging which may be attributed to a 
marriage between the idea of personalising framing in the personalisation literature, and the 
idea of personalising options/choices/outcomes in the personalised nudge literature. Peer et 
al. (2019) write,  
“it is possible that a stronger outcome could be achieved if existing nudges, which have 
already been shown to work on average, are deliberately given only to the specific 
groups of individuals on which they are expected, ex ante, to yield a positive effect, 
while other groups would receive different nudges or be treated differently.108 In other 
words, personalization could be more effective if it is directed at selecting a nudge from 
a pool of existing nudges. In this we distinguish between personalization of a certain 
nudge vs. personalizing the selection of the nudge” (Peer et al., 2019: 4, original 
emphasis).109 
Peer et al. (2019) look to test this latter type of personalised nudging using techniques 
developed in the personalisation literature.110 They conduct two related studies. In the first 
 
108 Peer et al. (2019) may be eluding to the concept of shielding, where a person who would be harmed by a 
nudge is shielded from the nudge. For instance, one response to the heterogeneity identified by Thunström, 
Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) might be to shield tightwads from the nudge entirely, as they already save 
enough and do not need any further encouragement to save. However, shielding may be a contentious issue. 
It may be reconciled into personalised nudging as a form of nudge selection (i.e. the range of nudges which 
could be used in any given context presumably includes the option to not nudge). However, Thaler and 
Sunstein (2003, 2008) argue some form of choice architecture is inevitable, and so it is potentially spurious to 
believe a person could be shielded from any influencing choice architecture. Equally, Hansen (2016) wonders, 
though offers no definitive conclusion, whether phenomena such as unintentional nudging, or intentionally 
not nudging, can actually be considered as part of nudge theory. Insofar as this remains a (pedantic but) 
unanswered question, shielding may be problematic. See Chapter 3 for more. 
109 To an extent, Beshears et al. (2015a) have also considered this rationale by arguing that some people may 
be predisposed to being nudged, while others may be more resistant. Furthermore, Benartzi (2017), Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) and Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) all offer commentary which reflects the idea given by 
Peer et al. (2019). 
110 Peer et al. (2019) claim theirs is the first of its kind, writing, “‘nudge personalisation’ has been advocated 
before, but its actual potency and feasibility has never been systematically investigated” (Peer et al., 2019: 1). 
To this author’s knowledge, this statement is not false, though might be adjusted slightly, as nudge innovations 
which respond to heterogeneity have been tested prior to the work of Peer et al. (2019) – notably Beshears et 
al. (2016) – but never explicitly branded as personalised nudging. 
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study, participants are tasked with creating strong yet memorable passwords.111 Building from 
the work of Egelman and Peer (2015), Peer et al. (2019) first ask participants to complete 
several psychometric tests before starting the password setting task.112 Upon beginning the 
task, participants were randomly shown one of five nudges designed to improve the strength 
of passwords. There was also a control group.113 
Peer et al. (2019) find significant evidence of interaction between several psychometric traits 
and the nudges, and argue this evidence supports their hypothesis that it may be possible to 
personalise the selection of the nudge itself. It is somewhat questionable how much of a result 
this is. For instance, Peer et al. (2019) have no a priori hypotheses about which psychometric 
traits would interact with which nudge strategies, and so do not and cannot test these 
hypotheses. Furthermore, they do not report comparisons between the nudge groups and the 
control group, so it remains unclear whether these nudges are effective when administered 
impersonally. Nevertheless, beyond being an overzealous statement, the results found by 
Peer et al. (2019) in their first study are of significance in their second study. 
In their second study, Peer et al. (2019) use the findings from the first study to predict whether 
a specific nudge strategy will be more or less effective when used in conjunction with a given 
psychometric trait. By matching nudges with psychometrics with the goal of maximising the 
strength of participant-created passwords, they argue they are personalising the selection of 
the nudge. Peer et al. (2019) find that personalising the selection of the nudge leads 
participants to create significantly stronger passwords than impersonal nudging, or not 
 
111 If passwords were not memorable, participants would be able to very quickly create a strong password by 
randomly selecting characters. 
112 These are the General Decision-Making Style, Need for Cognition and Consideration for Future scales, as 
well as a numeracy scale. See Egelman and Peer (2015). 
113 On this, Peer et al. (2019) are less clear. As a working paper, developing findings may be forgiven, but 
neither the original draft discussed here (Peer et al., 2019) nor the most recent draft (Peer et al., 2020) 
considered in this thesis report substantial findings in relation to this control group. The likely purpose of the 
control group is to check whether nudges used impersonally are still effective. As discussed in Chapter 8, this is 
likely done but is not reported. One can infer Peer et al. (2019) find these nudges to be effective even when 




nudging at all.114 This result has two immediate consequences. Firstly, Peer et al. (2019) seem 
to demonstrate the benefits of personalised nudging only previously speculated and do so by 
introducing a new methodological approach – at least relative to previous work. Secondly, 
they provide strong evidence that several nudges can be involved in personalisation, and that 
personalising outcomes or choices may not be the only way of personalising nudges. 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) provide a comparable study. While more basic, 
methodologically speaking, than Peer et al. (2019), Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) follow a 
similar rationale of matching “cognitive styles” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 4395) to 
nudge strategies. In this sense, they seem to share the same view as Peer et al. (2019) that 
the selection of the nudge can be personalised. For instance, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
investigate how the layout of websites can be altered to improve the transmission of disclosure 
information, ultimately to encourage users to remove privacy restrictions. Thus, Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) seem to be following the strategy used by Peer et al. (2019) of altering 
the type of nudge embedded within an advice message shown to users. This may, however, 
only be speculation regarding the intentions of Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019). As they write, 
“it is important to note that the presentation of choices is personalised, not the choice 
themselves”115 (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 4397), which may be interpreted in support 
of personalisation via the selection of the nudge,116 or may be interpreted as supporting an 
 
114 Peer et al. (2019) only personalise using two of the five nudges they originally examined. This is explained in 
what might be called the mapping procedure. The rationale for this procedure is as follows: multiple 
psychometric traits may predict a given nudge will be effective. To maximise effectiveness, it is necessary to 
determine which psychometric trait should be prioritised. This requires some form of mapping procedure, i.e. 
a way of determining the relative strength of prediction between psychometric traits. Peer et al. (2019) use a 
Monte Carlo simulation for their mapping procedure, and as a result, argue only two of the five nudges should 
be included in the second study. The nature of the simulation, or how this result arises, is not explained. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
115 For some further context, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) argue that nudging must not reduce freedom of 
choice (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), and therefore personalising choices would necessarily reduce freedom of 
choice. Therefore, personalised nudging must definitionally not personalise choices. The syllogism here seems 
robust, but robust only when taken on a disputable understanding of nudges. For instance, Sunstein (2012) 
seems to suggest that personalising choices means using heterogeneity information to select a personalised 
choice from an existing range of options, or to expand the range of options to respect heterogeneity. Thus, in 
this instance, no freedom of choice is lost. 
116 Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) explicitly state that the choices themselves are not personalised, which 
would seem antagonistic to the idea of personalising outcomes/choices. 
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idea such as personalised default options.117 As such, it seems more worthwhile to evaluate 
the actual procedure of investigation, rather than to speculate at the ideas of Schöning, Matt 
and Hess (2019). 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) investigate personalised nudging regarding privacy 
disclosure using two nudges and three “cognitive styles” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 
4395). They argue that the advent of digital technologies and the online space allow nudging 
to easily be embedded into the user interface (UI) of many websites. This medium also 
facilitates the use of several different communication styles, including text-based and image-
based messaging. Thus, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) argue choice architects (i.e. 
nudgers) can readily nudge users by altering the UI.118 They, therefore, define two nudges for 
use in their study: a visual nudge utilising imagery, and a verbal nudge utilising language. 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) asked participants to complete a series of questions to 
determine whether their cognitive style was either verbal or visual, before randomly assigning 
participants to either a verbal or visual UI nudge. As such, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
follow the method of several authors in the personalisation literature119 who measure 
personality using a dichotomous variable before comparing groups whose cognitive styles 
match the message (or nudge) with those who do not match. Unlike the personalisation 
literature, however – and indeed unlike Peer et al. (2019) – Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
measure the effectiveness of the nudge in several different ways. First, they give participants 
the option to disclosure private information about themselves after viewing the verbal/visual 
nudge explaining how any disclosed material would be used.120 They hypothesise that those 
whose cognitive style matched the nudge would be more willing to reveal private information 
compared to those whose style didn’t match. Secondly, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
measured how much participants trusted the verbal/visual nudge, hypothesising that trust 
 
117 For instance, changing which option is presented as the default option could very reasonably be described 
as, “[personalising] the presentation of choices.” 
118 Also see Benartzi (2017). 
119 See part 2.3.1. 
120 Rather than simply recording willingness to disclose. 
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would be higher in the matching group. They also measured perceptions of privacy and risk, 
and respectively hypothesised that matching individuals would be less concerned about 
privacy and would see less risk in revealing private information. 
Unlike previous studies,121 Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) report mixed evidence that 
personalisation is effective. When evaluating how willing matched participants were to 
disclose private information compared to unmatched participants, they find no significant 
difference between the groups.122 Similarly, they identify no significant difference in trust levels 
between the groups. However, when measuring concerns regarding privacy and perceptions 
of risk, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) find those whose cognitive style matched the nudge 
were significantly less likely to express privacy concerns and significantly less likely to 
perceive giving away their private information as risky. Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
suggest these mixed findings may be as a result of the way the task was evaluated. They 
argue, “it is relatively easy to express perceptions, but actually expressing behaviour always 
comes with a certain risk” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 4401).123 Another possible 
explanation is that there are outstanding costs to disclosing private information which they do 
not measure. For instance, participants may be satisfied that the risk is low, but may still want 
additional compensation for their disclosures.124 It is also reasonable to suspect that various 
methodological shortcomings could account for these results.125 
 
121 Notably Peer et al. (2019). 
122 In fact, the matched group disclosed slightly less information. 
123 Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) may have been wise to write “certain additional risk,” as they are also 
measuring risk perceptions, and for this explanation to be correct, participants must be failing to notice an 
additional risk. 
124 For instance, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) asked participants to disclose “personal health information” 
(Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 4400), but do not provide any additional information about what this 
constitutes. It is very reasonable to imagine an individual in good health may not be very guarded about their 
personal health information – because there is little to reveal – but may be of the general belief that health 
information is important and something that should be kept private, or revealed only when sufficiently 
incentivised (in a manner of speaking) to do so. For this individual, they may believe there is very little risk in 
them revealing their private information, but still not be willing to do so because of contextual factors. 
125 For instance, the authors had a sample size of 156 (i.e. N=78 for each group), and do not state how they 
measured trust, privacy concerns or risk. These criticisms will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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Despite these results, much like Peer et al. (2019), Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) also 
contribute to a theoretical discussion of personalised nudging. However, unlike Peer et al. 
(2019), the assertions of Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) seem antagonistic to previous ideas. 
They justify the use of personalisation in the same way Peer et al. (2019), Porat and 
Strahilevitz (2014) and Sunstein (2012, 2013a) do, namely that populations are 
heterogeneous and one-size-fits-all nudges may create problems for some individuals. 
However, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) proceed to define personalised nudging wholly 
around Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke’s (2016) concept of a digital nudge.126 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) write, “Personalised nudging is a form of digital nudging that 
takes into account users’ individual characteristics and behaviour patterns” (Schöning, Matt 
and Hess, 2019: 4397). Within the context Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) examine, digital 
nudging is used as a super-set into which all personalised nudges fall, as would be the case 
if the work of Peer et al. (2019) were to be operationalised. However, this definition of 
personalised nudging seems to ignore the ideas of Sunstein (2012, 2013a) or Porat and 
Strahilevitz (2014) (notably the latter) surrounding crude personalised nudges and 
sophisticated127 personalised nudges. Furthermore, this definition is the exact opposite of 
Benartzi (2017), who defines digital nudging around personalised nudging.128 This discussion 
is elaborated on more in part 2.3.4.1. 
Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) investigate personalised nudging in a rather different way. 
Interested in FAFSA completion rates,129 they argue that FAFSA usually sees low uptake 
amongst those who would benefit from doing so,130 but could be expected to increase if 
 
126 Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke (2016) write, “we define “digital nudging” as the use of user-
interface design elements to guide people’s behaviour in digital choice environments” (Weinmann, Schneider 
and vom Brocke, 2016: 1). 
127 E.g. digital nudges. 
128 “In order to take advantage of these digital nudges, I believe we need to tailor them for our new online 
environment” (Benartzi, 2017: 7). 
129 FAFSA is a state and federal financial assistance program for high school students applying for university in 
the United States. 
130 Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) suggest a lack of uptake can ultimately discourage some from going to 
university, and present evidence from their own study to support this claim. 
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students were nudged into completing FAFSA. Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) believe 
the nudge itself must be customised (i.e. personalised) given the large and potentially very 
heterogeneous population being nudged.131 For instance, a reminder nudge which 
encourages a student to start their FAFSA application may be effective for someone who has 
not yet started it, but for someone who has started but has not yet completed it yet, the nudge 
may be ineffective.132 
Using an automated text-message system linked to students’ online FAFSA applications, 
Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) personalise reminder nudges to reflect completion rates. 
For instance, a student who has not yet started their application may receive a text reminding 
them to start, while a student who is in the course of completing their application may receive 
a text to finish their application. It is interesting that this approach diverges from the approach 
taken from Peer et al. (2019) but is rather similar to the concept of personalised nudging 
developed by Sunstein (2012) of personalising the outcomes a person receives. 
Controlling for school- and student-level effects, Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) find that 
personalised reminder nudges significantly increased FAFSA application uptake and 
completion, and also link these personalised nudges to the significantly higher enrolment of 
students into university several months after the nudge was administered.133 Once more, while 
a rather different approach to personalised nudging as seen previously, personalisation of 
nudges does appear to be an effective strategy. 
Finally, a recent study by Guo et al. (2020) returns to the use of personalised nudging and 
password creation. Guo et al. (2020) argue that there are several common reasons why 
 
131 Heterogeneous in terms of educational outcomes, economic background, university acceptance, and so on. 
132 Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020: 5): “Information that is generic and not tailored to an individual’s 
background and circumstances may seem less salient.” 
133 The significance of these results falls as time elapses between the event and the nudge being administered. 
This may lead one to conclude that the result of higher university enrolment amongst the nudged students is 
not a direct result of the nudge, but an indirect result of the nudge. For instance, if a lack of FAFSA would 
prevent a student who had not previously planned on going to university going ultimately going, the nudge to 
complete the FAFSA application may have helped this student go to university, but only because it – in 
conjunction with the student ultimately choosing to go to university – enabled this outcome. 
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passwords may be weak, such as the need for passwords to be memorable, and thus simple. 
Building from this premise, they hypothesise that these password weaknesses may occur in 
individuals who exhibit distinct personality types. For instance, Guo et al. (2020) argue that 
people who are typically more open about themselves will also typically utilise common words 
in their passwords.134 
Guo et al. (2020) thus suggest that if a person’s personality type can be known, the password 
tip which is used to nudge the person into creating a stronger password can be personalised. 
This study, therefore, has a very similar premise to that of Peer et al. (2019). However, this is 
where the similarities end. Firstly, Guo et al. (2020) ‘utilise’ the Big Five personality scale, 
which Peer et al. (2019) – following Egelman and Peer (2015) – do not use. Utilise, only in the 
sense that the notion of five personality types is used to structure the thinking of Guo et al. 
(2020). Guo et al. (2020) do not actually test participants to determine their personality type. 
Instead, they assume a priori that specific password weaknesses (such as using a common 
word or repetitive character combinations) correspond to a particular personality type. They 
thus only ask participants to create a password, analyse the password for specific 
weaknesses, and nudge participants – given the detected weakness – in accordance with their 
a priori model.135 Practically, there is clear benefit to doing this – in most password creation 
environments, one does not have the time or the willingness to complete a personality test. 
But within an experimental setting, actually administering the personality test would surely 
have been feasible, and thus the lack of this represents a weakness of Guo et al. (2020). 
 
134 This is, presumably, because openness is the opposite of secretive, and a secretive person may create 
passwords which are purposely more obscure. This, however, can only be speculated: Guo et al. (2020) offer 
little in the way of justification for their links between password weaknesses and personality types, much to 
the detriment of their work. 
135 To the credit of Guo et al. (2020), they allow for some error in their model by allowing each password 
weakness to correspond to two personality types, randomly choosing between these two, and then evaluating 
and updating the model as passwords are created. In this sense, Guo et al. (2020) adopt a trial-and-error 
approach which Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) has suggested may be necessary in personalised nudging. 
However, by a priori restricting password weakness to only two personality types – rather than all five – they 




This weakness is likely borne out in their results. Guo et al. (2020) do find that the 
personalising password tip nudges produced significantly stronger passwords, compared to 
two other commonly used password composition policies. However, the personalised 
password tips also required the participants to take significantly more time in creating 
passwords and was reported by participants to be significantly harder to use than alternative 
composition policies.136 
2.3.4 Personalised Nudging  
 
2.3.4.1 …as an Outgrowth of Technologies 
 
The mistake of equating personalisation with the use of big data, so far as it is asserted here, 
is not an uncommon one. Indeed, several authors (Thaler and Tucker, 2013; Yeung, 2017) 
focus on personalised nudging not necessarily as a response to heterogeneity, but as an 
opportunity emerging from information technology (Benartzi, 2017). While the conflation of 
these concepts may not be quite as explicit as that of Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019),137 this 
question of personalisation, technology and data remains a pertinent one worthy of 
exploration. 
One possible place to begin this exploration is with the originators of the wider concept into 
which Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) assign personalised nudging: that of digital nudging. 
Digital nudging is defined by Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke (2016) as, “the use of 
user interface design elements to guide people’s choices or influence users’ inputs in online 
decision-environments” (Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016: 4). Insofar as this 
discussion concerns only digital nudging, it is hard to dispute that digital nudging is wholly a 
 
136 These weaknesses can possibly be explained by the assumptions built into the model. Without grounding 
their personalisation model within behavioural theory (e.g. presenting evidence to suggest a given password 
weakness should be associated with a given personality type), Guo et al. (2020) are largely adopting a 
speculative approach. Furthermore, without a control group from which to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
password tips when used impersonally, it is difficult to conclude the effectiveness of these nudges was due to 
personalisation, and not simply due to nudging. 
137 I.e. defining personalised nudging as a subset of digital nudging. 
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response to the development of information technologies.138 However, insofar as this 
discussion concerns personalised nudging, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) are right to argue 
that digital nudging is merely a groundwork on which a form (but not all forms) of personalised 
nudging may be built.139 
Given the proposition of crude personalised nudges (Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014; Sunstein, 
2012, 2013a), there is certainly a clear argument that personalised nudges do not necessarily 
have to be digital nudges. Equally, the expanded opportunities to nudge in an online, digital 
space (Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016) does extend the discussion of 
personalised nudges. Several authors (Thaler and Tucker, 2013; Yeung, 2017) have explored 
these ideas. 
Thaler and Tucker (2013) argue that people quickly become overwhelmed when too much 
information is provided to them. They further state that easy access to information may be 
exacerbating these difficulties, while attempts to communicate important information such as 
contractual obligations often fail to address this problem.140 Instead, to address the problem 
of information overload, Thaler and Tucker (2013) propose the idea of a “choice engine” 
(Thaler and Tucker, 2013: 44). Choice engines would be information technologies such as 
recommendation algorithms that would interpret much of the disclosure information available 
 
138 “The increasing adoption of digital technologies in large areas of our private and professional lives leads to 
a situation in which most decisions are made within – or are influenced by – digital choice environments. 
Already, when designing the user interfaces, like a Web site or a mobile app, we create a digital choice 
environment; for example, by the way defaults are set or workflows are organised predefines decisions [sic]” 
“Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016: 2). 
139 Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke (2016) make a single reference to personalisation, writing, “we 
propose five steps of a digital nudging process for online decision environments that takes into account 
specific affordances of information systems (e.g., personalisation, data availability, real-time tracking)” 
(Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016: 4). Thus, Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke (2016) also 
seem to imply that personalisation is an outgrowth of information technology, but it may also be important to 
appreciate that they mention personalisation without any evidence to suggest personalisation is significant 
part of their proposal. 




to individuals, and – using personal (heterogeneity) data – personalise the information that is 
ultimately disclosed to individuals.141 
Where Thaler and Tucker (2013) develop the idea of choice engines, Yeung (2017) 
establishes the concept of the “hypernudge” (Yeung, 2017: 118) and in many ways expands 
the scope of what might be called personalised digital nudges. Yeung (2017) initially argues 
hypernudges are simply the combination of behavioural nudges and big data,142 but reveals 
the assumed, personalised, nature of hypernudges when defining hypernudging: “Big Data-
driven nudging is… nimble, unobtrusive143 and highly potent,144 providing the data subject with 
a highly personalised choice environment – hence I refer to these techniques as ‘hypernudge’” 
(Yeung, 2017: 122).  
As with Thaler and Tucker (2013), Yeung (2017) does not emphasise the personalisation 
aspect of hypernudges in their discussion; however, again in accordance with Thaler and 
Tucker (2013) – and Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke (2016) – Yeung (2017) 
recognises that information technology facilitates the personalisation of nudges. Further, the 
concept of “a highly personalised choice environment” seems very similar to the broad 
discussions of Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke (2016) and Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) surrounding the integration of nudges and personalised nudges, respectively, with 
user-interface design. 
 
141 Thaler and Tucker (2013) also contribute to the conversation surrounding access to heterogeneity 
information, generally calling for more open data systems and transparency from governments and private 
firms. 
142 Yeung (2017) writes, “My central claim is that, despite the complexity and sophistication of their [big data 
systems] underlying algorithmic processes, these applications ultimately rely on a deceptively simple design-
based mechanism of influence – ‘nudge’… By characterising Big Data analytic techniques as a form of nudge, 
this provides an analytical lens for evaluating their persuasive, manipulative qualities and their legal and 
political dimensions” (Yeung, 2017: 119). 
143 This is presumably because hypernudges should also follow the definition of standard (non-hyper) nudges 
offered by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). 
144 The concept of potency is also mentioned by Peer et al. (2019), and may suggest that using personalisation 
to increase conformity with the nudge is separate from the idea of people following the nudge because it leads 
to a better outcome, as considered a normative standard in nudge theory (Oliver, 2019). 
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Benartzi (2017) offers a slightly different perspective. Writing about influencing behaviour in 
online spaces,145 Benartzi (2017) argues that digital nudging is merely an extension of non-
digital146 behavioural science and nudging into a new medium. They further assert, however, 
that with a new medium comes new possibilities and argues that digital nudges and choice 
architecture have an opportunity to become extremely effective by embracing personalisation. 
In this sense, Benartzi (2017) does not argue that all personalised nudges are digital nudges; 
instead, Benartzi (2017) merely recognises the ease which with digital choice environments 
can be personalised, and advocates for this to happen. Thus, returning to Weinmann, 
Schneider and vom Brocke (2016), one may conclude the view of Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) is a misunderstanding of previous discussions. Rather than personalised nudging 
necessarily being digital nudges, digital nudges may potentially be personalised nudges. 
2.3.4.2 …In Relation to Previous Ideas 
 
Digital nudging, choice engines and hypernudges exist primarily as outgrowths of information 
technology, rather than specifically as conceptions of personalised nudges. This is not to say 
that these ‘sophisticated’ personalised nudges147 do not contribute to this discussion, with 
ideas regarding potency (Peer et al., 2019; Yeung, 2017), and user-interface design (Benartzi 
and Bhargava, 2020; Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019; Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 
2016) expanding on both early ideas of personalisation (Moon, 2002; Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen, 2012) and theories of personalised nudging (Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; 
Sunstein, 2012; 2013a). Further, Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) even find it necessary to 
distinguish between crude personalised defaults and personalised defaults which use big data 
because they also see the advantages of information technology in achieving ever-more 
precise personalisation.148 
 
145 Also see Bhargava and Benartzi (2020). 
146 One may be tempted to call it analogue. 
147 So-called here to contrast with Porat and Strahilevitz’s (2014) crude personalised nudges. 
148 As does Sunstein (2012, 2013a), though Sunstein emphasises information technologies significantly less. 
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Yet information technology seems to have such a close relationship with the idea of 
personalisation not because it explicitly seeks to personalise users experiences,149 but 
because the data necessary for the basic function of many online and digital services can 
often be used as heterogeneity information, and thus incorporated to solve problems arising 
from heterogeneity.150 Personalised nudging driven by information technology may resolve the 
persistent challenge in some of the personalised nudging literature (Sunstein, 2012, 2013a; 
Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014) of a practical method for collecting heterogeneity information and 
personalising nudges. But previous research – both in personalised nudging and 
personalisation more generally – have also demonstrated the possibilities to personalise 
without using big data.151 Therefore, while personalised nudging using big information 
technology is likely one (perhaps the major) future of the discipline (Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; 
Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014; Thaler and Tucker, 2013), it is important to note that personalised 
nudging does not  emerge from of an outgrowth of information technology, but rather recourse 
to information technology emerges as one of several means of personalising nudges in 
response to the problem of heterogeneity (Sunstein, 2012, 2013a). 
2.4 – Conclusion 
 
The effectiveness of behavioural nudges can be undermined when individuals within target 
populations are significantly different. Often, a one-size-fits-all or impersonal nudge will still 
produce a significant benefit for many people (Sunstein, 2012), and may continue to produce 
 
149 The contemporary work of Zuboff (2019) on surveillance capitalism may disagree with this assertion, and 
such a comment would be fair as the business model of many information technology companies has 
subsequently come to revolve around targeted advertising and behavioural prediction. See Zuboff (2019). 
150 Sunstein (2012, 2013a) argues that some data such as demographic data often serve a purpose beyond 
capturing heterogeneity. For instance, gender may be known to an employer as part of equal opportunity 
employment requirements. Butt et al. (2018) also demonstrate this idea, and this idea could also be extended 
to incorporate information technology firms such as Facebook. While personal data may be used by Facebook 
to personalise content (Luckerson, 2015), Facebook’s basic function of connecting people also requires this 
information (also see Zuboff (2019) for a discussion of Google’s targeted advertising as an outgrowth of their 
desire to be the best search engine). The use of personal data beyond a primary functionality purpose is what 
Zuboff (2019) calls, “behavioural surplus” (Zuboff, 2019: 97) 
151 Rather than, as is often the case in the discussions surrounding, say, recommendation algorithms, 
retrospectively interpreting these systems in terms of nudge theory. Again, see Zuboff (2019). 
74 
 
a net benefit across the population even when considering the potential harm or loss of welfare 
suffered by heterogeneous individuals (Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; Sunstein, 2013a). In some 
cases, however, heterogeneity within a target population may be so great that aggregate 
benefit is eliminated. Even when this isn’t the case, addressing the problem of heterogeneity 
still represents an opportunity to improve behavioural interventions (Ruggeri et al., 
forthcoming; Peer et al., 2019; Sunstein, 2012, 2013a). This review has shown that various 
unexpected and unintended results, from spending behaviour to policy setting, can be 
explained in terms of heterogeneity. This review has also examined possible solutions to the 
problem of heterogeneity, focusing centrally on strategies for personalising nudges. 
Personalisation has been an emerging area of study in the fields of marketing and consumer 
decision-making, and several authors (Matz et al., 2017; Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky, 2016; 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012; Cesario, Grant and Higgins, 2004; Moon, 2002) have 
found evidence to suggest personalisation produces significantly more effective outcomes, as 
measured in several ways. With the exception of Egelman and Peer (2015), who briefly ponder 
about personalisation and nudging, none of these authors have sought to marry the field of 
message personalisation with behavioural science and nudge theory.  
Some (Sunstein, 2012, 2013a; Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014) have approached the topic of 
personalisation primarily from a behavioural science perspective and have subsequently 
contributed greatly to the theory of personalised nudges but have also failed to facilitate a 
satisfying union. However, emerging research is demonstrating how personalisation and 
nudge theory can practically be combined. Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) show that using personalisation methods developed in the marketing and consumer 
decision-making literature (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012) to personalise behavioural 
nudges produces significantly more effective nudge strategies. Peer et al. (2019) in particular 
also contribute to the conceptual discussion around personalised nudging, arguing that the 
selection of the nudge could be personalised in addition to Sunstein’s (2012, 2013a) original 
conception of personalising choices/outcomes. 
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Personalisation, however, requires heterogeneity information, and this review has explored 
the arguments of Sunstein (2012) and the relevancy principle. Many individual differences 
could be found between any two individuals, and these differences may influence the 
respective preferences of these individuals.152 However, many of these differences will 
probably not be relevant to the circumstances in question, say when making a decision. 
Relevancy, following Sunstein (2012), is a concept that should be applied to heterogeneity 
when personalising nudges. Several components of relevancy emerge from the literature: 
heterogeneous information that is relevant in one instance may not be relevant in another; 
even when heterogeneous information is believed to be relevant, accessing this information 
may violate a person’s privacy. Therefore privacy is a component of relevancy; as is the cost 
of personalisation, for it is reasonable to believe that the costs of personalisation may 
sometimes outweigh the benefits of respecting heterogeneity; and personalisation may be 
more necessary for some nudges than others, meaning the need to respect heterogeneity and 
thus relevancy may also be dependent on the decision-maker’s (i.e. nudgee’s) desired 
outcome and the nudge in question, as well as the circumstance (Ruggeri et al., forthcoming). 
The review of the literature gives some indication of what might be considered relevant 
heterogeneity information. Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) distinguish between crude 
personalised nudges which utilise heterogeneity information that is easy to access and simple 
to incorporate, such as age or gender, and more sophisticated personalisation strategies 
which utilise big data and information technologies. Several authors in the personalisation 
literature (Dubois, Rucker and Galinsky, 2016; Cesario, Grant and Higgins, 2004; Moon, 2002) 
examine personality traits using dichotomous variables, while Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012), Egelman and Peer (2015) and Peer et al. (2019) use more sophisticated personality 
and psychometric tests (respectively) to investigate how heterogeneous cognition information 
could be utilised. Finally, Matz et al. (2017) investigate how social media data and other 
personal datasets could be used to infer cognitive styles and thus personalise advertising, 
 
152 Or seem to influence preferences. 
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following from the arguments of several authors (Yeung, 2017; Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014; 
Thaler and Tucker, 2013). 
Finally, this review has considered personalisation and personalised nudging as an outgrowth 
of information technology. The basic requirement of heterogeneity information in order to 
personalise nudges has meant that technologies which provide access to and automate the 
use of large amounts of personal data have become closely associated with the idea of 
personalisation (Yeung, 2017; Thaler and Tucker, 2013). Furthermore, the relatively fluid 
canvas of online user-interfaces has led some (Bhargava and Benartzi, 2020; Schöning, Matt 
and Hess, 2019; Benartzi, 2017; Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016;) to imagine 
how nudges could be used in significantly more dynamic ways, prompting some to conflate 
the two into ideas such as personalised choice environments (Yeung, 2017). From this review, 
it is argued that information technologies do not hinder any programme of personalisation or 
personalised nudges. However, personalisation should not be thought of as an outgrowth of 
information technology, but as a response to the problem of heterogeneity found in impersonal 




Chapter 3 – Theory 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 
Two concepts of personalisation emerge from the literature. Firstly, Sunstein’s (2012, 2013a) 
concept of personalisation, which seeks to address the problem of heterogeneity by 
personalising the options/outcomes which decision-makers are nudged towards. This concept 
of personalised nudging, therefore, might be said to be considering what to nudge. Secondly, 
Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) offer a concept of personalisation 
which seeks to address the problem of heterogeneity by personalising the nudge strategy 
implemented, while not altering the option which is nudged towards. This concept of 
personalised nudging, therefore, might be said to be considering how to nudge.153 
This chapter explores these two concepts in greater detail. Henceforth, the cumbersome ‘what 
to nudge’ concept of personalisation is called choice personalisation, emphasising that under 
this procedure, the nudge strategy remains impersonal, while the outcome supported by the 
nudge (i.e. nudged towards) is personalised. Furthermore, the equally cumbersome ‘how to 
nudge’ concept of personalisation is called delivery personalisation, emphasising that under 
this procedure, the nudge strategy (i.e. the type of nudge selected) is personalised, while the 
outcome supported by the nudge remains impersonal. 
 
153 Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) and Benartzi (2017) also adopt similar ideas, albeit implicitly. For instance, 
consider this extended quote from Benartzi (2017: 51):  
 
“the McDonald’s Chinese language site is full of information – reflecting the Chinese preference for 
higher levels of visual complexity – while the German site is very plain. Such aesthetic adjustments are 
currently done by hand, but it’s easy to imagine a future in which each Internet user has his or her 
own “aesthetic algorithm,” customizing the appearance of every site they see. Just as Pandora 
recommends music based on what I like, and Netflix sends me suggestions based on my viewing 
history, so might our browser automatically “format” Web sites in accordance with our visual 
preferences. Life is too short for ugly screens.”  
 
Note that Benartzi (2017) makes an equivalency between two notions of personalisation which are not 
equivalent. First, there is website design, or how any information is presented. Second, there is content 
recommendation, or what content is presented regardless of design. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, definitions of choice and delivery 
personalisation are presented, with any objections emerging from these definitions unpacked 
and addressed. These definitions follow from Mills (forthcoming), as does much of the 
discussion in this chapter. Secondly, by way of situating the choice/delivery framework into 
the existing literature, a brief re-analysis of some of the literature considered in Chapter 2 is 
presented with the intention of demonstrating that the choice/delivery framework compliments 
many existing studies examining personalisation. Finally, a brief discussion is offered 
regarding the use of choice and delivery personalisation as separate personalisation 
strategies and combined. It is here the two main hypotheses of this thesis are presented. 
3.2 – Choice and Delivery Personalisation 
 
Defined in terms of heterogeneity, definitions of choice and delivery personalisation are offered 
below: 
• Choice personalisation utilises various heterogeneity data to determine what is the 
best outcome to nudge a decision-maker towards when the method of nudging has 
already been determined. For instance, if a default nudge is being used to increase 
pension saving, one individual might have a higher contribution product set as the 
default because they frequently under save, while another might have a lower 
contribution product set because they frequently over save (Porat and Strahilevitz, 
2014; Sunstein, 2013a). Choice personalisation, therefore, is personalisation within 
nudges. 
• Delivery personalisation utilises various heterogeneity data to determine what is the 
most effective method of nudging an individual. For instance, some individuals might 
be impatient and respond well to default nudges, while others might greatly value the 
opinions of their peers and respond better to social norm nudges (Peer et al., 2019; 
Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019; Beshears et al., 2015a). Delivery personalisation, 
therefore, is personalisation across nudges. 
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Immediately, there are two items to note from these definitions. Firstly, the definitions are such 
that delivery personalisation is assumed to precede choice personalisation. Secondly, various 
language is used – notably the phrases “best outcome” and “most effective” – which require 
some consideration. 
3.2.1 Delivery Before Choice? 
 
In the above definitions, delivery seems to precede choice. In other words, choice 
personalisation is defined as being contingent on some decision regarding the delivery of the 
nudge (the nudge strategy or the method of nudging) having already been determined (either 
personally or impersonally), while no such contingency is placed on the definition of delivery 
personalisation. 
One potential reason for defining these terms in this way can be found in Schöning, Matt and 
Hess (2019), who argue choice personalisation itself cannot be a type of nudging, because 
choice personalisation necessarily changes the options available to decision-makers, thus 
infringing on freedom of choice. As a result, any personalisation of choices – according to 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) – should not be considered a type of nudging.154 While it may 
be initially tempting to embrace this argument to counter the question at hand, not only would 
such an embrace seem to undermine half of the choice/delivery framework outlined above, 
but the argument itself contains two noteworthy issues. 
Firstly, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) are rather open to the concept of nudging by reducing the 
number of options available to people (and the salience of those options) insofar as the smaller 
range of options enables people to better evaluate which they would prefer. This follows from 
Simon’s (1955) bounded rationality critique of decision-making, whereby people rationally 
consider only a small amount of information available to them. Hansen (2016) expands on the 
 
154 Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019): “Personalised nudging is a form of digital nudging that takes into account 
users’ individual characteristics and behaviour patterns. It is important to note that the presentation of choices 
is personalised, not the choices themselves, i.e. freedom of choice is ensured” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 
4397, emphasis added). 
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question of nudging by reducing options, and argues many people – including, at times, Thaler 
and Sunstein themselves – mis-interpret the idea of preserving freedom of choice as maximal 
choice (i.e. making all possible options available) or equal salience of options (i.e. making all 
options equally noticeable). In this instance, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) seem to have 
fallen into this trap. 
Secondly, Schöning, Matt and Hess’ (2019) argument leaves a tremendous amount of 
discussion unaccounted for. Besides disregarding Sunstein’s (2012) arguments about 
personalising choice, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) seem willing to allow personalisation 
to respond to some heterogeneity in the population – namely, differences in decision-making 
style associated with delivery personalisation – but ignore other heterogeneity in the 
population – namely, differences in outcomes given individual circumstances. This is 
problematic in two ways. Firstly, Sunstein (2012) argues the primary criterion for disregarding 
heterogeneity is relevance, yet Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) other no compelling reason 
why heterogeneity of outcomes is irrelevant to personalisation.155 Secondly, accepting 
heterogeneity of outcomes is irrelevant creates a myriad of philosophical problems associated 
with objectively determining outcomes to nudge towards. These objections usually follow that 
choice architects (i.e. nudgers) who nudged populations (i.e. nudge impersonally) must ignore 
individual preferences (Rizzo and Whitman, 2009). This is another way of characterising the 
problem of heterogeneity.156 
 
155 One argument may be that, because they do not believe in personalising choices, heterogeneity 
information which could be used to personalise choices is irrelevant. Yet, as argued above, it seems incorrect 
to disqualify choice personalisation, and by extension, to disqualify various heterogeneity information. 
Furthermore, such an argument requires the assumption that choice architects can reasonably know that 
certain heterogeneity will not be relevant to delivery personalisation. Such an assumption may be unjustified. 
For instance, heterogeneity of outcomes might infer decision-making style, i.e. a person’s observable 
circumstances are a result of their unobservable methods of decision-making. 
156 It is interesting to note the role of paternalism in nudging. One of course can object to the claims of nudging 
being paternalistic, as some do (Rebonato, 2014; Rizzo and Whitman, 2009; Mitchell, 2005), but the primary 
reason why nudging claims to be paternalistic is centrally to justify the techniques as part of a program for 
improving outcomes (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, 2003). Even if one disagrees with the reality of this claim, it is 
more difficult to deny the ambition behind this claim. Accepting this, consider the definitions of paternalism 
given by Thaler and Sunstein (2008, 2003). In their 2003 paper, they write, “In our understanding, a policy 
counts as “paternalistic” if it is selected with the goal of influencing the choice of affected parties in a way that 
will make those parties better off” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003: 175). In their 2008 book, however, this 
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If not for the argument of Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), then, why might delivery 
personalisation be said to precede choice personalisation? The argument put forth here is that 
delivery precedes choice because the type of nudge determines the sensible type of options 
available. 
Consider, for instance, UK workplace pension schemes. The United Kingdom’s Pensions Act 
2008 introduced legislation that sort to require employees to ‘opt-out’ of their workplace 
pension scheme, rather than ‘opt-in’ – a change known as automatic enrolment, and in the 
language of nudges, can be described as changing the default option (Service, 2015). This 
change to UK pension law was to occur gradually, beginning in 2012, and being completed by 
2017 (Pensions Act, 2008). 
Much discussion of automatic enrolment has focused specifically on the nudge in question, 
with little analysis of the range of options available as a consequence of the nudge (Service, 
2015).157 Having chosen to use a default option nudge, the government implicitly limited the 
options available to decision-makers (i.e. employees) to either opting out of a workplace 
pension scheme, or staying in that scheme. Of course, alternative schemes may have existed 
for employees, as well as various features might have been adjustable by employees once 
part of a scheme, but these are choices which only occur following the initial decision to stay 
with the scheme or leave the scheme. In short, the type of nudge chosen (i.e. the delivery) 
impacts the type of options available (i.e. the choice). 
By way of further explanation, consider an alternative retirement savings nudge, Save More 
Tomorrow developed by Thaler and Benartzi (2004). Thaler and Benartzi (2004) utilise a 
present bias nudge to encourage employees to commit to saving more for retirement. The 
 
definition has changed: “In our understanding, a policy is ‘paternalistic’ if it tries to influence choices in a way 
that will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 5, original emphasis). 
Demanding that better off be judged by the person making a decision implicitly imbues a tendency towards 
personalisation into nudging, as for a nudge to be paternalistic, it must endeavour to render better off often 
very different people. 
157 To aid smaller businesses who may not have the sufficient resources to establish and manage a workplace 
pension scheme, the UK government established NEST, a workplace pensions service which businesses could 
register with in order to offer workplace pension schemes. 
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present bias holds that people value the future less than the present, and Thaler and Benartzi 
(2004) use this to develop a retirement savings plan whereby employees commit to save more 
of their earnings in the future. As with automatic enrolment, Save More Tomorrow had already 
chosen the method of nudging, namely the present bias nudge, and as a consequence, the 
type of options available to employees are limited – employees can choose to save more 
today, or save more sometime in the future. Again, the type of nudge has influenced the 
choices that can be nudged towards. 
Finally, consider Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) famous cafeteria analogy. Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008) argue that rearranging the layout of foodstuffs within a cafeteria can nudge people 
towards different choices. For instance, by placing healthy snacks such as fruit at the front of 
the cafeteria, and unhealthy snacks such as chocolate at the back of the cafeteria, people can 
be encouraged to choose healthier options. As evidenced with nudges that encourage 
retirement saving,158 there are a myriad of ways of nudging healthier lifestyles. Yet, by 
choosing to use a convenience nudge to make healthier snacks more convenient and 
unhealthy snacks less convenient, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) are limited in the type of 
choices that can be nudged towards, namely healthy snacks versus unhealthy snacks. To 
emphasise this point, there are many ways a person could be nudged to be healthier, from 
social norm nudges about obesity, to gamification of exercise, to reminder nudges to get up 
and have a walk. Each different nudge, while trying to achieve the same broad objective – 
namely, healthier lifestyles – engenders different types of options to be nudged towards (i.e. 
healthy snack versus unhealthy snack; walk versus sitting down; overweight versus 
underweight). 
There are two further notions to consider. Firstly, the type of nudge chosen impacts the type 
of options available but does not necessarily impact the range of options available within a 
given type. For instance, automatic enrolment reduces choices down to opt-out versus opt-in 
 




(the type), but does not restrict the ability of a choice architect to select which option, from a 
range of schemes, to automatically enrol an employee in. Similarly, the Save More Tomorrow 
plan reduces choices down to ‘save today’ versus ‘save in the future’ (again, the type), but 
does not restrict the ability of the choice architect to select which date, from a range of dates 
in the future, to offer as a potential future starting date. Finally, the decision to make healthy 
snacks more convenient than unhealthy snacks reduces choices down to ‘healthy’ versus 
‘unhealthy’ (once more, the type), but does not restrict the ability of choice architects to select 
which snack, from a range of healthy snacks, to make convenient for a decision-maker. 
As such, by distinguishing between the type of choice and the range of choice, the idea that 
the delivery component of nudging precedes the choice component of nudging does not 
invalidate the choice component. This is vital when considering personalisation. Beshears et 
al. (2016), for instance, personalise the Save More Tomorrow programme by personalising 
the future date which employees begin saving on. As such, even when the delivery of the 
nudge has already been selected (and selected impersonally), thus limiting the type of choice, 
it is still possible to personalise the choice from a range of options. 
3.2.2 “Best Outcome” and “Most Effective” 
 
In the above definitions, two terms are used which may evoke controversy. These are the 
terms “best outcome” when discussing choice personalisation, and “most effective” when 
discussing delivery personalisation. Exploring these terms and the conditions which surround 
them is not easy, and involves traversing several layers of conflict, some which spawn directly 
from the complication of personalisation, and some which emerge from the basics of nudge 
theory. 
A good place to begin may be by asking a question: why do the objectives of choice and 
delivery personalisation differ? The answer is because these terms – especially the term “most 
effective” – endeavour to respect the language and ideas found in the existing literature. 
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Notably, Yeung (2017) and Peer et al. (2019) introduce the notion of potency into this 
conversation. 
The idea of potency is not clearly defined by either author(s), but some understanding of the 
term can be inferred from the context in which these terms are used. For instance, Peer et al. 
(2019) contrast the term potency with that of feasibility, distinguishing between the practical 
ability to personalise nudges (feasibility) and the effectiveness of personalised nudges at 
nudging people (potency). Similarly, Yeung’s (2017) exact wording is, “highly potent” (Yeung, 
2017: 122, emphasis added), a phrase which implies degrees of potency much like there might 
be variation in the number of people seemingly being nudged.159 Potency, as can best be 
understood from these uses, seems to follow a definition such as: 
the number of decision-makers who choose an option supported by a nudge (i.e. follow 
the nudge) compared to the number of decision-makers who choose an alternative 
option (i.e. do not follow the nudge). 
Thus, the term “most effective” seeks to capture the idea of potency. For instance, an 
impersonal nudge suffers from the problem of heterogeneity. In some instances, heterogeneity 
will be so great that the nudge, or the option nudged towards, will be rejected in favour of some 
other option (Sunstein, 2012). As such, because of heterogeneity, the relative potency of an 
impersonal nudge would be expected to be less than the potency of a personalised nudge, 
when defined as a ratio of the number of people who follow the nudge versus the number who 
do not (Peer et al., 2019; Yeung, 2017).160 By defining delivery personalisation around the 
term “most effective,” therefore, the notion that personalisation should maximise potency is 
established. 
 
159 Yeung (2017) also uses this phrase as an extra qualification of their hypernudging definition, which includes 
practical or feasible (to use the language of Peer et al. (2019)) qualifications. This would suggest potency, in 
Yeung’s (2017) definition, does not describe the feasibility of personalised nudging, but some additional 
characteristic of personalised nudging. 
160 Assuming personalisation resolves the problem of heterogeneity. 
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Yet this still does not explain why “most effective” is used when considering delivery 
personalisation, and “best outcome” is used when considering choice personalisation. Indeed, 
personalising choice so as to promote a good outcome might lead more people to ‘following’ 
the nudge, even if the nudge exerted no effect on their decision. This would seem to contribute 
to potency too.  
The difference in terms between choice and delivery personalisation can seem somewhat 
arbitrary. This is not the case, though one may find themselves treading on treacherous 
ground if the concept of potency is reserved solely for a discussion of delivery personalisation. 
The difference, instead, stems from a desire to emphasise the differences between choice 
and delivery personalisation. Delivery personalisation, for instance, says little about the 
choices which a decision-maker is nudged towards, in much the same way that choice 
personalisation says little about the method of nudging as determined by delivery 
personalisation. The use of the term “best outcome” to describe choice personalisation, 
therefore, purposely emphasises outcomes to demonstrate the great importance of outcomes 
in choice personalisation, and the relatively low importance of outcomes in delivery 
personalisation. For this same reason, “most effective” emphasises the importance of potency 
to delivery personalisation, as argued by Yeung (2017) and Peer et al. (2019).161 
Yet, for such an argument to stand, “most effective” and “best outcome” must be understood 
to generally be the same. To evidence this, consider the concept of libertarian paternalism 
developed by Thaler and Sunstein (2003). Broadly, libertarian paternalism argues people 
should be nudged towards outcomes which are better for them (paternalism) while maintaining 
freedom of choice (libertarianism). Oliver (2019) posits that nudges could be defined 
normatively around libertarian paternalism, which is to say, for a behavioural intervention to 
 
161 One might even argue that effectiveness, as defined here, can be determined relatively objectively. If a 
great many people are following a nudge, irrespective of the outcome they are receiving, the nudge can be 
considered effective. However, what the “best outcome” is is significantly harder to determine objectively 
(hence why Thaler and Sunstein (2003) ultimately change their definition of paternalism). Only in a 
hypothesised world of perfect personalised nudging, where all decision-makers are nudged towards their 
subjectively determined best outcome, might a degree of consensus around the effectiveness of nudges and 
outcomes be achieved. 
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count as a nudge, it should preserve freedom of choice, and promote an outcome which will 
benefit the decision-maker (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008).162 
From this perspective, a highly potent nudge is also a nudge which nudges towards an 
outcome which will improve the welfare of the decision-maker. As such, the notion of 
“effective” takes on both the qualities of potency (i.e. lots of people following the nudge) and 
welfare (i.e. people benefiting from following the nudge). Thus, the use of the term “most 
effective,” from a libertarian paternalist perspective, can be understood as the notion of 
nudging towards improved welfare with an emphasis on potency, while the term “best 
outcome” can be understood as the notion of nudging towards improved welfare with an 
emphasis on specific outcomes. In this sense, the terms may be equivalent. 
One might note, however, that Thaler and Sunstein (2003) argue that policies should promote 
outcomes that will leave decision-makers “better off” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003: 175), and 
place no special emphasis on choosing optimal outcomes to nudge towards, or utility 
maximising outcomes. Yet, the use of the term “best outcome” when defining choice 
personalisation emerges as a necessary condition: “best outcome,” from a personalisation 
perspective, means the best outcome for a given individual on the basis of which outcome will 
minimise disutility arising from heterogeneity (Sunstein, 2012, 2013a). The use of the 
language “better off” by Thaler and Sunstein (2003) is better understood when considering 
impersonal nudging through the lens of utilitarianism (Sætra, 2019; Itai, Inoue and Kodama, 
2016), where a policy is good if overall welfare or happiness are increased, while personalised 
nudging is less easily appraised under a utilitarian doctrine.163 
3.3 – Re-analysis with the Choice/Delivery Framework 
 
 
162 Such a normative definition is controversial. For instance, Hansen (2016) argues that libertarian paternalism 
and the existing definition of a nudge are insufficient to deal with contemporary nudge theory problems, while 
Schubert (2017, 2015) argues nudges are simply tools, and whether something promotes a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ 
outcome matters little when determining if something is or is not a nudge. Even Sunstein (2017a) seems mixed 
in their assessment of the normative status of nudging. 
163 Again, Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) adjustment to their definition of paternalism imbues nudging with a 
tendency towards personalisation, and away from a utilitarian evaluation of welfare. 
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For all the arguments made thus far, in an attempt to clarify and address issues which may 
arise from the choice/delivery framework, an outstanding query must surely be whether the 
choice/delivery framework is consistent with research which has come before. In many ways, 
it likely is. For instance, in a paragraph highly influential to the ideas developed here, Peer et 
al. (2019) write, “we distinguish between the personalization of a certain nudge (e.g., adding 
the recipient’s first name to the nudge’s message) vs. personalizing the selection of the nudge 
(e.g., assigning different kinds or versions of nudges to different individuals)” (Peer et al., 2019: 
3). In this statement, whether intentional or not, Peer et al. (2019) seem to acknowledge the 
dynamics of nudge personalisation conceptualised within the choice/delivery framework. 
3.3.1 Peer et al. (2019) 
 
The use of delivery personalisation by Peer et al. (2019) is rather evident from their statement 
given above. Yet, for prudency, it is worthwhile examining the procedure which they undertake. 
Immediately, one can determine that Peer et al. (2019) cannot have been using choice 
personalisation, as participants are only nudged towards a single outcome – stronger 
passwords. It should be evident that personalisation cannot genuinely occur when the range 
of options to choose from numbers one.164 Thus, for Peer et al. (2019) to have any claim at all 
to personalisation, they must undertake delivery personalisation. 
Such evidence by elimination is, to an extent, lacking insight. A closer consideration of the 
procedure undertaken by Peer et al. (2019) reveals that they clearly investigated how a range 
of different methods of nudging could be used as part of a personalisation strategy to nudge 
participants into creating stronger passwords. This was done by collecting heterogeneity 
information about decision-making styles. As such, Peer et al. (2019) clearly use various 
heterogeneity data to determine the most effective method of nudging, and thus undertake 
delivery personalisation. 
 
164 One is reminded of the famous Henry Ford quote: “You can have any color so long as it’s black.” 
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3.3.2 Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
 
The case for Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) is not as immediately obvious as that of Peer et 
al. (2019). This is not for lack of trying on the part of Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019); as 
above, they clearly believe that only delivery personalisation is possible, and that the prospect 
of choice personalisation renders the nudge being personalised something else entirely. 
Despite this assertion being flawed (again, as outlined above), it should be taken as a valuable 
clue as to the direction they follow. However, as with Peer et al. (2019), it is necessary to go 
beyond what Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) state and examine their actual procedure. 
It is here that complications arise. As will be discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 8, Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) adopt a matching approach; a procedure which has a dubious claim to 
personalisation. They impersonally show participants verbal and visual nudges, and then 
assess whether individuals had verbal or visual preferences. By examining the effectiveness 
of the nudge when the nudge and the preference matched, versus when they did not, 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) are able to assess the impact personalisation would have 
had. As will be seen, this is not an uncommon strategy within the literature. 
For the immediate purpose, however, the work by Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) seems to 
use delivery personalisation. Ignoring the problems created by the matching approach in 
claiming to actually be personalising nudges, as with Peer et al. (2019), Schöning, Matt and 
Hess (2019) are nudging people to reveal more private information but doing so using a range 
of nudges. Therefore, they are not personalising choice, but are personalising delivery. 
3.3.3 Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) 
 
Page Castleman and Meyer (2020) adopt the term “customized nudging” (Page, Castleman 
and Meyer, 2020: 3), though there is no indication that the term customized marks any 
difference from that of personalisation. As with Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019), Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) offer something of a theory of personalisation (or 
customization), writing, “a potentially important distinction [between decisions] is what kind of 
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information is likely to be most salient to individuals […] for instance, information about the 
benefits of pursuing education […] may not resonate with individuals if they already have some 
basic understanding of the benefits” and continuing, “information that is generic and not 
tailored to an individual’s background and circumstances may seem less salient” (Page, 
Castleman and Meyer, 2020: 5). 
It is immediately obvious that Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) are grappling with the same 
notions of heterogeneity which have been tackled by Peer et al. (2019) and Sunstein (2012). 
Yet, unlike Peer et al. (2019), Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) focus their attention on what 
may impact the salience of information delivered via a reminder nudge, and do not elaborate 
on alternative nudges. Furthermore, they talk about tailoring information, not nudges, which 
resonates much more with the theories of personalisation considered by Sunstein (2012) and 
Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) than by Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019). 
Thus, there is an initial suspicion that Page, Castleman and Meyer’s (2020) work may be 
classified as choice personalisation. 
Again, this becomes evident in an examination of method. Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) 
investigate how customized (personalised) nudging can be used to increase uptake of FAFSA, 
a federal benefit available to US students applying to university. They utilised a reminder 
nudge administered via a text-message to students. The contents of the reminder nudge were 
customized based on the completion status of the student’s FAFSA to nudge them towards 
various behaviours.165 As such, it seems likely the work by Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) 
can be classified as choice personalisation, because the method of nudging was already 
selected (text-message reminder nudges), while the outcome nudged towards was varied in 
accordance with various heterogeneity data (namely, application status). 
3.3.4 Beshears et al. 2016 
 
 
165 For instance, those that hadn’t started their application were reminded to do so, those who had only 
partially completed their application were reminded to complete it, and those who had completed were 
reminded to ensure various tangential considerations were under control. 
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Beshears et al. (2016) do not classify their work as personalised nudging, but an analysis 
using the choice/delivery framework soon creates a compelling case for their work to be 
classified as such. Yet, because Beshears et al. (2016) do not approach their research from 
the perspective of personalisation, they offer no explicit theory of personalisation from which 
to base an initial assessment. 
They do, however, identify a clear example of what Sunstein (2012) calls the problem of 
heterogeneity. By examining Thaler and Benartzi’s (2004) Save More Tomorrow program, 
which – as above – encourages employees to save for retirement by committing to saving 
more in the future, Beshears et al. (2016) find that the implicit message “saving can be 
deferred into the future” leads some employees to renege on their commitment to save when 
the pre-selected date arrives. In response, Beshears et al. (2016) formulate a concept called 
the fresh-start nudge, which sets the future commitment date as a date which is personally 
important to each employee (e.g. a birthday or wedding anniversary). 
Here, two key pieces of evidence emerge. Firstly, the fresh-start nudge uses various 
heterogeneity data to respond to a problem created by heterogeneity, and thus insofar as 
Sunstein (2012) formulates it, Beshears et al. (2016) do engage in personalised nudging. 
Secondly, by retaining the present bias nudge used by Thaler and Benartzi (2004), they do 
not seem to be personalising delivery, and by considering that the fresh-start nudge uses 
heterogeneity data to select, from any date in the future, the optimal date for an employee to 
begin saving, it seems likely that Beshears et al. (2016) are engaging in choice 
personalisation. 
3.3.5 Guo et al., 2020 
 
Finally, Guo et al. (2020) investigate how personalised password tip nudges can be used to 
increase password security, much like Peer et al. (2019). Topic is not the only similarity 
between these studies. As with Peer et al. (2019), Guo et al. (2020) utilise inferred information 
about participants personalities to choose, from a range of password tip nudges, which nudge 
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would be most effective at improving password security. Once more, it can be seen that 
various nudges are being used to nudge towards a single outcome, namely effective 
passwords. This study, therefore, seems to follow delivery personalisation. 
3.3.6 Re-analysis Conclusion 
 
From this brief re-analysis of some of the literature, it can be seen that the choice/delivery 
framework rather easily categorises existing work on personalised nudging. Furthermore, by 
re-analysing using the choice/delivery framework, components which exist only in the most 
abstract of personalisation theory – such as heterogeneity – become more obvious.  
3.4 – Choice and Delivery in Isolation and in Tandem 
 
One outstanding question is whether choice and delivery personalisation can be used in 
conjunction, or whether they represent distinctly different forms of personalisation which must 
remain separate. The literature on personalised nudging would seem to suggest the latter, 
with no study seemingly combining both, and no conceptual understanding of personalised 
nudging – even that put forth by Peer et al. (2019) – bringing both together. 
Yet, there is no clear reason why choice and delivery personalisation must operate separately. 
There may be a myriad of contextual reasons – for instance, a given choice may not lend itself 
to using both, there may be inhibitive costs associated with one or the other, or personalisation 
itself may not be a worthwhile endeavour.166 Yet, from a theory perspective, there seems little 
reason to not conceive of a personalisation process which first uses heterogeneity data to 
personalise the delivery of the nudge, before using the same or additional heterogeneity data 
to personalise the choice which a decision-maker is nudged towards. 
Furthermore, such an evolution of personalised nudging seems absolutely necessary to 
conform with future imaginings of nudging as found in the literature. Yeung (2017), for 
 
166 For instance, Sunstein (2013a) argues nudges which likely involve a lot of heterogeneity such as the present 
bias nudge may better candidates for personalisation than those with less associated heterogeneity. 
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instance, writes of hypernudges, “technologies thus operate as self-contained cybernetic 
systems, with the entire tripartite regulatory cycle continuously implemented via a recursive 
feedback loop which allows dynamic adjustment of both the standard-setting and behaviour 
modification phases of the regulatory cycle, enabling an individual’s choice architecture to be 
continuously reconfigured in real time” (Yeung, 2017: 122). Clearly, the ambition for 
behavioural nudging and interventions within the information technology era vastly exceeds 
the hypothesis (and in many ways presumes to be correct) that the two base-components of 
personalisation, choice and delivery, might be used in tandem. Furthermore, contextual 
evidence, where it exists, supports this hypothesis. Luckerson (2015), for instance, notes that 
the Facebook algorithm prioritises content which adopts a medium which an individual user is 
expected to interact with. For instance, a user who regularly engages with photos, but 
generally scrolls past text, will be shown more photo-based content. Matched with the 
Facebook advertising algorithm which shows users targeted advertising (Zuboff, 2019), a 
picture begins to emerge of a “continuously reconfigured”, “[individual] choice architecture”, to 
use the language of Yeung (2017), one that combines both personalisation in delivery (i.e. 
selecting the best medium) and personalisation in choice (i.e. selecting the best product). 
This example, of course, is not an example of personalised nudging, both from the perspective 
that Facebook is not explicitly nudging users, and from the libertarian paternalist perspective 
that advertising may not be a welfare-bolstering outcome.167 Yet, choice and delivery are much 
more methods of personalisation, with personalised nudging representing these methods 
applied to nudge theory. As such, the question of using choice and delivery personalisation in 
conjunction is not a question which is the reserve of nudge theory; rather, it is a distinct 
 
167 Following Sunstein (2017a), what Facebook does with its algorithms may be considered nudging. But this 
argument is based on a fraught argument used by Sunstein (2017a) that a GPS also nudges users; an argument 
which quickly reveals itself to suggest that most anything can be considered a nudge. Equally, following 
Schubert’s (2017, 2015) arguments that nudges are merely tools, and Beggs’ (2016) and Lavi’s (2017) 
arguments that nudges can be used for non-paternal reasons, once more an argument could be made that 
Facebook, within this example, is nudging – simply not following libertarian paternalism. 
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question which has implications for personalised nudging, just as it has implications for 
personalisation generally. 
As such, despite the lack of empirical evidence that choice and delivery personalisation can 
be used together, the expectation of those with futuristic attitudes, coupled with some 
commentary on real-world personalisation systems, and in absence of any compelling 
argument to the contrary, it seems more than reasonable to anticipate that choice and delivery 
personalisation could be used in tandem. 
What might be the expected result of such a formulation? Without a direct examination, such 
a conclusion can only be speculated at. As seen with the empirical literature into personalised 
nudging, personalised nudges – be them choice personalised or delivery personalised – are 
often more effective than impersonal nudges. Using Sunstein’s (2012) notion of heterogeneity, 
the reason for this increase in effectiveness can be ascribed to a reduction in any issues 
created by heterogeneity, which is to say, by personalisation respecting more heterogeneity. 
A fair hypothesis, therefore, may be that using both choice and delivery personalisation would 
respect even more heterogeneity than simply using choice or delivery, and thus nudges which 
are personalised using both methods would be expected to be even more effective. 
From this discussion, two hypotheses are thus proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Personalised nudges will be statistically significantly more effective at 
influencing political decision-making than impersonal nudges, which in turn will be 
more effective than not nudging. 
Hypothesis 2: Choice and Delivery personalised nudges will be statistically 
significantly more effective at influencing political decision-making than delivery or 
choice personalised nudges alone. 




It is feasible that, in some circumstances, a person may be found to be better off if they were 
not nudged at all. For instance, in Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018), over-savers 
were found to be negatively impacted by nudges which encouraged saving. One conclusion, 
using personalisation, may be to nudge over-savers towards lower contribution rate products. 
But these people already over-save! Surely, a more optimal solution would be found by not 
nudging at all. Of course, further research would be required to examine this hypothesis, but 
it opens up an intriguing possibility. As does another example, that of reactance. Reactance 
is a psychological phenomenon described by Brehm (1966) whereby individuals, by virtue of 
being told to do one thing, engage in the opposite behaviour. Sunstein (2017b) has identified 
reactance as a potential reason why nudges may fail. For individuals who might be expected 
to exhibit reactance, the presence of any nudge may prompt deleterious behaviour. As such, 
when personalising nudges for these individuals, it may be appropriate to consider not nudging 
at all. 
The notion that personalised nudging might result in a person not being nudged at all is a 
concept hereby dubbed shielding. Shielding is not a focus of this research, but it is an idea 
which emerges out of discussions surrounding personalised nudging. Further, it is an idea 
which necessarily needs to be embedded within the theory proposed here, less the theory 
remain incomplete, and requiring some adjustment. It is the opinion of this author that shielding 
is not inconsistent with the theory offered here. 
Firstly, it is prudent to consider were shielding fits within the choice/delivery framework. 
Shielding almost certainly represents a type of delivery personalisation. When imagining 
various types of nudges which could be used to nudge an individual, an additional implicit 
option – not nudging – is always available for selection. The apparent omission of shielding 
from the discussion thus far is the result of the unstated assumption that regardless of whether 
a nudge is being personalised or used impersonally, and regardless of whether choice or 
delivery personalisation is being used, a nudge is always being used. But dropping this 
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assumption, shielding emerges, and it emerges within the choice/delivery framework as a form 
of delivery personalisation. 
Secondly, shielding is not inconsistent with the definitions of choice and delivery 
personalisation. If shielding is a form of delivery personalisation, it would be expected that 
shielding would impact the types of choices available, but not the range of choices (which are 
adjusted using choice personalisation). Indeed, shielding does this. For instance, if a default 
option is being used, the type of choices are opt-in versus opt-out. Shielding removes the 
nudge, and thus the choice reverts to an active choice. This reversion says nothing of the 
range of choices available, which don’t change at all. This consistency with theory is just 
further evidence that shielding is a type of delivery personalisation. Furthermore, when 
considering the language of “most effective” and “best outcome,” it can be seen that neither 
phrase demands the use of a nudge. Indeed, the notion of shielding emerges from accepting 
that circumstances exist whereby the use of a nudge may produce harmful outcomes, and 
therefore not be effective. In some ways, it may even be argued that shielding is a necessary 
consideration to ensure the holistic consistency of the choice and delivery definitions. 
Furthermore, shielding is not simply an emergent quirk of personalised nudging. As Sunstein 
(2012) argues, a perfectly valid alternative solution to the problem of heterogeneity are active 
choices – in other words, not nudging at all. Thus, the consistency between nudge theory and 



















Chapter 4 – Review of Previous Methods 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
 
There is very little prior research on personalised nudging, and while the use of 
psychographics in political campaigns – notably the Cambridge Analytica scandal which 
emerged in 2018 (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018) – has been extensively 
documented in recent years (Chen and Potenza, 2018; Resnick, 2018; Rokka and Airoldi, 
2018; Wade, 2018), no research has sort to apply the behavioural theory of personalised 
nudging to political decision-making.  
This is not to say that valuable prior research, applying either wholly or partially ideas 
pertaining to personalised nudging to alternative domains, does not exist, as evidenced by the 
review of the literature in Chapter 2. Notably, studies by Peer et al. (2019), Schöning, Matt 
and Hess (2019) and Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020). Methodologically, some additional, 
if tangential, studies are also of benefit to this analysis, notably Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012) and Moon (2002). 
Not unexpectedly, methodological weaknesses exist in all these studies. Some appear as 
oversights on the part of the respective authors, while others emerge when these studies are 
recast against the backdrop of the personalised nudging theory developed thus far in this 
thesis. Insofar as an optimised methodology must be developed – and is desirable – 
understanding these weaknesses is advantageous. More advantageous, however, are the 
numerous insights a consultation of previous work can provide. Via a critical, methodological 
review of the studies outlined in the paragraph above, some direction on an effective 
methodological approach to investigating personalised nudging can be ascertained. 
Each paper discussed in this chapter will be split into five categories, or points of discussion: 
Summary, where the approach of the respective authors is summarised; Psychometric 
Selection, where the type of heterogeneity measurement, and the rationale for that measure’s 
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selection, is considered; Nudge Selection, where the selection of nudges, and the rationale 
for their selection, is considered; Mapping Procedure, where the process of creating a model 
from which to personalise interventions is considered; and Additional Comments, where 
miscellaneous commentary on respective papers, if necessary, can be given. This chapter 
concludes with a summary of these findings. 




The work conducted by Peer et al. (2019) examining personalised nudging in the domain of 
cybersecurity is the strongest forerunner to the research undertaken in this thesis. Peer et al. 
(2019) conduct a two-stage project utilising incentivised survey experiments using Amazon’s 
micro-tasking platform, Mechanical Turk (MTurk hereinafter).  
In the first stage, they collect various psychometric data about respondents, before giving 
respondents a password-setting task which utilises impersonal nudges.168 These data are then 
used to construct a model for personalising nudges based on psychometrics. This is done via 
(what will be dubbed here) a mapping procedure, whereby psychometric traits are mapped 
onto nudges.169  
In the second stage, Peer et al. (2019) first collect psychometric data from respondents, before 
utilising these data within their personalisation model (i.e. the mapping procedure) to 
personalise which nudge is shown to an individual respondent, in order to maximise the 
strength of passwords which are created (i.e. maximising the effectiveness of the nudges). By 
comparing the passwords which the first (impersonal) group created with those created in the 
 
168 Which is to say, randomly assigns a nudge to a participant, and is thus, in effect, impersonal nudging. 
169 The mapping criteria could, in theory, vary depending on the purpose of personalisation. Consistent with 
the definition of delivery personalisation outlined in Chapter 3, Peer et al. (2019) utilise a mapping procedure 
which maximises the effectiveness (i.e. potency) of the nudge. From a normative nudging perspective (Oliver, 
2019), which is to say from a libertarian paternalist perspective (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003), this mapping 
criterion is the expected mapping criterion. 
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second (personalised) group, Peer et al. (2019) find the latter group’s passwords to be 
significantly stronger. 
4.2.2 Psychometric Selection 
 
The first stage consisted of a sample of 2,074 participants who were asked to complete two 
psychometric tests, the General Decision-Making Style (GDMS) and the Need for Cognition 
(NFC) scale. Because their research concerns nudging and decision-making, Peer et al. 
(2019) argue – following Egelman and Peer (2015) – psychometric tests which are designed 
to measure decision-making traits are more appropriate than broader psychometric tests such 
as the so-called ‘Big Five’ personality scale used by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) 
and Moon (2002). Once these psychometric tests had been completed, Peer et al. (2019) 
asked participants to part-take in a password setting task. It was only after participants 
completed the password setting task that Peer et al. (2019) asked participants to complete 
two more psychometric tests, the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) scale, and 
the abbreviated numeracy scale (ANS).170 
Peer et al. (2019) do not explain why these tests are performed after the password setting 
task, nor why the GDMS and NFC are performed prior. It may be speculated that they did not 
want to lead or frame the thinking of participants prior to the password setting task. However, 
if this is so, explanation as to why the GDMS and NFC tests were performed prior remains 
lacking. Furthermore, only the CFC would seem to have an obvious framing effect, perhaps 
prompting some participants to think about the longevity of their password, and thus impacting 
the results. The delay in administering the ANS, however, remains unexplained, and given 
any explanation for a delay in the CFC scale is speculative, the decision by Peer et al. (2019) 
to order their procedure in the way that they have still requires explanation. Indeed, in absence 
 
170 Peer et al. (2019) do not refer to their numeracy scale as the ANS, but they do cite Peters et al. (2006), who 
develop the ANS. 
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of an explanation, any reason for replicating the order of psychometric administration would 
be speculative at best. 
What is more evident, and argued explicitly by Peer et al. (2019), is the rationale for the 
selection of the various psychometric tests they use. Contrasting specifically with Hirsh, Kang 
and Bodenhausen (2012; see below), Peer et al. (2019) argue that the general personality 
types of the Big Five personality scale used by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) cannot 
capture the various cognitive traits which would be expected to contribute to decision-making 
in sufficient detail. However, such an assertion does immediately prompt the question of 
whether the rationale behind the selection of the GDMS, NFC, CFC and ANS is sensible.171 
Beyond the name of the GDMS, this scale – developed by Scott and Bruce (1995) – attempts 
to measure the cognitive patterns through which individuals choose between a set of options. 
The GDMS is a scale dedicated to measuring typical or “habitual” (Scott and Bruce, 1995: 
818) decision-making styles, and so seems suitable for an investigation of decision making.172 
The NFC scale also seems reasonable. Originally developed by Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe 
(1955), the scale seeks to measure a person’s propensity to perform cognitively taxing tasks. 
In turning to the nudge literature, the notion of laziness or a path of least resistance frequently 
emerges (Benartzi, 2017), most notably in discussions surrounding default options and the 
status quo bias (Madrian and O’Shea, 2001). The idea, then, that propensity to engage in 
cognitively taxing tasks may moderate the effectiveness of various nudges seems rather 
reasonable. 
In a similar fashion to the NFC scale, the CFC scale can also find justification for its inclusion 
via a comparison with existing behavioural phenomena and nudges. Developed by Strathman 
et al. (1994), the CFC scale attempts to measure a person’s propensity to behave in such a 
way as to consider future consequences, versus more immediate consequences. As such, the 
 
171 For a fuller review of the literature surrounding each of these scales, see Chapter 6. 
172 Scott and Bruce (1995) note that the term ‘decision-making style’ can be used interchangeably with the 
term cognitive style, hence the use of both terms above. 
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CFC may be closely linked to the present bias (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2015), a behavioural 
bias that suggests people place greater importance on immediacy (i.e. the present) compared 
to the future. 
Finally, the rationale for including the ANS is set out by those who develop the scale, namely 
Peters et al. (2006), in their introductory line: “many judgements and decisions rely heavily on 
understanding basic mathematical concepts” (Peters et al., 2006: 407). Peer et al. (2019) 
acknowledge the relevance of numeracy on decision-making, and further link numeracy to the 
notion of risk-taking, a pertinent consideration given their research into cyber security. 
In summary, while the order with which the various psychometric tests are administered 
remains unexplained, and subject only to speculation, the selection of the tests themselves 
seem, at least in this brief review, sensible within the context of decision-making, particularly 
decisions with a degree of risk, and decisions with a degree temporality. 
4.2.3 Nudge Selection 
 
Peer et al. (2019) select strategies which seem to qualify as nudges, following Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008), though the choices of nudges examined by Peer et al. (2019) remain 
somewhat particular. This is in no small part because of the domain in which they situate their 
research, and the experimental conditions/limitations which are imposed.  
To begin, it is helpful to explain what nudges Peer et al. (2019) use in their research. In the 
first round of data collection, they offer five different nudges to participants: an insertion nudge, 
which provides participants with an example of what makes a good password; a meter nudge, 
which indicates to participants how strong/weak their password is, in the form of a progress 
meter; a crack-time nudge, which estimates and informs participants how long it would take to 
crack their password; a social norm nudge, comparing the strength of the participant’s 
password to the password strength of other users; and a correct horse battery staple (CHBS) 
nudge, which offers participants a specific tip on how to generate a good password, in this 
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instance, concatenation of words. These nudges are selected based on their prominence 
within the cyber security literature. 
While the validity of these strategies at encouraging good password-setting is not under 
question, the discussion offered by Peer et al. (2019) remains lacking, as they do not explicitly 
relate these strategies to any underlying behavioural phenomena, or a more conventional 
nudge strategy. With the exception of the social norm nudge, Peer et al. (2019) fail to explicitly 
recognise that, for instance, a meter nudge may invoke loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), or a crack-time nudge the present bias (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2015; Laibson, 
1994).173 While these interventions still do operate as nudges, the lack of relation back to the 
literature leaves several areas under-explained.  
Centrally, the relationship between psychometrics and nudges becomes muddled, as Peer et 
al. (2019) relate their nudges to psychometrics, and fail to offer broad hypotheses for how 
general types of nudges (i.e. the present bias, social norms, the default option effect) relate to 
psychometrics. Insofar as they seek to only ground their research within the domain of cyber 
security, this oversight may be permissible, but insofar as this work is being considered as a 
contribution to an analytical method, this absence is unfortunate. 
4.2.4 Mapping Procedure 
 
Perhaps the most significant contribution offered by Peer et al. (2019) to the present 
discussion is their procedure for analysing data collected from their first, impersonal, nudging 
stage, in order to develop a model of how to personalise the nudges shown to participants 
 
173 By way of further explanation, the meter nudge may be thought of as something of a probability. While no 
password is totally secure, it may be reasonable to expect a password which scores, say, 100% on a password 
meter is more secure than one with a score of, say, 50%. If the 100% score is evaluated as a certainty, then the 
50% score has a component of loss associated with it. This loss takes the form of a risk of the password being 
cracked. For the crack-time nudge, while this may also be evaluated as a sort of probability, it may be much 
harder to calculate the probability of a password being cracked, given an estimate of how long it would take to 
be cracked. As such, the time component would seem more reminiscent of the present bias, where the nudge 
is moderated by one’s propensity to value the short over the long. 
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given their psychometric profiles.174 This procedure is dubbed here the mapping procedure, 
and is a term which will be used throughout this and further discussions. 
Following the first round of data collection, Peer et al. (2019) report 1,824 participant 
responses which are used in their analysis. They aggregate the results of their various 
psychometric scales – which each consist of multiple questions – and test for the internal 
reliability of this aggregation using Cronbach’s alpha. They find no issues with internal 
reliability. These aggregated figures are then used in a regression analysis procedure. 
Specifically, Peer et al. (2019) use moderation regression analysis, followed by the Johnson-
Neyman technique (JNT hereinafter), which is also known as “floodlight analysis” (Hayes, 
2018: 254; Spiller et al., 2013).175 Referring to Hayes (2018), who offers an authoritative 
overview of moderated regression and floodlight analysis, Hayes (2018) notes that moderated 
regression may be a suitable means of analysis when there is reason to believe the effect of 
an independent variable on a dependent variable is moderated by another independent 
variable, namely a moderator variable.176 
The research question Peer et al. (2019) investigate would seem to fit these criteria, holding 
an implicit hypothesis that the effectiveness of a nudge in inducing stronger passwords is 
moderated by individual differences in decision-making, which are captured by the various 
psychometric scales. While Peer et al. (2019) neither state this hypothesis outright, nor their 
use of moderated regression, they do write, “This [the JNT] allowed us to examine the 
moderation effects of each trait on each nudge’s effectiveness” (Peer et al., 2019: 9), which is 
consistent with the use of the JNT following a moderated regression (Hayes, 2018).177 
 
174 I.e., delivery personalisation. See Chapter 3. 
175 For further discussion on the JNT and floodlight analysis, see Chapter 8. In brief here, the JNT allows one to 
evaluate the significance of a moderating (interacting) variable across a continuous range of values. 
176 By ‘moderated,’ Hayes (2018) is referring to a change in effect size due to the presence of a moderator 
variable. The validity of moderation is often evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively, with the former 
relationship tested for statistical significance, and the latter tested based on what might be expected from the 
literature. See Hayes (2018) for more. Moderated regression is also discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
177 A review of the supplementary material provided by Peer et al. (2019) does not offer further clarity here. 
104 
 
Presently, however, several questions remain outstanding. Chiefly: how is the effectiveness 
of the nudge being measured?; what variable is taking the form of the moderator variable?; 
what mathematical form does the moderated regression take?; and what purpose does the 
JNT serve? These questions will be addressed in this order, with some reference to Hayes 
(2018) where appropriate. Furthermore, for a more complete explanation of moderated 
regression and floodlight analysis (the JNT), see Chapter  8. 
Peer et al. (2019) explain that the effectiveness of the nudge is measured by the strength of 
passwords being created by participants, which in turn is determined by using a neural network 
to estimate how many guesses it would take to crack the password. The number of guesses 
is then log-transformed, and this forms the variable which is said to capture the effectiveness 
of the nudge interventions.178 
To answer the second and third questions, Hayes (2018) is a more useful source of 
information, as Peer et al. (2019) do not explicitly outline their statistical procedure. Hayes 
(2018) argues that mathematically the moderator variable, and the variable that is moderated, 
can be interchangeable. This is because – to address the question of the mathematical form 
of a moderated regression – the moderator variable, and the moderated variable, are 
multiplied together as an interaction term within an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
This interaction term can also be called the moderation term (Hayes, 2018), and as the product 
of moderator and moderated is the same regardless of which variable is which, these labels 
are mathematically interchangeable. Of course, the actual interchangeability of these 
variables, as Hayes (2018) explains, is dependent on the subject under research.179 
 
178 This, however, does not necessarily determine that the nudges were effective. Peer et al. (2019) are aware 
of this, and beyond the five subgroups for each of the five nudges examined, they also collect data from a 
sixth, control subgroup. This control subgroup is simply asked to create a password and receives no nudge 
which might influence their judgement. The original draft of this study (Peer et al., 2019), nor the most recent 
draft which is available (Peer et al., 2020) do not offer comparisons of these nudges when used impersonally to 
the control group. However, Peer et al. (2019) do seem to have performed this analysis, as they are able to 
conclude the Crack-Time nudge is the best impersonal nudge. 
179 Hence why Hayes (2018) devotes much time to emphasising not only the quantitative significance 
surrounding a moderation effect, but also the validity of the qualitative underpinnings of that effect. 
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Furthermore, as Johnson and Neyman (1936) argue, the JNT should only be used when the 
moderator variable is a continuous variable. 
Peer et al. (2019) clearly explain that they treat psychometric traits as moderation variables 
(see above). Qualitatively, with reference to the concept of heterogeneity and nudging 
developed by Sunstein (2012), it makes sense for the psychometric traits to be the moderator 
variables. Quantitatively, the various nudge subgroups are likely coded as dummy or 
dichotomous variables, and so would not meet the criteria for use in the JNT as set out by 
Johnson and Neyman (1936), while the psychometric trait variables, being aggregates of 
multiple questions using Likert scales, would qualify as continuous variables.180 
Finally, Peer et al. (2019) use the JNT as a means of probing “regions of significance,” (Peer 
et al., 2019: 8), a term which has also been used extensively by Hayes (2018) and by 
Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006).181 As Peer et al. (2019) note, “regions of significance [are] 
ranges of [psychometric] trait values where the effect of each nudge on password strength is 
statistically significant” (Peer et al., 2019: 8-9). The presence of ranges is a result of the 
continuous moderator variable, as some values of the moderator may exhibit a significant 
moderation effect on the dependent variable, while other values may not (Hayes, 2018). This 
is somewhat intuitive; a person who scores highly on one psychometric is, based on that 
psychometric, different from someone who scores very low on that same psychometric. It 
would thus be somewhat deceptive to equate the relationship these disparate individuals’ 
experience with any nudge to be identical simply because the psychometric overall has a 
significant moderating effect.182 
 
180 More so if the aggregation process follows an averaging of responses, rather than a summation. Peer et al. 
(2019) do not state which method they used, though it is likely they used averaging. 
181 Peer et al. (2019) draw on the use of the JNT by Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006) rather than Hayes 
(2018). The term ‘regions of significance’ can, in fact, be found in Johnson and Neyman’s (1936) original paper 
on the topic. 
182 Peer et al. (2019) perform some initial probing of the effect different scores have in their supplementary 
material. While these results do not form a significant part of their final contribution, they do find some initial 
evidence of differences seemingly resulting from arbitrarily ‘high’ scorers and arbitrarily ‘low’ scorers, 
reinforcing this intuitive notion. 
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Following the moderated regression analysis, Peer et al. (2019) identify significant moderation 
effects from all psychometric tests for the CHBS and crack-time nudges; significant 
moderation effects from the CFC and GDMS scales for the meter nudge; some significant 
moderation effects from the NFC scale for the social norm nudge; and no significant 
moderation for the insertion nudge. Following the JNT, they then identify the corresponding 
regions of significance for each nudge.183 
Having identified these scores, Peer et al. (2019) seem close to having built a mapping model 
to personalise the nudges shown to participants, which they do in a second stage of data 
collection. However, an outstanding problem remains, namely, if a person could be nudged 
effectively with two or more nudges – given their psychometric profile – some procedure must 
determine which nudge to use. Without resolving this problem, one may be personalising 
nudges, but not optimally personalising. The lack of clarity in this step is the biggest 
methodological weakness of Peer et al. (2019). 
They first establish that they seek to maximise the effectiveness of the nudge, noting, “we 
computed for each participant the nudge that would be expected to produce the highest effect 
on the password strength” (Peer et al., 2019: 12). The problem facing Peer et al. (2019), 
however, is not so much understanding the criteria by which a single nudge is selected from 
a pool of nudges, but rather in explaining what computation they did once establishing these 
criteria. Peer et al. (2019) give some insights into their procedure, noting that they used a 
Monte-Carlo simulation to compute which nudge was best in a given situation. However, they 
do not explain the parameters of their simulation, nor do they explain why they used a 
simulation, when alternative strategies may be available (see Chapter 8). Furthermore, 
through using this strategy, Peer et al. (2019) note, “Our simulations estimated that the crack-
time nudge would be optimal for 85% of the sample, whereas the meter nudge would be 
optimal for 15% of the sample” (Peer et al., 2019: 12-13). In other words, this simulation 
 
183 I.e., the values of a given psychometric variable that would be expected to significantly moderate the 
effectiveness of the nudge. 
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method greatly reduced the range of nudges they use in the second stage of their analysis, 
prompting an observer to question whether such a reduced range of nudges is sufficient to 
adequately personalise interventions.184 
Regardless of questions surrounding the use of a Monte-Carlo simulation, Peer et al. (2019) 
now argue they are able to adequately personalise nudges, given a person’s psychometric 
profile, such that password strength is maximised. 
4.2.5 Additional Comments 
 
While the data collection and mapping procedures capture most of the significant aspects of 
the approach to personalisation adopted by Peer et al. (2019), it is still worthwhile to explore, 
ultimately, how Peer et al. (2019) assess the effectiveness of their personalisation strategy. 
This is achieved by collecting data from a second group of participants, again using an 
incentivised experiment hosted on Amazon’s MTurk. Of the 1,146 participants initially 
recruited, Peer et al. (2019) retain 931 participants following the failure of some 215 to 
correctly respond to an attention check question. 
Unlike in the first group, this second group were asked to complete all four psychometric tests 
(GDMS, NFC, CFC and ANS) prior to being shown any nudge. Recall in the previous round, 
participants were asked to complete some psychometrics prior, and some following, the nudge 
task. The rationale for conducting all the tests prior to nudging participants in the second group 
is quite sensible – the psychometric data is needed in order to personalise the delivery of the 
nudge. This does, however, raise two points of consideration. Firstly, the slight difference in 
procedure may call into question the direct comparability of the first and second groups. 
Secondly, and additionally, the speculated rationale for having administered tests at different 
times in the first group was to avoid any priming or framing effects those tests might have 
 
184 Note, they may be. However, it is difficult to rectify this criticism without a more thorough explanation on 
behalf of Peer et al. (2019) as to why their simulation approach was more appropriate than alternative 
approaches, such as ranking coefficients. Without such an explanation, the conclusion that only two nudges 




contributed; having performed all the psychometric tests before nudging in this second group, 
it may be speculated that either a) those priming effects are now a potential source of variance 
in response between the first and second cohorts, or b) the risk of priming effects is 
insignificant enough so as to be ignored in this second stage, prompting the question of why 
tests were administered in the order that they were in the first. Peer et al. (2019) are not 
forthcoming with explanations of these criticisms. 
Nevertheless, as above, it seems wholly reasonable to collect all psychometric data prior to 
nudging, as all psychometric data are needed to personalise the delivery of the nudge. As 
above, Peer et al. (2019) only select from two nudges in this second stage, the crack-time 
nudge, and the meter nudge. It may be inferred that they examine the various psychometric 
results produced by a given participant, refer to the regions of significance information 
produced by the JNT to identify which nudge/nudges are viable for that given participant, 
before deferring to the Monte Carlo simulation results to ultimately choose between the two 
nudges, when either are deemed appropriate.185 
Once personalised nudges have been selected, Peer et al. (2019) invite participants to part-
take in the same password setting task as that undertaken by participants in the first stage. 
These passwords are then appraised for their strength. Peer et al (2019) test for differences 
between the personalised group (the second group), the impersonal group (members of the 
first group who were nudged), and the control group (members of the first group who were not 
nudged). These comparisons are done using a t-test and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitley U-test 
(WMW-test). 
4.3 – Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
 
 
185 It is important to note that this is an inference, and Peer et al. (2019) remain rather scant on the exacting 
details of their process. Issues thus arise; for instance, without them explaining the nature of their simulation 
model, it cannot be known whether the simulation model alone is relied upon, or whether the output of the 
JNT is also consulted. Furthermore, it is possible that neither nudge would be deemed suitable for a given 
participant (and the likelihood of this occurring increases as the range of nudges to choose from decreases – 





For what is, in principle, a similar investigation to that conducted by Peer et al. (2019), 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) take a very different methodological approach (though, their 
approach is rather similar to those of Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) and Moon (2002). 
See below). 
Where Peer et al. (2019) situate their investigation of personalised nudging in the domain of 
cybersecurity, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) investigate the use of personalised nudging in 
the domain of data privacy, specifically, personal health information (PHI hereinafter). 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), much like Peer et al.  (2019), view online, digital 
infrastructures as an opportunity to embed nudges into a process which they very much view 
as a decision, complete with risks and rewards. In fact, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) go 
so far as to define personalised nudging as a subset of digital nudging.186 
They conducted a survey experiment which received a total of 156 respondents. Participants 
were recruited via a university database (though the exact selection criteria are omitted) and 
via Facebook (though the conditions of this sampling are not elaborated upon). The 
experiment was not incentivised, and was modelled around, “a health bonus programme 
[used] by a health insurance company,” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 4399) which 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) explain is typically provided via a mobile app. 
Measuring two “cognitive styles” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 4398), namely verbal and 
visual, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) investigated levels of trust, perceptions of risk, 
concerns for privacy, and willingness to disclosure PHI between groups who were nudged 
using a nudge which matched their cognitive style, versus those whose nudge didn’t match. 
Following a t-test, they find mixed results, suggesting personalisation may significantly lower 
 
186 This is disputable given the choice/delivery framework developed here. For more, see Chapters 2 and 3. 
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privacy concerns and risk perceptions, but not significantly increase levels of trust or 
willingness to disclose PHI. 
4.3.2 Psychometric Selection 
 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) select two “cognitive styles” for their investigation.187 They 
investigate dichotomous verbal/visual styles, with the former suggesting text and language-
based information is preferred, and the latter suggesting visual and image-based information 
is preferred. The justification for this selection is somewhat unclear. Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) are quite forthcoming with some semblance of a justification, suggesting the 
verbal/visual styles were selected because they are, “a widely agreed upon distinction in 
psychology, marketing, and education” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019). A wide agreement 
regarding the existence of the verbal/visual distinction, however, is not a sufficient justification 
for the selection of the verbal/visual styles in their investigation. 
Given this, one is inclined to infer the selection criteria. Such inference is quite forthcoming, 
given the definition Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) provide for personalised nudging, and 
the discursive landscape in which they place their research. As above, Schöning, Matt and 
Hess (2019) consider personalised nudging a type of digital nudging, and borrowing from 
Weinmann, Schneider and Brocke (2016), define digital nudging as, “the use of user-interface 
design elements to guide people’s behavior [sic] in digital choice environments” (Schöning, 
Matt and Hess, 2019: 4396; Weinmann, Schneider and Brocke, 2016: 433). As such, 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) are definitionally limited in their investigation of personalised 
nudging to an exploration of user-interface (UI) adjustments. Given this limitation, the choice 
 
187 The use of terminology in the literature (i.e. psychometric vs. cognitive style vs. decision-making style) 
remains varied, but seemingly inconsequential. Typically, decision-making styles may be described as 
psychometrics (Peer et al. 2019; Egelman and Peer, 2015) but have also been considered an entity in und 
themselves (Scott and Bruce, 1995), as well as a sub-component of cognitive styles (Dewberry, Juanchich and 
Narendran, 2013; Kozhevnikov, 2007). In each instance, the principle of the term (i.e. a numerical measure of 
some cognitive phenomenon) remains the same, and so the language used by respective authors is adopted 
when discussing their work, but these terms are considered essentially interchangeable throughout. 
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of measuring verbal/visual cognitive styles makes sense; UIs consist of various verbal and 
visual components which UI designers can manipulate. 
As such, the selection of the verbal/visual cognitive styles can be justified within the constraints 
established by Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019). Yet, the rationale for selection still remains 
rather weak. For instance, following the arguments of Peer et al.  (2019) and Egelman and 
Peer (2015), specificity in psychometric selection may be important to improve predictive 
power. Insofar as they discuss the verbal/visual cognitive styles, Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) do not address how these measures may be adapted (or be outright suitable for) the 
PHI context they are investigating.188 
4.3.3 Nudge Selection 
 
Much like Peer et al. (2019), Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) suffer from an ill-defined nudge 
framework, though differences persist. With Peer et al. (2019), the assertion was that various 
graphical adjustments to their password-setting task would function as nudges, and as above, 
the main criticism levered was that they failed to explicitly relate most of these nudge ideas to 
underlying behavioural phenomena. 
With Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), they define the nudges they investigate around the 
concept of verbal/visual. The first nudge, the visual nudge, “[displayed] the information about 
data usage with icons” while the second, verbal, nudge, “[displayed] the information with bullet 
points” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 4399). Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) offer little 
justification to support their nudge design, and – as with Peer et al. (2019) – generally fail to 
relate their nudges to underlying behavioural phenomena. Though, this may be forgiven, as 
 
188Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) do not even state precisely what questions make up the verbal/visual scale. 
They may indicate a source of this material, appearing to reference Kirby, Moore and Schofield (1988) and 
Solomon and Felder (1991). However, this remains unclear, as Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) write, “for 
determining respective cognitive styles, i.e. if someone classified [sic] a visual or a verbal type, we employed 
three semantic differentials with questions drawn from the literature” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 4399) 
before proceeding to cite the above authors. As such, it is unclear whether Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
first classify participants, and then differentiate further, or differentiate candidates using the “three semantic 
differentials” found in the literature. 
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they seem to be following a rather intuitive rationale; a visual style will likely need to involve 
images or icons, while a verbal style will likely need to involve text. 
This is not to say outstanding questions cannot be asked. Namely, given the same information 
regarding privacy must be conveyed by each nudge,189 one may question how significantly 
different swapping bullet points for icons may be? This criticism may not just be speculative; 
given Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) report generally mixed results regarding differences in 
decision-making between verbal and visual participants, there is good cause to question 
whether these changes were sufficient.  
4.3.4 Mapping Procedure 
 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) adopt a mapping procedure that is very different to that of 
Peer et al. (2019) but is – when contrasted with other literature considered here – not 
particularly unusual. This is not to say that Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) share no ground 
with Peer et al. (2019) in terms of mapping; in fact, with Peer et al. (2019) in mind, it is evident 
that the method adopted by Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) could easily be reformulated so 
as to follow the method of Peer et al. (2019). What’s more, the method adopted by Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) is entirely feasible within the method taken by Peer et al. (2019). These 
existing methodological links are interesting, and worthy of some discussion. Immediately, 
however, the specific method adopted by Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) should be 
considered. 
The name ‘mapping procedure’ is something of a misnomer when considering the work of 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) – it is likely more appropriate to use the name matching 
procedure.190 This is because they do not adopt a two-stage data collection method as Peer 
 
189 Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) report information from GDPR, which mandates various disclosures which 
must be reported. 
190 Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) have also used the phrase “message-person congruence” (Hirsh, Kang 
and Bodenhausen, 2012: 578). The use of the term ‘matching’ as given here, however, rather than this 
alternative phrase, is that the alternative places unwarranted emphasis on messaging, which will not always be 
the nudge under examination. Furthermore, Moon (2002), whose process is very similar to Hirsh, Kang and 
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et al. (2019) do, and instead utilise only one round of data collection.191 Schöning, Matt and 
Hess (2019) first showed each of their 156 participants PHI privacy disclosures, with 
participants randomly shown these disclosures under a visual frame, or under a verbal frame. 
They then measured a participant’s trust, privacy concerns and risk perceptions surrounding 
privacy disclosures, before testing to see if participants had verbal or visual cognitive styles. 
Finally, participants were asked to provide PHI. 
Several items of note emerge from this process. Most intriguing is the measurement of 
verbal/visual styles. While Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) give examples of the questions 
asked of participants (e.g. “I am rather the verbal/visual type” (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019: 
4400)), it remains unclear precisely what scale, if any, they are drawing from. Furthermore, 
each question could be answered on a 6-point Likert scale, and so some degree of 
aggregation is necessary, as with Peer et al. (2019) and their psychometric scales. Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) aggregate using a mean average but offer no Cronbach’s alpha to 
indicate whether this process maintained internal validity.192 Additionally, with these questions 
now aggregated, they simply assign participants who had an average score less than 3.5 
(based on a 6-item, 1 through 7 Likert scale) as visual, while those with a score greater than 
3.5 were verbal. While the structure of the questions asked enable this procedure,193 and while 
there may be practical reasons for doing so, such a decision may be unnecessarily simplifying. 
For instance, it seems likely that many people exhibit a range of both verbal and visual 
 
Bodenhausen’s (2012) and Schöning, Matt and Hess’ (2019) uses the terms “matching” (Moon, 2002: 322) and 
“matches” (Moon, 2002: 313). The use of the term here, therefore, finds precedence in Moon (2002). 
191 The implications of this are to be elaborated on more below. In sum, the second round serves, for Peer et 
al. (2019), as something of a prediction round, whereby the mapping procedure can be tested by assessing the 
effectiveness of its predictions. For Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), no such round exists, which prompts 
some epistemological concerns. 
192 There are two items to note. Firstly, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) do provide some Cronbach alpha 
results later in their paper, but these appear related to the various questions measuring trust, privacy and risk, 
rather than verbal/visual cognition. Secondly, only three questions are used to measure verbal/visual 
cognition, so it might be argued that Cronbach’s alpha serves little purpose here (as relatively little aggregation 
is happening). This, however, seems insufficient, as a) Cronbach’s alpha could still be tested; b) if so few 
questions are necessary, could verbal/visual not simply be measured using a single question? and c) if not, are 
three questions sufficient to measure verbal/visual cognition? 
193 By which, all questions had low scores indicating visual, and all high scores indicating verbal, and as such, an 
average would still encode this information. 
114 
 
preferences, even if one dominates. By way of their assignment, Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) allow this detail to be lost. Furthermore, questions must be raised about the validity of 
this measure, assuming a normal distribution of scores. Given this assumption, many people 
will have scores around 3.5 for both verbal and visual, and so it must be considered whether 
it is reliable to simply split the sample based on achieving an above or below average score. 
Another item of note is the order in which Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) collect their data. 
Assume, for a moment, that data pertaining to trust, privacy concerns and risk propensity is 
actually akin to the psychometric data collected by Peer et al. (2019).194 Under this 
assumption, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) collect these psychometric data after nudging 
participants. As will become clear in a moment when discussing the matching procedure, the 
use of a nudge before collecting additional data greatly diminishes the claims of Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) that they were personalising nudges, both from the perspective of 
predicting  which nudges would be best, and from the perspective of actually adjusting nudges 
to match preferences.195 
However, the assumption that underpins this critique does not hold – in fact, to proceed with 
such an assumption would reveal a great misunderstanding of their work. Schöning, Matt and 
Hess (2019) do not treat trust, privacy concerns and risk propensity as psychometrics which 
moderate the effectiveness of the verbal/visual nudge, but rather regard these measures as 
additional dependent variables – along with willingness to disclosure PHI – with which to 
scrutinise the effectiveness of personalisation. 
 
194 They are not, but there is more to be said of this notion. See below. 
195 There is a fair argument that these are the same thing. They may be considered different if one believes 
that sometimes it can be known which nudges correspond to which preferences, and thus no prediction is 
occurring. This belief may be questionable, and so the argument that these perspectives are the same seems 
valid. The benefit of framing these perspectives as such largely comes from methodological perspectives. For 
instance, Peer et al. (2019) use a mapping process from which to predict how to personalise nudges; Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) utilise a matching process whereby they presume to know that, say, a visual person will 
respond better to a visual nudge. In the language of reasoning, the former, predictive approach is first 
inductive, before becoming deductive, while the latter, matching approach is only deductive. 
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In this sense, and as already alluded, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) do not use a mapping 
procedure where they search out relationships between nudges, psychometrics, and a 
measure of effectiveness; instead, they use a matching procedure, whereby they hypothesise 
a relationship between a nudge and a psychometric, and test this hypothesis using a 
dependent variable. For instance, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) hypothesise that visual 
individuals will respond better to visual nudges, and verbal people will respond better to verbal 
nudges. They then randomly assign people to either a verbal or visual nudge, and then after-
the-fact determine if a) a person was a verbal/visual person and b) if that person was matched 
or not to a corresponding verbal/visual nudge. In a comparison of groups, therefore, Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) do not contrast verbal participants with visual participants, but instead, 
what might be called matched participants with unmatched participants (or personalised 
participants with impersonal participants). 
Using a t-test, they are able test, for each of the four dependent variables, whether these 
groups were statistically significantly different, and through an examination of the means, 
determine which group seemed most effected by the nudge. There are, centrally, three core 
criticisms to be made of this matching approach, compared to the previously examined 
mapping approach. Firstly, as discussed above, the act of personalising after-the-fact makes 
any claim to personalising the nudges rather dubious. At best, the matching procedure allows 
researchers to make statements to the effect of, “if nudges were personalised, they would 
have X effect.” This, in the opinion of this author, does not constitute actually personalising 
nudges.  
Secondly, in this specific instance, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) did not contrast their 
‘personalised’ and ‘impersonal’ groups against a third, control group. They may implicitly 
assume that the unmatched group functions as the control group, but given members of this 
group are by definition being nudged in an impersonal way (which, presumably, means a less 
effective way), it is unfair to consider this group a representative control group. Furthermore, 
by consciously assembling groups into matched and unmatched after-the-fact, Schöning, Matt 
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and Hess (2019) may be manufacturing significance. For instance, consider Peer et al. (2019). 
In their first stage of data collection, participants were impersonally nudged. Within this group 
will be many that could be determined to be, after-the-fact, being nudged sub-optimally, and 
a few being nudged optimally, albeit unintentionally. The unmatched group assembled by 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), however, definitionally contains no one who was 
unintentionally nudged optimally. As such, this assembly of the groups imbues a degree of 
methodological bias which may exaggerate any significance.196  
Thirdly, the matching procedure actually exists as a sub-procedure within the mapping 
procedure. This will be expanded on shortly – the immediate point to be made here is that, 
methodologically, one should not see mapping versus matching as a binary choice; rather, an 
advantage that emerges only through an analysis of the matching procedure is the clear, 
holistic approach of the mapping procedure.  
4.3.5 Additional Comments 
 
In the case of Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) in particular, this revelation is quite significant. 
One methodological contribution they offer – which, to their detriment Peer et al. (2019) do not 
– is a conceptual model of how nudges (in the model, ‘stimulus’), psychometrics (in the model 
‘perception’) and effectiveness (in the model ‘behaviour’) interact. Recall, for instance, an 
above criticism of Peer et al. (2019) was a lack of a clear statement relating – even as a 
hypothesis – nudges and psychometrics. Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) should face no such 
criticism, as their conceptual model (visually shown as a flow-chart on page 4398) clearly 
shows that the effectiveness of the nudge (behaviour) is affected by the nudge (stimulus) via 
psychometrics (perception). The language chosen here is selected so as to best reflect the 
 
196 There are two arguments one could make when playing Devil’s advocate. Firstly, it may not be possible to 
have a ‘true’ control group within the domain Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) examine. This follows from 
Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) argument that choice architecture and nudges cannot be avoided – as long as a 
decision must be made, framing surrounding that decision must exist. Secondly, assuming Schöning, Matt and 
Hess (2019) had limited resources or reason to adopt alternative methods, the matching procedure reveals 
itself to be a rather sensible and easy method to adopt. Even if one can criticise it, these practical 
considerations should not be dismissed. 
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ideas found within their paper, but the conceptual model given by Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) seems frightfully close in conception to the notion of psychometrics moderating nudges 
examined by Peer et al. (2019). 
It is for this reason that one might be tempted to describe trust, privacy concerns and risk 
perceptions as psychometric measures, rather than additional dependent variables as 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) do. What’s more, given the data available to Schöning, Matt 
and Hess (2019), it seems entirely possible that a mapping procedure following Peer et al. 
(2019) could be replicated by Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) with no change in how the data 
are gathered. In this sense, it first becomes evident that the matching procedure is contained 
within the mapping procedure. This conclusion might also be arrived at in reverse; by 
considering the first stage data collected by Peer et al. (2019), it is feasible that these authors 
could have hypothesised various relationships between nudges and psychometrics within a 
conceptual model, and assigned first stage participants to matched/unmatched groups after-
the-fact, in accordance with their hypotheses. 
In conclusion, by contrasting the methods of Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019), both points of weakness and points of complement can be identified, and a stronger 
methodological approach begins to emerge. 




Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) consider how personalised (or “customized”) reminder 
nudges can be used in conjunction with FAFSA completions – FAFSA being a US state and 
federal programme designed to provide financial support to students graduating from high 
school and entering higher education. They argue that FAFSA is, like other public policies, 
“often hindered by complicated application processes that make it difficult for people who are 
eligible for public benefits to access them” (Page, Castleman and Meyer, 2020: 3). To increase 
FAFSA uptake, therefore, they suggest behavioural nudges could be introduced. However, 
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Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) argue, “information that is generic and not tailored to an 
individual’s background and circumstances may seem less salient” (Page, Castleman and 
Meyer, 2020: 8), and thus hypothesise that customizing or personalising any nudges used in 
conjunction with FAFSA may prove more effective than impersonal nudging. 
Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) take advantage of an automated text message distribution 
service available to some 66 high schools, with a reach of as many as 17,000 students, to 
introduce a reminder nudge in the form of a text message to encourage students to engage 
with and complete their FAFSA application.197 For half of these schools, however, Page, 
Castleman and Meyer (2020) also customize (personalise) these text messages by linking the 
automated service to a database of students’ FAFSA applications. This allows them to send 
application-appropriate messages to students in the personalised treatment group, and 
generic reminders to students in the impersonal control group. 
Generally, Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) find consistent statistical evidence that 
personalised nudging produced a significant increase in student engagement with and 
completion of FAFSA, as well as enrolment in higher education, compared to the control 
group. 
4.4.2 Psychometric Selection 
 
It would be rather disingenuous to talk of psychometric selection in regard to Page, Castleman 
and Meyer (2020), as they make no endeavour to collect psychometric data (despite 
acknowledging that people may differ in how salient they find the same piece of information). 
To be sure, this lack of collection was likely outside of their control, given their research 
concerns several thousand children, for many of whom FAFSA and higher education will be 
their first significant financial decision.198 Even if Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) could 
 
197 Cadena and Schoar (2011) have demonstrated the effectiveness of reminder nudges at encouraging loan 
repayments, while Altmann and Traxler (2014) have shown reminder nudges can increase attendance of 
dental appointments. 
198 This is to say there is an ethical component (working with children) and a methodological component (are 
participants suitable for psychometric testing?). 
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and did collect psychometric data, therefore, it may be speculated that the validity of such data 
would be clouded by a lack of experience from participants; distorted given the time in life the 
testing would be occurring in (e.g. at a time of applying for university or a job, considering 
moving away from home, taking on a significant financial commitment; all big decisions which 
may influence judgment); and compromised by the character of participants (e.g. participants 
may still be developing physically and cognitively). 
It is also not clear that collecting any psychometric data within this study would necessarily 
improve the quality of the research; indeed, when contrasted with the procedure undertaken 
by Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020), it seems likely psychometric data would have 
complicated the procedure. Furthermore, in consultation with the definitions of choice and 
delivery personalisation seen in Chapter 3 – and accepting the proposition laid there that 
Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) use choice personalisation – there is no compulsion to 
use psychometric data, only some measure of heterogeneity. As such, one must consider 
what measure of heterogeneity Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) use. 
Insofar as Page, Castle and Meyer (2020) can be fit into the general schema constructed in 
this thesis, they identify heterogeneity broadly within the FAFSA application process. This is 
to say, at any given moment during the course of their experiment, the automated system 
used by Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) could identify the completion status of a given 
student’s application. As can be expected, at any given time, many students were at different 
points in completing their applications, with some having not begun their FAFSA, and some 
having completed their FAFSA. Stage-of-completion, therefore, appears as the heterogeneity 
data Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) use to personalise the reminder nudge. 
This need not be the only data they could use, however. The case for why conventional 
psychometric testing cannot be used has been made above, but Page, Castleman and Meyer 
(2020) outline in great detail the various demographic data they are able to acquire about 
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participants, as well as school-level data.199 One might speculate as to whether these data 
could have been used as a means of personalising interventions. Certainly, a hypothesis may 
be constructed around, say, family income and attentiveness to financial matters, which may 
moderate the effectiveness of any nudge, to use the language of Peer et al (2019). 
Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) do not pursue a hypothesis like this, though their use of 
stage-of-completion data does not seem inconsistent with their general theory of 
personalisation. They write, “a potentially important distinction is… what kind of information is 
likely to be most salient to individuals… for instance, information about the benefits of pursuing 
higher education… may not resonate with individuals if they already have some basic 
understanding of the benefits” (Page, Castleman and Meyer, 2020: 8, original emphasis).  
By this same logic, it is easy to imagine that an impersonal reminder text to two students, one 
who has nearly completed their FAFSA, and one who has not started, would resonate much 
more with the latter if it were reminding them to start the application, and much more with the 
former if it were reminding them to finish their application. The reverse, however, would seem 
to communicate the wrong kind of information (to use the language of Page, Castleman and 
Meyer (2020)) and thus, “may seem less salient” (Page, Castleman and Meyer, 2020: 8). The 
immediate conclusion, therefore, is that while Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) utilise a 
rather different approach to heterogeneity as seen in Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt 
and Hess (2019) (and as will be seen with Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) and Moon 
(2002)), Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) still utilise a concept of heterogeneity that is 
consistent with their theory of personalisation, and consistent with the theory of personalisation 
developed in Chapter 3. 
 
199 One might even argue FAFSA information itself, such as academic grades or family income, could have also 
been incorporated into this analysis. There are three clear objections to this notion, however. Firstly, this 
supposes these data were available, which would not be the case for someone who never starts their FAFSA or 
does not complete the necessary sections. Secondly, if starting an FAFSA application is a precursor to accessing 
this data, it would not be possible for these data to be used to personalise the FAFSA experience (especially 
the initial nudge to start an FAFSA application). Thirdly, even ignoring the first two objections, Page, Castleman 
and Meyer (2020) may not have had permission (or ethical legitimacy) to use these data, given the type of 
data, and the subjects being investigated. 
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4.4.3 Nudge Selection 
 
With further reference to Chapter 3, it is argued there that Page, Castleman and Meyer’s 
(2020) “customized” nudges constitute choice personalisation, as the method of nudging – a 
reminder nudge – is not personalised, but the outcomes/choices/options nudged towards are 
personalised. Given this, and as with the previous subsection, it is quite inappropriate to 
critique their selection of nudges, as only one nudge has been selected.200 Rather, it seems 
appropriate to consider the outcomes/choices/options Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) 
instead select from. 
Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) detail on page 11 of their study four categories or 
classifiers which relate to their measure of heterogeneity – these are “FAFSA not yet started”; 
“FAFSA submitted, not yet complete”; “FAFSA complete”; and “FAFSA complete, selected for 
income verification.” From these classifications, they write, “Students’ FAFSA status 
information was updated in districts’ data systems every 1 or 2 weeks. As this information was 
updated, OneLogos [the automatic messaging service utilised by Page, Castleman and Meyer 
(2020)] updated the message stream that students received” (Page, Castleman and Meyer, 
2020: 11). In other words, when a student advanced from one classifier to another – say, from 
having no FAFSA to starting an application – the message sent to the student would also 
adjust. 
The exact wording of these messages is provided by Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) in 
their appendices. A review of Appendix A reveals that students in the control group received 
some of the messages received by students in the treatment group. Thus, the control group 
seems to function as an impersonal nudge group, while the treatment group receives 
additional text messages which are personalised. In all, the treatment group receives 3 
 
200 A conversation could be had, as part of a methodological critique, as to whether a reminder nudge was the 
best choice, or what rationale was used to support the selection of a reminder nudge. On this first point, it 
seems largely moot given the study at hand, as any investigation to resolve this query would, most likely, 
constitute an entirely different study in and of itself. On the second point, the pre-existence of communication 
infrastructure designed around disseminating text messages seems reasonable justification for the selection of 
a text-based reminder nudge. 
122 
 
personalised messages, despite their being four classifiers, because all students – 
irrespective of grouping – who have not started their application receive the same generic 
message.201 
4.4.4 Mapping Procedure 
 
Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) adopt a rather different analytical approach compared to 
either Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), opting for a standard regression 
analysis (i.e. OLS). A departure from previous methods is to be expected here, as Peer et al. 
(2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) investigate delivery personalisation, while Page, 
Castleman and Meyer (2020) investigate choice personalisation. Given the latter investigate 
a different aspect of personalised nudging, it is not surprising that they adopt a different 
analytical technique. 
As above, Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) utilise regression analysis, specifically OLS. It 
may be helpful at the immediate moment to ignore their dependent variable and return to this 
question shortly. Instead, immediate attention is paid to the independent variables which they 
use. Much like Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), Page, Castleman and 
Meyer (2020) demarcate their control and treatment groups (those who do not receive 
personalised reminder messages, and those who do, respectively) with a simple dummy 
variable. They include additional control variables, specifically variables controlling for 
individual student demographics, and variables controlling for school-level variation. Page, 
Castleman and Meyer (2020) do not give an indication of whether such controls were 
necessary following an analysis of distributions across the control and treatment groups and 
may have simply been included for prudency. Furthermore, as a single school could only 
belong to one group (i.e. all members of school A would be in a control group, all members of 
 
201 Generic in terms of information, though not content. A review of the content of messages found in 
Appendix A reveals that all students receive texts messages which include their name and their high school. In 
a rather washed-out sense of the word, therefore, all messages could be said to be personalised or 
customized. Insofar as the topic is discussed here, such personal inclusions do not count as personalisation. 
However, it should be acknowledged that these inclusions may have induced some effect, and thus the control 
group may not represent a true control group (where no personalisation is offered at all). 
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school B would be in a treatment group), it is possible that such a comparison of distributions 
across the control and treatment groups on a school-level would not be meaningful. 
Nevertheless, after controlling for individual- and school-level differences, Page, Castleman 
and Meyer (2020) determine whether personalisation was a) statistically significant and b) 
positive through an interpretation of their dummy variable and its associated coefficient. 
Returning now to the dependent variable, Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) share some 
similarities to Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) in that they investigate multiple dependent 
variables, contrasting various regression results to inform their conclusions.202 Page, 
Castleman and Meyer (2020) explore three broad dependent variables in greater minutiae 
than is necessary to discuss here. From a methodology perspective, they consider how 
personalised reminder nudges impacted student engagement with the FAFSA process, the 
completion rate of FAFSA, and the enrolment rate following FAFSA.203 Student engagement 
is measured by the frequency of engagement with the reminder service (i.e. responding to 
messages, or messaging the service with questions, arranging appointments with expert 
advisers, etc.), while completion rate and enrolment rate are calculated as a percentage of 
students who A) complete FAFSA and b) who enrol at a university, respectively. 
Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) find statistically significant and positive effects on each of 
their dependent variables arising from the personalising reminder messages, compared to 
their control group. However, the significance and the size of the effect decreased from 
engagement, to completion, to enrolment. An explanation for why this occurred seems 
reasonably forthcoming – as time elapsed between being nudged, the effect of the nudge 
 
202 This is by no means obvious upon a first, or indeed second or third read. Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) 
write “Yijk [dependent variable] is the outcome of interest” (Page, Castleman and Meyer, 2020: 13, emphasis 
added) but do not elaborate further on what “outcome of interest” means within the investigation’s context. 
203 On the minutiae: Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) break down their sample to investigate the 
significance of the treatment on students who interact more/less with the reminder service, those applying for 
courses of different length, and those enrolling at different times, for instance. These analyses in the context 
with which Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) undertake their research – educational policy – seem 
worthwhile but are largely just repetitions of a general method outlined in the main body here, hence the 
decision to not focus on them. 
124 
 
decreased.204 Nevertheless, the findings reported by Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) are 
broadly consistent with the significant, positive effects identified by Peer et al. (2019) and 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019). 




In several ways, the work by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) serves as an example of 
the intersection of methodologies and methodological arguments already explored in this 
chapter. The reason for this is quite clear – on the one hand, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012) follow from previous work (including Moon (2002), see below) in utilising a matching 
approach, rather than a mapping procedure. 
On the other hand, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) contribute important criticism of 
previous literature (see, again, Moon (2002), but also this chapter’s discussion of Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019)), notably their criticism of the simplistic, dichotomous approach the likes 
of Moon (2002) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) take. Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012) write, “existing research has examined congruence effects primarily by separating 
message recipients into one of two psychological categories… utilizing a model of personality 
based on dimensional variation could allow for more fine-grained personalization of 
persuasive messages based on an individual’s relative standing on a given trait dimension” 
(Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012: 578-579). Such an argument serves as the foundation 
of Egelman and Peer’s (2015) criticism of the Big Five personality scale, with both this study 
 
204 Given these results, and some intuition, it is possibly inappropriate to directly attribute, as Page, Castleman 
and Meyer (2020) do, something like enrolment rate to the reminder nudge. Two broad reasons come to 
mind. Firstly, the decision to pursue higher education is a complex one involving many factors, and one should 
be mindful of this when attributing any effect. Secondly, while the nudge may have initially been significant, 
future significance may be better understood as something like a snowball effect, with students more likely to 
enrol given their access to FAFSA, and their access to FAFSA being a function of the nudge. Thus, it may be 
more realistic to think of this nudge as indirectly impacting, say, enrolment rates – a principle which Page, 




and Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) contributing greatly to the methodological approach 
taken, ultimately, by Peer et al. (2019). 
By way of summary in the context of this chapter, such points are sufficient. Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen (2012) do situate their work within the marketing literature, framing their 
investigation around the advertisement of a new smartphone, but they emphasise that their 
contribution is not to the field in which their study is framed – as opposed to Peer et al. (2019), 
who greatly situate their research within the cybersecurity sector, or Page, Castleman and 
Meyer (2020), who situate their work in the education sector. As such, less of an emphasis is 
offered here. Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) utilise a survey-experiment approach, with 
a sample of 324 participants recruited via Amazon’s MTurk. 
4.5.2 Psychometric Selection 
 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) spend relatively little time justifying their psychometric 
selections, and comparatively more time critiquing the more simplistic approach of others. 
They write, “Although message-person congruence effects have been examined in relation to 
a variety of psychological characteristics, they have not yet been systematically related to a 
comprehensive model of personality traits. Such integration, however, would advance the 
message-framing literature by opening the door to exploring new ways to make persuasive 
messages more personalized and effective” (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012: 578). As 
such, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) select psychometrics based on the scale’s 
comprehension and multidimensionality. As they continue, “examining message-person 
congruence effects within a comprehensive model of personality would allow for a 
multidimensional assessment of recipients’ characteristics with a single measurement 
instrument” (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012: 578). 
It is perhaps no surprise, therefore, that they opt to utilise the Big Five personality scale, which 
they note is well-researched, generally regarded as robust and capable of measuring several 
(i.e. five) different aspects of personality. Within the context that Hirsh, Kang and 
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Bodenhausen (2012) conduct their research – namely, attempting to move beyond analysis 
using a simple dichotomous measure – the criticisms levied by Egelman and Peer (2015) that 
the Big Five personality scale is not specific enough and is inferior to other psychometric 
scales can be somewhat disregarded. Of course, this is a fair criticism given the evidence 
Egelman and Peer (2015) present, but as Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) emphasise, 
their immediate concerns are with the comprehensiveness of the scale. Given specificity at 
times can be anathema to comprehensiveness (or, to use an alternative word, generality), to 
take Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen’s (2012) approach and subject it to direct criticism from 
Egelman and Peer (2015) may be unfair.205 
4.5.3 Nudge Selection 
 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) investigate personalisation, but do not investigate 
personalised nudging. In fact, they do not draw upon nudge theory at all, and thus it would be 
most inappropriate to characterise their work as such. The correct characterisation would be 
an analysis of their message selection, as Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) do adjust the 
advertising slogan shown to participants, in accordance with each of the five personality types 
covered by the Big Five personality scale. 
Some parallels between what Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) do, and nudge theory, 
can be drawn, however. For instance, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) offer a slogan 
which appeals to neuroticism (which they characterise as “especially sensitive to threats and 
uncertainty”; Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012: 579) “Stay safe and secure with the 
XPhone”, a slogan which – cast under the guise of nudge theory – could easily be understood 
as designed to appeal to a person’s sense of risk or loss aversion. As above, it is wrong to 
characterise this and other slogans developed by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) as 
 
205 It is important to note that Egelman and Peer’s (2015) work is informed directly by Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen (2012), and the former very much proceed with an interest in improving the conceptual 
procedure advanced by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012). Therefore, one should be reluctant to see these 
studies as antagonistic and would be better served conceiving as Egelman and Peer’s (2015) work as a direct 
attempt to build on and improve Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen’s (2012) work. 
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nudging, as they do not utilise behavioural insights or a nudging framework, but mechanically, 
the integration of nudging into a process such as adjusting slogans seems eminently 
reasonable. 
4.5.4 Mapping Procedure 
 
As above, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) follow previous literature (see Moon, 2002) 
and precede other literature (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019) in their use of a matching 
procedure, or as they dub it, “message-person congruence” (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 
2012: 578). Yet, in comparison to, say, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen (2012) take a slightly more sophisticated approach. 
Primarily, they use regression analysis (again, OLS), constructing a dependent variable 
measuring the effectiveness of an advertisement by averaging six answers to slightly different 
questions probing effectiveness and persuasiveness.206 They demonstrate the validity of this 
aggregation (i.e. averaging) with a test for Cronbach’s alpha, reporting a high score for internal 
validity. Statistically, therefore, this construction is adequate, yet with reference to Page, 
Castleman and Meyer (2020) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), both of whom investigate 
the effectiveness of personalisation against several dependent variables, it may be reasonable 
to consider whether averaging these responses was necessary, or whether Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen (2012) might have used each response as a different dependent variable and 
assessed the consistency of their results across multiple regressions.207 
Nevertheless, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) proceed with an average effectiveness 
score for each type of advertisement as their dependent variable, with a small adjustment (see 
below). It is worth taking a moment, before proceeding, to discuss the experimental procedure 
which they undertake. 
 
206 For instance, agreement statements such as, “this is an effective advertisement”; “I would purchase this 
product after seeing this advertisement” and so on. 
207 It is not obvious that this alternative approach would be better, and would certainly require more work 
than Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen’s (2012) approach requires. 
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Based on the phrasing given by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), it would seem they did 
not adopt a random allocation procedure (i.e. randomly assigning nudges/messages to 
individuals), but instead showed all advertisements to every participant. With reference to Peer 
et al. (2019), this method may create potential for priming effects, as a participant may respond 
differently after seeing a similar advertisement multiple times (even if the personality framing 
varies). Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) report evidence which may indicate as such, 
with a very high correlation between all the effectiveness scores. Of course, the reason for 
adopting this approach may also be methodological; Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) 
use a relatively small sample of 324, meaning if they randomly assigned messages to 
participants and stratified based on matches after-the-fact, there may be too few natural 
matches for a reasonable comparison across matched-unmatched groups.208 This being the 
case, the risk of priming effects may be outweighed by methodological necessity. 
For independent variables, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) administer the Big Five 
personality scale after recording participant feedback on the advertisements.209 Each 
participant was thus measured for each of the five personality types, and these five scores 
associated with each individual were utilised as independent variables within their regression 
models. 
As above, they note a small adjustment was made for their dependent variable. Hirsh, Kang 
and Bodenhausen (2012) report high correlation between their five measures of advertisement 
effectiveness, and argue such high correlation demonstrates that these advertisements – 
despite being framed differently – must have still been reasonably similar. To isolate the 
 
208 This may also be an issue facing Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019). Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) had an 
even smaller sample of 156. However, for Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), the probability of matching was 
50%, so the matching group can be estimated to contain around 78 participants, compared to an unmatched 
group of another 78. For Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), the probability of matching is 20% (1 in 5), and 
based on a sample of 324, the estimated matching group based on random allocation would be around 65 
compared to an unmatched group of 259. As such, the random allocation method may not have been suitable 
for Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) – despite a relatively larger sample size – because of the relatively 
lower probability of matching. 
209 Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) do not state what version of the Big Five they use. 
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variance attributable to the framing, rather than to aesthetic similarities,210 they utilise some 
additional regression analysis. For the sake of discussion here, assume five variables 
measuring the effectiveness of the five personality type-advertisements, X1 through X5. Hirsh, 
Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) regressed, say, X2, X3, X4 and X5 on X1, before extracting 
the residual. This residual was said to capture the variance that cannot be attributed to 
similarities in the other advertisements, and as such, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) 
do not use average effectiveness of each personality type as the dependent variable in their 
main regression analyses, but the residuals produced by these five initial regressions. 
By way of a further departure, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) do not construct a dummy 
variable to demarcate groups. By instead using the personality scores for each personality 
type produced for each individual (i.e. each individual had a score for each of the five 
personality types), they do not have to (somewhat arbitrarily) assign participants to, say, an 
extraversion group, or a neuroticism group. This resolves an issue present in the method of 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), namely, Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) determined 
whether a person was verbal or visual simply based on whether a person came above or 
below the average of their verbal/visual scale. As argued above, this approach could be called 
arbitrary and is subject to some criticism. By simply allowing the responses of participants to 
‘speak for themselves’ (in a manner of speaking), Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) avoid 
this issue. 
Over five regressions, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) find that individual scores in a 
particular personality type statistically significantly and positively predict the effectiveness of 
the corresponding advertisement (i.e. the extraversion trait significantly and positively predicts 
the effectiveness of the extraversion-framed advertisement). Furthermore, in every 
regression, only the corresponding personality type is found to be significant, and often it is 
 
210 “We constructed five advertisements featuring a picture of a cell phone and a few lines of text; the text was 
manipulated so that each advertisement highlighted the motivational concerns associated with one of the five 
personality dimensions” (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012, emphasis added). 
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only the corresponding personality type which has a positive effect (i.e. positive coefficient). 
Based on these results, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) conclude that personalising 
advertisements to match personality types produces statistically significantly positive effects 
on advertisement effectiveness, which is consistent with all other studies discussed thus far. 
As with Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) – and the matching procedure generally – it is 
questionable whether the method undertaken by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) should 
be called personalisation, because they only demonstrate the potential effectiveness of 
personalisation, and do not purposely personalise themselves. Overlooking this (potentially 
semantic) criticism, however, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) do produce results which 
are consistent and do so using a methodology which offers several insights which can (and in 
the case of Peer et al. (2019) do) inform other studies discussed here. 
4.5.5 Additional Comments 
 
One important contribution to this discussion offered by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) 
is that of imagery or visualisation. Peer et al. (2019) adjust the password tips shown to 
participants, while Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) adjust the content of a text message 
sent to participants. It is only Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) who come close incorporating 
some sort of visual element into their intervention. Even here, however, the visual discussion 
is between the use of icons to demarcate blocks of text, or bullet points. Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen (2012) are the only set of authors thus far to integrate a significant visual 
element into their research, even if the visual element is not significantly changing. 
By noting that similarities in the imagery used may have been impacting the effectiveness 
scores which participants produced, and treating for this effect by trying to isolate the variance 
resulting from the framing, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) provide an insightful guide 
to how any intervention utilising visuals might proceed (again, even if the adjustment in the 
visuals is not a significant component of the intervention). Thus, despite being quite similar in 
methodological approach and result to previous studies discussed, Hirsh, Kang and 
131 
 
Bodenhausen (2012) provide practical methodological insights which previous authors have 
not needed to consider. 




Moon (2002) is, in many ways, a forerunner to the work of Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012). Indeed, the substantive difference in approach between the former and the latter is 
quite clearly explained by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012),211 and reiterated here, 
namely, Moon (2002) investigates the role of personality and responses to messaging using 
only a simple measure of personality. This simple measure is a single aspect of the Big Five 
personality scale, extraversion, which Moon (2002) deconstructs further into dominant 
personality types (dominance) and submissive personality types (submissiveness). Following 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), such a limited scope may not be sufficiently broad to 
truly capture personality; yet, following Egelman and Peer (2015), Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen’s (2012) broadness may not be sufficiently specific. It is unfair, thus, to 
necessarily critique Moon (2002) with (at the time of writing) nearly two decades of hindsight 
and experimental development to draw upon. 
The rationale for drawing on Moon (2002), then, given more contemporary literature exists 
which has developed the methodology of personalisation studies greatly, is largely to 
demonstrate this development and evolution of methodologies. Just as the contrast of the 
methods adopted by Peer et al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) reveal areas of 
methodological compliment and conflict, by returning to a relatively early study such as Moon’s 
(2002), the evolutionary story beginning with Moon (2002) and ultimately arriving at Peer et 
 
211 Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) do not directly refer to Moon (2002), but they do discuss their work as 
building upon “existing research [which has] examined congruence effects” (Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 
2012: 578), a group in which Moon (2002) can mostly certainly be considered. 
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al. (2019) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) via Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) can 
be seen. 
Much like Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), Moon (2012) necessarily investigates 
personalisation within a specific domain (the consumer goods market) but does not place their 
research within the consumer goods literature. Rather, Moon (2002) seeks to contribute 
directly to the personalisation and personality literature, and so throughout, her work places 
minimal emphasis on the domain in which her experiments are situated. Moon (2002) utilises 
an experimental task in combination with data collection via an incentivised survey, and 
presents results arising from a sample of 48 participants. 
4.6.2 Psychometric Selection 
 
Moon (2002) initially argues that the Big Five personality scale is a sufficient psychometric or 
personality scale to draw upon as it is the most extensively researched personality scale. 
Moon (2002) offers no reason why she chooses to only select a single characteristic captured 
by the Big Five personality scale – extraversion – though a reason may be speculated when 
considering Moon’s (2002) analytical procedure, namely, a matching approach is used, and 
thus a psychometric or personality measure which can be easily converted into a dummy 
variable to indicate matching and unmatching groups may have been desirable. As Hirsh, 
Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) show, alternative methodologies can be developed which 
integrate all five aspects of the Big Five.  
Nevertheless, Moon (2002) does justify her selection of the extraversion characteristic in 
particular, writing, “the most ‘psychologically prominent’ factor is the dominance and 
submissiveness (‘extraversion’) dimension of personality, which has been found to provide 
information, relative to other factors, about what an individual is ‘really like.’ It is thus more 
useful in understanding and predicting another individual’s behaviour” (Moon, 2002: 314). 
Given this, it might be argued that despite the subsequent development of a methodology by 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) which could accommodate all aspects of the Big Five, 
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this may not be necessary, as each aspect does not offer an equal contribution to the ultimate 
picture of individual personality the scale produces. Certainly, this is Moon’s (2002) implicit 
assertion. 
4.6.3 Nudge Selection 
 
As with Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), it would be incorrect to characterise Moon 
(2002) as selecting a nudge, as at no point does Moon (2002) invoke nudge theory. Equally – 
again as with Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) – the message framing employed by 
Moon (2002) can be re-interpreted through the lens of nudge theory, and thus some 
semblance of a parallel established. For instance, in Moon’s (2002) first experiment 
investigating consumer preferences in automobiles, participants are offered statements such 
as, “The Elantra does not come very well-equipped, which will be annoying if you like air-
conditioning or power steering” (Moon, 2002: 316), a statement which could easily be 
understood as an appeal to, say, loss aversion. 
The issue with the re-interpretation offered here, compared to the similar procedure offered in 
relation to Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), is that Moon’s (2002) framing does not vary 
the component of the statement which would be associated with the nudge. For instance, in 
the above statement, the loss aversion component emerges from the phrase, “which will be 
annoying if you like air-conditioning or power steering.” Yet, in both the dominant framing 
(given above) and the submissive framing,212 the potential for loss is emphasised. As such, 
while some endeavour can be made to relate the procedure adopted by Moon (2002) to nudge 
theory, one must be cautious in doing so, and aware of any limitations which arise in turn. 
However, a consideration of Moon’s (2002) experiments through the lens of nudge theory is 
not a fruitless endeavour, and in doing so, potentially reveals some methodological oversights 
on the part of Moon (2002). In experiment 1, for instance, Moon (2002) asks participants to 
 
212 Moon (2002): “Perhaps you should put the Hyundai Elantra lower in your ranking? The Elantra does not 




rank 12 cars in order of preference. An automated program then presents participants with an 
alternative ranking, which is generated using a standard transformation of the participants’ 
original ranking.213 The computer justifies its ranking with various statements, such as that 
quoted above. These statements are worded to appeal to either a dominant or submissive 
personality type. However, by the computer presenting an explicit ranking, one might wonder 
whether this serves as a kind nudge, such as establishing a default option. Madrian and Shea 
(2001) consider such a hypothesis in their study of default options and retirement savings 
behaviour. As such, when participants are invited to change their ranking, given the messaging 
and the computer ranking, any change that occurs may be attributed to appeals to various 
personality framing, but may also be attributed to some nudging effect. 
Of course, this is just a hypothesis, and Moon (2002) conducts manipulation checks for both 
of her experiments, finding participants successfully identify dominant and submissive 
framing. This hypothesis may continue to stand, however, even in the presence of significant 
results, as the combination of effects may be producing statistical significance. In turn, one 
might wonder whether, rather than offering participants the computer’s ranking, Moon (2002) 
should have not simply had the computer pass commentary on the participant’s ranking.214 
Regardless of this relatively small quandary, Moon (2002) constructs her messages following 
a reasonably consistent and logical formulation. In the first experiment, all statements begin 
with a firm (dominant) or softer (submissive) comment on ranking, before an additional 
statement referring to various features about the cars which seems to justify the statement.215 
In the second experiment, which relates to recommended entertainment content, messages 
 
213 For instance, whatever car the participants ranked as number 4 is ranked by the computer as number 1. 
214 For instance, a statement such as, “Number 4 is ranked too low” does not establish a new, recommended 
ranking for number 4, but does convey a message which is attempting to persuade the participant to change 
their ranking. Such a statement could be framed in accordance with the dominant and submissive framing 
without much issue: “Number 4 is ranked too low” follows a dominant frame, while “Perhaps number 4 is 
ranked too low?” follows a submissive frame. By showing the computer’s ranking, and then explaining that the 
computer believes number 4 to be ranked too low, the participant is not just informed of the computer’s 
opinion regarding the relative ranking of number 4 (i.e. too low) but the absolute ranking of number 4, which 
may influence the re-ranking undertaken by the participant just as much as the message framing itself. 
215 Participants were provided with various information about these cars during the experiment. 
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consist of an initial statement introducing the type of media content (i.e. news report, music, a 
joke, health advice etc.), followed by a statement either confidently assuring (dominant) or 
cautiously suggesting (submissive) the participant will enjoy the content. 
4.6.4 Mapping Procedure 
 
As touched on above, Moon (2002) utilises a matching procedure which has subsequently 
been reproduced rather faithfully by Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), and shares 
characteristics with the matching procedure adopted by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012). Moon’s (2002) treatment is utilised over two experiments, each utilising 48 
participants.216 Immediately, one should note the tremendously small sample size, even when 
compared to Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019). Of course, the relatively small sample may be 
due to factors external to Moon’s (2002) research and beyond her control; nevertheless, the 
limited number of participants necessarily limits the statistical analysis which can be robustly 
utilised. This, though an unfortunate justification, may serve as justification for Moon’s (2002) 
use of the matching procedure and relatively simple personality framework (compared to, say, 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012)). 
Participants were invited by Moon (2002) to complete a personality test several weeks prior to 
either experiment. Moon (2002) notes that this was done to avoid any association between 
the experiment and the personality test, suggesting she may have had concerns about the 
role of framing the personality test may play in participant behaviour. Like Peer et al. (2019), 
however, this is never stated as such, and can only be speculated on. 
Upon completion of these personality tests, Moon (2002) aggregated participant scores, 
reporting a high Cronbach’s alpha. However, she then proceeds to assign participants to either 
a dominant or submissive group using a rather questionable method. Recall that Schöning, 
 
216 It is unclear whether the same participants are used in both experiments, or whether 96 different 
participants are used across the experiments. The former seems most likely, as there is little reason to 
maintain the same sample size across experiments which are only going to be qualitatively compared, rather 
quantitatively contrasted.  
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Matt and Hess (2019) tested their participants using a verbal/visual test, before splitting the 
group based on whether a participant scored higher or lower than the midpoint. As above, this 
method is criticised because detail is lost, and those near the margins (i.e. near the midpoint) 
may not be faithfully represented by this division, and the selection is arbitrary. Moon (2002) 
adopts a similar method to Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), splitting participants into 
dominant and submissive groups based on whether a participant scored above or below the 
median score (respectively). From a sampling perspective, this seems to have been done to 
ensure an equal sample of 24 participants in each group. But besides suffering from the 
arbitrariness which Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) also suffer, the use of the median score 
embeds sampling bias into the groupings. For instance, participants in the sample may 
randomly contain many more dominant, or many more submissive, personalities, which would 
skew the group median compared to the expected median from the population and result in 
some participants potentially being misclassified. Some comparisons of the median with the 
mean could potentially strengthen the rationale for this procedure, but problems surrounding 
representativeness at the margins – which Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) share – still 
persist. Furthermore, such a method of constructing groups must return a critical eye to the 
sample size; the use of median, mean or any dividing value becomes more acceptable as the 
sample comes to resemble the population, which is to say, when the sample size is very large. 
The risk that the sample group used by Moon (2002) is not representative of population is very 
high given the sample size is so small. It seems only fair, therefore, to conclude that the 
method of constructing groups adopted by Moon (2002) is very inadequate. 
Regardless, Moon (2002) proceeds to conduct 2 experiments. The first experiment asks 
participants to rank 12 cars based on whatever criteria the participants see fit. Moon (2002) 
notes that all cars are reasonably comparable in terms of price and utility. Once participants 
have submitted their ranking, they are shown a computer’s ranking, as well as various 
messages explaining why the computer’s ranking differs with their own. The computer is 
programmed so as to always alter the participants’ rankings in the same way, regardless of 
137 
 
how individual participants rank the cars. The messages shown to participants will either follow 
a dominant tone, or a submissive tone. The tone is randomly determined for each participant. 
Finally, participants are offered the chance to adjust their ranking, given the computer’s 
ranking and messages. As the computer’s ranking is a standardised transformation of the 
participant’s ranking, any changes which participants make can be quantified and compared 
across participants. Moon (2002) uses this variable as a measure of the message’s 
persuasion. This is one of the dependent variables used in experiment 1. The second 
dependent variable is constructed from a series of survey questions which ask respondents 
how persuasive they found the computer to be and is verified using Cronbach’s alpha. As 
such, Moon (2002) argues these two dependent variables capture persuasiveness as an 
expression of actual behaviour (adjusted rankings) and perception of persuasiveness. 
Experiment 2 follows a somewhat similar strategy to experiment 1. In experiment 2, 
participants were presented with four pieces of entertainment content, including a news report, 
a song, a joke, and a health-tip. Before being shown each piece of the content, participants 
received a message from the computer summarising the computer’s confidence that the 
participant would enjoy the content. Again, these messages took on dominant or submissive 
framing, and were randomly assigned to participants. Participants were then invited to 
complete a survey assessing how much they enjoyed each piece of content, and for each 
piece, a dependent variable was constructed. Again, these variables all showed a high 
Cronbach’s alpha. A fifth dependent variable was also constructed, based on survey 
responses to participants’ general perceptions of the computer’s competence. 
Following a matching procedure near identical to that of Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), a 
dummy variable was constructed to distinguish between those whose messaging matched 
their personality type, and those whose messaging did not match. Differences in the various 
dependent variables between these groups were then examined using a t-test for both 
experiments, as well as ANOVA in experiment 2. Moon (2002) reports consistent evidence of 
statistical difference between matching and non-matching groups for most dependent 
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variables. Where statistical significance was identified, the results consistently supported the 
hypothesis that messages which matched the personality types of participants would be more 
persuasive/received more favourably than those that did not match. For the two results which 
were not significant (the news content, and the health-tip content), the means still suggested 
matching produced more favourable responses to messaging. These results are consistent 
with all other literature examined. 
4.6.5 Additional Comments 
 
Few additional comments need be made regarding Moon (2002). The consistency in 
methodology between Moon (2002) and Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019), adjusted slightly by 
Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), indicates a relative methodological robustness in the 
matching procedure. However, as argued above, the matching procedure only dubiously 
personalises interventions, suffers from arbitrariness, and can be incorporated into the more 
rigorous mapping procedure developed in part by Peer et al. (2019). 
4.7 – Conclusion 
 
As an aid to the conclusions drawn from this section, details of the reviewed studies are 
summarised in Table 1:
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Peer et al. (2019) Delivery 2755 Incentivised Survey 
Experiment 






Cronbach’s alpha, Moderated 
Regression, Johnson-Neyman 
Technique, two-tailed t-test, 
ANOVA, WMW-test 
Yes 
         
Schöning, Matt and 
Hess (2019) 
Delivery 156 Survey Experiment Matching Verbal/Visual Bullet points, Icons Cronbach’s alpha, Factor 
Analysis, two-tailed t-test 
Yes 
         
Page, Castleman 
and Meyer (2020) 
Choice 17731 Partnered Project Matching Progress Score Reminder Text 
Message 
OLS Regression Yes 
         
Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen 
(2012) 
Delivery 324 Incentivised Survey 
Experiment 
Matching Big Five 
Personality 
Scale 
Message Framing Cronbach’s alpha, OLS 
Regression, two-tailed t-test 
Yes 
         
Moon (2002) Delivery 48 Incentivised Survey 
Experiment 
Matching Dominance and 
Submissiveness 
(Extraversion) 
Message Framing Cronbach’s alpha, ANOVA, 
two-tailed t-test 
Yes 




217 Note: for all studies to be presented in a tabular format, some liberties have been taken with the reporting of some details. For transparency: 1) Page, Castleman and 
Meyer (2020) may not neatly align with the notion of mapping or matching; 2) Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) do not refer to their data collection method as a 
“partnered project” but do establish that their data was collected as part of a collaboration with several outside institutions; 3) Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) and 
Moon (2002) do not liken their messages to nudges, and as such, “Message Framing” should not be misconstrued as a type of nudge; 4) “Progress Score” is not a 
psychometric, nor do Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) refer to psychometrics, though the phrase “Progress Score” broadly captures the heterogeneity Page, Castleman 
and Meyer (2020) used to personalise their interventions; 5) while all studies produced significant results, significance was not consistent across all tests performed by all 
authors, and levels of significance varied on multiple occasions. 
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Immediately, several commonalities emerge from this side-by-side comparison. All but Page, 
Castleman and Meyer (2020) collect data via survey experiment, with, out of these, only 
Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) not using an incentivised survey experiment. All but Page, 
Castleman and Meyer (2020) utilise common statistical treatments including Cronbach’s alpha 
and t-test, while some – including Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) – utilise some type of 
regression analysis, notably OLS. All but Peer et al. (2019) adopt a matching approach in their 
analysis, and all but Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) investigate delivery personalisation. 
Finally, all find statistically significant results. 
Equally, various disparities in approach can also be identified. There is a large variance in the 
sample size employed by these studies, with a tendency towards relatively small (>500) 
samples. There is also little consistency in terms of psychometrics or nudges which have been 
analysed. Both points, to an extent, have simple explanations. On the matter of sample size, 
beyond various exogeneous factors which may have impacted the capacity of the researchers, 
sample may have been influenced by the planned statistical analysis. On the matter of 
psychometric and nudge selection, given all the studies situated their research in rather 
different domains, it is to be expected that the types of psychometrics to be analysed and the 
variety of nudges to be examined would vary across these domains. 
The advantage of the detailed analysis offered in this chapter, and the summary provided 
above, is that a methodological route for the investigation of the hypotheses established in 
Chapter 3 can now be determined. From this route, further details can be established, from 
psychometrics to nudges to advertisement design to statistical procedure and logic. The 
following chapters in this section discuss these considerations, making frequent reference to 
the literature discussed above as part of the methodological justifications for various choices 
made in this research design. On occasion, explicit reference is made to Table 1, however, 
readers are invited to use Table 1 as a helpful summary-resource even when explicit reference 




Chapter 5 – An Introduction to Political Advertising and Nudge 
Selection 
 
5.1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter establishes the four behavioural nudges to be examined in this thesis. These are 
the status quo nudge, the present bias nudge, the loss aversion nudge and the social norm 
nudge. Firstly, a brief discussion of political advertising is offered. This is provided here 
because it is necessary to understand the context in which any nudges would be used, so as 
to interrogate the suitability of any selected nudges. Such interrogation follows a brief review 
of the literature pertaining to each nudge. 
It is helpful to begin this chapter by returning to the research question and corresponding 
hypotheses pertaining to this thesis: 
 
Research Question: Can personalised nudges be used to significantly influence political 
decision-making? 
Hypothesis 1: Personalised nudges will be statistically significantly more effective at 
influencing political decision-making than impersonal nudges, which in turn will be more 
effective than not nudging. 
Hypothesis 2: Choice and Delivery personalised nudges will be statistically significantly more 
effective at influencing political decision-making than delivery or choice personalised nudges 
alone. 
 
The purpose of this exercise is to establish a sensible starting point to begin discussing the 
method used in this thesis, and the many moving parts involved. By reviewing the above 
question and hypotheses three worthwhile starting points emerge, namely: what is the political 
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component investigated in this thesis?; what nudges are investigated?; and how do these 
relate? 
5.2 – A Brief Introduction to Political Advertising 
 
In trying to investigate political decision-making, one must first formulate a way of invoking a 
political decision. This thesis focuses on political advertising, more specifically, investigating 
how individuals respond to various political advertisements. Of course, one might consider an 
alternative – and possibly more realistic – political decision to be casting a ballot at the ballot 
box, rather than evaluating a political advertisement.218 Yet this alternative is problematic for 
several reasons, most notably because few – if any – legitimate democratic exercises would 
accommodate attempts to influence said exercise. This is not to say that attempts are not 
made, but for the most part they are made away from the ballot box – in speeches, televised 
debates, newspaper columns and political advertising, which are increasingly found on social 
media (Bakir et al., 2019). Furthermore, while this project will be concerned only with citizens 
who experience democratic institutions,219 it should be acknowledged that political influence 
can still be exerted – often in the form of propaganda – in non-democratic countries.220 
Experiences, therefore, of political advertising are likely more numerous than of democratic 
exercise, which remains limited to those eligible to part-take in supposedly democratic 
countries. 
A further advantage of focusing on political advertising is the contemporary nature of the 
medium in relation to the mechanism under investigation here, namely personalised nudging. 
In recent years, controversial stories have emerged regarding political advertising being 
targeted at very specific individuals via social media networks which command – for the sake 
 
218 See, for instance, Downs’ (1957) economic theory of voting. Here, Downs (1957) argues that not merely the 
choice of who to vote for, but the choice to vote at all, is subject to a rational evaluation of the costs and 
benefits. 
219 US citizens. See Chapter 7. 




of linguistic consistency – heterogeneity data about individuals (Zuboff, 2019). In the emerging 
rationale of modern political advertising, while influence may be minimised at the ballot box, 
influence can be exercised over individuals in a variety of ways prior to their voting. 
5.3 – Selecting Nudges 
 
This thesis returns to a discussion of political advertising in Chapter 7, where choices over the 
construction of the political advertisements used in this research are discussed. At present, it 
is more opportune to turn to a discussion of nudges. This is because nudges are embedded 
within the political advertisements used in this research, and as such it is prudent to 
understand the nature and rationale for the selection of nudges prior to any fuller discussion 
of particular political advertisements. 
When considering the existing literature, little indication of which nudges to investigate can be 
found. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, much of the literature does not investigate 
nudging per se. Secondly, where nudges are clearly used, these nudges often result from the 
psychometric tests particular authors use. For instance, see Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) 
with their verbal/visual scale and corresponding verbal/visual nudges. 
It is argued here that it is more prudent to first select nudges to examine, identify the 
psychological traits associated with those nudges, and then select psychometric scales which 
are designed to measure propensity of those traits. This approach has been taken, in varying 
degrees, with Peer et al. (2019), Guo et al. (2020) and Lipman (2020), with the former two 
selecting ‘nudges’ which respond to problems typically seen in password design, while the 
latter selects behavioural interventions which can be incorporated into financial incentives 
structures (e.g. loss aversion or the present bias). 
As such, nudges are first selected, the psychological traits associated with these nudges 
identified, and psychometric scales which are expected to measure these traits thus chosen. 
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Figure 1: Selecting Nudges 
 
This method of selection, visualised in Figure 1, also offers a guide for how to construct the 
hypothesised psychometric map constructed later (see Chapter 6). 
Four nudges are selected for this research. These are 1) the status quo nudge; 2) the present 
bias nudge; 3) loss aversion nudge; and 4) the social norm nudge. These nudges are selected 
primarily on the basis that they can be incorporated into the medium for assessing political 
decision-making, namely, political advertising, and secondarily on their prominence in the 
literature. In 5.3.1 to 5.3.4, each nudge is discussed, with the psychological traits underpinning 
each nudge clearly identified. A demonstration of how the nudge can be incorporated into 
political advertising is then offered. 
5.3.1 The Status Quo Bias 
 
Investigation of the status quo bias largely begins with Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), 
who investigate the impact of status quos on subsequent decisions. They identify a significant 
bias towards the status quo (i.e. the status quo bias), writing, “Subjects in our experiments 
adhered to status quo choices more frequently than would be predicted by the canonical 
model” (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988: 8), with the “canonical model” being the rational 
model of decision-making, whereby agents are expected to evaluate prospects independent 
of previous choices. The status quo bias, therefore, can be understood as a tendency for 
decision-makers to prefer whatever option is the status quo. Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
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(1988) hypothesise that this bias may occur because people seek to reduce perceived risk by 
selecting options which they are more familiar with, or they believe to have a more certain 
understanding of. By framing choices around a status quo, the status quo bias may be used 
to nudge decision-makers. 
Closely related to the status quo bias is the default option nudge, a nudge which could be 
characterised as the nudge-transformation of the status quo bias. For instance, in their 
investigation of the default option nudge, Madrian and Shea (2001) make frequent reference 
to the status quo bias and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). Madrian and Shea (2001) 
argue that decision-makers may prefer defaults because they see them as a sort of 
recommendation, a hypothesis which subsequent research into information leakage (Sher and 
McKenzie, 2006; Tannenbaum and Ditto, 2011) supports. Johnson et al. (2012) argue defaults 
and the status quo may appeal because people are impatient or seek to avoid making 
decisions.221 Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) also suggest the status quo bias may be 
driven by a desire to avoid risk. 
Insofar as the default option nudge establishes a status quo – as the default option is often 
characterised as the choice an individual would receive if they did nothing (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008) – it may be tempting to equate the default option nudge with the status quo 
bias. However, this may be unhelpful for the purposes immediately at hand, for two reasons. 
Firstly, the default option nudge changes a very specific piece of choice architecture, namely, 
whatever option is set as the default. While the changing of the default may be considered to 
be establishing a status quo of sorts, this specific adjustment is by no means the only way of 
establishing a status quo. Indeed, regardless of the default option, all decision-makers come 
to any decision with an established status quo. As such, while the default option nudge is very 
 
221 Also see Akerlof (1991), Madrian and Shea (2001) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) for their respective 
work on procrastination and decision-making. 
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closely related to the status quo bias, it should be understood as a status quo nudge, rather 
than the status quo nudge.222 
This distinction is advantageous given the second objection, namely that the use of a default 
option nudge as a means of appealing to the status quo does not seem sensible within the 
context of political decision-making. To be clear, a status quo exists in political decision-
making, just as a status quo exists in all decision-making. In this instance, the status quo 
decision is to not vote, as this is the outcome a person will receive if they do nothing. But it 
does not seem substantially correct, by extension, to assert that a default option exists in 
political decision-making. Instead, political decision-making is better described as an active 
choice (Sunstein, 2012), whereby a person must indicate their preference. This is evidenced 
by the fact that in the voting process, people are presented with political choice to not vote via 
the ruining of their ballot (Lijphart, 1997). In fact, it seems rather anathema to the notion of 
democracy to impose a default option. Such an argument extends to the domain of political 
advertising; if the ultimate decision an advertisement is trying to influence a person about is 
an active choice, it seems wholly inconsistent to suppose the advertisement may nudge using 
a default option.223 
As such, using a default option nudge as a status quo nudge is not sensible, as the second 
objection outlines, but equally, the default option nudge is feasibly not the only status quo 
nudge which could be used, as the first objection outlines. Combining these objections, 
 
222 Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) do investigate the effects of the status quo by using an experimental 
design likely comparable to the default option nudge. For instance, they suggest to participants that some 
investments have already been accounted for, and should the participant choose to do nothing, these 
accountings will be the fate of their investments. On the one hand, therefore, Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
(1988) can be seen to be describing the status quo in similar language to the description of the default option 
nudge given by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). On the other, however, one might wonder what a status quo is, if 
not the expected result of doing nothing? Defining, say, the default option nudge in these terms is not 
inaccurate, merely incomplete; such a description defines the default option nudge far more broadly than it 
need be. 
223 One might imagine, for instance, an advertisement which read, “now that you have seen this 
advertisement, if you do not indicate otherwise, you will vote for this candidate.” Such a statement is doubly 
absurd, as the advertisement has no licence in a free society to impose such a loss of agency on a decision-




therefore, reveals a route to adequately utilising the status quo bias. If a status quo nudge is 
simply imagined as any choice architecture which appeals to a status quo, it seems eminently 
possible to imagine a statement which could be incorporated into a political advertisement 
which does this.224 This endeavour is actually aided, rather than hindered, by the political 
domain, as many political (electoral) decisions are a choice between incumbent candidates 
and challenger candidates. As such, it would seem reasonable to imagine political advertising 
to evoke a candidate’s incumbency.225 
By way of a political slogan which nudges decision-makers by appealing to the status quo, the 
following is offered: 
 
“Let’s Keep Going!” 
 
The emphasis on continuation clearly suggests that the candidate associated with this slogan 
is the incumbent, and as such, this slogan represents a status quo nudge as it is appealing to 
the status quo. Finally, given the format (i.e. a political slogan), this status quo nudge is clearly 
incorporated into a political advertisement, unlike the default option nudge. 
5.3.2 The Present Bias 
 
The present bias represents a more recent manifestation of a much older notion of value 
varying depending on whether it is received today or sometime in the future (O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, 2015). While O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015) attribute the foundational thinking of the 
contemporary study of present bias to Liabson (1994), it is in fact O’Donoghue and Rabin 
 
224 Furthermore, such a characterisation is not inconsistent with the definition of the default option nudge, 
which can very easily be understood as also appealing to a status quo, albeit by establishing a new status quo. 
225 Or, indeed, a candidate’s insurgency. The actual electoral advantage of incumbency is mixed. See, for 
instance, Ade, Freier and Odendahl (2014). The point here is not to argue that appeals to incumbency 
universally convey an advantage; rather, it is to assert that incumbency represents a status quo which can 
sensibly be invoked. 
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(1999a) who distinguish between Laibson’s (1994, 1997) analysis of time-dependent 
discounting and the behavioural notion of bias.226 O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) write, “when 
presented a choice between doing seven hours of an unpleasant activity on April 1 versus 
eight hours on April 15, if asked on February 1 virtually everyone would prefer the seven hours 
on April 1. But come April 1, given the same choice, most of us are apt to put off the work until 
April 15. We call such tendencies present-biased preferences: When considering trade-offs 
between two future moments, present-biased preferences give stronger relative weight to the 
earlier moment as it gets closer” (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a: 103, original emphasis).227 
Closely related to the present bias is Laibson’s (1994, 1997) work on hyperbolic discounting, 
a term used to describe the mathematical form discounting takes.228 However, as O’Donoghue 
and Rabin (2015) note, the hyperbolic form can distract from the behavioural implications of 
the present bias by seeking to model relative discounting rather than emphasising the 
preference for the present. As O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015) write, “Present Bias is About 
Now” (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2015: 274, original emphasis). 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015) and Prelec (2004) have attributed the present bias to 
impatience, a very reasonable explanation given the characteristic feature of the bias, namely 
desire for most immediate consumption. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) have also linked the 
present bias to procrastination, building from the rationale established by O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (1999a). On the one hand, the procrastination explanation emerges from the notion of 
prolonging unpleasant tasks. On the other hand, as O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015) 
emphasise, the present bias is about now, and so what appears as procrastination can also 
 
226 “We have contrived the term “present-biased preferences” as a more descriptive term for the underlying 
human characteristics that hyperbolic discounting represents” (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a: 103, footnote 
2). 
227 Also see Prelec and Loewenstein’s (1991) discussion of the immediacy effect, which suggests that future 
discounting is more dramatic if one is asked to forgo consumption which would otherwise have been received 
immediately (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). 
228 Being hyperbolic, if one were to receive a gift, the relative discounting of that gift when received tomorrow 
rather than today would be significantly greater than the relative discounting when received the day after 
tomorrow, rather than tomorrow. 
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be understood as a preference for non-unpleasant tasks now.229 Risk may also contribute to 
the present bias, yet many who model hyperbolic discounting and present bias assume risk-
neutrality,230 resulting in relatively little appreciation of the risk aversion as a mechanism 
driving the present bias (Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter, 2010; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 
1999b).231 However, as O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) note, without the assumption of risk-
neutrality, risk aversion may have a role to play. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) go further in 
their analysis of risk and time preferences, presenting results which, “cannot be explained 
by… hyperbolic discounting, or preferences for resolution of uncertainty, but seem consistent 
with a direct preference for certainty” (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012: 3357). Thus, they 
conclude that certainty and an aversion to risk may contribute to the present bias. 
Is a present bias nudge suitable for use in a political decision-making context? Returning to 
Downs’ (1957) economic conception of voting, he argues that great uncertainty arises for a 
voter when making a political decision.232 Such uncertainty can be attributed to a time-lapse 
between a person voting for a candidate, and that candidate implementing the policies which 
initially led to the person’s vote.233 Invoking Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and their work on 
uncertainty, therefore, it can be speculated that a present bias of sorts might be manifest in 
political decision-making. Such speculation need not be mired in the language of (un)certainty 
either; it is perfectly feasible to imagine a candidate who emphasises their intentions to get 
 
229 Any implications here seem largely insubstantial. At best, one might engage in a semantic debate about the 
use of the word procrastination. Yet, insofar as a preference for non-unpleasantness now is the same as 
putting off unpleasant tasks until later (i.e. procrastination), very little changes. The impetus to demonstrate 
this flipside is wholly so that the discussion of procrastination might be couched in the same language and 
perspective as O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015) adopt when discussing the present bias. 
230 “Most of the experimental literature assumes risk neutrality” (Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter, 2010: 218). 
231 Risk-neutrality assumes that there is no risk associated with delaying consumption. For instance, 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) write, “Temporal incentives can impose risk on the agent… Because we wish to 
focus solely on the procrastination issue, we will assume that the agent is risk-neutral.” Yet, as they 
acknowledge, risks do arise from delay, and so a preference for the present may also feasibly be explained by 
aversion to risk. 
232 Downs (1957: 13): “though we can find out something about how rational governments operate by 
analysing them in a “certain” world, we learn much more by facing uncertainty and the problems it creates.” 
233 If, indeed, the candidate acts on their promises at all. This is just one of the many sources of uncertainty 
Downs (1957) identifies in political decision-making. 
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policies done sooner rather than later would appeal to an impatient mindset described by 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015) and Prelec (2004). 
Building on the general notion of the present bias manifesting in relative appeals to the present 
over the future (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a), the following political slogan is imagined: 
 
“Fighting for You Today, Not Tomorrow.” 
 
The above slogan incorporates the present bias nudge in a very simple – if not subtle – way. 
By establishing a time framing (i.e. “today” vs. “tomorrow”), this present bias nudge nudges 
decision-makers towards the candidate associated with the present (i.e. “today”) rather than 
the future (i.e. “tomorrow”). Importantly, this nudge can be incorporated into a political 
advertisement in the same way as the status quo nudge is incorporated, and as will be seen, 
the other nudges examined are. 
5.3.3 Loss Aversion 
 
Loss aversion is a behavioural phenomenon identified first by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
It is succinctly described as the tendency for losses to loom larger than gains, which is to say, 
a loss confers greater disutility upon an individual than the utility conferred onto a person who 
received a proportionate gain. 
Loss aversion is closely related to risk aversion, so much so that Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) directly draw upon the notion of risk aversion in their formulation of decision making 
under risk (i.e. Prospect Theory). There is intuitive sense to relate the concepts – if one is 
averse to losses, surely such aversion extends to risk-taking which presents the possibility of 
a loss? Yet, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find this argument only partially true, specifically 
only in the domain of gains. They find that when there is a choice between a certain gain, and 
a gain with a risk component, decision-makers tend to prefer the certain gain (risk aversion). 
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In the domain of losses, however, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find people become risk-
loving when faced with a certain loss versus only a possible loss. Only aversion to losses can 
explain the apparent changing attitudes to risk-taking across the domains of gains and losses. 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) offer an additional mechanism which may drive loss aversion. In 
their work on loss aversion and stock markets, they point out that decisions with associated 
risks resolve over extended periods of time (say, several years). When allowed to resolve over 
said periods, risky returns will often yield greater returns than much safer investments (as 
these carry a lower premium). Yet, when evaluated in the short-term, the safer investment 
may appear preferable because of the lower risk. This version of loss aversion, which Benartzi 
and Thaler (1995) dub myopic loss aversion, thus suggests that individuals who are more 
sensitive to the time horizons of their decisions may exhibit loss aversion less than those who 
are not as sensitive.234 Several studies (Fellner and Sutter, 2009; Langer and Weber, 2008; 
Benartzi and Thaler, 1995) confirm the concepts established by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). 
Finally, loss aversion may be explained by a tendency to procrastinate. Akerlof (1991) writes, 
“Procrastination occurs when present costs are unduly salient in comparison with future costs, 
leading individuals to postpone tasks until tomorrow without foreseeing that when tomorrow 
comes, the required action will be delayed yet again” (Akerlof, 1991: 1). Given this definition, 
it may be reasonable to suppose that a person who exhibits the tendency to procrastinate 
does so as they are averse to the costs associated with making any decision or engaging with 
a particular activity. When faced with the choice of accepting a cost (embracing a loss) today 
or forgoing a cost (avoiding a loss) until tomorrow, it would be expected that a loss averse 
person would thus demonstrate procrastination-tendencies.   
While a political candidate can try and appeal to voters by promoting the benefits (i.e. gains) 
they will bring to the voter, they can similarly emphasise the potential dangers (i.e. losses) 
 
234 Thaler and Benartzi (1995: 75, original emphasis): “The longer the investor intends to hold the asset, the 
more attractive the risky asset will appear, so long the investment is not evaluated frequently. Put another 
way, two factors contribute to an investor being unwilling to bear the risks associated with holding equities, 
loss aversion and a short evaluation period. We refer to this combination as myopic loss aversion.” 
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which their opposing candidate could bring about (Hemphill and Shapiro, 2019; Allcott and 
Gentzkow, 2017; Hopp and Vargo, 2017). From this perspective, it seems more than 
reasonable to suppose that a loss aversion nudge – which highlights the potential losses which 
might befall an individual if they don’t support a candidate – could be used as part of a political 
advertising strategy to influence political decision-making. The following slogan is offered: 
 
“Let’s Not Go Backwards.” 
 
By emphasising the regression associated with the alternative candidate (i.e. “backwards”), 
this slogan is designed to emphasise the potential loss associated with that candidate, and 
thus nudge decision-makers towards the candidate who is not associated with loss (i.e. the 
candidate using the slogan). The use of the word backwards is also pertinent when 
considering Tverksy and Kahneman’s (1992) work on reference frames. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) note that gains and losses are relative to a frame of reference, above which 
one must regard utility as being gained, and below which one must regard utility as being lost. 
The word backwards speaks illicitly to a reference frame, namely that regardless of the relative 
utility position of the decision-maker, backwards always refers to regression. 
5.3.4 Social Norms 
 
Social norms can generally be understood as the standards or expectations which a person 
holds – informed by their peers and wider environment – which in turn influence how they 
themselves act (Sunstein, 1996). Sunstein (1996) argues that norms represent powerful 
forces in the organisation of society and speaks in great detail regarding the power (and 




In more recent years, the power of social norm nudges – which seek to change norms or 
establish new norms – has been demonstrated in a variety of areas, from energy usage 
(Allcott, 2011; Allcott and Rogers, 2014) to charitable giving (Bartke et al., 2017) to healthy 
eating (Huitink et al., 2020) and voting (Gerber et al., 2014).  
Sunstein (1996) argues such nudges work because they invoke shame within a decision-
maker. Yet, this seems far too simple a proposition. Schultz et al. (2007), in their investigation 
of social norms and household energy use, describe a magnetic effect associated with social 
norms: “Because a social-norms marketing campaign provides specific descriptive normative 
information that can serve as a point of comparison for an individual’s own behaviour, the 
descriptive norm acts as a magnet for behavior [sic] for individuals both above and below the 
average” (Schultz et al., 2007: 430).235 Such a finding could find a hypothesised explanation 
in shame; a person may feel shame in their excessive consumption but may also feel shame 
in their lack of consumption.236 But shame is just one explanation which could be offered here. 
Equally, it might be imagined that a person reduces their consumption as the norm makes 
them aware that they may continue to live adequately with less consumption, while another 
may increase their consumption for the norm offers them a legitimising reason to overcome 
their frugality. Here, shame plays no role.  
Returning to Schultz et al. (2007), it seems more appropriate to say that social norms work 
because they, “can serve as a point of comparison for an individual’s own behaviour,” and 
speculate that those more conscious to this comparison may be more influenced by the social 
norm. This does not invalidate Sunstein’s (1996) argument regarding shame; rather, it better 
situates shame as one response which might be expected given a person’s awareness of 
others. 
 
235 Also see Bernheim and Exley’s (2015) “gravity effect” (Bernheim and Exley, 2015: 3, original emphasis). 
236 See, for instance, Veblen’s (2012 [1899]) concept of conspicuous consumption as a means of demonstrating 
one’s class and mere ability to consume. Bernheim (1994) has drawn a similar comparison with social norms 
and Veblen’s work. See footnote [3] of Bernheim (1994). 
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It is important to note, however, that awareness of others does not by extension mean one is 
inclined to follow or mimic the actions and decisions of others. An individual may be fully aware 
of others and still pursue the so-called road less travelled (Bernheim, 1994). Following 
Bernheim (1994), the utility a decision-maker derives from a decision might be said to have 
two components: the intrinsic utility associated with the decision itself, and the utility conferred 
onto an individual given their decision. For those whom the later represents a significant 
degree of their utility, they can be described as conformists. For others, the former might 
dominate the utility function, and thus may be wholly willing to ignore the status their decision 
may confer. As such, a person’s tendency to conform or to be autonomous also represents 
mechanisms which may explain the effectiveness of social norms. 
Finally, it is important to recognise that the awareness of others represents information which 
may contribute to a decision even if an individual cares little for the what Bernheim (1994) 
identifies as the status component. Moon (2010), for instance, argues people are more inclined 
to follow recommendations when they know relatively little about an area as the collective 
wisdom of others may make up for this shortfall.237 Bernheim (1994) addresses this argument 
more generally, arguing conformity may arise due to the positive externalities generated by 
conforming.238 As such, a person who is less inclined to evaluate information about a decision 
(i.e. establish expertise) may be more susceptible to following a social norm. 
Voting is a typical example of an individual decision which is greatly entangled with the 
decisions of other individuals. Unt, Solvak and Vassil (2017) argue that voting has an inherent 
social nature and produces a sense of civic duty, with Gerber et al. (2014) finding that whether 
a person votes or not can be an important factor in shaping the attitudes directed towards that 
 
237 This argument broadly follows Friestad and Wright’s (1994) persuasion knowledge model, which argues a 
person’s expert knowledge (topic knowledge) within a context in which someone is trying to persuade them 
will moderate the effectiveness of the persuasive technique. It follows from this model that a person with less 
knowledge may be more susceptible to persuasion, while someone with more knowledge may be more 
inclined to ignore the persuasion attempts. 
238 For instance, Bernheim (1994) cites Katz and Shapiro’s (1986) work on networks as an exemplar of this 
point. Here, Katz and Shapiro (1986) argue that the value received by each member of a network from the 
network grows as the network expands. As such, one may follow the crowd purely because there is a crowd. 
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individual. This social nature of voting creates opportunities to nudge individuals via social 
norms. For instance, given many people may be supporting a candidate, emphasising this 
apparent popularity could be used – within a political advertisement – to nudge a decision-
maker. This is demonstrated with the following slogan: 
 
“Trusted by Voters.” 
 
The slogan represents a social norm nudge by establishing that other voters place trust in the 
candidate. In this sense, this slogan is dissimilar to social norms which, for instance, report 
the monetary value of a neighbour’s household consumption, establishing a reference point 
from which the decision-maker can evaluate their own consumption. However, such a 
reference point seems neither necessary nor appropriate within the political advertising 
medium; instead, this slogan simply indicates to decision-makers that other voters have 




As above, it is prudent to first select the nudges to be examined, and then identify the 
psychological traits associated with those nudges, before selecting the psychometric scales 
to be used in this research. Having considered the four nudges selected, various psychological 
traits have been identified, each requiring measurement via some psychometric scale. 
Immediately, however, the details of the nudges discussed, psychological traits identified, and 





Table 2: Nudges, Psychological Traits and Slogans 
Nudge Psychological Traits Example Slogan 
 
 








































“Trusted by Voters” 
 
In total, seven broad psychological traits are identified here. These are described as follows: 
• Risk – the propensity to engage in decisions where multiple outcomes are possible, 
and the final outcome is uncertain. Risk may be understood on a scale from risk-loving 
(high engagement) to risk-averse (low engagement). 
• Decision-impatience – the propensity to make decisions quickly. The reverse may be 
understood as decision-patience. See, for instance, Kahneman (2011, 2003).239 
• Cognition – the propensity to engage in tasks and decisions which require a high (low) 
level of thinking. 
• Time – the propensity to evaluate decisions with several time horizons in mind. Time 
does not necessarily capture time-preference but is instead indicative of lesser or 
greater consideration of the temporal-nature of a given decision. 
• Immediacy – the propensity to prefer immediate outcomes over delayed outcomes. 
Immediacy can be understood as a form of impatience, but regarding outcomes rather 
 
239 In this literature, Kahneman (2011, 2003) distinguishes between two ‘systems’ of thinking: system 1, 
described as, “Fast”, “Effortless” and “Emotional”, and system 2, described as, “Slow”, “Controlled” and 
“Effortful” (Kahneman, 2003: 1451). In the language of ‘decision-patience’ and ‘decision-impatience’ used 
above, these terms should be taken as corresponding, generally, to systems 2 and 1 respectively. 
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than the decision-making process itself. See, for instance, O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(2015) and Prelec (2004). The reverse, postponement, can be understood as a form 
of patience with preferences for delayed outcomes.240 
• Procrastination – the propensity to put off or delay making a decision.241 
Procrastination differs from patience in that pertains to a propensity to not make 
decisions, while patience pertains to the speed at which a person willingly makes a 
decision.242 
• Conformity – the propensity to engage in the same or similar activities to those who 
have come before (Bernheim, 1994). The reverse, autonomy, can be understood as a 
propensity to engage in different or dissimilar activities to those who have come before. 
  
 
240 See Kahneman (2003), who discusses the time-preference component of systems 1 and 2. 
241 Akerlof (1991: 1): “Procrastination occurs when present costs are unduly salient in comparison with future 
costs, leading individuals to postpone tasks until tomorrow without foreseeing that when tomorrow comes, 
the required action will be delayed yet again.” 
242 See, for instance, Akerlof (1991) who notes the apparent similarly between patience and procrastination. 
Akerlof (1991) notes that procrastination models might be used to offset deleterious impatient behaviour, but 
ultimately argues that procrastination is better understood as occurring when a person wishes to put off 
incurring a cost associated with acting, rather than because a person who procrastinates is necessarily 




Chapter 6 – Psychometric Selection and the Psychometric Map 
 
6.1 – Introduction 
 
Having selected the nudges to be used in this thesis, and identified the psychological traits 
associated with each nudge, appropriate psychometrics can now be selected so as to capture 
these various traits. Additionally, returning to Table 1 offers some guidance as to which 
psychometric scales may be appropriate to draw upon. 
This chapter discusses three psychometric scales, consisting in total of seven psychometric 
measures, which are used in this investigation. These are the General Decision-Making Style 
(GDMS), the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale, and the Consideration of Future Consequences 
(CFC) scale. The suitability of each scale is assessed against the psychological traits identified 
from the literature discussed in the previous chapter. Two more scales – the Big Five 
personality scale, and the Abbreviated Numeracy Scale (ANS) – are also discussed, but not 
utilised in this thesis. Combining information on nudges, psychological traits and psychometric 
scales provided in this chapter and Chapter 5, this chapter concludes by providing a 
hypothesised psychometric map, which can be used to interrogate empirical results. 
6.2 – General Decision-Making Style 
 
The General Decision-Making Style (GDMS) is developed by Scott and Bruce (1995) as a 
means of broadly measuring decision-making style, which they state relates to the habits and 
characteristics individuals exhibit when making decisions. The initial robustness of the GDMS 
across several different contexts is demonstrated by Scott and Bruce (1995), but has been 
further demonstrated by Loo (2000), Thunholm (2004) and Spicer and Sadler-Smith (2005) in 
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the context of general decision-making, del Campo et al. (2016) in the context of heuristic-
based decision-making, and Peer et al. (2019) in the context of nudging.243 
From the literature, Scott and Bruce (1995) propose an initial scale consisting of some 37 
items contributing to 4 variables: rational, “characterized by a thorough search for and logical 
evaluation of alternatives”; intuitive, “characterized by a reliance on hunches and feelings”; 
dependent, “characterized by a search for advice and direction from others”; and avoidant, 
“characterized by attempts to avoid decision making” (Scott and Bruce, 1995: 820). Through 
an analysis of their initial dataset, they reduce their scale from 37 items to 25. They also 
conclude, based on a factor-analysis, that a 5 five-factor solution, rather than their 
hypothesised 4-factor solution, would be superior. Scott and Bruce subsequently propose a 
fifth variable, spontaneity, described as, “the amount of time devoted to decision making” 
(Scott and Bruce, 1995: 823). 
Is the GDMS appropriate for an investigation into political decision-making? Likely, it is, as the 
GDMS is designed to capture styles of decision-making, and political choices are a type of 
decision-making (Downs, 1957), with variables that appear well adapted to capture several of 
the psychological traits identified as being associated with the selected nudges. The GDMS is 
disadvantaged in that it is designed to remain very broad (Scott and Bruce, 1995). However, 
as Egelman and Peer (2015) demonstrate, the GDMS remains a stronger predictor of 
decision-making than an alternative and popular scale in the literature (Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen, 2012; Moon, 2002), the Big Five personality index. 
6.2.1 Risk-Taking 
 
There is evidence linking variables within the GDMS with risk. For instance, Gambetti and 
Giusberti (2019) find that rational and avoidant styles predict risk perceptions within an 
investment environment. They suggest this finding could be related to desires for control, with 
 
243 The effectiveness of the GDMS has also been shown across languages, with Girard, Reeve and Bonaccio 
(2016) demonstrating its robustness in French, Alacreu-Crespo et al. (2019) in Spanish, Gambetti et al. (2008) 
in Italian and Fischer, Soyez and Gurtner (2015) in German. 
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the rational style leading people to have more understanding and thus a sense of control over 
the risks they are undertaking, and the avoidant style leading people to avoid decision-making 
and in turn attempt to distance themselves from risks. In their review of control and the GDMS, 
Thunholm (2004) supports the arguments of Gambetii and Buisberti (2019). In their study of 
medical decision-making, Bavolar and Orosova (2015) also report this relationship between 
risk and the avoidant style. 
6.2.2 Decision-Impatience 
 
To this author’s knowledge, no study has established a link between decision-impatience and 
any aspect of the GDMS. As such, any proposed link must be speculative. However, 
propositions can be made. For instance, the intuitive variable – as characterised by Scott and 
Bruce (1995) – could be hypothesised to positively predict decision-impatience, as reliance 
on one’s own intuition may grant licence to a decision-maker to spend less time searching for 
additional information. As such, it may also be expected that the rational variable would 
negatively predict decision-impatience. Finally, spontaneity, by its very characterisation, 
seems a likely candidate to positively predict decision-impatience. 
6.2.3 Conformity 
 
Again, little research has linked conformity and the GDMS. However, unlike above, some 
research has explored concepts such as emotional intelligence and manipulative tendencies, 
both of which may be indicative of susceptibility to feelings such as shame (Sunstein, 1996) 
or self-awareness which contribute to conformity (Bernheim, 1994).  
Geisler and Allwood (2017) find the dependent style to be significant when decision-makers 
are faced with negative emotions, suggesting that – in accordance with Sunstein’s (1996) 
assertions surrounding conformity and shame – those who are dependent would be expected 
to demonstrate more conformity. This seems intuitively sensible – a person who seeks out 
advice and guidance from others can be reasonably expected to care about the opinions of 
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others. This idea is also consistent with the ideas advanced by Moon (2010) and Bernheim 
(1994) that individuals may conform simply for the advantages conforming confers.244  
Geisler and Allwood (2017) also find some evidence that spontaneity may be related to, “a 
tendency to have an amorally manipulative social orientation” (Geisler and Allwood, 2017: 
424). Extending this result into the current discussion, it might thus be speculated that 
spontaneity is negatively related to conformist behaviour as amorality and manipulative 
actions would seem to demonstrate a diminished social importance of emotions such as 
shame. Even ignoring this postulate, an intuitive assertion may be that a person who acts 
spontaneously does so without giving great importance to the actions of others. 
6.2.4 Time 
 
Carelli, Wiberg and Wiberg (2011) find that future prospects tend to lead decision-makers to 
adopt avoidant and dependent styles. They argue avoidance may be invoked because 
decision-makers wish to avoid a future they see as negative, while the uncertainty associated 
with the future may prompt some to seek support from others (dependency). By contrast, those 
who viewed the future positively tended to exhibit a rational decision style. Finally, they find 
those who are more focused on the present tend to demonstrate the spontaneous and intuitive 
decision styles. Carelli, Wiberg and Wiberg (2011) explain this may be because these people 
are used to relying on feelings and hunches which occur in the moment.  
6.2.5 Immediacy and Procrastination 
 
Geisler and Allwood (2017) largely corroborate the findings reported by Carelli, Wiberg and 
Wiberg (2011). However, they go further and relate time preferences to the ideas of 
procrastination (deferment of a decision) and immediacy (eagerness for outcomes). 
Consistent with Carelli, Wiberg and Wiberg (2011), Geisler and Allwood (2017) find that the 
 
244 For instance, Moon’s (2010) assertion that often non-experts will follow the road most travelled while 
experts will tread their own path is consistent with the notion of dependency – why would an expert seek out 
the guidance of others? 
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spontaneous decision style positively predicts immediacy in decision-making, while the 
avoidant style positively predicts procrastination tendencies. Again, these results are 
unsurprising, with the decision style associated with in-the-moment decision-making 
(spontaneity) being associated with immediacy, and the style associated with avoiding 
decisions (avoidance) being associated with procrastination. 
6.2.6 Cognition 
 
As with decision-impatience, no literature appears to examine the cognitive strain of decisions 
in conjunction with the GDMS. As such, the GDMS may not be appropriate for measuring this 
psychological trait. Nevertheless, relationships may be hypothesised. For instance, the 
rational decision-making style characterises a decision-maker as one who surveys their 
options and thinks logically, and thus this decision-maker may feel very comfortable with highly 
cognitive decisions. By contrast, intuitive and spontaneous decision-makers, who rely on in-
the-moment, instinctive decision-making, may do so because they dislike the cognitive burden 
associated with more rational decision-making. 
6.3 – Need for Cognition 
 
As seen above, there is good evidence that the GDMS may be able to capture many of the 
psychological traits which are expected to be associated with the selected nudges. However, 
for two of these traits – decision-impatience and cognition – possible links can only be 
hypothesised. As such, the GDMS alone is likely insufficient. Fortunately, existing literature 
suggests two additional psychometric scales which might be used to supplement the 
shortcomings of the GDMS. Specifically, Peer et a. (2019) also utilise the Need for Cognition 
(NFC) scale, and the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) scale.245 The latter will be 
discussed in part 6.4. At present, discussion turns to the NFC scale. 
 
245 Peer et al. (2019) also utilise a numeracy scale. The relevance and suitability of this scale in this thesis is 
discussed in more detail below. 
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The NFC scale was developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982), though as these authors note, 
the notion of a cognitive need existed prior to their work (Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe, 1955). 
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) state the NFC scale is designed to assess, “the tendency for an 
individual to engage in and enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982: 116). Cacioppo and 
Petty (1982) initially propose a 45-item scale to measure cognition, though over the course of 
several trials they narrow the NFC scale down to 34 items. Cacioppo, Petty and Kao (1984) 
subsequently reduce the scale to only 18-items. Unlike the GDMS, the NFC scale is wholly 
contained within these 18-items and does not take the form of multiple variables (e.g. rational, 
intuitive etc.). 
By design, the NFC scale measures cognition, with a high-NFC score indicating a person who 
likes engaging with tasks which require a lot of thinking, while a low-NFC score indicates a 
person who does not like tasks which require a lot of thinking. Given the need for some 
measurement of cognition following the lack of measurement from the GDMS, the NFC is 
therefore welcome. Following Peer et al. (2019), furthermore, the NFC has been shown to be 
appropriate in a study of nudges. Finally, the NFC has been found to be indicative of several 
other psychological traits previously discussed. 
As with the GDMS, it should be considered whether the NFC scale is suitable for political 
decision-making. This consideration should go beyond the need for a robust measure of 
cognition as found given the shortcomings of the GDMS. Political decision-making often 
consists of a myriad of factors (Boiney and Paletz, 1991) which require cognitive effort to 
appropriately resolve in a political decision-making process. For instance, Gomez and Wilson 
(2006) have found that politically sophisticated voters – those with more knowledge of issues 
and capacities to consider said issues – are motivated by different interests compared to less 
sophisticated voters, while Coulter (2008) has found cognition to be a mediating factor in how 
voters assess the positive and negative frames of advertisements. Using the NFC scale, more 
contemporary studies (Sohlberg, 2019; O’Hara, Walter and Christopher, 2009) have found 
similar results. There is not only a reasonable argument as to the relevance of the NFC scale 
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in political decision-making, therefore, but also evidence demonstrating the scale’s 
effectiveness within investigations of political decision-making. 
6.3.1 Additional Psychological Links 
 
Some evidence exists which draws a link between the NFC scale and propensity to take risks. 
In their study of healthcare decision-making, Hadj-Abo et al. (2020) find that those with high-
NFC tended to be more careful in their healthcare decisions, and thus may be indicative of a 
low risk propensity. Lin, Yen and Chuang (2006) find similar in their study of risk and consumer 
choice. They find that high-NFC participants were less likely to be influenced into undertaking 
riskier activities than those low in NFC. Following both Hadj-Abo et al. (2020) and Lin, Yen 
and Chuang (2006), those who had high-NFC were more likely to evaluate and understand all 
available information, allowing them to better understand the relative risks associated with 
their choices. Estelami (2020) has elaborated further on this argument, suggesting that high 
cognition leads to over consideration of information, which increases sensitivity to risk. 
Srivastava and Sharma (2012) investigate the NFC scale in the context of consumer decision-
making and find that NFC is a significant factor in the speed of consumer decision-making, 
with those with low-NFC acting faster than those with high-NFC. Furthermore, Das et al. 
(2003), in their investigation of the NFC scale and online consumer purchasing, find that 
individuals with high-NFC consider more information and take longer processing information 
than those with low-NFC. These results aren’t surprising, given that high-NFC is characterised 
by more thinking, which one would naturally expect to take longer. As a result, the NFC scale 
may also be able to capture decision-impatience. 
Finally, following Bernheim’s (1994) suggestion that conformity may arise due to the benefits 
which arise from following the crowd, it may be speculated that a conformist individual may 
have a low-NFC as they are satisfied relying on collective wisdom or the wisdom of others, 
while a non-conformist individual may have a high-NFC. Lee (2014), for instance, finds that 
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individuals with low-NFC tend to be more persuaded by the opinions of others in political 
decision-making, while those with high-NFC do not demonstrate this behaviour. 
6.4 – Consideration of Future Consequences 
 
While the need for cognition may somewhat capture it, decision-impatience remains an 
outstanding psychological feature which requires some form of measurement. Fortunately, a 
third psychometric test – consideration of future consequences (CFC) – appears suitable for 
this task.246 The CFC scale is 12-item scale developed by Strathman et al. (1994) and is 
designed to capture, “the extent to which people consider distant versus immediate 
consequences of potential behaviours” (Strathman et al., 1994: 742). 
Such a definition would seem to invite commentary on time preferences and immediacy – 
indeed, Strathman et al. (1994) very much consider these aspects too. However, the CFC 
scale measures consideration with respect to the future outcomes of decisions, both in the 
short- and long-term. As such, a low-CFC is interpreted as a demonstration of decision-
impatience, as a person who makes decisions quickly is also likely to demonstrate less 
consideration of their decisions. Equally, a high-CFC score is typified by demonstrating great 
consideration over their decisions, and as such, would be expected to make decisions slower 
(i.e. decision-patience). 
As previously, it must be considered whether the CFC scale is appropriate within the context 
of political decision-making. Given political decision-making has an inherent temporal 
dimension (the time between engaging with the political process and an outcome resulting 
from that engagement; Downs, 1957), it is reasonable integrate a measure of temporality into 
this thesis. For instance, Fowler and Kam (2006) argue that the inherent “delayed gratification” 
(Fowler and Kam, 2006: 113) associated with political decision-making means patience is an 
 
246 See Peer et al. (2019). 
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important factor in engagement with the political process. As the CFC scale attempts to 
capture the temporal thinking of decision makers, it seems appropriate for this thesis. 
6.4.1 Additional Psychological Links 
 
As above, the CFC scale can also be linked to time preference and immediacy. Orbell and 
Kyriakaki (2008) find evidence – consistent with the expectations of the CFC scale (Strathman 
et al., 1994) – that those who have low-CFC tend to respond to emphasis on immediate 
outcomes, while those with high-CFC tend to respond to outcomes which are emphasised to 
occur over a longer-term timespan.  
Similar findings are reported by Orbell, Perugini and Rakow (2004), who find that low-CFC 
individuals, “were more persuaded when positive consequences were short term and negative 
consequences were long term. The opposite was true for high CFC individuals” (Orbell, 
Perugini and Rakow, 204: 388). O’Connor et al. (2009) also report this relationship in their 
study of healthcare decision-making.  
While the Orbell, Perugini and Rakow (2004) or O’Connor et al. (2009) do not make such a 
link, such a result may also indicate a relationship between the CFC scale and procrastination, 
as low-CFC individuals may put off negative consequences (costs) while high-CFC individuals 
embrace them. Evidence for this link is provided by My Lien Rebetez et al. (2016) and Sirois 
(2004), who both find a negative relationship between CFC and procrastination. My Lien 
Rebetez et al. (2016) suggest greater consideration about the future may led individuals to 
see the fruitlessness of delay and thus prompt action in the present. 
Finally, the CFC scale may be indicative of conformist behaviours and awareness of others. 
For instance, Griffin and O’Cass (2010) find that individuals who have high-CFC are more 
likely to obey the speed limit, and Ebreo and Vining (2001) and Lindsay and Stratham (1997) 
have found individuals with high-CFC are more inclined to participate in recycling initiatives. 
Griffin and O’Cass (2010) argue such behaviour is manifest because high-CFC individuals are 
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more conscious of the potential outcomes of their behaviour, including the outcomes of non-
compliance and non-conformity. 
6.5 – Numeracy Scale 
 
Despite being used by Peer et al. (2019) in their study of personalised nudging and 
cybersecurity, this thesis will not use a numeracy scale. There are two reasons for this.  
Firstly, as Peer et al. (2019) acknowledge, there are several reasons why numerical 
competence may be important to cybersecurity and password design. For instance, an 
understanding that an 8-character password will be harder to crack than a 7-character 
password – while adding little additional inconvenience to the password-holder – is reliant on 
a simple understanding of exponentials.  
However, it is not so obvious that numerical understanding is relevant in political decision-
making. A rational theory of voting, such as that proposed by Downs (1957), may contribute 
to an argument that individuals must understand the expected payoffs of any political decision. 
However, such a theory of voting is one of several,247 and subject to tremendous criticism. For 
instance, people often make political decisions which are driven by emotional, social or moral 
reasons (Borah, 2019; Hamlin and Jennings, 2011; Boiney and Paletz, 1991). Even when 
political decisions are expected to occur along economic lines, this may only occur in a small 
proportion of a population (Gomez and Wilson, 2006). The major justification for imagining 
political decision-making as a rational cost-benefit analysis, and thus using a numeracy scale, 
is based on an unrepresentative model of political decision-making. Beyond this view, there is 
little reason to suspect that competency with numeracy may guide political decision-making. 
Secondly, unlike the scales already considered, numeracy scales often consist of multiple-
choice questions with only a single correct answer. This is the case with the abbreviated 
numeracy scale (ANS) utilised by Peer et al. (2019), as well as various longer numeracy scales 
 
247 For a review, see Boiney and Paletz (1991). 
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from which the ANS descends (Weller et al., 2012). This means it may be unfair to compare 
a numeracy psychometric scale – which, even when averaged, is constructed from a series of 
right/wrong questions – with another psychometric scale – when, despite being averaged, is 
constructed from a genuine scale of response. 
6.6 – The Big Five Personality Scale 
 
From the review of previous literature, one scale which emerges on several occasions is the 
Big Five personality scale. See, for instance, Moon (2002), Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012) and Guo et al. (2020). This scale is an extensively studied set of questions which seek 
to profile personalities from five personality traits: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness and neuroticism. Given the scale’s previous usage, it may be tempting to 
include the Big Five personality scale in this project. 
However, following Egelman and Peer (2015), the Big Five personality scale is omitted from 
this project. Egelman and Peer (2015) argue that scales should match the context in which 
they are used, while the Big Five personality scale is designed to be extremely broad. Indeed, 
in the two studies which quantitatively utilise the scale – Moon (2002) and Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen (2012) – the former only considers one trait – extraversion – because of its 
apparent explanatory power compared to the other four traits, while the latter considers all five 
traits, but only because previous research has failed to do so. The prior arguments for using 
this scale, then, are weak. 
Following their argument, Egelman and Peer (2015) further demonstrate that the predictive 
power of the Big Five personality scale is weak compared to the GDMS, and subsequently 
argue that in investigations of decision-making, the GDMS represents a superior scale. For 
this reason, the Big Five personality scale is not used in this thesis, and the GDMS is used. 




Having first established the nudges which will be investigated in this thesis, and having 
identified the psychological traits which are expected to be associated with these nudges, 
three psychometric scales, consisting of a total of seven variables, are selected which are 
expected to capture each of the seven psychological traits identified. Returning to Figure 1, 
therefore, a psychometric map relating these psychometric scales – which can be measured 
– with nudges – which can be observed – via psychological traits – which are predicted – can 
now be offered. 
Firstly, however, the expected relationship between psychometric scales and psychological 
traits is visualised in Figure 2: 
Figure 2: Predicted Relationships Between Psychometric Scales and Psychological Traits 
 GDMS 





























       
Green = Positive, predicted relationship 
Red = Negative, predicted relationship 
White = No predicted relationship 
 
Several items must be noted with Figure 2. Firstly, green cells represent a predicted positive 
relationship between the psychometric scale and psychological trait. For instance, a person 
who scores highly in the avoidant style is predicted to demonstrate high procrastination. Red 
cells, on the other hand, represent a predicted negative relationship between the psychometric 
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scale and psychological trait. For instance, a person who scores highly in the spontaneous 
style is predicted to demonstrate low conformity. As such, Figure 2 represents something of a 
correlogram, albeit one based on indicative relationships and predictions found in the 
literature, rather than demonstrated via data analysis. 
Secondly, the two-tone nature of Figure 2 may suggest that all predicted relationships are 
strong.248 This may be a misrepresentation. The visualisation is merely meant to demonstrate 
the direction of the relationship (i.e. positive or negative) and should not be used to infer the 
strength of the relationship (e.g. strongly positive, weakly negative, and so on). This is a 
limitation of this visualisation, but an inevitable one, given Figure 2 is derived from reported 
findings in the literature, and not specific data which has been analysed. Figure 2, therefore, 
is merely a visual aid, and is not a visualisation which should be taken to capture statistical 
precision. 
Finally, several cells within Figure 2 remain blank. This is because evidence to suggest a 
relationship between a psychometric scale and a psychological trait has not been identified. 
As above, this should not be taken as there being no relationship, only that the evidence at 
present does not support the assertion that there is a relationship. Indeed, it is more correct 
to interpret Figure 2 as suggesting – where a cell is coloured – that a significant relationship 
would be expected, and – where a cell is blank – that either no relationship, or an insignificant 
relationship, is expected. These expectations, of course, may be misguided when interrogated 
with data. This, to an extent, will be undertaken in proceeding chapters. 





248 In the language of correlation, highly (un)correlated. 
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Figure 3: Hypothesised Psychometric Map 
 
 
Such a ‘map’ brings together the various nudge-trait-psychometric elements discussed thus 
far. The construction of the map differs from Figure 1; where in Figure 1 nudge selection was 
the first step, in Figure 3 there is a clear progression from psychometric measurement, via 
psychological traits, to nudges. This primarily reflects practical reality, with the psychometric 
measurements expected to moderate the effectiveness of nudges (see Chapter 8), rather than 
as previously understood when nudges were used as the basis for selecting psychometrics 
(see Figure 1). 
The use of psychometric maps is not a novel contribution here. Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) and Guo et al. (2020) both illustrate their personalised nudging procedures via 
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rudimentary psychometric maps. The purpose of doing so, both for these authors and for this 
thesis, is to visualise expected relationships between psychometrics and nudges which can 
inform a matching procedure analysis. For instance, using Figure 2 and Figure 3, it is 
hypothesised that those who score high in the rational decision style will be more risk-taking, 
and so will be less susceptible to the status quo nudge. From a data sample, therefore, high- 
and low-scorers for the rational decision style can now be identified and divided – likely in a 
somewhat arbitrary fashion such as above/below an average or a midpoint (Schöning, Matt 
and Hess, 2019; Moon, 2002) – before the effectiveness of the status quo nudge across both 
groups is tested. 
In fact, many such hypotheses can now be formulated and considered via a matching 
procedure approach. This approach carries with it all the issues already identified with the 
matching procedure (e.g. ‘personalising’ after-the-fact, arbitrary value selection) but 
introduces a new concern in turn. Namely, by identifying and testing all possible relationships 
using the matching procedure, one might fall into a pick-and-choose mentality, with 
‘personalisation’ sometimes seeming effective, and sometimes seeming ineffective. Indeed, 
beyond overwhelming evidence of (in)significant effects, it would seem rather difficult to 
confidently conclude ‘personalisation’ is or is not effective using a matching procedure 
alone.249 This is not to say that the matching procedure cannot be of interest and indicative – 
on both counts, this remains to be seen – only that when a matching procedure is not selected 
a priori, but is instead arrived at via this selection process and understood using a 
psychometric map, the subjective and arbitrary selections which seem apparent in previous 
studies using the matching procedure become amplified. 
Nevertheless,  
Table 3 details the 44 such hypotheses which can arise from Figure 2 and Figure 3 and the 
wider discussion of the literature offered here. For the readers aid, each item in  
 
249 For evidence of such difficulties, see Chapters 11 and 13. 
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Table 3 is best read as: 
“If A is high, then B is expected to be C, and so the effectiveness of D is expected to be E.” 
Table 3: Matching Statements (Hypotheses) 






































































































































































































































It is a testament that, when the results found in the literature are arranged this way, there is a 
remarkable degree of consistency in expectation. Two contradictions do emerge. Firstly, a 
high NFC would seem to produce a high effectiveness with the status quo nudge when acting 
via risk, but a low effectiveness when acting via cognition or conformity. Secondly, the CFC 
would seem to produce a high effectiveness with the present bias nudge when acting via 
procrastination, but a low effectiveness when acting via immediacy or time preference. 
Yet, these apparent contradictions demonstrate a reasonable expectation regarding the 
hypotheses shown in Table 3 and the hypothesised psychometric map presented as Figure 3, 
namely that these predicted relationships arise from a wide literature, and such relationships 
are likely to be much sparser when investigated with data. This, it is expected, will allow a 
much more meaningful picture to emerge, with apparent contradictions resolved. 
The question of data collection will be addressed shortly. Immediately, however, discussion 




Chapter 7 – Constructing Political Advertisements and Experimental 
Implications 
 
7.1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter develops preliminary political advertisements to be used in the first pilot study. 
To begin, the concept of dynamic choice architecture is developed. This concept bridges the 
behavioural concept of choice architecture with the visual design considerations of 
advertisements to offer a schema for producing the political advertisements to be used in this 
thesis. These advertisements are then offered, followed by a discussion of various design 
choices. 
Attention then turns to the experimental implications of these political advertisements. Broadly, 
there are two key experimental implications. The first concerns the sample population, as all 
design is often grounded in a social or cultural aesthetic. In this instance, an American style is 
adopted, and thus an American sample is selected. The second concerns the role of differing 
aesthetics. Where advertisements differ in ways which are not of experimental interest, the 
effect of any difference between a control and a treatment is obscured. This is the case in this 
experiment. The solution proposed here is to adopt a randomised controlled trial (RCT) design. 
The use of RCTs within the behavioural science literature is offered in this chapter, as well as 
a consideration of a (potential) alternative solution proposed by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012). 
7.2 – Dynamic Choice Architecture 
 
Political decision-making can be a very complex process (Borah, 2019; Stone, 2012; Hamlin 
and Jennings, 2011). The advertisements which support and encourage political decision-
making, therefore, come to reflect the complexity of an electorate through their designs (Kehle 
and Naimi, 2019). From a behavioural perspective, design elements, components and 
aesthetics represent choice architecture (Benartzi, 2017), especially in online and digital 
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advertising (Yeung, 2017; Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016). It is this language 
which is utilised here when considering the design of political advertisements. 
Classically, choice architecture is characterised as the various framing conditions under which 
a proposition is given, and a decision is made (Thaler, Sunstein and Balz, 2014). Nudges 
exist, in relation to choice architecture, as small, often singular changes which influence 
decision-making (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). With the emergence of digital landscapes, a 
growing body of work on digital nudging and digital choice architecture (Benartzi and 
Bhargava, 2020; Benartzi, 2017; Yeung, 2017; Weinmann, Schnieder and vom Brocke, 2016) 
frequently posits that choice architecture is much more dynamic (Yeung, 2017) than the 
classical account would suggest, with different choice environments being built or designed 
(Benartzi and Bhargava, 2020; Thaler and Tucker, 2013) depending on different individual 
preferences.250 
This offers a rather useful, if quite reductionist, view of design. An initial proposition is put forth: 
an advertisement consists as the sum of its constituent parts. Depending on the 
advertisement, these parts may include a product name, a logo, a background image, a colour 
scheme and so on.251 This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. In other words, an advertisement 
can be thought of as: 
Advertisement = Product + Logo + Colour Scheme… 
In a more mathematical language, an advertisement 𝐴 is assembled from components within 
a set { 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑖 } such that 𝐴 = 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝑋𝑖. Each component 𝑋 represents an 
element of choice architecture which, in theory, can be changed so as to nudge a decision-
maker. 
 
250 Here, the intersection between digital nudging and personalisation is rather obvious. 
251 Furthermore, depending on the medium, this list can be expanded. For instance, a video advertisement 
may include a soundtrack as a constituent part. 
177 
 
In fact, each component might be thought of existing in a state of being either ‘switched off’ – 
whereby that component is not changed, and no nudge is intentionally embedded – or 
‘switched on’ – whereby that component is changed and a nudge is intentionally embedded.252 
For instance, recall Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) who nudge decision-makers within a 
digital space by changing whether images are used, or whether bullet points are used.  
It is through this lens that Yeung’s (2017) discussion of “dynamically reconfiguring the user’s 
[decision-maker’s] informational choice context in ways intentionally designed to influence her 
decisions” (Yeung, 2017: 122) can be understood; dynamism may refer to the ‘switching’ on 
or off of different choice architectural components depending the circumstances of the 
decision-maker and the goals of the choice architect.253 Furthermore, for a thesis concerned 
with personalised nudging, with an experiment conducted online, this approach to choice 
architecture and design seems the most appropriate. As Benartzi (2017) notes in their 
authoritative work on the choice architecture of online spaces: “The logical endpoint [of digital 
choice architecture] is an internet in which the best Web sites and apps customize their 
appearance based on our demographic background. Are we an educated senior citizen from 
Poland? Then take away all the colors and give us plenty of text and links. Are we a young 
Thai man? Then give us lots of bright color and imagery” (Benartzi, 2017: 50).254 
7.3 – Political Advertisements 
 
 
252 It is important to note that Thaler and Sunstein (2008) and Sunstein (2013, 2017) argue that choice 
architecture cannot be avoided. It is for this reason the notion of intentionality is included. 
253 There is much more to be said of this notion than is appropriate to include here. For instance, one might be 
inclined to assume the effectiveness of an advertisement 𝐴, measured as the proportion of people who choose 
whatever option 𝐴 is nudging them towards, would always be greater when two components are used to 
nudge, rather than one. This, of course, assumes that the effect of ‘switching’ one component on is the same 
as ‘switching’ any other on – an assumption which is likely unsupported. An investigation of this notion, 
however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
254 Benartzi (2017), here, is drawing on the work of Reinecke and Gajos (2014), who investigate the aesthetic 
design choices of websites and corresponding user engagement. Benartzi (2017) is clear, later on, that the 
simple colour scheme and complex nexus developed by Reinecke and Gajos (2014) can be more complex: 
“There are, of course, countless variables that go into human attention, from font size to the color  [sic] palette 
of a Web site. (A lot of A/B testing is about fine tuning these details)” Benartzi (2017: 68). This notion, once 
more, speaks to the concept of dynamic choice architecture proposed here. 
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This dynamic, choice architectural approach to advertisement design is utilised here. 
Following the proposition, the political campaign slogan is taken to be one component of the 
whole political advertisement, and the only component which is ‘switched’ on, which is to say, 
the only element of the advertisement which is used to nudge participants. All other 
components of the advertisement, including the political candidates, background imagery, 
accompanying graphics and colour scheme remain ‘switched’ off, which is to say, no nudge is 
intentionally embedded within these components.255 




255 Kehle and Naimi (2019) demonstrate the ability to dynamically reconfigure advertisements to appeal to 
different kinds of voters (e.g. right or left, young or old) by varying several components within their 
advertisements. See Figure 4, below. In a relatively recent study, Praino and Stockemer (2018) demonstrate 
how changing the facial features of political candidates within advertisements can influence voters, extending 
the notion of dynamic reconfiguration even to the physical image of the candidate shown. 
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Several features of these advertisements warrant further elaboration. 
1. The Control Advertisement – Firstly, a control advertisement is offered. The relevance 
of this advertisement will be discussed in greater detail below. Immediately, this 
discussion concerns the selection of the slogan “Working for You.” In accordance with 
the dynamic, choice architectural approach described above, this slogan is designed 
to represent a slogan which has no nudge embedded within it. A common argument 
within nudge theory, of course, is that no choice architecture is neutral (Sunstein, 2013, 
2017a), and as such, the desire for this slogan to carry no nudging influence is an 
ambition more than a proposition which can be verified. The alternative would be to 
have no slogan at all, but this raises a comparability issue. Namely, without a slogan, 
participants may favour the nudge slogan not because of the nudge, but simply 
because the presence of any slogan provides them with more information about their 
decision. This would, then, obscure the ability to discern the effectiveness of the nudge. 
2. Background imagery – The background imagery used with candidates A and B is 
designed to appeal to neutral spaces. Both images are outdoors, and contain buildings, 
some greenery and some water, with none of these aspects in such a concentration 
so as to intentionally imply something about the candidates, e.g. the use of a lot of 
greenery may imply something to do with an environmental agenda. Finally, the 
backgrounds are blurred in an effort to draw attention away from the background 
images and towards the foreground which contains the nudge. 
3. Candidate portraits – Two stock images of middle-aged, white men in suits are used 
to visualise the candidates in this project. These images are selected based on their 
broad demographic similarities, as well as their body language. For instance, both 
candidates have their arms together, are orientated towards the viewer in the same 
way, and have a generally pleasant facial expression. The choice of white, male 
candidates was made to reflect the present reality of US politics: 78% of the 116 th US 
Congress is white, and 76% is male (Bialik, 2019; Desilver, 2018). 
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4. Candidate names – Generic names are chosen so as to not be unusual given the 
demographics of the selected candidates. The names ‘Steve Jones’ and ‘Jack Smith’ 
are chosen as the names ‘Steve’, ‘Jack’, ‘Jones’ and ‘Smith’ are quite typical examples 
of very common names. In addition to these names, a banner with the word ‘Vote’ is 
added to ensure participants recognise these advertisements as political 
advertisements. 
5. Graphics – a small graphic consisting of three arrows is included to make the 
advertisement feel more genuine. The arrows go from left to right in the same direction 
that English and other western languages are typically read, and thus are meant to 
indicate progression rather than regression. The colour scheme used with this graphic 
is red, white and blue, a very typical colour scheme used in American political 
advertisements (Kehle and Naimi, 2019). These colours are also the colours of the US 
flag and capture to two main colours of the two main US political parties. In addition to 
the arrow graphic, a transparent curve graphic is used, again to make the 
advertisement feel more genuine. 
6. Font – candidate names are displayed in bold block text following design choices used 
by Kehle and Naimi (2019). However, the campaign slogans use a ‘handwriting’ font 
so as to encourage participants to associate the words of the slogans with the 
candidates shown in the advertisements. 
Despite these design choices and the various reasons which accompany them, two 
outstanding points remain to be addressed. Firstly, given the designs which have been 
adopted, what target population will the sample be drawn from? Secondly, given the 
advertisements for Candidate A and Candidate B differ by more than just the nudge, how will 
the conflating effect of these differences – so-called aesthetic effects – be isolated and 
removed? 




This discussion of sampling centrally concerns the target population from which a data sample 
will be drawn, rather than the question of sample sizes, which is considered in Chapter 9. The 
inspiration for the political advertisements shown in Table 4 comes from Kehle and Naimi 
(2019) and their work on big data and customised political advertisements: 
Figure 4: Example Advertisements from Kehle and Naimi (2019) 
 
Kehle and Naimi (2019) design their advertisements for an American audience. It makes 
sense, having taken influence from these advertisements, for this experiment to therefore 
sample an American audience. There are several additional advantages to selecting an 
American audience. Firstly, Americans have experience of the electoral process with an 
established history of democracy. Someone who has limited experience participating or even 
seeing political campaign material may evaluate the advertisement very differently to someone 
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who has more familiarity with said material. Secondly, data are collected in the same year as 
the 2020 US presidential election, during which some state elections also are planned. 
Therefore, an American audience can be expected to already be evaluating election material. 
Thirdly, most users on the MTurk platform report to be from America, meaning the ability to 
recruit participants for this experiment will not be hindered by the selection of an American 
audience. 
7.5 – Aesthetic Differences and Randomisation 
 
One important item of consideration is the aesthetic differences in advertisements for 
Candidates A and B. The presence of these differences prompts the question of how such 
differences can be controlled for so as to not inflate or diminish the observed effect of the 
nudge. A more immediate question, however, is why two advertisements – which produce the 
potential for aesthetic effects – are even used to begin with? 
7.5.1 Why Use Two Advertisements? 
 
To be sure, one resolution to the problem of aesthetic effects would be to only use a single 
advertisement, or to use multiple advertisements but only use a single candidate. The use of 
two advertisements supporting two candidates, however, is largely for realism. A basic tenant 
of the democratic process is the notion of a choice between two or more candidates. Where 
only a single candidate is running for an elected position, the act of election itself becomes 
moot.256 In an effort to encourage participants to treat their choices as choices made within a 
genuine democratic setting, two different candidates are provided. 
The act of providing two different candidates itself creates the opportunity for aesthetic effects 
to occur. While efforts have been made to control for demographics, body language and 
expression, it is a wholly plausible possibility that participants find favour with one of these 
candidates based on appearance alone (Praino and Stockemer, 2018; Praino, 2018; Lawson 
 
256 Rebonato (2014), writing on the falsity of choice, argues that when people see no meaningfulness in the 
exercise of choice, the claim of freedom of choice itself becomes “nominal” (Rebonato, 2014: 360). 
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et al., 2010; Little et al., 2007). Furthermore, the inclusion of different candidate pictures may 
not be enough to make participants feel as though this is a genuine choice. One can imagine 
two advertisements, absolutely identical apart from the slogan and the candidate picture, 
engendering one to believe these advertisements are – despite their differences – more or 
less the same. Indeed, political advertisements between different candidates often convey 
similar ideas in different ways. For instance, Figure 4 shows the same candidate discussing 
the same policy, but advertisements targeted at democrats, republicans and independents 
vary quite significantly in terms of aesthetics. In other words, to encourage a feeling of genuine 
choice between candidates, it seems prudent to introduce differences in the advertisements 
beyond merely changing the candidate and the slogan. 
7.5.2 Resolving Aesthetic Effects 
 
Now that the question of why aesthetic differences are introduced has been addressed, 
attention turns to the more demanding question of how the resulting aesthetic effects can be 
resolved. As a term, aesthetic effects is taken here to mean any influencing effect a difference 
between the advertisements other than the nudge has. As such, the difference between a 
treatment advertisement and a control advertisement without controlling for aesthetic effects 
can be described as: 
Equation 1 
 
𝑌1 − 𝑌0 = (𝑥1 − 𝑥0) + (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) (1) 
  
where 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 is the difference in observed effectiveness scores, (𝑥1 − 𝑥0) is the implied effect 
attributable to the nudge, and (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) is the implied effect attributable to presence of other 
differences, such as aesthetic differences.257 Two routes to resolving the presence of aesthetic 
 
257 In the randomised controlled trial literature, from which this equation draws, (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) captures a large 
range of differences, including the demographic differences of respondents. The equation shown above is 
simplified and should be taken as representing a single decision-maker. As such, there is no demographic 
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effects emerges from this model. Firstly, an adjustment of some kind can be made to the 
observed effect so as to remove the inflating or diminishing effect of aesthetics. Secondly, an 
adjustment of some kind can be made to the experimental design itself so as to reduce (𝑆1 −
𝑆0) to zero.
258 
7.5.2.1 Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen’s (2012) Approach 
 
In the personalisation literature, an example of the first strategy can be found. Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen (2012) create an advertisement for each of the Big Five personality types, 
varying these advertisements only by their appeal to a given personality type. Each participant 
is then asked to rate the effectiveness of every advertisement. Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012) initially find that the effectiveness ratings of the advertisements are very similar and 
suggest this is because the aesthetics of the advertisements were the same. To draw out the 
effect due to the treatment,259 they regress the effectiveness of four of the advertisements onto 
the fifth, arguing that the outstanding variance (the residual) captures the effectiveness of the 
personality type attributable to the fifth advertisement.260 
This strategy of resolving aesthetic effects is appealing as it is relatively simple. However, it is 
also problematic for both specific and very general methodological reasons. Specifically, the 
experiment design which would be necessary to implement Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen’s 
(2012) adjustment would reduce the experiment to merely asking participants to rate the same 
advertisement which is subtly changed each time. This is not congruent with a typical political 
decision-making experience, and in fact would reduce this experiment to just asking 
respondents to rate slogans. At that point, the need for aesthetics of any kind evaporates 
entirely. In short, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen’s (2012) procedure may not be suitable for 
 
variance and the term (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) captures only aesthetic effects. Where Equation 1 describes the aggregate 
decisions of multiple people, this narrow understanding is not correct. 
258 At the very least, to afford a responsible argument that (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) is zero and thus assume as much. 
259 This is to say, the authors argue 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 may not be significantly different from zero, but (𝑥1 − 𝑥0) 
may be significantly different from zero. 
260 This process was done for each of the five advertisements. 
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this specific experiment. Generally, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen’s (2012) procedure may 
be problematic in that it requires the experimenter to adjust the data after they have been 
collected, rather than the experiment before data are collected. For instance, it may be 
worthwhile to consider whether Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) would have undertaken 
the process of regression and residual extraction had the absolute effectiveness scores initially 
collected produced results congruent with their expectations.261 While not to disparage Hirsh, 
Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), insofar as one anticipates the presence of an aesthetic effect 
which could be obscuring an effect of primary interest, adjusting for this obscuring effect after-
the-fact grants experimenters licence to engage in a variety of activities under the guise of 
isolating and removing an effect which – in the process – may render any investigation into 
the effect of primary interest questionable. 
Given the specific issue the experiment proposed here would have should the only direct 
example of treating for aesthetic effects be implemented, and given the general concerns 
which can be raised by adjusting for aesthetic effects after-the-fact, it would seem most 
advantageous to engage with an adjustment to the experimental design prior to any data 
collection. 
So far, the consequences of aesthetic effects have been described as having either an inflating 
or diminishing effect on the treatment effect. Partly, this is because the role of aesthetic effects 
cannot be known a priori. More importantly, where aesthetic effects are significant,262 it is 
because the experimental design produces circumstances where aesthetic effects always 
inflate or always diminish the treatment effect. If the experiment design can be adjusted such 
that half the observations gathered experience an inflationary effect, while half experience a 
diminishing effect, the net aesthetic effect across the sample can be assumed to be zero. This 
is the principle behind a randomised controlled trial (Deaton and Cartwright, 2017). 
 
261 This is not to say that they did not, nor is it to attack authors who are unable to defend their approach at 
present. Rather, such a question is merely designed to demonstrate how attempts to treat aesthetic effects 
after data have been collected can produce such critiques of process. 
262 Which is to say, where without any adjustment, (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) is expected to be non-zero. 
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7.5.2.2 Randomised Controlled Trials 
 
Randomised controlled trials (RCT) have become a popular method in behavioural science 
(Madrian, 2014). Ho and Imai (2008) investigate how randomising the position of political 
candidates on a voting ballot influences voter outcomes, compared with a control ballot of 
alphabetised candidates. They find that, for non-partisan voters, regardless of who was first 
on the voting ballot, that candidate received more votes than their rivals. Both Redfern et al. 
(2016) and Just and Price (2013) use an RCT experiment design to investigate the use of 
small incentives to encourage healthier eating in children, while Fryer (2011) uses an RCT to 
investigate the use of different educational-support interventions amongst children living within 
different US cities. Most famously, the UK’s Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) have made RCT 
experiments the cornerstone of their research approach (Haynes et al., 2013). For instance, 
BIT projects have used RCT designs in experiments looking at messaging to reduced over-
prescription of anti-biotics within the UK (Hallsworth et al., 2016), reminder nudges to improve 
hospital appointment attendance (Hallsworth et al., 2015) and engagement with UK pension 
provisions (Glazebrook, Larkin and Costa, 2017). 
By randomising which advertisement is the treatment advertisement (i.e. contains the nudge) 
and which advertisement is the control, it can be assumed that over a large enough sample 
the effect of aesthetic differences will be zero.263 Returning to above, randomisation rather 
than allocation is used as it often cannot be known a priori under what circumstances aesthetic 
differences are expected to have an inflationary effect versus a diminishing effect (Banerjee, 
Chassang and Snowberg, 2016). Furthermore, randomisation eliminates a source of 
experimenter bias (Deaton and Cartwright, 2017). As experimenters may indeed have a priori 
 
263 A large sample is required because randomisation over a small sample may not conform to an expected 
distribution. For instance, randomisation into one of two groups is expected to produce a 50/50 split amongst 
participants. However, over a small sample (say, N = 10), randomisation may produce a 60/40 or 70/30 quite 
frequently. In such a situation, the assumption that (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) = 0 is much weaker. The Australian Behavioural 
Economics Team (BETA) note that in a review of published RCT’s, some 55% of studies used samples of N = 
1,000-10,000, followed by some 29% that used samples N = 100-1,000. Few (4%) used less than 100 
observations, and none (unsurprisingly), used less than 10 (BETA, 2016). 
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beliefs about the effectiveness the treatment and the role of aesthetic effects, allocation may 
lead the experimenter, consciously or not, to construct control and treatment groups which 
reinforce these expectations, and in turn obscure the true effect size (Deaton and Cartwright, 
2017; Banerjee, Chassang and Snowberg, 2016). 
RCTs are not beyond criticism. For instance, Deaton and Cartwright (2017) argue that 
because RCTs are often considered the ‘gold standard’ approach to experimental design, 
some researchers may use RCT designs despite alternative approaches being better for their 
specific research project. Haynes et al. (2013) have also criticised RCTs from a time and cost 
perspective, noting that RCTs typically require larger sample sizes compared to other (though 
potentially less methodologically robust) approaches. The time and the cost of these larger 
samples can sometimes be inhibitive. 
Nevertheless, an RCT approach appears advantageous here. Indeed, following Deaton and 
Cartwright’s (2017) criticism of RCTs, the most appropriate alternative methods of tackling 
aesthetic effects (namely Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen’s (2012) approach and the use of a 
single advertisement) have been considered and, per the arguments provided above, 
determined problematic for several reasons. As such, in using an RCT and varying which 
advertisement contains the nudge and which is the control, the theoretical aesthetic effect 
arising from aesthetic differences between advertisements can be assumed to be zero, and 
thus the difference in recorded effectiveness can be determined to be the average treatment 
effect without any adjustments to the data post-collection. 
The outstanding questions to which attention now turns are the experiment design, method of 




Chapter 8 – Data Collection and Matching and Moderation Analysis 
 
8.1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter details data collection methods, as well as specific methods for statistical analysis 
of the data which are collected. The first part of this chapter establishes the idea of a primer 
group or stage. This stage of experimentation is used to collect data which a) form the basis 
of prediction in the second stage, and b) can be used as a contrast with data collected in the 
second stage. Primarily, this part of the chapter is concerned with point a), and offers two 
methods of analysis, the advantages and disadvantages of which are discussed at length: 
matching analysis, and moderation analysis. 
The second part of this chapter considers an issue which arises when making predictions 
about personalised nudges; when multiple means of personalisation are predicted to be 
effective, the optimal method must be determined. A novel method of ‘ranking coefficients’ is 
offered here, and this method is contrasted with the simulation method offered by Peer et al. 
(2019). 
The third part of this chapter considers the second stage of data collection, where predictions 
based on the data gathered in the primer stage are implemented, and data collected. This part 
details practical information about experimental implementation of predictions, as well as 
outlining the delivery only (DO), choice only (CO) and choice and delivery (CD) groups which 
are to be analysed as part of the investigation into hypotheses 1 and 2. This chapter concludes 
by addressing point b), which concerns how these various groups will be compared and the 
statistical procedure to be undertaken in this thesis. 
As shown in Table 1, many previous studies utilise incentivised-survey experiments. Following 
Peer et al. (2019) and Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012), distribution of the survey-
experiment is done using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) micro-tasking platform, a 
service commonly used for behavioural research (Peer et al., 2017; Chan and Holosko, 2015; 
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Mason and Suri, 2011).264 Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) also recruit respondents online, 
but using Facebook’s survey service. This platform, however, is undesirable as the social 
media nature of Facebook may encourage users to share survey links, producing a sampling 
bias. The survey-experiment itself is constructed using Qualtrics, a survey creation and 
hosting service.265 
As with the use of the MTurk platform, incentivised research is common practice within the 
personalised nudging literature (Peer et al., 2019; Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012; 
Moon, 2002) and the wider behavioural science literature (Chan and Holosko, 2015). Much 
research has been conducted into the effects of incentivised data collection. Singer and Ye 
(2012) find that incentivisation increases response rate; that increased incentives increase 
response rates but with ever reduced increments; and that no significant difference in data 
quality is found between incentivised and non-incentivised data.266 Furthermore, Singer and 
Cooper (2008) find that incentivised participants exhibit similar willingness to take risks in 
experiments as non-incentivised participants. The expected effects of incentivisation, then, 
would seem to be an increase in the rate of response but not change in the quality of response. 
Given the RCT design and the method of analysis (moderated regression) discussed below, 
a reasonably large sample size, without degrading the quality of data, is desirable, and so 
incentivisation appears appropriate. 
Following Peer et al. (2019), data collection occurs in two stages. The first stage, referred to 
hereinafter as the primer group or primer stage, collects various psychometric data before 
impersonally nudging respondents. The second stage, henceforth referred to as the treatment 
group or treatment stage, collects various psychometric data before showing respondents 
personalised nudges. This is done by exploiting relationships identified between nudges and 
 
264 Peer et al. (2017) investigate alternative micro-tasking platforms, arguing that the maturity of MTurk means 
users may now be too experienced to provide reliable behavioural data. However, in their research, they find 
no alternative service performs better than MTurk in terms of response rate or data reliability. 
265 Qualtrics is also a commonly used service, but this is not the primary reason for its selection. Primarily, 
Qualtrics is used because of its functionality. See below for more. 
266 Also see Singer (2002), Singer and Kula (2002) and Cantor, O’Hare and O’Connor (2008). 
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psychometrics in the primer group. This approach is adopted because, as outlined above, it is 
questionable whether a matching approach with its deductive approach can be described as 
actual personalisation. As such, an inductive approach must be taken, and thus, an initial 
dataset must be assembled from which the means of personalising can be identified, before 
a second dataset is constructed capturing the results of actually personalising. 
8.2 – The Primer Group 
 
The structure of the primer group survey is as follows: 
1. Participants are first asked a series of demographic questions. These include their age, 
their gender, their education level and their political identity. Education level and 
political identity questions consist of five categories for education (“what is the highest 
level of education you have completed”: none; high school; bachelor’s degree; 
master’s degree; PhD) and political identity (“what is your political affiliation”: left-wing; 
left-leaning; centre; right-leaning; right-wing). These questions are used to check that, 
across a range of potentially relevant criteria, that various sample groups are 
comparable. For anonymity reasons, no names or geographical data are collected, 
beyond geographical specifications available through MTurk. 
2. Participants then complete the three psychometric scales discussed Chapter 6. Firstly, 
the GDMS is completed in the order avoidant, dependent, intuitive, rational and 
spontaneous. Next, the standard ordering of the 18-item NFC scale is given. Finally, 
the standard ordering of the 12-item CFC scale is given. As above, there is some 
indication that previous studies have purposely selected the order of item delivery, 
possibly to avoid framing effects (Peer et al., 2019; Moon, 2002). However, little 
evidence is offered to support a compelling narrative regarding the mitigation of 
framing effects via ordering or indeed the presence of framing effects at all. The order 
used here is designed to encourage participant completion of the survey-experiment, 
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with the 25-item total GDMS followed by the 18-item NFC followed by the 12-CFC. In 
other words, the scales get shorter as participants progress. 
3. Upon completion of the psychometric scales, participants are randomly assigned into 
one of five groups: a status quo nudge group; a present bias nudge group; a loss 
aversion nudge group; a social norm nudge group; and a control group. Each of these 
groups is further divided into two subgroups: a subgroup where Candidate A is used 
in the nudge-advertisement and Candidate B in the control; and a subgroup where 
Candidate B is used in the nudge-advertisement and Candidate A in the control. In all 
subgroups, the advertisement containing the nudge is shown above the control 
advertisement. Distribution of participants into these subgroups is set evenly, so each 
subgroup will – on average – contain 10% of respondents (1 in 10), and each group – 
on average – will contain 20% of respondents (1 in 5). While the distribution of 
respondents is determined by the author, the author remains blind to the allocation of 
participants. As such, this is a blind randomised control trial. 
4. Once assigned to a subgroup, participants are given the following prompt: 
“Imagine these candidates are running in an upcoming election which you can 
vote in. Based on these advertisements, please indicate how likely you would 
be to vote for each candidate:” 
Participants can then indicate their likelihood of voting for Candidate A – labelled for 
the participant as whoever is featured in the (nudge) advertisement at the top of the 
page – or Candidate B – labelled for the participant as whoever is featured in the 
(control) advertisement at the bottom of the page. Participants may answer from 0 to 
100. 




Figure 5: Primer Group Survey Flow 
 
8.2.1 Effectiveness Variable 
 
All previous studies construct or directly measure a variable which can be said to capture the 
effectiveness of whatever nudge or intervention is being used. In all cases, this variable 
becomes the variable of central interest in that it captures the effectiveness of the nudge and, 
often by proxy, the effectiveness of the personalisation method utilised. A similar procedure is 
undertaken here. 
Given the design of the survey-experiment, the construction of the effectiveness variable (so-
called because it is taken to account for the effectiveness of the nudge) is rather simple. Each 
respondent is required to indicate their likelihood of voting for both candidates A and B (as 
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displayed for the participant), which can be labelled 𝐿(𝐴) and 𝐿(𝐵) respectively. The 
effectiveness of the nudge, therefore, can be characterised as: 
Equation 2 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝐿(𝐴) − 𝐿(𝐵) (2) 
 
In theory, this construction of the effectiveness variable will render all effectiveness scores in 
the control group (i.e. the group which sees two control advertisements) zero. Therefore, a 
nudge which positively influences participants should have an (average) effectiveness which 
is greater than zero, and a nudge which negatively influences participants should have an 
(average) effectiveness which is less than zero.267 Note that the name ‘effectiveness’ is not 
indicative of whether the nudge is effective in a statistical sense, which is to say significant. 
Insofar as an (in)effective nudge differs from the control group, effectiveness is merely the 
name for a variable that captures this difference. 
Of course, the (average) effectiveness of the control group may not be zero because, despite 
the RCT design, there may still be significant aesthetic effects. This is because 𝐿(𝐴) − 𝐿(𝐵) is 
equal to 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 in Equation 1. Allowing (𝑥1 − 𝑥0) = 0,
268 any difference between zero and 
𝐿(𝐴) − 𝐿(𝐵) must be attributable to other effects, i.e. (𝑆1 − 𝑆0) ≠ 0. However, such a 
conclusion can only be drawn when the variation from zero in the control group is significant; 
the control group will likely vary slightly (but insignificantly) from zero simply due to a finite 
sample size. 
Regardless, the relative relations between the effectiveness score of the control group and 
that of the nudge groups still applies; where the nudge has a higher (average) effectiveness 
score than the control group, this would indicate the nudge having a positive influence, and 
where the nudge has a lower (average) effectiveness score, this would indicate a negative 
 
267 A positive influence is taken to be indicating a greater likelihood of voting for the candidate whose 
advertisement contains the nudge compared to the alternative candidate. A negative influence is the reverse. 
268 Because no nudges are used in the control group. 
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influence. However, accepting that the control group may have a non-zero effectiveness score 
means that it is not correct to interpret any positive score as an indication of positive nudging 
influence, nor is it correct to interpret any negative score as an indication of a negative nudging 
influence. Rather, such interpretations must be established relative to the effectiveness score 
of the control group. 
8.2.2 Testing for an Aesthetic Effect 
 
Assuming no aesthetic effects are acting on the data (either inflating or diminishing the 
effectiveness scores associated with the nudges), the difference in the effectiveness scores 
of each of the two subgroups within a given group in the sample should be zero. This holds 
when the group in question is the control group (which is expected to have an overall, group 
average effectiveness score of zero) or a treatment group (which are expected to have overall, 
group averages with are non-zero).  
As such, a simple test for differences in the averages of these subgroups can be performed 
using a two-tailed t-test,  with a significant difference suggesting the presence of significant 
aesthetic effects.269 This test will be performed for each of the five pairs of subgroups. 




As above, various demographic data are collected to ensure comparability between the control 
group and the four treatment groups. The impact of non-comparable groups is the requirement 
 
269 A two-tailed t-test is an inferential statistical test which examines the difference between the means of two 
groups. The t-test assumes these groups are normally distributed and have the same (or very similar) 
variances. The null hypothesis of a two-tailed t-test is that the means of both groups are equal. The alternative 
hypothesis is that they are not equal. Given the hypotheses outlined in this thesis, therefore, a one-tailed t-
test may also be used. A one-tailed t-test has the same assumptions and null hypothesis as the two-tailed t-
test, but the alternative hypothesis is that one group is larger than another. In this sense, the two-tailed t-test 
is a simply a test of difference in group means, while the one-tailed t-test is a test of difference in group means 
with a directional component. 
270 A two-tailed t-test is appropriate here as there is no a priori expectation regarding aesthetics. 
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to control for the factor which is not comparable. For instance, if the control group is 
significantly younger than a treatment group, the age variable will have to be controlled for in 
whatever subsequent analysis is performed. This, in turn, changes what analyses can be 
performed. For instance, often a t-test will be a suitable test, but in having to control for a 
demographic disparity, a t-test will need to be replaced with an OLS regression. Of course, if 
the groups are comparable, which is to say, if the distributions of the four demographic 
variables (age, sex, education and political identity) are not significantly different, no such 
adjustment will be necessary. A chi-squared test for differences in distribution is used to test 
the comparability of the data. Given a random assignment and a large sample size, it is 
expected that the groups will be comparable. 
8.2.4 Testing Whether Impersonal Nudges Are Effective 
 
The final piece of analysis to be conducted prior to any investigation of psychometric variables 
and nudge effectiveness is a simple examination of whether, without any conflating factors, 
the four nudges are effective at influencing behaviour in a positive direction. Again, positive is 
taken to be a higher likelihood score (effectiveness) for the nudge advertisement compared to 
the control advertisement. 
The statistical procedure for investigating such a proposition follows the methods outlined for 
examining the presence of significant aesthetic effects, as well as by others in the literature 
(Lipman, 2020; Peer et al., 2019; Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019; Hirsh, Kang and 
Bodenhausen, 2012; Moon, 2002). Namely, each nudge group is compared to the control 
group using a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if an observation is in the nudge 
group, and a value of 0 for all other observations. A test for difference in the average 
effectiveness of these groups using a t-test can then be performed, with a significant difference 
indicating the nudge is effective at influencing behaviour.  




An assumption of the t-test is that the dependent variable (effectiveness) is normally 
distributed (Kim and Park, 2019). This can be examined though histogram plots and several 
statistical tests, notably the Shapiro-Wilk’s test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For this 
thesis, the Shapiro-Wilk’s test is adopted as it has been shown to be the most powerful (Razali 
and Wah, 2011). While normality is expected, provision should be made to account for the 
possibility of a non-normally distributed dependent variable. The usual solution is to utilise a 
non-parametric equivalent of the t-test, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-test, or the WMW-test 
(Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann and Whitney, 1947; Fay and Proschan, 2010). The trade-off for non-
normality comes in the form of statistical power, with the WMW-test having less statistical 
power than the t-test (Fay and Proschan, 2010). However, given non-normality is often a 
problem which cannot be easily overcome if a few initial strategies fail,271 this compromise on 
statistical power is often a worthwhile trade. 
A second assumption is homogeneity of variance (Kim and Park, 2019). Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variance is an effective test of this assumption (Levene, 1960). Levene’s test 
is also less sensitive to violated normality than the alternative Bartlett’s test (Snedecor and 
Cochran, 1989). Where homogeneity of variance is violated, Welch’s t-test can be used 
(Welch, 1947).272 
8.2.6 Identifying Relationships Between Psychometrics and Nudges 
 
The basis on which the delivery personalisation of nudges will occur is the identified 
relationships between the seven psychometric scales and the four nudges. It is therefore 
paramount – and indeed, the modus operandi of the primer group – to identify these 
relationships and thus proceed to examine the effectiveness of nudges when delivery 
 
271 Such strategies usually include log-transformations and square-transformations. These adjustments may 
produce their own challenges, largely centred around interpreting means and coefficients. Furthermore, 
where multiple groups are under examination, the transformation of one group may not produce normality in 
another, prompting further discursive and comparability challenges. 
272 These assumptions and solutions also apply to ANOVA, which is discussed below. 
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personalisation is used. In the personalisation literature, two methods of identifying these 
relationships can be found.273  
The first is the deductive matching approach, whereby groups of participants are constructed 
after-the-fact in accordance with a priori expectations about psychometric profiles and nudge 
effectiveness (Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019; Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen, 2012; Moon, 
2002). The second is the inductive moderation approach, whereby participants are analysed 
using a moderated regression model to identify significant moderation effects (i.e. 
relationships between psychometrics and nudges; Peer et al., 2019). 
One may argue that this second method is actually two methods (Hayes, 2018). In conjunction 
with moderated regression, Peer et al. (2019) utilise the Johnson-Neyman technique (JNT; 
Johnson and Neyman, 1936) – also known as floodlight analysis (Hayes, 2018; Spiller et al., 
2013) – to identify regions of significance: precise values between which the moderation effect 
is expected to be statistically significant (see part 8.2.6.3). Alternatively, Hayes (2018) 
discusses the use of the pick-a-points method – also known as spotlight analysis – whereby 
– once a statistically significant moderation effect is identified – various values of the 
moderator are tested for statistical significance. 
Each of these three methods has advantages and disadvantages, and as argued above, can 
often be used in conjunction with one another to elucidate a greater understanding of the 
ongoing dynamics within the data. Below, each method, and the statistical procedure involved 
in each method, is discussed, before a summary discussion is offered. First, however, a note 
on psychometric variables is offered. 
8.2.6.1 A Note on Psychometric Variables 
 
In this experiment, seven psychometric scales are used: five of the components of the GDMS 
scale, the NFC scale, and the CFC scale. Each scale consists of multiple questions which 
 
273 An introduction to these methods is provided immediately, while more in-depth discussions, with terms 
clearly defined, are offered below. 
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must be aggregated into psychometric variables to be used in statistical analyses. Aggregation 
can take two forms, summation and averaging, with averaging being the most common 
approach and so the one taken here. 
The issue aggregation raises, however, is that in aggregating, a single variable must capture 
a sufficient amount of the variance captured by the non-aggregate components, less the single 
variable be insufficient to represent these data. To verify the validity of this single variable, 
therefore, Cronbach’s alpha test for internal consistency is used (Cronbach, 1951). Testing for 
validity using Cronbach’s alpha is commonplace within the individual difference literature 
(Appelt et al., 2011; Cho, 2016) and has been used within the personalisation literature also 
(Peer et al., 2019). Given all the scales examined are well-established and have been 
consistently shown to produce high Cronbach’s alpha scores (typically higher than around 0.6-
0.7; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994), no issue is expected in repeating these examinations 
here. 
8.2.6.2 The Matching Approach 
 
The principle of the matching approach is best demonstrated by Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019) and Moon (2002). The approach begins by imagining a 2 × 2 grid in which all 
respondents can be categorised: 




As shown in Figure 6, the 2 × 2 grid is assembled along two-axes. The first axis demarcates 
whether a respondent falls into some treatment group ‘Group 1’ or ‘Group 2’. The second axis 
demarcates whether a respondent scores ‘high’ or ‘low’ on some psychometric scale. 
Assuming a priori that the treatment in Group 1 will be more effective with ‘low’ scorers and 
the treatment in Group 2 will be more effective with ‘high’ scorers, those respondents which 
match the conditions of these assumptions are organised into a ‘matching’ group, indicated 
using a dummy variable with the value 1. Those respondents who do not match the conditions 
of these assumptions are also organised, however into an ‘non-matching’ group, indicated by 
the dummy variable with the value of 0. 
A difference in the average effectiveness scores of these matching and non-matching groups 
can then be tested using a t-test. Where a significant difference is found, and the average 
effectiveness of the matching group is found to be greater than that of the non-matching group, 
researchers can conclude that their a priori expectations about the relationship between the 
treatments and the psychometric were correct. Furthermore, as Moon (2002) and Schöning, 
Matt and Hess (2019) do, researchers can propose that, in the future, matching respondents 
in accordance to the relationship subsequently identified will produce more effective 
outcomes. It is from this perspective that these authors use the matching approach to 
contribute to discussions of personalisation without, during their experiments, actually 
personalising interventions. 
The key advantage of this form of the matching approach is it is very simple. Depending 
survey-experiment design, participants can automatically be sorted into one of the two 
treatment groups, while the researcher can determine the threshold for a high or low score 
once the data are collected and easily categorise participants appropriately. Furthermore, 
having constructed the match/non-match dummy variable, the analysis to determine the 
presence of a significant relationship is also very straightforward. 
The matching approach, however, has several drawbacks. Firstly, the high/low scorers must 
be determined arbitrarily. Of course, within a specific research project their may be good 
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reason to suspect responses above or below a given value should matter and be appropriately 
labelled. But in general, there is no fundamental reason to determine a score of, say, 2.2 out 
of 5 to be low and 2.8 out of five to high.  
At best, on an n-point Likert scale, one might be tempted to construct the high/low demarcation 
around the midpoint, defined as 
𝑛+1
2
. This would initially appear to not be an arbitrary selection 
as the demarcation corresponds to the measurement scale of the psychometric itself. Of 
course, this is a false proposition, as the measurement scale for the psychometric is itself 
arbitrarily selected.  
An alternative approach may be to demarcate high/low scorers based on the data, say defining 
a low scorer as someone who scores less than the mean or the median, and a high scorer as 
someone who scores more than the mean or the median. This does not resolve the problem 
of arbitrary selection, however. For instance, if the behaviour of 90% of the population is 
observed to be statistically similar, it is not clear what rationale might correspond to the 
selection of the mean (which is unlikely to capture 90% of the population) or median (which 
splits the population 50/50).274 Indeed, even discounting this criticism, another emerges. 
Namely, the use of a sample mean or median requires one to assume the sample mean or 
median is similar to that of the population, less the demarcation of high/low can only be taken 
to describe that given sample. Such an assumption is not required of the midpoint 
demarcation. 
Regardless of how the high/low demarcation is determined, the selection remains arbitrary. 
Acknowledging this, a further adjustment may be to examine the difference by matched/non-
matched groups under several different demarcations, e.g. the mean, median and midpoint.275 
This pacifies somewhat the criticism that can be levied at the method by acknowledging the 
 
274 Note, such an argument rests on the lack of an expectation that 90% of the population is statistically similar. 
Where this is an a priori expectation, such an expectation could be tested, and such an expectation would 
serve as a reasonably fair reason for defining high/low around being above/below the 90th percentile. 
275 This represents a tendency towards expanding the range of examined values for significance, a tendency 
which will return in due course. So too, however, will the problem of arbitrary value selection. 
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arbitrariness of the demarcations and taking efforts to address it; but it in turn introduces a 
new form of arbitrariness. Namely, it is not clear how significant relationships might be 
determined under multiple constructions of high/low scorers. For instance, it would seem 
rather compelling if, regardless of construction, a significant difference in a consistent direction 
(i.e. positive/negative) was identified. But it is not clear what might the interpretation be if only 
two constructions produced such a result, or indeed only one. Or, further, the interpretation of 
the results is unclear if multiple instances of significance are identified, but the direction of the 
effect varies across constructions. When one is seeking to confidently identify a relationship 
between a treatment effect and a psychometric, constructed around a single value or within a 
bounded range of values, the matching approach can only be treated as exploratory of 
relationships, and not determinant. 
A somewhat different matching approach is used by Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012). 
This approach differs both in experimental design and analytical procedure. They investigate 
advertisements and the Big Five personality scale. Five advertisements are constructed – one 
for each of the five personality types captured by the scale. Each advertisement is shown to 
every participant, who then scores the effectiveness of each advertisement. Rather than 
constructing matching and non-matching groups along an arbitrary determinant of high/low 
scoring, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) then simply regress the five psychometric 
variables for each of the Big Five personality types onto each of the advertisements: 
Equation 3 
𝐴𝑑𝑛 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 + 𝛽6𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 + 𝜀 (3) 
 
where 𝐴𝑑𝑛 is the effectiveness of advertisement 𝑛, which corresponds to one of the five 
personality type advertisements. In taking this approach, Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen 
(2012) are able to show that only when the psychometric and the advertisement match is the 
psychometric statistically significant. 
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This approach improves on the previous matching approach as it avoids arbitrary group 
construction and allows all of the values of the data to be considered. The major drawback of 
this approach, however, is that the regression analysis can only determine the direction of any 
effect (i.e. is the coefficient positive or negative?) and does not delineate at what values of the 
psychometric the significant effect may be most notable. 
Both approaches are also unsuitable for this project as each requires some degree of 
adjustment to the experiment design. In the simple 2 × 2 matching approach, both groups 
which are being compared are treatment groups. While the current survey-experiment design 
would enable a comparison of treatment groups, it remains unclear how a comparison of 
treatment groups would be beneficial given the measurement of multiple psychometrics. The 
alternative may be to compare the control group with a treatment group in a 2 × 2 matching 
approach; however, it remains unclear what a person who ‘matches’ with the control group 
would represent. The control group is not a treatment group, and thus any matching group 
which can be constructed would not be congruent with the idea of matching treatments. 
The same problem of survey design is present in the regression-based approach. In order to 
use regression analysis, participants would need to be shown all four nudge advertisements. 
As above, insofar as the survey-experiment is designed to resemble a real-world choice 
between political candidates, this survey design would undermine this endeavour. 
Given this, an alternative matching approach – henceforth dubbed matching analysis for 
disambiguation – can be determined for this project.276 Two key limitations remain with 
matching analysis: values must be selected arbitrarily, and relationships between nudges and 
psychometric variables are assumed to be dichotomous, existing either above or below these 
arbitrarily selected values. However, the matching analysis approach proposed here does not 
require an adaption of the survey-experiment design as outlined above. 
 
276 This approach shares similarities with Lipman (2020). 
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The approach broadly has three steps: 
1. First, the significance of the difference between the control group and the treatment 
group needs to be examined. This analysis will already be conducted. The importance 
of this examination on the matching analysis, however, is that it informs the 
interpretation of the third stage of the matching analysis. A statistically significant 
difference overall would be expected to produce statistically significant results when 
the treatment group is split into high/low subgroups, just as a statistically insignificant 
difference would be expected to produce statistically insignificant results. This initial 
analysis, therefore, frames expectations later on, and allows contrary results to be 
identified. 
2. Second, the treatment group is divided into high/low subgroups according to average 
psychometric scores. This must be done for each psychometric scale. Furthermore, 
as the demarcations of high and low are arbitrary, several constructions of high/low 
are used. These are the mean, median and midpoint as discussed above. With these 
subgroups constructed, a two-tailed t-test277 is used to compare the effectiveness of 
the nudge between the high subgroup and the low subgroup. Where no statistically 
significant difference is found, no relationship between the psychometric and the 
nudge is determined. Where a significant difference is found, a relationship may 
exist.278 
3. Third, a two-tailed t-test is used to investigate a significant difference in averages 
between a given treatment subgroup and the control group. Where high/low subgroups 
associated with the same psychometric variable are statistically significantly different 
from each other, and one or both subgroups are statistically significantly different from 
the control group, there is good reason to conclude that a statistically significant 
 
277 A two-tailed t-test is used as matching analysis is exploring for relationships and therefore makes no a priori 
assumptions about the sign of the effect. 
278 Interpretation of these results, given the multiple constructions of the subgroups, still remains arbitrary, 
and a degree of discrepancy and prudence is required. 
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relationship exists between the nudge and the psychometric. Where neither subgroup 
is significantly different from one another, and both subgroups are statistically 
(in)significantly different from the control group, no relationship is the most likely 
conclusion. 
In Chapter 11 and Chapter 13, this matching analysis is performed on two pilot studies, and 
the effectiveness of this approach evaluated. Where matching analysis is found ineffective, 
this approach is not used in the primary analysis presented in Chapter 14, with the alternative 
moderation analysis approach utilised. 
8.2.6.3 Moderation Analysis 
 
An alternative approach to matching analysis is moderation analysis, utilised by Peer et al. 
(2019) in their work on delivery personalisation. The term moderation describes an interaction 
between variables. As Saunders (1956) describes moderation: “There are many examples of 
situations in which the predictive validity of some psychological measure varies systematically 
in accord with some other independent psychological variable” (Saunders, 1956: 209). In 
recent years, Hayes’ (2018) work on moderation has come to dominate. Hayes (2018), in more 
methodological language, describes moderation as follows: “The effect of 𝑋 on some variable 
𝑌 is moderated by 𝑊 if its size, sign or strength depends on or can be predicted by 𝑊. In that 
case, 𝑊 is said to be a moderator of 𝑋’s effect on 𝑌 or that 𝑊 and 𝑋 interact in their influence 
on 𝑌” (Hayes, 2018: 220, original emphasis). 
As Peer et al. (2019) argue, moderation can be used to describe the relationship between a 
person’s psychometric profile and their susceptibility to being nudged. Indeed, when the 
phrase, ‘identify a relationship between a psychometric variable and a nudge’ – a phrase which 
has been used several times in one form or another already – is used, this is implicit of an 
acknowledged belief in the moderated interaction of psychometric variables and nudges. 
Following Hayes and Rockwood (2017), the hypothesis that the relationship between 
psychometric variables and nudges as understood within the discussion of delivery 
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personalisation and in Peer et al. (2019) is a moderated one seems justified. Hayes and 
Rockwood (2017) write, “moderation analysis is used to address when, or under what 
circumstances, or for what types of people [an] effect exists or does not and in what 
magnitude” (Hayes and Rockwood, 2017: 47, original emphasis). Certainly, given this 
description, the hypothesised relationship between nudges and psychometric variables 
qualifies as one to be described in terms of moderation. 
Statistically, simple moderation effects are examined using OLS regression with the inclusion 
of an interaction term between the independent (sometimes called focal) variable 𝑋 and the 
moderator variable 𝑊.279 Hayes (2018) outlines the regression model associated with a simple 
linear moderated model (SLMM): 
Equation 4 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋 + 𝛽2𝑊 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑊 + 𝜀 (4) 
 
where 𝑌 is a dependent variable, 𝑋 is a factor or dummy variable, 𝑊 is a continuous variable 
which is taken to moderate the effect of 𝑋, and 𝑋𝑊 is an interaction term between 𝑋 and 𝑊 
(i.e. the product of 𝑋 and 𝑊).280 Unlike in a standard OLS regression model without the 
interaction term, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 take on slightly different interpretations. Hayes (2018): “these 
regression coefficients estimate the effect of 𝑋 when 𝑊 = 0 and the effect of 𝑊 when 𝑋 = 0, 
respectively” (Hayes, 2018: 239).281 This is important to note because, in some instances such 
 
279 As Hayes (2018) notes and documents extensively in their appendices, moderated regressions can be 
extremely complicated. There is no theoretical limit on the number of interaction terms, or the number of 
terms interacting within a single interaction term. Furthermore, moderation effects can exist within other 
models. The model shown here, and the model focused on here, is the simplest and most commonly discussed 
construction of a moderated regression. 
280 Mathematically, 𝑋 could be described as the moderator and 𝑊 the focal variable (Hayes, 2018). However, it 
is most common to treat the dummy variable as the focal variable and the continuous variable as the 
moderator as these are the specifications for probing moderation effects post-estimation (Hayes, 2018; 
Preacher, Curran and Bauer, 2006). 
281 Hayes (2018) demonstrates this mathematically, though this is a rather simple conclusion. When either 𝑋 or 
𝑊 = 0, the interaction term and respective variable falls out of the model, and the model reduces to either an 
𝑋 on 𝑌 or a 𝑊 on 𝑌 form. 
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as this thesis, the value of 𝑊 cannot equal 0 (as the psychometric scale ranges from 1 to 5), 
and so the coefficient of 𝑋 (the dummy variable indicating control or treatment in this specific 
instance) cannot be interpreted in isolation using a moderated regression model. 
However, with the inclusion of the interaction term, this limitation becomes less significant.282 
In seeking to identify a statistically significant (moderated) relationship between the 
psychometric variable and the nudge – to use the language of the this experiment – one needs 
only to identify and interpret a significant moderation effect, which is to say, the p-value 
associated with the interaction term need only be statistically significant to determine a 
significant relationship between the nudge and the psychometric. The effect size of the 
moderation effect, known as the conditional effect (Hayes, 2018; Preacher, Curran and Bauer, 
2006), is then given by: 
Equation 5 
𝜃𝑋→𝑌 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑊 (5) 
 
As eluded to in Equation 5, the conditional effect can be understood as the effect of 𝑋 on 𝑌 
given the presence of a moderating effect 𝑊. This statement becomes useful when probing 
the interaction term following the model’s estimation.283 Two methods for probing the 
interaction exist in the literature. These are the pick-a-points method, sometimes known as 
spotlight analysis, and the Johnson-Neyman technique, sometimes known as floodlight 
analysis (Hayes, 2018; Spiller et al., 2013). These alternative names illuminate (pardon the 
pun) the difference between these techniques: spotlight analysis investigates the interaction 
term using specific values of interest, while floodlight analysis solves for specific values of 
 
282 Hayes (2018) notes that some researchers may choose to zero centre their moderator variable so as to 
remove this limitation and does not offer any distinct opinion on how worthwhile this is. Rather, the only 
comment is a reminder that such an adjustment should not change the substantial meaning of the model, only 
the values of the coefficients. 
283 Note that Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006) use slightly different notation to that used in Equation 5, 
which follows Hayes’ (2018) notation. These statements, however, are identical in meaning. 
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interest given the specifications of the model (Hayes, 2018; Preacher, Curran and Bauer, 
2006). 
The trade-off between spotlight analysis and floodlight analysis returns to previous 
discussions. Hayes (2018) and Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006) argue spotlight analysis 
can be a useful tool for analysing a moderation effect when there is a justified interest in a 
particular value of the moderator. For instance, if previous research has found consistent 
evidence that people who score a three on a given psychometric scale exhibit a particular 
behaviour, using spotlight analysis to investigate the moderation effect when 𝑊 = 3 makes 
sense. Hayes (2018) also notes that spotlight analysis is somewhat simpler to grasp than 
floodlight analysis, and can be interpreted easier too. The statistical significance of the effect 
can then be calculated by calculating the t-statistic associated with the value and in turn the t-







where 𝜃𝑋→𝑌 corresponds to Equation 5.
284 
However, spotlight analysis suffers the same arbitrary selection problem as the matching 
approach does. This is to say, when there is no obvious reason to select a given value of the 
moderator, spotlight analysis becomes a very arbitrary way of probing an interaction (Hayes, 
2018; Preacher, Curran and Bauer, 2006). In such a situation, it is often desirable to explore 
all possible values of the moderator. In principle, this is floodlight analysis, or the Johnson-
Neyman technique.285 In practice, floodlight analysis does not involve identifying p-values for 
 
284 Equation 6 is taken from Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006), however, is adapted to use Hayes’ (2018) more 
recent notation. This change in notation does not change the substance of the equation. 
285 Johnson and Neyman (1936) even note, “It [the JNT] is shown that the problem of matched groups may be 
generalized so that both a more detailed analysis of experimental data and a greater accuracy of results is 
obtained” (Johnson and Neyman, 1936: 209). 
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every possible value of the moderator. Rather, the significance level is pre-selected (usually 
the 5% level), and the t-statistic calculation is used to solve for values of the moderator 
(Johnson and Neyman, 1936). This is shown in an adapted t-statistic equation: 
Equation 7 





However, while this rearrangement to isolate the moderator value 𝑊 is correct, it does not 
reveal the full picture. When the calculation for the standard error (𝑆𝐸) is accounted for, 
Equation 7 actually takes a quadratic form (Hayes, 2018). This derivation is not provided by 
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2) are constants (Carden, 
Holtzman and Strube, 2017). 𝑊 can thus be solved for. The consequences of doing so, as 
Hayes (2018) and Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006) do note, is that the Johnson-Neyman 
technique always produces two values for the moderator 𝑊 which correspond to a 𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 value 
associated with a given critical confidence level. These two values represent the bounds of a 
region of significance,286 between which all values of the moderator correspond to a 
statistically significant moderation effect. However, the JN technique may produce values 
which – while mathematically valid – are not values which the moderator can actually take. 
For instance, where a psychometric scale ranges from 1 to 5, a value of, say, -26.77 is not a 
value which can be practically used. Therefore, while the JN technique provides greater 
precision in determining moderator values than can be achieved with spotlight analysis, this 
precision can often be unnecessary. 
Nevertheless, where regions of significance are identified, a common output accompanying 
the JN technique is a graphical representation. An example is shown in Figure 7: 
 
286 Or regions of significance. 
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Figure 7: Example Johnson-Neyman Plot 
 
The JN plot shows values of the moderator on the x-axis, while the conditional effect (i.e. 𝛽1 +
𝛽3𝑊) is shown on the y-axis.
287 The grey area represents the upper and lower confidence 
intervals, while the dotted line represents the boundary between a region of significance and 
insignificance. A region of significance exists at the point that both the upper and lower 
confidence intervals are either greater than, or less than, zero on the y-axis.288 Thus, the 
interpretation of Figure 7 would be that a region of significance exists for values less than 3.45. 
Of course, a second moderator value is produced by the JN technique which demarcates the 
other boundary for this region, but as this value is not a value the moderator can take, it is 
merely of mathematical interest, not practical. 
Methodologically, the difference in approach between floodlight analysis and spotlight analysis 
(and, for that matter, the matching approach) is that floodlight analysis adopts an inductive 
approach to identify values of significance and thus interest, while spotlight analysis adopts a 
 
287 The y-axis can also be thought of as showing the total effect of 𝑋 on 𝑌, after accounting for moderation. 
288 In other words, the point at which the effect of 𝑋 on 𝑌 can be confidently (i.e. at the 95% level) be said to 
differ from zero. 
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deductive approach to examine the significance or lack thereof of values already determined 
(by some criteria) to be of interest. 
Where no such values are obviously of interest, as is the case here, and where an inductive 
approach may be desirable – again, as is the case here – floodlight analysis appears ideal. 
The trade-off, of course, is complication. Not only is floodlight analysis theoretically more 
complicated, but it is practically more difficult too. Hayes (2018) has made significant progress 
in easing the practical use of moderation analysis and the JN technique with their PROCESS 
macro for SPSS and SAS (Hayes, 2012). However, this macro lacks the graphical potential 
which is often reported as part of a floodlight analysis (Preacher, Curran and Bauer, 2006). 
Bachl (2015) has produced a series of functions in R which are capable of running the 
moderated regression, calculating the regions of significance, and plotting these results. 
However, Bachl (2015) has yet to update their package, and the present release is not 
functional with the latest version of R and the associated libraries. Brambor, Clark and Golder 
(2006) also offer code for the JN technique in their paper, this time for STATA. However, this 
software is, again, out-of-date, with the online repository housing the code – at the time of 
writing – inaccessible. Finally, Carden, Holtzman and Strube (2017) offer an Excel based 
program called CAHOST which is capable of calculating the moderated regression, 
undertaking the JN technique, and plotting the output. CAHOST, however, is limited to only 
1,000 observations, while the plot output is difficult to use. Peer et al. (2019) do not document 
how they produced their analytical output. 
The solution used here is a combination of programs. Firstly, STATA 13.1 is used to examine 
the presence of statistically significant moderation effects. Where a statistically significant 
effect is identified, data are entered into CAHOST, which is used to calculate regions of 
significance and data to be plotted. ggplot2 in R is then used to plot these data and edit the 
graphical output. As such, despite being technically more demanding than alternative 
methods, this disadvantage of the moderated regression and JN technique approach is not 
insurmountable. Furthermore, this approach resolves the problem of arbitrary selection 
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associated with both spotlight analysis and matching analysis, while providing greater 
precision (in the form of regions of significance) than these approaches as well. 
Of course, before any of this can be conducted, the moderated regression model which is to 
be estimated needs to be established. Fortunately, assuming no confounding differences 
arising from demographics, the SLMM model is sufficient for the proposed experiment. This is 
a further advantage of moderated regression over the matching procedure – namely, no 
adjustments to the experimental design are necessary in order to utilise moderated 
regression.289 
The equation form of the estimated moderated regression model used here is: 
Equation 8 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝜀𝑖  (8) 
 
where 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is the effectiveness score of treatment group 𝑖 compared to the control 
group (i.e. 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌0), 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable – or focal variable – taking the value of one if an 
observation is in treatment group 𝑖, and a value of zero for all other observations,290 𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 is a 
continuous variable – or moderator variable –  containing the psychometric scores for 
psychometric 𝜆, and 𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 is the interaction or moderation term. 𝛽0 is an intercept and 𝜀𝑖 is 
an error term. 
Where demographic differences between groups may need to be controlled for, this produces 
a relatively straightforward adaption of Equation 8: 
Equation 9 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝛽𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖  (9) 
 
289 In contrast to the matching approach, which itself has had to be adapted to this experimental design in the 
form of matching analysis simply to be usable here. 




However, such an adjustment does reintroduce the technical challenges associated with 
floodlight analysis. CAHOST, for instance, can only accommodate SLMM designs (which is to 
say, 2 independent variables). As such, an alternative approach relying more heavily on 
Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS tool may become necessary. Of course, this all assumes a 
statistically significant difference is found and will need to be controlled for – where this is not 
the case, no adjustments to Equation 8 will be necessary. 
8.3 – Prioritising Relationships 
 
Given the advantages of moderation analysis with the JN technique compared to the 
alternative methods of identifying relationships between nudges and psychometric variables 
and given the precedent of this method also having been used by Peer et al. (2019), 
moderated regression is selected as the primary method of analysis of the primer group. As 
noted above, however, it is feasible to engage with the matching approach while also utilising 
moderated regression, provided the matching approach adopted is adjusted so as to not alter 
the survey-experiment design. This adapted approach is offered here as matching analysis, 
and is investigated as a secondary method of analysing the relationships existing within the 
primer group and during the two pilot studies.291 
An outstanding question pertains to the use of nudge-psychometric relationships once they 
are identified. The goal of the primer group is to construct an evidence-based psychometric 
map which can be used to personalise the delivery of nudges to the treatment group in the 
second round of data collection. However, an aspect of the mapping process which is missed 
in diagrammatic presentations of the psychometric map, such as that shown in Figure 3, is 
what might be called the nudge preference.  
 
291 One may be tempted to argue that the use of both methods enable comparability and thus the most robust 
conclusions. This is perhaps assertible; however, the many methodological weaknesses of the matching 
analysis mean it is liable to miss or misreport conclusions found using moderation analysis. See Chapter 13 for 
evidence of the limitations of matching analysis in comparison to moderation analysis. 
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The issue of nudge preference arises in several ways:  
1. A region of significance may exist between psychometric A and nudge B, and a region 
of significance may exist between psychometric A and nudge C. Thus, if a respondent 
were to score for psychometric A a value which falls within both regions of significance, 
which nudge – B or C – should be delivered to this participant? 
2. A region of significance exists between Psychometric A and nudge B, as well as 
between Psychometric B and nudge C. If a respondent were to score within these 
regions of significance for both psychometrics, which nudge – B or C – should be 
delivered to this participant? 
3. Various regions of significance exist between various psychometric variables and 
various nudges. However, a participant does not score within a region of significance 
for any psychometric variable. Which nudge – from all available – should be delivered 
to this participant? 
While not stated quite so situationally as expressed here, these problems are ones Peer et al. 
(2019) also tackle in their work. Their ‘solution’ is to use a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate 
which nudges should be delivered under various conditions to maximise the effectiveness of 
the nudges overall. This approach is inadequate for several reasons. Firstly, they provide no 
specifications for their simulation model, leaving the methodological space void. Secondly, the 
model is ultimately extremely simplifying, eliminating entirely two of their original nudges and 
suggesting 85% of participants should be nudged using only one nudge. Thirdly, even where 
a simulation model is appropriate, Peer et al. (2019) provide no explanation for why a Monte 
Carlo simulation over, say, a suite of machine learning techniques is selected.292 Finally, it is 
not clear why a simulation model is used at all when a much simpler solution to the problem 
 
292 Note that this critique is not to say that machine learning techniques are definitely better than Monte Carlo 
simulation. Indeed, the literature on this specific question is extremely sparse, constituted entirely by Peer et 




at hand presents itself within the analyses which are already untaken to get to this 
methodological junction. 
This simpler solution is merely to rank the effects of nudges. Recall that the conditional effect 
(i.e. 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑊) is defined as the effect of 𝑋 (the nudge) on 𝑌 (effectiveness) given moderation 
by W (the psychometric). Insofar as the selection of nudges in the above scenarios is done so 
as to maximise the effectiveness of the nudge, one can simply rank the modulus of the 
coefficients of the interaction terms (i.e. 𝛽3) prioritise delivering the nudge associated with the 
largest coefficient. The use of the modulus arises from a problem associated with an 
alternative approach, namely ranking the conditional effect. If one were to calculate the 
conditional effect for a positive moderation effect, and compare it to a negative moderation 
effect, a 1-unit change in the value of 𝑊 would increase the conditional effect of the positive 
relationship and decrease the conditional effect of the negative relationship. To make these 
results comparable – which is to say, to determine which moderation effect and thus which 
nudge would produce a greater effect following a 1-unit shift into a region of significance, one 
must make these relationships comparable. This is easily done by taking the modulus. 
This method resolves scenarios 1 and 2. Scenario 3 is resolved using an even simpler 
approach: where participants demonstrate no affinity for any particular nudge, they should be 
presented with the nudge which, overall, is found to be most effective compared to the control 
group (i.e. the best impersonal nudge). 
Again, the data required for establishing nudge preferences are already produced in the 
planned analysis. The interaction term coefficients are produced as part of the moderated 
regression, while the most effective nudge is determined when the effectiveness of the nudges 
without any psychometric effects are examined against the control group. Two alternative 
solutions to this problem also emerge from the literature – both of which remain comparatively 
simpler than the simulation approach taken by Peer et al. (2020).  
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The first is to rank 𝛽1 coefficients, i.e. the coefficient associated with the nudge without 
moderation effects. The logic of this solution is quite evident – if one is seeking to select the 
most effective nudge, then the nudge with the greatest effect as given by the coefficient seems 
ideal. Recall, however, that the conditional effect is defined as the effect of 𝑋 (the nudge) on 
𝑌 (effectiveness) given a moderating effect by 𝑊 (the psychometric). Where a statistically 
significant moderation effect exists, it makes no sense to select nudges based on their 
effectiveness when not moderated. 
The second solution as discussed by Hayes (2018) is to use a comparison of r-squared (so-
called change in r-squared). By estimating the amount of variance explained (i.e.  r-squared) 
by a regression without the interaction term, and comparing this to the amount of variance 
explained when the interaction term is included, an estimate of the impact of the interaction 
term on variance can be determined (i.e. 𝑅2
2 − 𝑅1
2). This estimate can be used, according to 
Hayes (2018), as a means of evaluating moderation effects, and Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS 
macro provides this estimate as a default output. However, Hayes and Darlington (2017) are 
critical of the reductive effect such an approach has on the interpretation of moderation 
models. Indeed, this is evidenced here: just because one moderation effect may explain more 
variance in a given moderated regression model than another in its respective model does not 
mean the nudge associated with the former is necessarily more effective than the later. In fact, 
while potentially a handy trick for appraising moderated regression in some circumstances,293 
such an approach fails to offer any solution to the scenarios set out above. 
8.4 – Personalised Treatment Group 
 
Given the inductive approach taken here, a flow of the survey-experiment design for the 
personalised treatment group (PTG) cannot be provided a priori.294 Indications of how this 
 
293 For instance, where both the focal and moderator variable are significant and r-squared is already high 
without the moderator term, an analysis of change in r-squared may be useful in deciding if the inclusion of 
the moderation term is useful, or whether the more parsimonious model is better. 
294 A survey flow the PT group is provided in Chapter 14. 
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survey-experiment will be constructed, however, can be offered. As with the primer group, the 
survey-experiment will be incentivised, hosted on Qualtrics and distributed via MTurk.  
The major difference between the primer group survey design and the personalised treatment 
group survey design is the presence of personalisation. This manifests in two ways. Firstly, 
PTG participants are, at the outset, randomly assigned into one of three subgroups. These 
subgroups are delivery personalisation only (DO), choice personalisation only (CO) and 
choice and delivery personalisation (CD). These subgroups can then be compared to examine 
the hypotheses established in Chapter 3. 
8.4.1 Delivery Personalisation Only 
 
The DO subgroup will first be asked to complete the three psychometric scales, in the same 
order as the primer group (i.e. GDMS, NFC, CFC).295 Unlike the primer group, however, once 
these questions are completed, based on their responses, participants are shown a nudge-
advertisement which is predicted to be most optimal (in terms of effectiveness) from the primer 
group data.  
This process is surprisingly complicated. Qualtrics, on a UI level, is extremely limited in its 
functionality. In order to automate the personalised delivery of nudges, it must be possible 
within Qualtrics to automatically calculate the average score for a given psychometric. If this 
is possible, the standard ‘Branch’ feature within Qualtrics can be used to assign participants 
to their delivery-personalised nudge. A review of the literature would suggest, however, that 
automated averaging is not possible. Peer et al. (2019), for instance, require participants to 
complete the psychometrics before inviting those same participants back to complete the 
nudge-task at a later date.  
 
295 This assumes all psychometrics will contribute something to delivery personalisation. It may be the case 
that, upon analysis, some psychometrics are not indicative of any moderated relationship with any nudge. As 
such, they may not need to be included in the survey-experiment. The same is true of nudges: where a nudge 




However, this averaging limitation only exists at the UI level, and by utilising the ‘Embedded 
Data’, ‘Recode Values and ‘Math Operations’ tools available within Qualtrics, as well as some 
basic JavaScript, it is completely possible to automatically average scores. These averages 
can then be used in conjunction with the ‘Branch’ function to deliver the nudges.296 Automating 
the survey-experiment in this way, it is hoped, will encourage greater completion of the survey-
experiment.  
Nudge-advertisements shown to participants in the DO group will not be altered from those 
shown in the primer group. However, participants will still be randomly assigned to a group 
where the delivery-personalised nudge-advertisement features Candidate A and a control 
advertisement featuring Candidate B, or a group where the delivery-personalised nudge-
advertisement features Candidate B and a control advertisement featuring Candidate A. As 
such, the RCT design remains, and any nudging effect observed can be ascribed as the effect 
of delivery personalisation without an aesthetic effect. 
As above, participants who fail to produce any psychometric scores associated with a 
moderation effect will be shown the nudge-advertisement which is found, within the primer 
group, to be overall the most effective. Crucially, regardless of what nudge is delivered to a 
given participant, no semblance of choice personalisation is used; neither Candidate A or B 
appeal to outcomes which have been specifically chosen for the participant, and with the only 
difference being which impersonal outcome is being supported by personalised nudge 
delivery. 
8.4.2 Choice Personalisation Only 
 
Participants in the CO group are first asked to select, from four voter issues, which issue is in 
the abstract most important to them. These four issues are: 1) the economy; 2) education; 3) 
healthcare; 4) national security. These issues are selected as they are identified in Gallup’s 
 
296 It is possible that Peer et al. (2019) were unable to take this approach as they use a more complex 




2020 poll of top voter issues as being most important to American citizens, with over 80% of 
respondents agreeing each issue is either extremely important or very important (Hrynowski, 
2020).297 Upon selecting one of these four options, participants are then shown a political 
advertisement with the slogan changed to embed their most important issue. However, the 
nudge and candidate used remains randomised. Example slogans are shown in Table 5: 
Table 5: Choice Personalised Slogans 
Nudge Generic Slogan Policy Choice Personalised 
    
Status Quo “Let’s Keep Going” The Economy “Let’s Keep Building a Better 
Economy” 
Education “Let’s Keep Building a Better 
Education System” 
Healthcare “Let’s Keep Building a Better 
Healthcare System” 





“Fighting for You Today, not 
Tomorrow” 
The Economy “Fighting for a Better Economy 
Today, not Tomorrow.” 
Education “Fighting for a Better Education 
System Today, not Tomorrow.” 
Healthcare “Fighting for a Better Healthcare 
System Today, not Tomorrow.” 
National Security “Fighting for a Secure Nation 




“Let’s not go Backwards” The Economy “Let’s not let the Economy go 
Backwards.” 
Education “Let’s not let Education go 
Backwards.” 
Healthcare “Let’s not let Healthcare go 
Backwards.” 





“Trusted by Voters” The Economy “Trusted by Voters to look after 
the Economy” 
Education “Trusted by Voters to look after 
Education.” 
Healthcare “Trusted by Voters to look after 
Healthcare.” 
National Security “Trusted by Voters to look after 
National Security.” 
    
 
By randomising the nudge delivery but changing the slogans to embed policies participants 
have revealed to be important to them, these advertisements personalise choice (by nudging 
 
297 The economy (84%), education (83%), healthcare (81%), national security (80%). No other issue is found to 
be above 80%, with the closest being gun policy and immigration, both at 74%. 
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towards the candidate which would appear to be the desirable outcome for the participant) but 
do not personalise delivery (by still using a random (i.e. impersonal) nudge). This approach 
follows methodologically from Matz et al. (2017), who personalise advertisements based on 
user-revealed Facebook likes, Guo et al. (2020), who offer password tips based on previously 
constructed passwords, and Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020), who design personalised 
text messages based simply on however complete a person’s FAFSA application is. By simply 
asking respondents to reveal those outcomes which matter to them, one can easily produce 
an advertisement which subsequently appeals to those preferences. To ensure the 
transparency of this strategy was not revealed, respondents are informed at the start and the 
end of the survey that the advertisements they are shown are randomly allocated. CO 
participants also complete a set of psychometric questions after they are asked which issue 
matters most to them, but before they are shown an advertisement, further separating these 
actions. 
8.4.3 Choice and Delivery Personalisation 
 
Following Chapter 3, the hypotheses in brief arrived at from theory were: a) personalised 
nudging would be more effective than impersonal nudging and not nudging at all, and b) choice 
and delivery personalisation, when used in conjunction, would be more effective than either 
used in isolation. The CO and DO groups provide a basis for evaluating this first hypothesis, 
but a group must be constructed which utilises both choice and delivery personalisation. This 
is the CD subgroup. 
The CD subgroup is very much an amalgam of the survey-experiment designs used for the 
CO and DO subgroups. Upon completing the demographic questions, participants face the 
same policy question as in the CO subgroup, namely which of the four policies matters most 
to them. From here, the survey splits into four branches, with each participant following one 
branch depending on their answer to the policy question. Participants will answer the same 
psychometric questions in the same order and with the same branching structure as in the DO 
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subgroup. Finally, upon completing the psychometric questions, participants will be shown a 
nudge advertisement and a control advertisement. The nudge used in the advertisement will 
be personalised based on the predictions borne from the primer group data, while the slogan 
used will be personalised based on the policy preference specified by the participant. 
8.5 – Comparisons 
 
With data on the nudge effectiveness for the primer group, the CO subgroup, the DO subgroup 
and the CD subgroup, several statistical comparisons can be used to evaluate whether the 
hypotheses of this project can be accepted or should be rejected.  
Following Peer et al. (2019) an ANOVA is used to compare the CO and DO groups, 
respectively, to the primer group (impersonal nudging) and the control group. A positive, 
statistically significant difference in effectiveness between the personalisation subgroups and 
the primer and control groups would support the hypothesis that personalisation makes 
nudges more effective.298 Tukey’s test can add further detail to this analysis, as well as t-tests 
of various pairs. In instances of statistical exploration, such as are involved in matching 
analysis, the use of two-tailed t-tests is advantageous, as these tests test for any statistical 
difference in the means of group, regardless of the sign of the effect (i.e. positive or negative 
effect). However, when testing the proposed hypotheses, a one-tailed t-test may prove more 
instructive, as this test offers a statistical examination of not simply difference in means, but 
also the sign associated with the effect. As personalisation is expected to produce a 
statistically significant and positive effect, a one-tailed t-test is suitable here. 
Finally, the CD subgroup needs to be compared to both the CO and DO subgroups to evaluate 
the second hypothesis that using choice and delivery in conjunction produces more effective 
nudges than using them in isolation. This, again, should utilise an ANOVA, Tukey’s test and a 
t-test.  
 
298 Where the assumptions of an ANOVA are violated, a Kruskal-Wallis test (non-parametic ANOVA) or Welch’s 
test (heterogeneous variance) can be used. 
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Chapter 9 – Sampling, Power Testing and Other Factors 
 
9.1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a power analysis of the statistical tests discussed in the previous 
chapters, drawing on effect estimates from previous research. This analysis takes the form of 
a priori power analysis, and is used to inform sample size selection. Following this analysis, a 
short discussion of three exogeneous factors which may impact the data collected in this 
investigation is offered. These factors are the COVID-19 pandemic, the rise of populism, and 
the 2020 presidential election in the US. 
9.2 – Sampling and Power Testing 
 
While sample population has been addressed, the question of sample size remains 
outstanding. There are several indicative pieces of evidence to inform sample size selection. 
For instance, when discussing the Johnson-Neyman technique, Cronbach and Snow (1977) 
argue a minimum of 100 observations are required for moderation analysis. Additionally, when 
considering the technical limitations of the CAHOST program for calculating regions of 
significance, a maximum of 1,000 observations can be used.299 Furthermore, following the 
review of RCT designs by BETA (2016), most RCT designs utilise samples between 1,000-
10,000 observations in size, and the vast majority (84%) use samples between 100 and 
10,000 observations in size. Finally, one must appreciate budget constraints associated with 
incentivised research which also limit the final sample size. 
These pieces of information, however, are merely indicative. A more immediate approach to 
choosing an adequate sample size is to calculate the statistical power associated with the 
three means of analysis outlined above: moderated regression, t-test, and ANOVA. This is 
done using a priori power testing. 
 
299 These limitations can be overcome, but as above, there are relatively few statistical packages that are 
capable of performing the JN technique which are not, at present, disparate and outdated. 
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In an updated draft of their 2019 paper, Peer et al. (2020) provide some details on their own 
power analysis which can be used to estimate a sample size for the moderated regression 
analysis planned here. While they do not report the R-squared associated with their moderated 
regressions, they do report an estimated effect size300 𝑓2 of 0.1.301 Using G*Power v3.1.9.4 
power calculation software for multiple regression (which follows the methodology of Cohen 
(1988) and Cohen et al. (2003)), an 80% power level as used by Peer et al. (2020) as well as 
an effect size of 0.1, three predictor variables following the SLMM (Hayes, 2018) and a 
probability level (p-value) of 0.05, the estimated sample size required for a moderated 
regression is 124. Note, this is similar to the rule-of-thump value given by Cronbach and Snow 
(1977). Given a hypothetical moderated regression sample of 124 would consist of 
observations from the control group and a nudge-treatment group, the total sample size 
estimate for the primer group is 310.302 
G*Power calculation software for two-tailed t-test is used to calculate the estimated sample 
size for a two-tailed t-test. Cohen (1988) advises that a small effect size has a Cohen’s 𝑑 of 
0.2, a medium 0.5, and a large 0.8.303 However, by reviewing previous literature, a more 
accurate estimate of effect size, 𝑑, may be arrived at. Unfortunately, the necessary details for 
this calculation are absent from Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020), Schöning, Matt and Hess 
(2019), Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) and Moon (2002). Peer et al. (2020) do provide 
the necessary information, but only for a test of their impersonal nudge group versus the 
personalised nudge group, which they found to have a statistically significant but very small 
difference. Calculating the effect size using these details gives a value of 𝑑 = 0.2359.304 
 




301 Soper (2020) notes that a value of 0.02 is considered a small effect, 0.15 is considered a medium effect, and 
0.35 is considered a large effect. Given Peer et al. (2019) detect significant moderation effects in 47.5% of their 
tests (19 out of 40), one may estimate that the effect size to be around the medium value. 
302 124 divided by 2 is 62. 62 multiplied by the number of subgroups (5) is 310. 
303 Cohen’s 𝑑 for effect size is developed by Cohen (1988). 









Compared to Cohen’s (1988) guidance, this would appear to be a relatively small effect, which 
corroborates the findings of Peer et al. (2019). When 0.2359 is used, the estimated sample 
size for an 80% power level is 568, or 284 per group. While this may be a valid estimate of the 
sample size required for the PTG data collection stage,305 the basis of this calculation is not 
applicable to the primer group stage. Unfortunately, Peer et al. (2020) do not provide data to 
calculate an effect size for the primer group.306 Assuming the effect size to be of a similar size 
to the estimated effect size used in the moderated regression power analysis (i.e. slightly less 
than a medium effect size), an effect size of 0.4 is used. At an 80% power level, this produces 
an estimated sample size of 200 observations, or 100 observations per group.307 Based on 
this calculation, a total, minimum sample size of 500 observations is advisable.  
Finally, once more using G*Power, an estimated sample size given a one-way ANOVA is 
examined. Again, none of the literature provide information from which an effect size 𝑓2 can 
be estimated. Cohen (1988) suggests that a small size takes the value of 0.1, a medium the 
value of 0.25, and a large the value 0.4. As ANOVA is used in the PTG group, by way of an 
estimate the calculated effect size of 0.2359 using Peer et al. (2020) is used. For three groups 
and an 80% power level, this yields a sample size estimate of 177 total, or 59 observations 
per group. Moon (2002)308 does report an effect size based on Cohen’s (1988) eta-squared 
value of around 0.3873. Using this estimate, for an 80% power level, around 85 total 
observations would be needed, or 17 observations per group. 
Both estimated minimum sample sizes for the primer group (310 and 500) fall within the typical 
sample range used by RCT experiments (BETA, 2016) and are similar to previously used 
sample sizes (see Table 1). Furthermore, the estimated minimum sample for the moderated 
 
305 This estimated sample size differs somewhat, also, from the estimated sample size for ANOVA, which is the 
primary means of analysis in the PTG group. See below. 
306 Peer et al. (2020) also use a WMW-test, presumably because of a non-normal independent variable. Using 
the same effect size (i.e. 𝑑 = 0.2359), this produces a sample size estimate at the 80% power level of 297, 
very similar to the two-tailed t-test estimate (yet also larger, congruent with the expectation of lower power 
associated with non-parametric tests). As is done above, when a larger but still modest effect size of 0.4 is 
used, the estimated sample size at the 80% level is 104. This is also consistent. 
307 For prosperity, assuming a medium effect size of 0.5 yields an estimated sample size of 53. 
308 Moon (2002) reports multiple eta-squared values which average around 0.15. 
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regression analysis exceeds Cronbach and Snow’s (1977) rule of thumb recommendation, 
while both minimum estimations are less than the 1,000-observation maximum imposed by 
CAHOST.  
The estimated minimum sample sizes for the PTG data collection based on a two-tailed t-test 
(284 × 3 = 852), using Peer et al. (2020) as an estimator, is probably infeasible given budget 
limitations. The use of pilot studies allows the previous minimum sample estimations to be 
revised given the conditions of this specific project, and so the effect size found in the pilot 
studies may also be used to re-estimate the minimum sample estimation for the PTG data 
collection. Alternatively, the minimum sample estimate could follow from the power testing of 
the one-way ANOVA, which estimates a minimum sample of 177. This sample estimate is 
much more congruent with previous group estimates (62 and 100) and is within budget 
limitations. Finally, because a specifically positive effect is hypothesised from the PTG group, 
a one-tailed t-test could also be used. The one-tailed t-test has twice the power of the two-
tailed t-test for the same test size, (assuming the direction of the test is correctly specified) so 
an 80% power level can be maintained using half the estimated minimum sample (i.e. N = 
426, n = 142/subgroup). This is also feasible given various limitations. 
These minimum sample estimates are summarised in Table 6 below: 
Table 6: Minimum Sample Estimates 













































A sample congruent with the estimation using the power analysis of the moderated regression 
is the priority when estimating the size of the sample to collect as moderated regression is the 
primary means of analysis for the primer group, and matching analysis – which uses the t-test 
– is only a secondary approach. However, given this would set an initial benchmark sample N 
of only 310, when – assuming a slightly less than medium effect size – a sample N of 500 
would also accommodate the two-tailed t-test at the 80% power level, this higher sample size 
is set for the primer group sample. Estimates for the PTG vary greatly (from 177 to 852). At 
present, these estimates are used as a guide, with post hoc power analysis being performed 
on Pilot Study 2 as a means of establishing a firmer estimation. 
9.3 – Other Factors 
 
Research is often shaped by the times in which it is conducted. Several extenuating factors 
are present which could impact – to an extent which likely cannot be known – the research 
conducted during this experiment. Three factors are of pertinent consideration. 
9.3.1 COVID-19 
 
Firstly, all data collection is conducted during a period of global pandemic caused by the novel 
coronavirus and resulting COVID-19 disease. At the time of writing, the US is one of the worse 
affected countries, with the highest absolute number of both cases and deaths, and one of the 
highest per capita figures also (Sullivan, 2020). The US is, as expected, suffering the 
consequences of such a situation, with unemployment at its highest level in a decade (Badkar, 
Smith and Politi, 2020). In such an environment, it is reasonable to consider the impact on the 
current research. For instance, the present levels of risk and uncertainty arising from the 
pandemic may cause people to exhibit a preference for messages that promise security and 
certainty. As such, this may skew preferences towards, say, the loss aversion nudge. 
Methodologically, widespread unemployment coupled with easy access to Mechanical Turk 
can be expected to increase the user base and thus the number of individual participants who 
can be drawn upon to participate. Equally, financial strain of unemployment may incentivise 
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less than honest responses in the hope of maximum revenue generation. However, this is 
likely an issue regardless of economic circumstances. Finally, the pandemic places a great 
onus, and subsequently scrutiny, on politicians and public officials. Of course, depending on 
one’s political perspective, the response of a governing politician or opposing po litician will 
vary. However, it would be wrong to not acknowledge that the current crisis may cause 
opinions about government to emerge which would not occur during times of relative normalcy. 
9.3.2 Populism 
 
Secondly, political scientists have noted over the past several years a rise in emotive, populist 
driven politics which stands in stark contrast (both in performance and policy) to the political 
landscape of the preceding decades (Blyth and Lonergan, 2020). Again, the impact of this 
changing political landscape is likely a highly subjective one, with some viewing various shifts 
as positive or negative. Regardless, though, the current political moment is one which is 
characterised by a sense of uncertainty (Blyth and Lonergan, 2020), which once more might 
be expected to impact the assessment of the political advertisements in this project. 
9.3.3 2020 Presidential and General Election 
 
Finally, the US is due to hold a presidential election in November 2020, several months prior 
to data collection. With the US Democratic primary race recently concluding (at the time of 
writing), one can expect that – amongst a not insignificant proportion of the American 
population – people are looking more critically at political commentary and materials as they 
consider how they will vote (or act) in the upcoming election. As above, this can be viewed 
positively in that data collection is conducted during a period where people can be expected 
to be making similar judgements of political advertisements, adding the realism of this 
experiment. But it could also be viewed to the detriment of this experiment, with people 
ascribing onto hypothetical advertisements very real emotions, concerns and complaints. This, 
to an extent, touches on the previous consideration. It is also – valid or not – one which should 
be viewed as something to embrace rather than a problem to resolve. If the findings of this 
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thesis work only within a narrow set of circumstances (i.e. an apolitical circumstance, for the 
most part) the impact of this research is minimised. 
Indeed, for all of these considerations, little can be done to rectify them. The best that can be 
done is to acknowledge them as potentially conflating factors, and to draw upon them critically 




Chapter 10 – Summary of Methods 
 
In summary, a review of the methods used in the prominent literature reveals several 
methodological directions to take when seeking to answer the hypotheses and research 
questions associated with this thesis, as well as several areas from which to improve and 
develop the methodology.  
Most studies utilise incentivised survey-experiments distributed via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk micro-tasking platform. This choice of data collection is subsequently adopted. The 
choice of nudges – where they can be reasonably called nudges – amongst the previous 
literature is sparse, and so four common nudges which seem reasonably suitable for the 
experiment at hand are selected. These are the status quo nudge, the present bias nudge, 
the loss aversion nudge, and the social norm nudge. 
In conjunction with nudge selection, psychometric scales are also selected. Again, the 
literature is indicative but not definitive. Much of the literature utilises psychometric scales 
which are lacking specificity such as the Big Five personality scale. Following the use of the 
GDMS, NFC and CFC scales adopted by a most comparable study – Peer et al. (2019) – this 
experiment adopts these scales too. Through a review of the literature on psychological traits, 
nudges and these psychometric scales, the theoretical underpinnings for selecting these 
psychometric scales is demonstrated. 
When it comes to actually nudging, political advertisements which embed the nudge within the 
campaign slogan are offered. For realism, two different political candidates are utilised, 
introducing aesthetic differences between the two advertisements beyond the differences 
introduced with the nudge. To control for this, the survey-experiment design is adapted to use 
an RCT design. The rationale here is that the aesthetic differences should in roughly half the 
instances support the nudging effect, and in the other half hinder the nudging effect, and so 
the net aesthetic effect should be around zero when randomised. To assess the effectiveness 
of the nudge, in each instance a participant will be presented with a nudge-advertisement and 
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a control advertisement, with the difference in likely voting scores (effectiveness) being 
attributed to the presence of the nudge. 
This stage of the data collection constitutes a primer group stage, where participants complete 
demographic questions and the psychometric questions before randomly – or impersonally – 
being nudged with one of the four nudges. One in five participants will be assigned to a control-
control group which is used to assess the effectiveness of the nudges. The use of two stages 
of data collection – the impersonal primer group and the personalised treatment group – again 
follows from Peer et al. (2019). 
As does the method of analysis. Key to personalising the delivery of nudges is identifying 
statistically significant relationships between the nudges and the psychometric variables. 
Within the literature, the most popular method of doing this has been what is dubbed here the 
matching approach, a deductive approach whereby data are artificially stratified along often 
arbitrary lines to determine whether, in theory, personalisation would work. The merits of this 
method have been offered in this Section, as well as the many criticisms which can be made 
of it. An alternative approach utilised by Peer et al. (2019) is moderation analysis, which uses 
moderated regression and the Johnson-Neyman technique to identify statistically significant 
relationships – and the value-bounds of this significance – which can then be used to 
personalise the delivery of nudges. Peer et al. (2019) still present some methodological 
shortcomings which solutions to have been offered here. However, in contrast with the 
matching approach, the moderation approach emerges as a superior technique. 
Provided statistically significant relationships between the nudges and the psychometric 
variables have been identified, the personalised treatment data collection can begin. Here, 
participants are split into 3 subgroups: a choice only personalised subgroup who receive an 
impersonal nudge which supports a personalised outcome; a delivery only personalised 
subgroup who receive a personalised nudge which supports an impersonal outcome; and a 
choice and delivery personalised subgroup who receive a personalised nudge which supports 
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a personalised outcome. Various changes to the functionality of the survey-experiment design 
are implemented to automate this process. 
Delivery personalisation follows the findings of the primer group. Choice personalisation is 
implemented quite simply by asking respondents to choose from one of four policy areas which 
is most important to them. The nudge slogan is then adapted to include this policy area, in 
effect making it the choice personalised nudge. These three subgroups are analysed in 
conjunction with the impersonal nudging subgroups found in the primer group, as well as the 
control group also found in the primer group, using various tests of statistical difference. The 
results of these tests allow the hypotheses established in this thesis to be either rejected, 
accepted, or adapted. 
For all analyses to be performed, appropriate power testing has been utilised to estimate a 
necessary minimum sample size. This estimate has also been interrogated using various 
suggestions and examples in the literature. Chapters 11 and 13 present the results of two pilot 
studies. These studies were conducted for three reasons. Firstly, to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the nudge-advertisements and the RCT design to determine if any changes need to be 
made. Secondly, to evaluate the effectiveness of the moderated and matching approaches in 
identifying statistically significant relationships. Thirdly, to establish further data to be used in 



















Chapter 11 – Pilot Study 1 
 
11.1 – Introduction 
 
In this chapter, data from an initial pilot study (Pilot Study 1) is analysed, and the results 
discussed. The structure of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, a data summary is offered, before 
the assumptions of the various proposed statistical tests are investigated. Secondly, the 
effectiveness of the nudge-advertisements when used impersonally is analysed, as well as 
the presence of an aesthetic effect owing to aesthetic differences in the advertisements. 
Following from these results, thirdly moderation analysis is undertaken. Matching analysis is 
then performed, before finally a conclusion is offered. 
The results of Pilot Study 1 are mixed and several areas for development of the experimental 
approach are revealed. Some of these developments are discussed in this chapter, with the 
implications of these ideas largely discussed in Chapter 12. 
11.2 – Data Summary 
 
A sample of 100 participants from the US were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) service and were compensated $0.65 for their participation. After removing responses 
registered as being completed inappropriately fast (less than 2 minutes) and responses with 
suspicious results (a standard deviation across all psychometric questions of less than 0.2),309 
a sample of N = 95 remained (female = 44%). 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 7: 
 
309 This method of ‘cleaning’ the data is subsequently determined to be inadequate as it is far too arbitrary and 
potentially ineffective. The rationale for using a standard deviation measure is that, for disingenuous 
respondents who choose to answer all questions with the same response, the standard deviation of their 
responses should be near zero. However, determining how close to zero is so close as to justify removing from 
the sample is an arbitrary decision. Furthermore, as a method of cleaning the data, there is no reason to 
believe it is comprehensive. A respondent who alternates their answers between the maximum and minimum 
scorings could be described as just as disingenuous. However, the resulting standard deviation may be quite 
similar to a sincere respondent. For these reasons, an attention check is utilised hereinafter. 
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Table 7: Pilot Study 1 Summary Statistics 
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From Table 7, it can be seen that the median respondent is around 37 years of age, is qualified 
slightly beyond a bachelor’s degree, and identifies slightly left of the political centre. A chi-
squared test for differences in distribution is used to examine whether the control group and 
four treatment groups are comparable demographically. No statistically significant difference 
between the control group and the four treatment groups was found for age (2 (136, N = 95) 
= 126.0, p = .72), sex (2 (4, N = 95) = 1.5, p = .83), education (2 (12, N = 95) = 9.8, p = 
.63) or political identity (2 (16, N = 95) = 15.8, p = .47) The control and treatment groups, 
therefore, appear comparable. 
11.3 – Testing of Assumptions 
 
It is first prudent to examine whether the four nudges under consideration appear to be 
effective or not when used impersonally, which is to say, when participants are randomly 
assigned to a particular nudge-advertisement. The data are, therefore, first examined to test 





The normality of the data is first reviewed. 
Figure 8: Pilot Study 1 Histogram Normality Plots 
 
Figure 8 shows histogram plots for each group, with the dependent variable (effectiveness) 
shown on the x-axis and frequency density shown on the y-axis. All four of the nudge groups 
have a reasonably normal distribution. The control group diverges from this trend in the 
histogram, but when plotted against a normal distribution function (bottom-left plot), the data 
points follow quite closely with the expected normal distribution pattern. Finally, Shapiro-Wilk’s 
test for normality justifies the assumption of normality throughout (control p = 0.6693; status 
quo p = 0.2411; present bias p = 0.4066; loss aversion p = 0.3448; social norm p = 0.5763). 
11.3.2 Homogeneity of Variance 
 
Using Levene’s test to investigate the presence of heterogeneity of variance between the 
control group and each of the four nudge groups reveals no statistically significant evidence 
of heterogeneous variance (status quo p = 0.6978; present bias p = 0.5787; loss aversion p = 
0.5660; social norm p = 0.8756). 
The assumptions of a t-test appear to be satisfied and thus no adjustment is made. 
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11.4 – Impersonal Nudging 
 
The results of these two-tailed t-tests examining the effectiveness of the nudges when used 
impersonally are presented in Table 8.310 
Table 8: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results of Impersonal Nudges 











Present Bias -2.170 -5.388 0.3584 0.7222 
Loss Aversion -2.170 -31.715 3.2788 0.0022*** 
Social Norm -2.170 -13.300 1.2616 0.2148 
 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
As Table 8 shows, only the loss aversion nudge produces effectiveness scores which differ 
significantly from the control group. Furthermore, through an examination of the means, the 
loss aversion nudge is significantly effective compared to the control group, however the sign 
of the effect is opposite to that which would be expected. In fact, this trend is seen in all the 
nudges examined. 
Three possible explanations emerge. Firstly, there may be a significant aesthetic effect which 
randomisation has not counteracted. Secondly, there may be moderation effects which, when 
accounted for, would improve the apparent effectiveness of the nudges. Thirdly, the nudges 
themselves may simply be ineffective, and/or the control slogan may be having an unexpected 
influence on participants. 
Fortunately, through analysis of the data, the first and second explanation can be examined. 
Should neither provide an explanation for the apparent ineffectiveness of the nudges, the third 
explanation seems likely to be correct, and a re-examination of the survey-experiment will be 
necessary. 
11.5 – Testing for the Presence of Aesthetic Effects 
 
 
310 Two-tailed tests are used here to avoid the imposition of a priori assumptions. 
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Aesthetic effects may be examined through comparison within the groups, comparing the 
effectiveness scores for Candidate A to that of Candidate B, where – should no aesthetic 
effects be present – it would be expected that no statistically significant difference is found. 
The results of these comparisons are shown in Table 9: 
Table 9: Pilot Study 1 Two-tailed T-test Results for Aesthetic Effects 











Status Quo 50.000 57.181 -1.0912 0.2839 
Present Bias 55.176 60.565 -0.7510 0.4582 
Loss Aversion 40.100 71.815 -4.7634 0.0000*** 
Social Norm 
 
50.140 63.440 -2.0551 0.0468** 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
The results shown in Table 9 demonstrate a mixed picture. When comparing advertisements 
in the control group, the status quo group and the present bias group, no statistically significant 
aesthetic effect is found. However, the loss aversion and social norm groups both suggest a 
statistically significant aesthetic effect is present, perhaps explaining – at least for the loss 
aversion nudge – the statistically significant difference found when compared to the control 
group (see Table 8). Furthermore, even where statistically insignificant, the mean 
effectiveness associated with the Candidate B advertisement is consistently greater than that 
associated with the Candidate A advertisement, suggesting – regardless of the nudge – that 
Candidate B is more popular. 
Of course, the criteria for assuming an aesthetic effect of zero under the RCT design is a large 
sample size and a roughly equal number of observations in each group being compared. As 
this is a pilot study, the first criterion clearly fails. On the second criterion, however, all groups 
have an equal number of observations in the compared subgroups. Therefore, a biased 
random allocation cannot explain any significant difference identified. At least in the case of 
the loss aversion and social norm nudges, therefore, these results suggest there may be an 
aesthetic effect occurring, though this is inconclusive. 
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11.6 – Moderation Analysis 
 
As above, it is feasible that the lack of a positive effect arising from the impersonal nudges is 
due to moderation effects. This is to say, nudges which would be positively effective for an 
individual who exhibits one set of traits were shown to an individual who exhibits a set of traits 
which render the nudge ineffective or negatively effective. If evidence of this can be found 
through moderation analysis, this may provide a route to effective, positive nudging via 
personalisation. 
One conflating factor for moderating regression may be statistically significant differences in 
psychometric responses across groups. These differences are examined and p-values from 
associated t-tests and chi-squared tests of differences in distribution are reported in Table 10: 
Table 10: Pilot Study 1 Differences in Psychometric Scores 



































































2 p-value shown in brackets, N = 95 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Across the sample, only two instances of statistically significant differences between the 
control group and a nudge group are identified. Firstly, the means of the intuitive psychometric 
score are statistically significantly different across the control and status quo group. However, 
this variable is not normally distributed, with a peak at around 5 (the high end of the variable). 
As a result, a t-test may be unsuitable for evaluating difference. Given this, an examination of 
the differences in distributions is undertaken. Here, the chi-squared value is not significant.  
Secondly, the means of the rational psychometric score are statistically significantly different 
across the control and social norm group, but only at the 10% level. In this instance, the 
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rational variable is normally distributed, and so a t-test appears suitable. However, as with the 
difference associated with the intuitive variable, no statistically significant difference in 
distribution is found. 
Given there are very few statistically significant differences, and where these exist, they are 
inconsistent across tests, no adjustment is made in the analysis. 
To examine moderation effects, each of the seven psychometric scales discussed previously 
are averaged, such that each respondent is associated with a single value for, say, NFC or 
intuition. The validity of this process is assured by measuring Cronbach’s alpha for each 
psychometric scale. These results are shown in Table 11: 
Table 11: Pilot Study 1 Cronbach's Alpha Results for Psychometric Variables 





GDMS: Dependent 0.8791 
GDMS: Intuitive 0.8454 
GDMS: Rational 0.8920 






As each scale demonstrates a Cronbach’s alpha value which is greater than a typically 
accepted threshold of around 0.6-0.7, averaging each of these scales appears wholly valid. 
Summary statistics of these psychometric variables are shown in Table 12: 
Table 12: Pilot Study 1 Summary Statistics of Psychometric Variables 













Avoidant 2.706 1.093 1.000 5.000 2.980 
Intuitive 3.361 0.749 1.020 5.000 3.560 
Dependent 3.117 0.861 1.000 4.800 3.220 
Spontaneous 2.968 0.955 1.000 4.520 3.140 
NFC 3.263 0.653 1.117 5.000 3.039 
CFC 3.283 0.457 2.575 4.667 3.108 
      
 




𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝜀𝑖  (8) 
 
where  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is the effectiveness of nudge 𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 for nudge 𝑖, and 0 for all other values, 𝑝𝑠𝑦𝜆 is a continuous variable for psychometric 𝜆, 
and 𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 is a moderator term, are estimated. Table 13 through Table 16 present the results 


















Table 13: Pilot Study 1 Moderated Regression Results for the Status Quo Nudge 
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Table 14: Pilot Study 1 Moderated Regression Results for the Present Bias Nudge 
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Table 15: Pilot Study 1 Moderated Regression Results for the Loss Aversion Nudge 
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Table 16: Pilot Study 1 Moderated Regression Results for the Social Norm Nudge 
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Robust SE shown in brackets 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
As Table 13 through Table 16 demonstrate, no statistically significant moderation effects are 
identified, and as such, moderation is not a sufficient explanation for the lack of a positive 
effect from the impersonal nudges. As with the analysis of aesthetic effects, a larger sample 




Furthermore, given this lack of moderation effects, further analysis by way of floodlight 
analysis is not performed. 
11.7 – Matching Analysis 
 
Given the consistent lack of moderation effects identified using moderation analysis, the 
alternative matching analysis is also utilised. This approach uses dummy variables to 
categorise respondents as being either ‘high’ or ‘low’ scorers on various psychometric 
variables, and then evaluates the effectiveness scores of the nudge across these 
manufactured groups. Where a statistically significant difference in effectiveness scores is 
identified, this difference can be attributed to a tendency to score either ‘high’ or ‘low’ on the 
psychometric variable used in the analysis. 
Determining, however, what constitutes ‘high’ and ‘low’ remains arbitrary. To alleviate such 
arbitrary selection, a range of constructions of high and low scorers are used: 1) a mean 
construction, where a person is considered a high-scorer (D = 1) if they score more than the 
mean, and a low-scorer if they score less than the mean (D = 0); 2) a median construction, 
where a person is considered a high-scorer (D = 1) if they score within the top 50% of 
respondents, and a low-scorer if they score within the bottom 50% of respondents (D = 0); 3) 
and a midpoint construction, where a person is considered a high-scorer (D = 1) if they score 
above 3 (the midpoint), and a low-scorer (D = 0) if they score below 3. 
Evidence of a relationship between a nudge and a psychometric can be determined using the 
matching analysis via several steps. Firstly, a statistically significant difference across the 
control and treatment group under examination informs later interpretations. Secondly, a 
statistically significant difference across high/low subgroups within the treatment group 
identifies possible relationships. Where a statistically significant difference is found, a 
relationship may be present. Finally, a statistically significant difference between a subgroup 
and the control group, with a prior statistically significant difference between subgroups, 
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provides good evidence to conclude a relationship exists between the psychometric variable 
and the nudge. 
11.7.1 Status Quo Nudge 
 
The results of a two-tailed t-test examining the effectiveness of the status quo nudge across 
the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 17 (also see Table 8): 
Table 17: Pilot Study 1 T-test results for the Status Quo Nudge vs. the Control Group 
Nudge Mean (Control) Mean (Treatment) p-value 
 








N = 38 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
  
As can be seen, the effectiveness score of the status quo nudge group indicates the behaviour 
of the nudged group is not statistically significantly different from that of the control group. 
However, this result does not consider that the susceptibility of some participants to the status 
quo nudge may be moderated by various psychometric effects. As an initial effort to account 
for these effects, the effectiveness ratings of those in the treatment group who exhibit high 
psychometric scores are examined against those in the same group who exhibit low 
psychometric scores. These results are shown in Table 18: 
Table 18: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for the Status Quo Nudge Treatment Group 


































Avoidant -11.791 -2.657 0.5446 -15.800 -0.678 0.2979 -11.791 -2.657 0.5446 
Intuitive -3.522 -12.956 0.5207 -3.522 -12.956 0.5207 -3.522 -12.956 0.5207 
Dependent -19.000 0.370 0.1802 -13.167 -3.311 0.5019 -10.783 -6.967 0.8075 
Spontaneous -11.250 -4.475 0.6477 -10.167 -6.311 0.7940 -11.250 -4.475 0.6477 
NFC -6.783 -11.150 0.7804 -6.922 -9.556 0.8586 -10.686 -6.682 0.7915 
CFC -6.600 -10.288 0.8040 -5.422 -11.056 0.7025 -5.480 -9.300 0.8168 
 
N = 18 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Consistent with the lack of statistically significant effects in the moderation analysis, regardless 
of how a ‘high’ and a ‘low’ scoring respondent is constructed, no statistically significant 
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differences between these subgroups are identified. This is re-affirmed when the high/low 
treatment subgroups are compared once more with the control group: 
Table 19: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for High (Low) Status Quo Nudge Subgroups vs. Control 
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* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
11.7.2 Present Bias Nudge 
 
The results of a two-tailed t-test examining the effectiveness of the present bias nudge across 
the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 20 (also see Table 8): 
Table 20: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for the Present Bias Nudge Group vs. the Control Group 
Nudge Mean (Control) Mean (Treatment) p-value 
 








N = 37 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
  
As can be seen, the effectiveness score of the present bias group indicates the behaviour of 
the nudged group is not statistically significantly different from that of the control group. 
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However, this result does not consider that the susceptibility of some participants to the 
present bias nudge may be moderated by various psychometric effects. Again, as an attempt 
to account for these effects, the effectiveness ratings of those in the treatment group who 
exhibit high psychometric scores are examined against those in the same group who exhibit 
low psychometric scores. These results are shown in Table 21: 
Table 21: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for the Present Bias Nudge Treatment Group 


































Avoidant -5.350 -5.409 0.9968 -11.433 1.413 0.3603 -14.900 3.067 0.1942 
Intuitive 9.000 -15.460 0.0739* 7.300 -19.663 0.0425** 12.417 -15.100 0.0482** 
Dependent -8.550 -2.578 0.6741 -4.411 -6.488 0.8841 6.040 -10.150 0.2902 
Spontaneous 5.388 -14.967 0.1379 1.167 -12.763 0.3200 5.150 -11.136 0.2634 
NFC -6.277 -2.500 0.8216 -2.367 -8.788 0.6511 -2.500 -7.410 -0.7335 
CFC -8.158 1.260 0.5436 -3.033 -8.038 0.7248 17.925 -12.562 0.0526* 
 
N = 17 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Contrary to patterns thus far, some evidence of a statistically significant relationship between 
intuition and the present bias nudge is found. Regardless of how the dummy variable 
demarcating ‘high’ and ‘low’ scorers is constructed, intuition consistently appears to have a 
statistically significant, negative relationship with the effectiveness of the present bias nudge. 
This finding is weakest when the dummy variable is constructed using the mean, being only 
significant at the 10% level. However, given the absence of statistical significance found using 
moderation analysis, the relative consistency of this result is interesting. 
When the high/low treatment subgroups are compared once more with the control group, 







Table 22: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for High (Low) Present Bias Nudge Subgroups vs. Control 
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* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
11.7.3 Loss Aversion Nudge 
 
The results of a two-tailed t-test examining the effectiveness of the loss aversion nudge across 
the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 23 (also see Table 8): 
Table 23: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for the Loss Aversion Nudge Group vs. the Control Group 
Nudge Mean (Control) Mean (Treatment) p-value 
 








N = 40 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
  
Unlike the previously examined nudges, the average effectiveness score for the loss aversion 
group indicates the behaviour of the nudged group is statistically significantly different from 
that of the control. However, the sign of this effect is counter to expectations – where the 
nudge was expected to lead to a higher average effectiveness score for the loss aversion 
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group, compared to the control group, the nudge actually lead to a lower average effectiveness 
score. 
As above, considering the role of psychometrics may explain this result. The effectiveness of 
the nudge amongst those with high psychometric scores is compared to those associated 
those with low psychometric scores. These results are shown in Table 24: 
Table 24: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for the Loss Aversion Nudge Treatment Group 


































Avoidant -45.125 -11.600 0.0108** -39.170 -24.260 0.2823 -42.585 -11.529 0.0240** 
Intuitive -34.770 -28.660 0.6639 -34.770 -28.660 0.6639 -25.957 -34.815 0.5469 
Dependent -44.989 -20.855 0.0749* -42.970 -20.460 0.0969* -37.245 -24.956 0.3805 
Spontaneous -43.020 -20.410 0.0953* -43.02 -20.41 0.0953* -42.718 -18.267 0.0708* 
NFC -27.038 -50.425 0.1730 -22.520 -40.910 0.1809 -12.667 -35.076 0.2473 
CFC -26.742 -39.175 0.3824 -28.810 -34.620 0.6795 -27.714 -33.869 0.6763 
 
N = 20 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
As with the present bias nudge, some evidence emerges from this analysis which suggests 
several relationships between psychometric variables and the effectiveness of the loss 
aversion nudge. While statistically significant only at the 10% level, spontaneity demonstrates 
a statistically significant, positive relationship with effectiveness across all dummy 
constructions.  
It is noteworthy, however, that even amongst those with high spontaneity, the loss aversion 
nudge is still considered rather less effective than the control advertisement (with the loss 
aversion advertisement consistently having an effectiveness of around -20 for the high 
spontaneity treatment respondents, compared to the average effectiveness of the control 
advertisement of around -2). This observation adds to mounting evidence that – regardless of 
relationships – the implementation of the nudges within advertisements is insufficient. 
 




A second potential relationship is a positive, significant relationship between avoidance and 
the loss aversion nudge. While statistically insignificant when the median construction is 
tested, there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between avoidance and 
effectiveness at the 5% level using the mean and midpoint constructions. Finally, though 
somewhat less compelling still, dependence appears to have a positive relationship with the 
loss aversion nudge, though it is statistically significant only at the 10% level, and is not 
statistically significant under the midpoint construction. Again, while positive, neither 
avoidance nor dependence appear to produce effectiveness scores which would see the loss 
aversion nudge be more positively effective than the control advertisement, supporting the 
hypothesis that the underlying integration of the nudge into the advertisement is inadequate. 
When the high/low treatment subgroups are compared with the control group, many occasions 
of statistically significant difference are identified. However, given the treatment group is 
overall statistically significantly different from the control group, and the high/low treatment 
subgroups are generally not statistically significantly different, these results are not surprising: 
Table 25: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for High (Low) Loss Aversion Nudge Subgroups vs. Control 
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312 There are insufficient observations to perform a t-test for the rational decision-making style under the 
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* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
In every instance where a statistically significant difference is identified, the average 
effectiveness of the loss aversion nudge is less than that of the control group. This would 
suggest that even amongst those high in psychometric traits which should find the loss 
aversion nudge appealing (or low in psychometric traits which should find the loss aversion 
nudge unappealing), the nudge itself is negatively effective compared to the control 
advertisement. This adds to mounting evidence that implementation of the nudge, potentially 
in conjunction with an aesthetic effect or unintended influence from the control advertisement, 
is inadequate, even when psychometric effects are accounted for. 
11.7.4 Social Norm Nudge 
 
Finally, the results of a two-tailed t-test examining the effectiveness of the social norm nudge 
across the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 26 (also see Table 8): 
Table 26: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for the Social Norm Treatment Group 
Nudge Mean (Control) Mean (Treatment) p-value 
 








N = 40 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Consistent with previous results, the effectiveness score of the social norm nudge is not 
statistically significantly different from the control group, and the mean effectiveness is less 
than the control group. As above, the difference in effectiveness scores between those high 
in a psychometric variable and those low in a psychometric variable within the treatment group 





Table 27: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for the Social Norm Nudge Treatment Group 


































Avoidant -25.343 -6.815 0.1816 -18.690 -7.910 0.4227 -25.038 -5.475 0.1455 
Intuitive -14.456 -12.355 0.8775 -10.930 -15.670 0.7264 -11.500 -13.900 0.8782 
Dependent -19.238 -9.342 0.4717 -22.770 -3.830 0.1507 -23.900 -8.757 0.2990 
Spontaneous -13.678 -12.991 0.9598 -11.970 -14.630 0.8445 -12.525 -13.817 0.9257 
NFC -10.164 -20.617 0.4771 -12.340 -14.260 0.8875 -14.363 -12.592 0.8982 
CFC -11.562 -16.529 0.7265 -8.730 -17.870 0.4978 -3.725 -15.698 0.4773 
 
N = 20 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Consistent with the results of the moderation analysis, no statistically significant differences 
are found between respondents who experience the social norm nudge and score high on a 
psychometric variable and those who score low on a psychometric variable. 
When the high/low treatment subgroups are compared with the control group, few statistically 
significant differences are identified, with those identified occurring only at the 10% level: 
Table 28: Pilot Study 1 T-test Results for High (Low) Social Norm Nudge Subgroups vs. Control 
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Furthermore, where statistical significance is identified, and thus one can conclude the social 
norm nudge is statistically significantly effective, compared to the control group, the sign of 
the effect is opposite to previous expectations. 
11.8 – Conclusions and Potential Developments 
 
The first pilot study suggests that the selected nudges have either statistically insignificant 
impacts, when comparing the nudged group to the control group, or statistically significant 
impacts, but with the sign of the effect being opposite to prior expectations. For three of the 
nudges – the status quo nudge, the present bias nudge, and the social norm nudge – 
effectiveness is not statistically significant, in that the nudged group did not behave 
significanltly differently from the control group. This is not the case with the loss aversion 
nudge, where effectiveness is statistically significant; implying the nudged group behaved 
significantly differently from the control group, but the effect of the nudge is that the nudged 
group has effectiveness scores which are less than that of the control group. This is the case 
even when no statistically significant difference is identified. 
One possible explanation for these results is the presence of aesthetic effects. If one 
advertisement is more effective than another, regardless of which is using a nudge, the 
effectiveness of the nudge is expected to be obscured. Evidence for a statistically significant 
aesthetic effect is mixed, with statistical significance found in the loss aversion and social norm 
groups, but not in others. However, for all four nudge groups and the control group, the 
average effectiveness score associated with Candidate B is greater than that of Candidate A. 
Even though this difference is often not statistically significant, the consistency of this tendency 
is interesting. 
A second explanation is the presence of moderation effects. In principle, a nudge could be 
ineffective when used impersonally, but also be statistically significantly moderated by a 
psychometric variable which – when accounted for – could render the nudge effective. 
Moderation analysis on this pilot sample data, however, reveals no statistically significant 
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moderation effects, which may suggest that the prior beliefs that moderation may be occurring 
are wrong (see Chapter 8). Given this, an alternative matching analysis is undertaken. This 
analysis largely corroborates the lack of statistical significance found using moderation 
analysis, and thus reconfigures expectations – it may not be that there is a lack of significant 
moderation occurring, but rather the experimental design is flawed. 
This leads to a final explanation, which is the survey-experiment set-up for the pilot study is 
simply inadequate. The four nudges may not be sufficiently incorporated into the 
advertisement medium to be effective; the control group may be exerting an unintended 
nudging effect, accounting for that group’s consistently higher effectiveness; and the 
introduction of aesthetic effects following the experiment design may be obscuring the genuine 
nudge effect. In Chapter 12, adjustments to the survey-experiment design are offered to rectify 
these issues. Immediately, however, several additional comments can be made. 
Firstly, the sample size of the pilot study is rather small given the planned analysis.313 It may 
be expected that as the sample size increases, the benefits of the RCT design should reduce 
the role of any aesthetic effects, assuming no aesthetic effect is expected across a population 
(Deaton and Cartwright, 2017). As such, the relatively small sample size may account for the 
influence of some aesthetic effects. Furthermore, as Cronbach and Snow (1977) argue, 
moderated regression usually requires a minimum of 100 observations. Therefore, each 
moderation regression shown in this chapter may not reflect the effects seen in a larger sample 
analysis. 
Secondly, regardless of the limitations born from the sample size, several results re-affirm 
confidence in some elements of the survey-experiment design. Across a relatively small 
sample no significant demographic differences have been identified, enabling a fair 
comparison of groups. Furthermore, all psychometric scales demonstrate a high Cronbach’s 
 
313 This is due to budget limitations as the pilot studies and the main study are both incentivised. It was not 
possible given current budget limitations to conduct extensive data collection for both the pilot studies and 
the main study. 
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alpha, which is consistent with the literature and suggests the seven selected scales are 
suitable for further use. Finally, the relative normality of the dependent variable suggests the 
assumptions of normality associated with the use of t-test and OLS – and, by extension, 




Chapter 12 – Experimental Adjustments 
 
12.1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the implications of the findings from the previous chapter and offers 
experimental adjustments which are subsequently examined in a second pilot study, which is 
the topic of Chapter 13. 
The evidence which emerges from the first pilot study suggests that the nudges were 
inadequately embedded into the advertisement format to allow for an assessment of their 
effect. Furthermore, Pilot Study 1 produces mixed evidence to support the hypothesis that 
there is a significant aesthetic effect. Finally, given the relative effectiveness of the control 
advertisement compared to the nudge advertisement, it is possible that the control 
advertisement is exerting some unintended nudging effect. 
Resolving the problem of aesthetic effects – if, indeed, such a problem exists – requires a 
relatively simple experimental adjustment. Namely, rather than showing participants two 
advertisements which differ both in nudging (i.e. nudge vs. control) and aesthetics, participants 
could be shown the same advertisement twice, differing only in the nudge used in each 
instance. Such an adjustment would control for any aesthetic differences, and thus any 
difference in response between the two advertisements could be attributed to the nudge. Yet, 
given evidence for aesthetic effects is mixed, such an adjustment is not immediately 
undertaken. 
12.2 – Dynamic Choice Architecture 
 
The more immediately relevant adjustment, however, pertains to the use of nudges within the 
political advertisements. As discussed in Chapter 7, an advertisement may be thought of as 
the sum of its components: 
Advertisement = Imagery + Text + Background + Colour Scheme… 
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In other words, an advertisement 𝐴 can be understood as consisting of a set of components 
𝑋 such that 𝐴 = (𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝑋𝑖). Each component, or 𝑋, can be used to nudge a decision-
maker (Yeung, 2017; Weinmann, Schneider and vom Brocke, 2016). As such, if a nudge 
embedded within a single component (𝑋) of an advertisement fails to exert a positive influence 
on a decision-maker, a positive influence may be induced by embedding the nudge into 
additional components of the advertisement. In the language of Chapter 7, to increase the 
effectiveness of the nudges, more choice architecture (components) can be ‘switched on’. 
Take, for example, advertisements 1 and 2, used in the first pilot study: 
Figure 9: Pilot Study 1 Advertisements 1 and 2 
Advertisement 1                                                 Advertisement 2 
 
Advertisement 1 is a treatment advertisement using a status quo nudge slogan, “Let’s keep 
going.” Advertisement 2 is the control advertisement, with the slogan “Working for you.” While 
aesthetic differences exist between the advertisements (e.g. the candidate pictures and 
names, or the background images), these features are designed to be generic and not exert 
any intended, significant influence on decision-makers. As such, these advertisements are 
designed with the purpose of the control advertisement containing no nudge in any of its 
components, and the treatment advertisement containing a nudge in only one of its 
components, the political slogan. 
In online and digital settings – as well as in settings where maximal influence is desired, such 
as a political campaign – such subtlety in nudging may not be typical, or indeed desirable. 
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Following this rationale, and in response to previous results, several new political 
advertisements are offered in Table 29 below. 
These advertisements differ from the advertisements previously used in several ways. 
12.2.1 Background Imagery 
 
In addition to embedding a nudge within the campaign slogan, each advertisement now 
embeds a respective nudge within the background image used.  
1. The Status Quo nudge – The status quo advertisement contains an image on the US 
Capitol Building, a prominent symbol of American government, which is designed to 
associate the candidate with this building and institution, thus appealing to the notion 
of the status quo and incumbency. 
2. The Present Bias nudge – The present bias advertisement contains an image of a 
check-box sheet with the option “Now” ticked. In the faded background, alternative 
options of “Yesterday”, “Today” and “Tomorrow” can also be seen, emphasising the 
focus on the present.314 The layout, similar to that of an election ballot, is also a 
desirable choice. 
3. The Loss Aversion nudge – The loss aversion advertisement contains an image of an 
agreeable handshake, a typical moment of agreement and certainty which is expected 
to appeal to the struggle between gains and losses. The choice of a handshake also 
has synergy with the adjusted loss aversion slogan (see below). 
4. The Social Norm nudge – The social norm advertisement features a row of houses in 
an American suburb spanning into the distance. The suburban imagery is designed to 
conjure a notion of community akin with the social norm nudge, while the continuity 
 
314 One could argue that “Now” and “Today” are essentially the same, and such an argument would not be 
without merit. The decision to use “Now” rather than “Today” is that “Today” could take on more alternative 
meanings than “Now.” “Now”, in the opinion of this author, is more associated with the immediacy the slogan 
is trying to invoke than “Today.” For instance, “Today” could mean now; it could also mean later today, an 
interpretation which would have a deleterious effect. “Now” does not suffer such an interpretation. 
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towards the vanishing point emphasises the magnitude of pre-existing support for the 
candidate. 
It is worthwhile to acknowledge that any imagery selected has subjective interpretations. 
Indeed, this is likely why the literature on digital nudging (Yeung, 2017; Weinmann, Schneider 
and vom Brocke, 2016) so often emphasise the personal, dynamic and automated nature of 
digital nudging – subjectivity may be mediated by large datasets which can test and determine 
ideal layouts, mediums and content for each individual.315 In absence of these resources, any 
selection made here is liable to suffer from clashes in subjective interpretation.316 Yet, given 
the rationale for the various selections is offered and seems – at least from this author’s 
subjective determination – sensible, these selections in their current forms are used..  
In conjunction with the notion of ‘switching’ choice architecture ‘on’ and ‘off’, while the 
treatment advertisements have the background imagery ‘switched on’, the control 




315 Or so discussions surrounding social media algorithms report, at the very least (Yeung, 2017; Luckerson, 
2015; Tucker and Thaler, 2013). 
316 Indeed, the choice of a visual advertisement, rather than a video or written advertisement, demonstrates a 
subjective determination when one considers the capacities of social media platforms (Luckerson, 2015). 
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“A Candidate For You” 
 
 
“Let’s Keep Going” 
 
 






“A Safe Pair of Hands” 
 
 





























Three of the four slogans have also been changed. These are the present bias nudge, the 
loss aversion nudge, and the social norm nudge. 
Before discussing these changes, however, it is important to consider a subtle change to the 
status quo nudge slogan. In terms of language, this slogan has not changed from Pilot Study 
1. However, an oversight in Pilot Study 1 was the lack of emphasis. The status quo slogan – 
“let’s keep going” – contains two words from which one might derive a behavioural hypothesis. 
These are “keep,” and “going.” The former is designed to invoke the status quo – to keep 
something, one must already have that thing. However, the latter – “going” – may suggest 
some sort of development. For instance, to keep going may suggest continuation, but 
continuation towards a destination not yet reached, changing the primary subject of interest in 
the phrase. In other words, the word “going” could invoke a behavioural response which is not 
necessarily characteristic of the status quo nudge. 
This is merely a hypothesis, but implies a potential confounding effect which should be 
minimised where possible. As such, by introducing emphasis,  the reader’s attention can be 
drawn to the word “keep” rather than “going”, thus emphasising the status quo element of the 
slogan, rather than any behavioural element which may arise from the word “going.” 
The change to the present bias nudge is largely for greater consistency, as the previous slogan 
– “Fighting for you today, not tomorrow” – was noticeably longer than other slogans.317 The 
revised slogan, “Delivering for You: Now” is of a much more similar length to the others. 
Furthermore, the word “fighting” has been changed to “delivering” to emphasise the idea of 
receiving something in the present, which the former may communicate less effectively than 
the latter. In addition, the temporal framing has been changed from “Today” to “Now” in the 
hopes of emphasising to an even greater degree the present temporality. 
 
317 One may also note that promising to not fight for a constituent tomorrow may suggest to a voter the 
candidate believes they will lose. 
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The loss aversion nudge was the worst performing in the first pilot study, and this is possibly 
because the nudge was framed as avoiding losses, rather than guaranteeing gains. Several 
authors (Utych, 2017; Dowling and Krupnikov, 2016; Gunsch et al., 2000) report a complex 
relationship between negativity and political decision-making, with appeals to the negative 
often producing a positive reaction amongst partisans (who support the attacking candidate), 
but can produce negative reactions amongst non-partisans (Ordway and Wihbey, 2016). As 
candidates A and B are deliberating hypothetical and not clearly aligned to either of the two 
major US parties, it may be the case that the original, negative framing of the loss aversion 
nudge failed to appeal to participants. 
To resolve this, a new slogan “A Safe Pair of Hands” is used. This slogan clearly appeals to 
the positive frame,318 and indicates certainty (i.e., safe) over risk or uncertainty. 
The final adjusted nudge slogan is that of the social norm nudge. This adjustment is rather 
small, changing from, “Trusted by Voters” to “Trusted by America.” The reason for this change 
is that, within the experiment, participants are not actually voters. Instead, they simply indicate 
their willingness to vote for each candidate. Thus, while trying to appeal to a social norm (i.e. 
that voters approve of this candidate), the participant themselves may fail to identify with this 
group as they are not actually voting. To ensure participants have a group to relate themselves 
to, the social norm slogan is changed to “Trusted by America.”319 
Finally, the control slogan is changed. As indicated by the first pilot study, the previous control 
advertisement outperformed all the treatment advertisements (though the difference was not 
always statistically significant). One explanation for this is that the previous control slogan – 
“Working for You” – was exerting some unintended influence on participants. Of course, the 
presence of any slogan (or indeed, any choice architecture) can be expected to shape the 
behaviour of decision-makers somewhat (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). But given the control 
slogan itself may have been producing something akin to a nudging effect, such an influence 
 
318 As opposed to the negative frame, such as “my opponent is not a safe pair of hands.” 
319 All participants report to be Americans. 
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may obscure the effect produced by the intended nudges. To resolve this, a new control slogan 
– “A Candidate for You” – is used. This slogan is selected as it is, at its core, a statement of 
fact: the candidate in the control advertisement is a candidate which is presented to the 
participant for their consideration. 
Finally, given the choice personalised slogans are adaptions of the generic nudging slogans 
shown above, these slogans are also altered from Chapter 8. These slogans are now as 
follows: 
Table 30: Changes to Choice Personalisation Slogans 










“Delivering a Better 
Economy: Now” 
 
“A Safe Choice for 
a Better Economy” 
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“Delivery a Secure 
Nation: Now” 
 




America to Protect 
National Security” 
 
12.2.3 Additional Changes 
 
Several additional changes have been made to the political advertisements. Firstly, a logo 
design following from Kehle and Naimi (2019) has been added.  
The same logo is featured on both advertisements, which may have the deleterious effect of 
prompting participants to believe they would be voting for the same party regardless. Equally, 
however, by having the same logo on each advertisement, participants may be discouraged 
from voting for which candidate they think looks like a member of their preferred political party. 
Furthermore, given the American primary system, it is not uncommon for elections to be held 
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between members of the same party.320 Therefore, the benefits of this change are deemed to 
outweigh the potential negatives. 
Emphasis has been added to a keyword in each of the treatment advertisements using (in 
most cases) underlining. This emphasis is designed to draw attention to a word within each 
slogan from which the nudge primarily relies, such as “Keep” in the instance of the status quo, 
“Now” in the instance of the present bias,321 “Safe” in the instance of loss aversion, or “Trusted” 
in the instance of the social norm nudge. No emphasis is used in the control slogan, as there 
is no keyword to draw attention to. 
Finally, the font has been changed. In the previous advertisements, a handwritten-style font 
was used to suggest the slogan were the words of the candidate. However, on reflection, such 
a font could be distracting and difficult to read for some participants. Following the stylistic 
choices of Kehle and Naimi (2019), a more standard and legible font is used.322 
To examine these changes, a second pilot study is conducted. As evidence for a significant 
aesthetic effect is mixed at present, the second pilot study continues to use an RCT approach 
with aesthetically different advertisements. The major change between the first pilot study and 
the second, therefore, is with the advertisement designs themselves. The new designs given 
in Table 29 are utilised and evaluated to see if embedding the nudge in more aspects of the 
advertisement produces a significant, positive effect. 
  
 
320 This extends to state elections in some US states. 
321 The emphasis for the present bias nudge differs from the other nudges, as the wording was already 
embedded within the selected background imagery. Insofar as this is a form of emphasis, this slight deviation 
is considered unsubstantial, but further demands emphasis be utilised in the other treatment groups. 
322 A slightly higher resolution image of Candidate B is also utilised. However, given the display size of the 
candidate and the advertisement, and the relatively small increase in image quality (around 100 pixels), this is 
not considered a substantial adjustment. 
267 
 
Chapter 13 – Pilot Study 2 
 
13.1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter presents data and results from a second pilot study, Pilot Study 2. This pilot study 
implements the experimental changes discussed in the previous chapter, and informs the 
procedure undertaken in the main experiment, which is the subject of Chapter 14. 
13.2 – Data Summary 
 
A sample of 100 participants from the US were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) service and were compensated $0.50 for their participation.323 After removing 
responses registered as being completed inappropriately fast (less than 2 minutes) and 
respondents who failed an attention check, a sample of N = 75 remained (female = 32%).324 









323 Compensation was revised from the first pilot study following completion-rate times. 
324 Another possible reason for the results found in the first pilot study was poor data quality. This prompted 
the introduction of an attention check, which subsequently 22% of respondents failed. Therefore, the 
hypothesis regarding the previous results and data quality may be compelling. Interestingly, following results 




Table 31: Pilot Study 2 Summary Statistics 
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From Table 31, it can be seen that the median respondent is around 37 years of age, is 
qualified slightly below a bachelor’s degree, and identifies slightly left of the political centre. 
These statistics are relatively similar to those compiled in the first pilot study. No statistically 
significant difference between the control group and the four treatment groups was found for 
age (2 (124, N = 75) = 129.9, p = .34), sex (2 (4, N = 75) = 0.65, p = .96), education (2 (12, 
N = 75) = 10.2, p = .60) or political identity (2 (16, N = 75) = 10.5, p = .84). The control and 
treatment groups, therefore, appear comparable. 
13.3 – Testing of Assumptions 
 
As previously, it is first prudent to examine whether the four nudges under consideration 
appear to be positively effective or not when used impersonally, which is to say, when 
participants are randomly assigned to a particular nudge-advertisement. The data are, 
therefore, first examined to determine if there is any violation of the assumptions of a t-test 





The normality of the data is first reviewed. 
Figure 10: Pilot Study 2 Histogram Normality Plots 
 
Figure 10 shows histogram plots for each group, with the dependent variable (effectiveness) 
shown on the x-axis and frequency density shown on the y-axis. There is limited evidence of 
normality, in particular regarding the control group. However, Shapiro-Wilk’s tests for normality 
suggest these data are normally distributed (control p = 0.1980; status quo p = 0.1715; present 
bias p = 0.4612; loss aversion p = 0.8057; social norm p = 0.4086). Despite this, the lack of 
visual confirmation means that the non-parametric WMW-test is also utilised. 
13.3.2 Homogeneity of Variance 
 
As with Pilot Study 1, Levene’s test is used to investigate the presence of heterogeneity of 
variance between the control group and each of the four nudge groups. In most instances, no 
evidence of heterogeneity of variances is found between the control group and the four nudge 
groups (status quo p = 0.1623; loss aversion p = 0.2251). However, for the present bias nudge 
at the 5% level (p = 0.0303), and the social norm nudge at the 10% level (p = 0.0779), there 
is some evidence the variance is heterogeneous. In these instances, a Welch test is used. 
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13.4 – Impersonal Nudging 
 
These results are presented in Table 32. 
Table 32: Pilot Study 2 Two-Tailed T-test Results of Impersonal Nudges with WMW-test Comparisons 























-36.923 -1.556 -2.689 0.0117** 0.0087*** 




Welch’s adjusted t-test shown in brackets. 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
 
As Table 32 shows, the status quo, loss aversion and social norm nudges all have 
effectiveness scores which are statistically significantly different from scores of the control 
group, and positively so. This is true for the social norm nudge even allowing for Welch’s 
adjustment. The present bias nudge is also significantly different from the control group at the 
10% level when evaluated using the WMW-test, but not using the two-tailed t-test or Welch’s 
t-test.325 Despite this statistical significance and the mean effectiveness of the nudges 
consistently being greater than that of the control group mean, only the status quo group 
produces an absolutely positive effectiveness score. The large negative effectiveness score 
associated with the control group – which should, in theory, be zero – suggests once more a 
statistically significant aesthetic effect. 
13.5 – Testing for the Presence of Aesthetic Effects 
 
As in the first pilot study, the presence of statistically significant aesthetic effects is examined. 
These results are shown in Table 33: 
 
325 As there is an expectation of a positive effect, a one-tailed t-test can also be used. Using the one-tailed t-
test, the present bias nudge is statistically significant from the control group at the 10% level (p = 0.0558). 
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Table 33: Pilot Study 2 Two-Tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for Aesthetic Effects 




















Status Quo 13.375 7.571 0.361 0.7242 0.3524 
Present Bias -20.600 -5.333 -1.292 0.2172 0.3275 
Loss Aversion -4.875 6.700 -0.735 0.4731 0.2662 
Social Norm 
 
-2.375 2.000 -0.298 0.7711 0.7136 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1%  
 
Generally, these results suggest that aesthetic effects are limited. For each treatment group, 
no statistically significant difference is found in the effectiveness of the nudge when Candidate 
A is used compared to Candidate B’s nudge-advertisement. However, as with the first pilot 
study, Candidate B generally produces a higher effectiveness score than Candidate A (the 
exception being for the status quo nudge). 
It is notable that these conclusions are reached under generally suboptimal conditions for the 
RCT design. The sample size is generally very small (N<20). Furthermore, no group has an 
equal distribution of observations in their respective subgroups, potentially creating a sampling 
bias which is amplified by the small sample size. Lack of evidence of an effect must be 
distinguished from evidence of lack of an effect; it may not be concluded that the general lack 
of statistically significance indicates no overall aesthetic effect, given the small sample size. 
However, it seems more prudent to draw no firm conclusions about the presence (or lack 
thereof) of aesthetic effects given the limitations of the data. 
13.6 – Moderation Analysis 
 
As with the first pilot study, the presence of statistically significant moderation effects is 
examined. Once more, differences in psychometric responses across the treatment groups 





Table 34: Pilot Study 2 Differences in Psychometric Scores 



































































2 p-value shown in brackets, N = 75 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
As expected, following Pilot Study 1, there are limited instances of statistically significant 
differences between the control group and a given nudge group. The rational psychometric 
score in the status quo treatment group is significantly different from the control group, and 
this significance remains when examined using a chi-squared test for differences in 
distribution, though only just at the 10% level. This is the only instance of consistent statistical 
significance between the two groups and suggests it is possible any observed significance of 
the rational psychometric within the moderated regression for the status quo nudge may be 
attributed simply to sampling differences between the groups. The rational psychometric score 
in the social norm treatment group is statistically significantly different from that of the control 
group, but this is not supported by a chi-squared test. Likewise, the dependent psychometric 
in the loss aversion treatment group is statistically significantly different from that of the control 
group, but only just at the 10% level and not when examined using a chi-squared test.  
Given these statistically significant differences are few and generally inconsistent in their 
implications for determining statistical significance of the effects, no adjustment is made to the 
analysis. 
To examine moderation effects, each of the seven psychometric scales discussed previously 
are averaged once more. The validity of this process is assured by measuring Cronbach’s 




Table 35: Pilot Study 2 Cronbach's Alpha Results for Psychometric Variables 





GDMS: Dependent 0.8965 
GDMS: Intuitive 0.9024 
GDMS: Rational 0.8425 






As each scale demonstrates a Cronbach’s alpha value which is greater than a typically 
accepted threshold of around 0.6-0.7, averaging each of these scales appears wholly valid. 
Summary statistics of these psychometric are shown in Table 36: 
Table 36: Pilot Study 2 Summary Statistics of Psychometric Variables 













Avoidant 2.952 1.132 1.000 4.800 3.200 
Intuitive 3.184 0.950 1.000 5.000 3.400 
Dependent 3.331 0.873 1.000 5.000 3.400 
Spontaneous 2.965 0.948 1.000 5.000 3.200 
NFC 3.136 0.623 1.278 4.778 3.056 
CFC 3.339 0.524 2.417 5.000 3.167 
      
 
Using these average figures, moderated regression models taking the form: 
Equation 8Equation 8 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝜀𝑖  (8) 
 
where  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is the effectiveness of nudge 𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 for nudge 𝑖, and 0 for all other values, 𝑝𝑠𝑦𝜆 is a continuous variable for psychometric 𝜆, 
and 𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 is a moderator term, are estimated. Table 37 through Table 40 present the results 




Table 37: Pilot Study 2 Moderated Regression Results for the Status Quo Nudge 
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Robust SE shown in brackets 








Table 38: Pilot Study 2 Moderated Regression Results for the Present Bias Nudge 
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Robust SE shown in brackets 








Table 39: Pilot Study 2 Moderated Regression Results for the Loss Aversion Nudge 
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Table 40: Pilot Study 2 Moderated Regression Results for the Social Norm Nudge 
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Robust SE shown in brackets 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Consistent with expectations developed in the first pilot study, the moderated regressions 
report very limited evidence of statistically significant moderation effects. However, unlike the 
first pilot study, some instances of statistically significant moderation are found, both in the 
social norm treatment group. 
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13.6.1 Avoidance and the Social Norm Nudge  
 
The first instance can be found in Model 2D, where the interaction between the dummy 
variable demarcating the presence of the nudge and the avoidant decision-making style is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Using the Johnson-Neyman technique,326 this result 
indicates a region of significance lies between the values -26.23 and 3.45 on the avoidance 
scale. The moderation effect of avoidance is visualised in Figure 11: 
Figure 11: Pilot Study 2 Moderation Effect of Avoidance on the Social Norm Nudge 
 
Given a person can only score between 1 and 5 on the avoidance decision-making style, a 
person who scores less than 3.45 on the avoidance decision-making style will face statistically 
significant moderating effects when presented with the social norm nudge. However, this 
 
326 STATA is used for estimating the moderated regression model. When a statistically significant effect is 
found, data are entered into CAHOST, an Excel program designed to calculate and plot regions of significance. 
Plots produced by CAHOST are, however, difficult to utilise, and so CAHOST is used much more as a calculator, 
with the CAHOST output sent to R for plotting purposes. 
279 
 
relationship is negative; a more avoidant person is expected to be susceptible to the social 
norm nudge than a less avoidant person. As such, a person who scores less than 3.45 on the 
avoidant scale is expected to be more susceptible to the social norm nudge and this produce 
a greater effectiveness score than someone who scores above 3.45 . 
13.6.2 Dependence and the Social Norm Nudge 
 
The second instance can be found in Model 4D, where the interaction between the dummy 
variable demarcating the presence of the nudge and the dependent decision-making style is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Again, using the Johnson-Neyman technique, this result 
indicates that a region of significance lies between the values of -2.37 and 3.73 on the 
dependence scale. The moderation effect of dependence is visualised in Figure 12: 
Figure 12: Pilot Study 2 Moderation Effect of Dependence on the Social Norm Nudge 
 
As with the previous JNT result, as a person can only score between 1 and 5 on the 
dependence scale, the identified region of significance means anyone who scores below 3.73 
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on the dependence scale is expected to face significant moderation effects when presented 
with the social norm nudge. This relationship is also negative; a more dependent person is 
expected to be less susceptible to the social norm nudge than a person who is less dependent. 
As such, a person who scores below 3.73 on the dependent scale is expected to be more 
susceptible to the social norm nudge, and thus produce a greater effectiveness score than 
someone who scores above 3.73. 
13.6.3 Discussion of Moderation Effects 
 
While these two examples of moderation have been identified, this analysis remains generally 
disappointing, and warrants further investigation using matching analysis. Of course, these 
moderation regressions continue to utilise a very small sample which may explain the absence 
of statistical significance. Nevertheless, the presence of any statistically significant moderation 
effects marks a distinct improvement from the first pilot study, while the Johnson-Neyman 
technique demonstrates applicability and utility in this investigation. 
The moderation results themselves are interesting insofar as they are counter to prior 
expectations. In the first instance, there was no hypothesised relationship between avoidance 
and the social norm nudge. The presence of such a result is therefore intriguing.327 In 
hypothesising what relationship may exist, it could be posited that an avoidant person could 
be susceptible to following the social norm as this allows others to, implicitly, make a decision 
on their behalf. However, the moderation analysis attests to the opposite relationship, namely, 
a person with less avoidance is expected to be more susceptible to the social norm nudge. An 
alternative hypothesis, therefore, may be that people who have low avoidance desire to make 
decisions quickly and so utilise information which is available to them quickly (such as the 
actions of others) rather than deliberate and search for additional information. 
 
327 Indeed, even Peer et al. (2019) find no statistically significant moderation effects between avoidance and 
the social norm nudge. 
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In the second instance, the hypothesised relationship between dependence and the social 
norm nudge was a positive one. This is to say those that score high on dependence were 
expected to be susceptible to the social norm nudge. This was because dependent people 
can be expected to rely on the judgement of others. The results, however, suggest the 
opposite relationship is true, with those who demonstrate low dependence expected to be 
more susceptible to the social norm nudge. At present, no explanation can be offered for such 
a finding. 
13.6.3.1 A Note on Moderation 
 
The above discussion offers potential explanations for these identified moderation effects. In 
this context it is important to bear in mind, as Hayes (2018) argues, quantitative evidence of a 
moderation effect may not be sufficient evidence to confidently conclude moderation is 
occurring; there should also be a qualitative explanation or expectation of a moderation effect. 
Chapter 6 establishes a psychometric map which serves as the basis for the expectations in 
this thesis. The above discussion is offered primarily to interrogate the qualitative basis of 
these moderation findings. 
13.7 – Matching Analysis 
 
Once more, matching analysis is also utilised to investigate the relationships between 
psychometric scores and nudge effectiveness. The same criteria as used previously are used 
to determine ‘high’ and ‘low’ scorers for each psychometric variable. While t-test results for 
this second sample have broadly aligned with the WMW-test results also utilised, both tests 
are used throughout this analysis. 
13.7.1 Status Quo Nudge 
 
The results of a two-tailed t-test and WMW-test examining the effectiveness of the status quo 
nudge across the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 41 (also see Table 32): 
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Table 41: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for the Status Quo Nudge vs. the Control Group 


















N = 28 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
 
As can be seen, without any consideration of psychometric effects, the effect of the advert 
with the status quo nudge is statistically significantly different from the control advert; a 
difference which can be attributed to the presence of the nudge. In Table 42, tests for 
statistically significant differences in effectiveness between high- and low-scorers within the 
status quo treatment group are reported: 
Table 42: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for the Status Quo Nudge Treatment Group 





































Avoidant -0.857 20.750 0.1740 
(1630) 
1.750 20.857 0.2332 
(0.2222) 
-4.333 20.667 0.1181 
(0.1100) 
Intuitive 7.714 13.250 0.7365 
(0.9075) 
11.125 10.143 0.9525 
(0.6841) 
2.750 13.545 0.5590 
(0.5120) 
Dependent 7.000 13.875 0.6756 
(0.8616) 
6.125 15.857 0.5522 
(0.7273) 
11.500 10.111 0.9341 
(0.6786) 
Spontaneous -0.800 16.400 0.3145 
(0.2957) 
4.250 18.000 0.3975 
(0.4855) 
-0.800 16.400 0.3145 
(0.2957) 
NFC 12.111 8.500 0.8295 
(0.8128) 
9.250 12.286 0.8538 
(0.7713) 
35.333 4.500 0.1153 
(0.1684) 
CFC 12.200 7.600 0.7918 
(0.9510) 
 
15.500 5.143 0.5266 
(0.6419) 
4.000 13.091 0.6233 
(0.5999) 
N = 15 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
WMW p-value shown in brackets 
 
Consistent with the lack of statistically significant effects in the moderation analysis, and 
regardless of how a ‘high’ and a ‘low’ scoring respondent is constructed, no statistically 
significant differences between these subgroups are identified. Given the nudge is statistically 
significantly different from the control group (see Table 41), this difference, therefore, can be 




This is re-affirmed when the high/low treatment subgroups are compared with the control 
group: 
Table 43: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for High (Low) Status Quo vs. Control 
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* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
WMW p-value shown in brackets 
 
As is expected given the status quo treatment group is overall statistically significantly different 
from the control group, and there is no statistically significant difference between the high and 
low subgroups, both subgroups when compared with the control are found – in the majority of 
cases – to be statistically significantly different from the control group. This pattern generally 
holds across all constructions of the high/low subgroups, and across all psychometrics. 
Therefore, it seems likely that no statistically significant relationship exists between the 
psychometric variables and the nudge, and that any difference between the nudge and the 
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control group can be attributed to nudging effects, rather than an interaction of a specific 
psychometric variable and the status quo nudge. 
This is not to say there may not be signs of a relationship, only that the data do not suggest 
any relationship is statistically significant. For instance, the effectiveness scores in the high 
spontaneity subgroup are not statistically significantly different from those in the low 
spontaneity subgroup. Yet, under the mean and midpoint constructions, the high subgroup is 
statistically significantly different from the control group, while the low subgroup is not. An 
examination of the means shows those with high spontaneity consistently consider the nudged 
advertisement to be more effective than those in the low spontaneity group. These results 
suggest a (non-significant) relationship whereby those high in spontaneity are more 
susceptible to the status quo nudge than those low in spontaneity. 
13.7.2 Present Bias Nudge 
 
The results of a two-tailed t-test and WMW-test examining the effectiveness of the present 
bias nudge across the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 44 (also see Table 32): 
Table 44: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for the Present Bias Nudge vs. Control Group 



















N = 29 
Welch’s adjustment shown in brackets. 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
 
Without consideration of any psychometric effects, the effectiveness score of the present bias 
treatment group advert is not statistically significantly different from the control group advert, 
except when examined using the WMW-test, where there is a statistically significant 
difference, but only at the 10% level. 
As previously, tests for a statistically significant difference in effectiveness scores between 
high and low groups are performed. These results are presented in Table 45: 
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Table 45: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for the Present Bias Nudge Treatment Group 





































Avoidant -16.624 -13.125 0.7790 
(0.7520) 
-16.625 -13.125 0.7760 
(0.7520) 
-18.889 -9.714 0.4553 
(0.4259) 
Intuitive -11.833 -16.700 0.7013 
(0.5865) 
-20.000 -9.750 0.3992 
(0.5274) 
-14.200 -15.182 0.9411 
(0.8647) 
Dependent -13.600 -17.000 0.7890 
(1.0000) 
-10.500 -19.250 0.4733 
(0.5274) 
-18.667 -14.000 0.7671 
(0.9462) 
Spontaneous -10.000 -19.750 0.4232 
(0.3994) 
-10.000 -19.750 0.4232 
(0.3994) 
-10.000 -19.750 0.4232 
(0.3994) 
NFC -4.889 -27.714 0.0485** 
(0.0798*) 
-0.875 -28.875 0.0107** 
(0.0270**) 
1.833 -24.900 0.0207** 
(0.0296**) 
CFC -14.333 -15.571 0.9206 
(0.8735) 
 
-9.625 -20.125 0.3875 
(0.3994) 
-20.500 -14.071 0.7294 
(0.6328) 
N = 16 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
WMW p-value shown in brackets 
 
In almost all circumstances, no statistically significant difference is found, suggesting – as with 
the status quo nudge – that psychometric differences are not influencing effectiveness. This 
conclusion is also consistent with the lack of moderation effects from in the moderated 
regression model (see Table 38).  
The exception to these conclusions, however, can be seen when statistically significant 
differences are examined between the high and low subgroups of the NFC psychometric. 
Here, across all constructions of the dummy variable, a statistically significant difference is 
identified, with those low in NFC typically finding the present bias advertisement more effective 
than those high in NFC. This is consistent with the predictions established in Chapter 6. 
Further evidence to support the possibility of a negative relationship existing between NFC 







Table 46: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for High (Low) Present Bias vs. Control 
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* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
WMW p-value shown in brackets 
 
Here, the difference is only significant at the 10% level (though significant at the 5% level 
under the WMW-test). Under all constructions of the high/low variable, those who score low 
in NFC consider the present bias advertisement to be more effective than the control 
advertisement. Furthermore, those who score high on NFC, under all constructions, find the 
present bias advert to be (significantly) less effective than their low-scoring contemporaries, 
and give effectiveness scores which are not statistically significantly different from the control 
group. 
In short, there is compelling evidence that a negative relationship does exist between the NFC 
psychometric variable and the present bias. Returning to the moderated regression results in 
Table 38 only further bolsters this evidence; while not investigated because the result was 
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only statistically significant at the 10% level, a statistically significant moderation effect 
between the NFC and the present bias was previously identified. Given this additional 
evidence, then, the Johnson-Neyman technique is used to investigate the interaction between 
the NFC psychometric and the present bias nudge: 
Figure 13: Pilot Study 2 Moderation Effect of NFC on the Present Bias Nudge 
 
As visualised in Figure 13, the Johnson-Neyman technique identifies a region of significance 
between the values of -0.80 and 2.83, which – given the NFC scale can range only from 1 to 
5 – means anyone who scores less than 2.83 is expected to be the present bias nudge than 
someone who scores above 2.83, thus producing a greater effectiveness score. Furthermore, 
the JNT reconfirms the observed, negative relationship between the NFC psychometric and 
the present bias nudge found in Table 45 and Table 46.328 
 
328 It is also interesting to note that the mean (3.06), median (3.00) and midpoint (3.00) of the NFC within the 
present bias treatment group are all close to the region of significance (2.83). 
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13.7.3 Loss Aversion Nudge 
 
The results of a two-tailed t-test and WMW-test examining the effectiveness of the loss 
aversion nudge across the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 47 (also see Table 
32): 
Table 47: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for the Loss Aversion Nudge vs. the Control Group 

















N = 31 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
 
As with the status quo nudge, the effectiveness of the loss aversion advert is found to be 
statistically significantly different from that of  the control group advert when used impersonally. 
This result, however, does not consider the effects of psychometric scores. When these effects 
are evaluated across high/low constructions within the loss aversion treatment group, little 
evidence of statistically significant difference is identified: 
Table 48: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for the Loss Aversion Treatment Group 





































Avoidant -1.429 3.455 0.7681 
(0.9278) 
-4.333 7.444 0.4624 
(0.5361) 
-1.429 3.455 0.7681 
(0.9278) 
Intuitive -14.333 9.500 0.1508 
(0.1596) 
-7.333 10.444 0.2618 
(0.2505) 
-20.400 10.000 0.0766* 
(0.0679*) 
Dependent -4.167 4.417 0.6152 
(0.7428) 
-3.333 6.444 0.5429 
(0.7237) 
-4.167 4.417 0.6152 
(0.7428) 
Spontaneous -4.333 4.500 0.6049 
(0.6731) 
-10.111 13.222 0.1347 
(0.1329) 
-4.333 4.500 0.6049 
(0.6731) 
NFC 1.667 1.333 0.9845 
(0.7428) 
7.778 -4.667 0.4370 
(0.6269) 
-5.000 3.429 0.6637 
(0.7498) 
CFC 2.769 -1.600 0.8085 
(1.0000) 
 
4.667 -1.556 0.6996 
(1.0000) 
-7.000 4.000 0.5695 
(0.5236) 
N = 31 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
WMW p-value shown in brackets 
 
The only instance of a statistically significant difference is found under the midpoint 
construction for the intuitive psychometric variable, and even this is only at the 10% level. As 
289 
 
with the analysis in Pilot Study 1, these results do not conflict with the lack of moderation 
effects determined above, and suggest the difference between the effectiveness of the loss 
aversion advertisement and that of the control advertisement is largely attributable to the effect 
of the nudge. 
Table 49: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for High (Low) Loss Aversion vs. Control Group 
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* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
WMW p-value shown in brackets 
 
When the high/low subgroups are compared against the control group, frequent examples of 
statistically significant differences are found. However, given the effectiveness of the loss 
aversion nudge was statistically significantly different from that of the control group, and given 




Several results do appear to be of interest, however. The intuitive, dependent and 
spontaneous psychometric variables all demonstrate a statistically significant difference from 
the control group when they are high, but not when they are low. In absence of a statistically 
significant difference between the high and low subgroups for these psychometric variables 
(the single occasion with the intuitive psychometric variable being the exception), the 
conclusion that respective, positive relationships exist between these psychometric variables 
and the loss aversion nudge cannot be drawn. However, given the relatively low sample size 
(N = 31), such findings may be indicative of a trend which may be seen using more data. 
13.7.4 Social Norm Nudge 
 
The results of a two-tailed t-test and WMW-test examining the effectiveness of the loss 
aversion nudge across the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 50 (also see Table 
32): 
Table 50: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for the Social Norm Nudge vs. the Control Group 



















N = 26 
Welch’s adjustment shown in brackets. 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
 
As with the status quo nudge and the loss aversion nudge, when accounting for no 
psychometric effects, the effectiveness of the social norm advert is found to be statistically 
significantly different from that of the effectiveness of the control group advert. As two 
statistically significant interactions were identified between the social norm nudge and the 
avoidant and dependent psychometrics, respectively, these relationships were expected to be 





Table 51: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for the Social Norm Treatment Group 





































Avoidant -3.500 0.556 0.7981 
(0.7570) 
2.429 -4.333 0.6439 
(0.4738) 
19.500 -4.364 0.2238 
(0.2763) 
Intuitive 6.250 -3.778 0.5238 
(0.4391) 
-5.714 5.167 0.4533 
(0.6161) 
6.250 -3.778 0.5238 
(0.4391) 
Dependent 3.143 -5.167 0.5690 
(0.5666) 
3.143 -5.167 0.5690 
(0.5666) 
20.000 -4.455 0.2117 
(0.1983) 
Spontaneous -5.200 2.125 0.6249 
(0.6597) 
-4.286 3.500 0.5940 
(0.7202) 
-3.250 0.444 0.8158 
(0.8770) 
NFC -1.875 1.200 0.8381 
(0.9415) 
-4.143 3.333 0.6089 
(0.7745) 
-1.875 1.200 0.8381 
(0.9415) 
CFC -4.889 8.750 0.3818 
(0.3532) 
 
-2.571 1.500 0.7815 
(0.7745) 
10.000 -3.900 0.4170 
(0.3092) 
N = 26 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
WMW p-value shown in brackets 
 
It is immediately noteworthy that no statistically significant differences between the high and 
low subgroups within the social norm treatment group are identified for any psychometric 
variable, or under any construction. In every case of the dependent psychometric variable, the 
negative relationship is evidenced via an examination of means, with those scoring low in 
dependence finding the social norm advertisement more effective than those scoring high in 
dependence. The same is true in two of the three constructions for the avoidant psychometric 
variable. However, to reiterate, these differences are not statistically significant. If not for prior 
expectations arising from the moderation analysis, there would be no reason to focus on these 
psychometric variables over any others, as other psychometric variables demonstrate – in 






329 See, for instance, the spontaneity or NFC psychometrics. 
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Table 52: Pilot Study 2 Two-tailed T-test and WMW-test Results for High (Low) Social Norm vs. Control Group 
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* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
WMW p-value shown in brackets 
 
When the high/low subgroups are compared to the control group, as with the status quo and 
loss aversion nudges, frequent instances of statistically significant differences are found 
between the nudge and control advertisements. Again, given overall the impact of the social 
norm nudge is statistically significantly different from the control, and the high-scoring 
subgroup within the social norm treatment group is not statistically significantly different from 
the low-scoring subgroup within the social norm treatment group, these results are not 
unexpected. 
What is unexpected is the lack of statistical evidence to corroborate the presence of 
moderation effects found previously. Neither the avoidant nor dependent psychometric 
variables demonstrate a statistically significant difference which is consistent with the negative 
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relationships identified by the moderation analysis. This, immediately, prompts an inquiry into 
why this is so. 
Two answers exist in general, though given prior moderation analysis, only one explains the 
current results. Firstly, it is likely all constructions of the high/low subgroups are obscuring the 
moderation effect. Recall, the regions of significance associated with the avoidant and 
dependent psychometric variables are below 3.45 and 3.73 respectively. However, the 
high/low subgroups are determined at the values of 3.32 (mean), 3.60 (median) and 3 
(midpoint) for the avoidant psychometric variable and 3.49 (mean), 3.40 (median) and 3 
(midpoint) for the dependent psychometric variable. Unlike in the instance of the NFC 
psychometric and the present bias nudge, where the region of significance was very near the 
high/low values (i.e. <0.2 difference), these constructions are generally further away from the 
region of significance boundaries. This is especially true when considering the midpoint 
constructions, and the dependent psychometric variable across all constructions. Given the 
relatively small sample size (N = 26), just a few observations being incorrectly330 classified 
high or low may obscure the presence of any relationship. 
Secondly, where regions of significance are found at very low (but still observed) values and 
at very high (but still observed) values, a simple high/low bisection of this sample will result in 
high/low  subgroups that are not statistically significantly different, as both subgroups contain 
observations that fall within regions of significance and regions of insignificance. Such a 
bisection – which cannot be avoided using matching analysis – may confound the relationship 
indicated by moderation analysis. Given previous moderation analyses and uses of the 
Johnson-Neyman technique, this second answer does not explain the conflicting results found 
when the matching analysis is performed. This is because, for both the avoidant and 
dependent psychometric variable, only one region of significance value is observable on the 
 
330 For the second reason, it is inappropriate to consider the region of significance boundary to be some sort of 
‘true’ value from which high/low subgroups should be determined. However, for these specific relationships, it 
may be appropriate to characterise the region of significance boundary as the ‘true’ value for determining 
high/low groups as there is only one value which falls within the observed range of psychometric scores. 
Where two values fall in this observed range, such a characterisation would be misleading. 
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psychometric scale. However, this second answer does speak to a fundamental weakness of 
the matching analysis approach and – as a result – the strength of moderation analysis and 
the Johnson-Neyman technique. Namely, while matching analysis can identify relationships 
when the values for constructing high/low subgroups are close to the single region of 
significance value which is observable on the psychometric scale, matching analysis becomes 
less precise as these values get further away from the single region of significance value, or 
when two region of significance values can be observed on the psychometric scale. For these 
reasons, matching analysis is not used in Chapter 14. 
13.8 – Qualitatively Evaluating Moderated Relationships 
 
Three moderation effects have been identified in this second pilot study. As has been noted 
above, Hayes (2018) argues, however, the research validity of these effects should not rely 
solely on quantitative results. Hayes (2018) suggests that while a moderated regression may 
identify a statistically significant moderation effect, if the effect does not make qualitative sense 
within the context that the research is conducted, one should be willing to reconsider the 
significance of the result. Of course, such an approach risks missing details. For instance, 
rejecting a result simply because no prior explanation can account for it hinders progress. But 
equally, pursuing a result without at least a hypothesis explaining it can also produce 
conclusions which are lacking formative explanation. It is therefore worthwhile to take a 
moment to evaluate the three identified moderation effects. 
As above, while contrary to expectations, the statistically significant, negative moderated 
relationship between avoidance and the social norm nudge has a possible explanation: people 
who have low avoidance may seek to make decisions quickly (decision-impatience), and one 
way of doing this is to do as others are doing (i.e. follow the social norm).  
The significant, negative moderated relationship between dependence and the social norm 
nudge is wanting an explanation. While the hypothesised psychometric map suggests that 
those with high dependence have low cognition, and thus rely on social norms more, the 
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reverse relationship might be supposed: those with low dependence have high cognition, 
allowing them to understand the potential consequences of not following the social norm. Yet, 
this explanation seems rather tenuous, supposing cognition – a trait primarily measured by 
the NFC – is involved, without NFC statistically significantly moderating the social norm nudge. 
It also runs counter to intuition – namely, that those who rely more on others (i.e. high 
dependence) do as others do. 
One identified effect which is predicted by the hypothesised psychometric map is the identified 
significant, negative relationship between NFC and the present bias. Following this result, and 
the prediction, those with low NFC are expected to have low levels of risk, making them to find 
appeals to the present more effective than appeals to later periods. This is because, with lower 
NFC, these individuals may be less likely to consider the longer-term consequences of their 
decisions. Qualitatively, then, this effect would seem worth pursuing (though, being only 
significant at the 10% level, one might disregard this result from a quantitative perspective). 
13.8 – Conclusions and Implications for Chapter 14 
 
The second pilot study demonstrates a marked progression in experimental design from the 
first pilot study. Most notably, the changes made to the nudge-advertisements appear to be 
effective, with three of the four nudges now positively, significantly different from the control 
advert. The exception is the present bias nudge, although this too is significant at the 10% 
level using the WMW-test and one-tailed t-test. 
A second notable development is the presence of significant moderation effects. While the 
number of moderation effects remains sparse (3 out of 28), the presence of any represents a 
noteworthy improvement on the results of the first pilot study, in which no statistically 
significant effects were found.  
The presence of moderation has also greatly aided in understanding the advantages and 
limitations of the matching analysis. In the first pilot study, in the absence of any regions of 
significance, the arbitrarily constructed high/low subgroups could only infer the presence of 
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relationships with relatively limited capacity to be verified beyond speculation. In the second 
pilot study, having already established in two instances the existence of regions of 
significance, the lack of identifying power using matching analysis very much informs the 
analytical procedure going forward. This is not to say that the matching analysis is without 
usefulness. For instance, the moderation effect between the NFC psychometric and the 
present bias was initially found to be significant only at the 10% level, and subsequently 
overlooked. Only via the matching analysis did this relationship re-emerge as one worthy of 
investigation. 
Nevertheless, moderation analysis had already identified some significance with this 
relationship. Furthermore, given the lack of arbitrary value selection associated with the 
Johnson-Neyman technique, moderation analysis clearly emerges as the superior method of 
analysis. Because of this, matching analysis is not used in Chapter 14. 
On the question of aesthetic effects, these results remain mixed once again. The second pilot 
study finds limited evidence of aesthetic effects but identifies evidence of statistically 
significant aesthetic effects in the control group. Given the only difference between the control 
advertisements are candidate names and pictures, such a statistically significant difference 
can be attributed to these aesthetics. However, no evidence of aesthetic effects is found in 
the nudge groups. It is once again noted that, in theory, the RCT design should reduce the net 
effect of aesthetic differences to zero given a sufficiently large sample size. As both the first 
and the second pilot study find mixed evidence of aesthetic effects using relatively small 
sample sizes (N = 95 and 75, respectively), no adjustment is made to the main survey-
experiment to respond to aesthetic effects. 
Some additional comments on the data remain outstanding. Firstly, the sample size of the 
second pilot study remains very small given the typical criteria for moderation analysis 
(Cronbach and Snow, 1977). With a larger sample, it may be expected that statistical tests will 
have increased power, for a given test size, and thus further moderated relationships between 
psychometric variables and nudges may be statistically significant.  
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Secondly, a partial reason the small sample size was the use of an attention check, which 
resulted in some 22% of respondents being removed from the sample (compared to around 
4% which were removed using the standard deviation method employed in the first pilot study). 
The inclusion of the attention check certainly inspires greater confidence in the quality of the 
data, but in turn inspires a lack of confidence in the quality of the data utilised in the first pilot 
study. This may explain the generally disappointing results found in the first pilot study. In the 
main survey-experiment, an attention check is introduced to ensure data quality. 
13.9 – Post-hoc Power Testing 
 
By way of further informing the sample selection for the primer group and PTG data collection 
stages, post-hoc power analysis is performed on the results of the second pilot study.331 
Please see Chapter 9 which contains details on the power testing discussed in this here. 
Across the three moderation regression models where a significant moderation effect was 
identified, all tests appear to be adequately powered. Model 2D produces an 𝑓2 of 0.3229, 
corresponding to a power of 87.73%. Model 4D produces an 𝑓2 of 0.3974, corresponding to 
a power of 92.90%. Finally, model 6B produces an 𝑓2 of 0.2005, corresponding to a power of 
86.39%. Using the average of these 𝑓2 values (0.3069) in a priori power testing for the main 
study, and accepting a power level of 80%, produces a minimum total sample size estimate 
of 28. 
Considering the use of the two-tailed t-test, adequate power is less consistent. The t-test 
between the control and status quo groups yields a Cohen’s 𝑑 of 1.2040 and corresponds to 
a power of 86.39%. However, the comparison between the control and present bias groups 
yields a Cohen’s 𝑑 of 0.5930 and a power of only 46.22%; between the control and loss 
aversion groups a Cohen’s 𝑑 of 0.8724 and a power of only 63.95%; and between the control 
and social norm groups a Cohen’s 𝑑 of 0.9638 and a power of only 72.56%. The relatively 
 
331 Post-hoc analysis is not performed on the first pilot study owing to a lack of significance. 
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large effect size (Cohen’s 𝑑 ) is assuring, but the low power suggests a larger sample size 
would be beneficial. Again, using the average of these 𝑑 values (0.9083) in a priori power 
testing for the main study, and accepting a power level of 80%, produces a minimum sample 




Chapter 14 – Experiment Implementation and Analysis 
 
14.1 – Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the results of the two-part survey experiment will be presented. The analysis 
used will follow methods detailed in Section 2 and ideas developed in the pilot studies detailed 
in Chapters 11 and 13. Where appropriate, comparison between the pilot studies and these 
results will be made. Given the nature of this project, results are presented in two parts. Firstly, 
the primer group data are analysed, and the various output produced from this analysis 
presented. Secondly, the personalised treatment group (PTG) data are analysed, and the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 considered. A discussion of these results in relation to the 
wider literature is offered in Chapter 15. 
14.2 – The Primer Group 
 
14.2.1 Data Summary 
 
A sample of 762 participants from the US were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) service and were paid compensation of $0.50 for their participation. After removing 
190 respondents (24.934%) who failed to pass an attention check question,332 and 8 
respondents who completed the survey inappropriately fast (less than 2 minutes), a sample of 
N = 564 remained (female = 38%). 





332 Respondents who failed the attention check were not compensated for their participation. 
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Table 53: Summary Statistics 
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From Table 53, the median  respondent is around 38 years of age, is qualified slightly beyond 
a bachelor’s degree, and identifies as slightly right of centre. These demographics are very 
similar to those reported in both previous pilot studies. No statistically significant difference in 
distribution between the control group and the four treatment groups was found for age (2 
(200, N = 564) = 169.0, p = .945), sex (2 (4, N = 564) = 0.28, p = .991), education (2 (16, N 
= 564) = 18.3, p = .306) or political identity (2 (16, N = 564) = 20.6, p = .194). The control and 
four treatment groups, therefore, appear comparable. 




The four nudges under consideration are examined to see if they are effective or not when 





Figure 14: Histogram Normality Plots 
 
Figure 14 shows histogram plots for each group, with the dependent variable (effectiveness) 
shown on the x-axis and frequency density shown on the y-axis. As Figure 14 shows, there is 
good visual evidence of normality in all four nudges and the control group when examining the 
histogram plots. Plotting the control group against a normal distribution function (bottom-left) 
also shows a reasonably close alignment. However, despite the clear visual normality, 
Shapiro-Wilk’s tests for all but the loss aversion group suggest the data are non-normal 
(control p = 0.0074; status quo p = 0.0285; present bias p = 0.0105; loss aversion p = 0.1164; 
social norm p = 0.0435). Such a situation can arise when data contain outlier values at the 
upper and lower ends of the distribution. QQplots333 of the data reveal this to be the case:  
 
333 Figure 15 shows QQplots for each of the five groups. A QQplot shows the alignment of a dataset – in this 
instance, the effectiveness dependent variable – against a theoretical, normal distribution. Where the data are 
perfectly, normally distributed, they will fall on the straight line shown in the QQplot (i.e. 𝑦 = 𝑥). Therefore, 
deviation from this line indicates non-normality. 
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Figure 15: QQPlots 
 
In each instance, the data align – for the most part – with a normal distribution. Removing 
outlier values may correct for the apparent lack of normality, however, one should remove 
outliers only with justified cause. In this instance, there is none; indeed, the nature of this 
experiment would suggest disparate data should be retained. Therefore, despite the Shapiro-
Wilk’s results, the data are assumed to be normal given the visual evidence and the 
explanation for the Shapiro-Wilk p-values. 
14.2.2.2 Homogeneity of Variance 
 
Homogeneity of variance is examined between the control group and each of the four nudge 
groups using Levene’s test. There is no statistically significant evidence the variance is 
heterogeneous in all instances (status quo p = 0.1237; present bias p = 0.7788; loss aversion 
p = 0.0780; social norm p = 0.4820), though Levene’s test between the control and loss 
aversion group does produce a value which is significant at the 10% level. 
The assumptions of the t-test are therefore accepted, and this test is used henceforth. 
14.2.3 Impersonal Nudging 
 
The results of these two-tailed t-tests are shown in Table 54: 
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Table 54: Two-tailed T-test Results of Impersonal Nudges vs. Control 











Present Bias -5.902 -6.372 0.165 0.8687 
Loss Aversion -5.902 -4.034 -0.374 0.7089 
Social Norm -5.902 
 
-0.468 -1.391 0.1656 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
As Table 54 shows, only the status quo nudge produces an effectiveness score which is 
statistically significantly different from the advert seen by the control group, though this is only 
at the 10% level. All other nudges do not produce effectiveness scores which are statistically 
significantly different from the control group. These results, however, differ from the previous 
pilot studies in two important ways.  
Firstly, unlike the first pilot study, where a similar lack of statistically significant difference was 
identified, all nudges produce average effectiveness scores which are greater than the 
average effectiveness of the adverts seen by the control group, except for the present bias 
nudge. While not statistically significantly different, there is little evidence that the set of 
nudges under consideration is having a detrimental effect, unlike in the first pilot study.  
Secondly, the results shown in Table 54 are rather consistent with the results shown in the 
second pilot study in terms of averages, with both showing the status quo nudge to be the 
most effective, followed by the social norm nudge, the low aversion nudge and finally the 
present bias nudge. The major difference between these results and the results of the second 
pilot study is the average effectiveness for the control group. In Pilot Study 2, the control group 
has a large, negative effectiveness score (-36.923), while the control group in this experiment 
– while still negative – has a much smaller score (-5.902). The control group in Pilot Study 2, 
therefore, appears to anomalous, perhaps as a result of the small sample size used in the 
second pilot study. This casts doubt on the validity of the statistically significant differences 
identified between the nudge groups and the control group in Pilot Study 2. 
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Because there is an a priori expectation of the sign of the effect (i.e. that the effect of the nudge 
will be positive), a one-tailed t-test can be used to examine whether there is a statistically 
significant and positive effect. These results are shown in Table 55: 
Table 55: One-tailed T-test Results of Impersonal Nudges vs. Control 











Present Bias -5.902 -6.372 0.165 0.5656 
Loss Aversion -5.902 -4.034 -0.374 0.3544 
Social Norm -5.902 
 
-0.468 -1.391 0.0828* 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
As Table 55 shows, using a one-tailed t-test, the status quo nudge advert is found to have a 
positive, statistically significant effect compared to the control. Furthermore, the social norm 
nudge is found to produce a positive effect which is statistically significant at the 10% level, 
compared to the control. Thus, there is now some evidence impersonal nudging may be 
effective at influencing political decision-making, but it is limited to only the status quo nudge. 
These results, therefore, continue to be comparable to the pilot studies, particularly the second 
pilot study. 
Following the second pilot study, one may suspect that once moderation effects are analysed, 
the statistical insignificance initially identified may be explained. Firstly, as with the pilot 
studies, the presence of aesthetic effects is analysed. 
14.2.4 Testing for the Presence of Aesthetic Effects 
 





334 As a note for consistency, a two-tailed t-test is used here, rather than a one-tailed t-test, as there is no a 
priori expectation of the sign of the effect. Indeed, the expectation is that there is no aesthetic effect. 
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Table 56: Aesthetic Testing 











Status Quo 2.793 0.961 -0.275 0.7841 
Present Bias -11.222 -0.260 1.830 0.0699* 
Loss Aversion -7.797 0.271 1.109 0.2696 
Social Norm 
 
-6.582 5.536 2.505 0.0137** 
 * p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Consistent with both pilot studies, there is some evidence to support the postulation that there 
is an aesthetic effect occurring. This is despite the RCT design and the larger sample size 
which, assuming there is no genuine aesthetic effect, in theory, should eliminate a bias which 
might wrongly be attributed to an aesthetic effect. Table 56 shows that the present bias 
treatment subgroup at the 10% level, and the social norm treatment subgroup at the 5% level, 
do have statistically significant differences in effectiveness scores when Candidate A is used 
in the nudge-advertisement compared to Candidate B. Furthermore, the control, present bias, 
loss aversion and social norm subgroups all suggest Candidate B is more effective than 
Candidate A, with the status quo nudge being the only exception. This is consistent with the 
results of the second pilot study.  
While across the two pilot studies, and this study, statistical evidence for some aesthetic effect 
is apparent, it is not sufficiently strong to support a conclusion. Furthermore, there is little 
consistency in these results, with the most consistent tendency being the statistically 
insignificant indication that Candidate B is preferred to Candidate A. 
14.2.5 Moderation Analysis 
 
In contrast to the aesthetic effects, moderation effects are expected to influence participants. 
This follows from both theory and the results of Pilot Study 2. As with the pilot studies, 
differences in psychometric responses across the treatment groups are examined, with these 
results shown in Table 57: 
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Table 57: Differences in Psychometric Scores 



































































2 p-value shown in brackets, df =, N = 564 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Across the sample, only one instance of a statistically significant difference between the 
control group and a nudge group is identified. This is following a two-tailed t-test for difference 
in the means of the avoidant psychometric variable between the control group and the loss 
aversion treatment group. This difference is only significant at the 10% level and is not 
reproduced in the chi-squared test of distributions. Given this single instance of difference is 
not compelling, no adjustment is made in the analysis. 
Cronbach’s alpha scores for each of the seven psychometrics are presented in Table 58: 
Table 58: Cronbach's Alpha Results for Psychometric Scales 





GDMS: Dependent 0.8729 
GDMS: Intuitive 0.8842 
GDMS: Rational 0.8357 






As each scale demonstrates a Cronbach’s alpha value which is greater than a typically 
accepted threshold of around 0.6-0.7, averaging each of these scales appears wholly valid. 




Table 59: Summary Statistics of Psychometric Variables 













Avoidant 2.813 1.110 1.000 5.000 3.000 
Intuitive 3.327 0.895 1.000 5.000 3.400 
Dependent 3.259 0.884 1.000 5.000 3.400 
Spontaneous 3.013 0.970 1.000 5.000 3.200 
NFC 3.177 0.651 1.000 5.000 3.056 
CFC 3.288 0.523 1.167 5.000 3.083 
      
 
As can be seen with a comparison to the second pilot study, these summary statistics are very 
similar to those previously found in the smaller sample investigation. 
Using these average figures, moderated regression models take the form: 
Equation 8 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 + 𝜀𝑖  (8) 
where  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is the effectiveness of nudge 𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 for nudge 𝑖, and 0 for all other values, 𝑝𝑠𝑦𝜆 is a continuous variable for psychometric 𝜆, 
and 𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑠𝑦𝜆 is a moderator term, are estimated. Table 60 through Table 63 present the results 











Table 60: Moderated Regression Results for the Status Quo Nudge 
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Robust SE shown in brackets 








Table 61: Moderated Regression Results for the Present Bias Nudge 
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Table 62: Moderated Regression Results for the Loss Aversion Nudge 
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Table 63: Moderated Regression Results for the Social Norm Nudge 
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Robust SE shown in brackets 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Building on the trends identified in the second pilot study, several statistically significant 
moderation effects are identified across the four nudges and seven psychometrics variables. 
In total, five moderation effects are statistically significant at the 10% level (17.9% of possible 
relationships) and four at the 5% level (14.3%). Furthermore, at least one moderation effect is 
identified for each nudge, with the social norm nudge treatment group producing two 
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moderation effects, though one only is statistically significant at the 10% level. For 
completeness, all five moderation effects are further analysed using the Johnson-Neyman 
technique. However, any moderation effects which are significant at the 10% level are not 
used in the personalisation stage. 
14.2.5.1 Spontaneity and the Status Quo Nudge 
 
The first instance of moderation can be found in Model 5A, where the interaction between the 
dummy variable demarcating the presence of the status quo nudge and the spontaneous 
decision-making style is statistically significant at the 5% level. Using the Johnson-Neyman 
technique, this result indicates regions of significance exist for all values less than 2.77 and 
all values more than 47.84 on the spontaneity scale. The moderation effect of spontaneity is 
visualised in Figure 16: 




Given a person can only score between 1 and 5 on the spontaneity decision-making style, 
only the region of significance that exists for all values less than 2.77 is shown. Because the 
relationship is negative, the status quo nudge is expected to be most effective for those who 
score below 2.77. 
14.2.5.2 NFC and the Present Bias Nudge 
 
The second instance of moderation can be found in Model 6B, where the interaction between 
the dummy variable demarcating the presence of the present bias nudge and the NFC 
psychometric variable is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result is noteworthy as it 
was indicated in the second pilot study, but only at the 10% level. Again, using the Johnson-
Neyman technique, this result indicates that regions of significance exist for all values less 
than 2.33 and for all values greater than 3.87 on the NFC scale. The moderation effect of NFC 
is visualised in Figure 17: 




As a person can score both below 2.33 and above 3.87 on the NFC scale, both regions of 
significance are shown in Figure 17. As the relationship is again negative, the present bias 
nudge is expected to be most effective with individuals who score below 2.33, and least 
effective with those that score above 3.87. 
14.2.5.3 Dependence and the Loss Aversion Nudge 
 
The third instance of moderation can be found in Model 4C, where the interaction between the 
dummy demarcating the presence of the loss aversion nudge and the dependent decision-
making style is statistically significant at the 5% level. Again, using the Johnson-Neyman 
technique, this result indicates that regions of significance exist for all values less than -1.59 
and for all values greater than 4.16. The moderation effect of dependence is visualised in 
Figure 18: 




As a person can only score between 1 and 5 on the dependence scale, only the region of 
significance that exists for all values above 4.16 is shown in Figure 18. Unlike previous 
moderation effects, this relationship is positive, and so the loss aversion nudge is expected to 
be most effective for individuals who score above 4.16. 
14.2.5.4 CFC and the Social Norm Nudge 
 
The fourth instance of moderation can be found in Model 7D, where the interaction between 
the dummy variable demarcating the presence of the social norm nudge and the CFC 
psychometric variable is statistically significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, this relationship 
was not identified in the second pilot study, and no evidence of moderation between those 
psychometric variables which were identified (avoidance and dependence) is identified 
here.335 Regardless, again using the Johnson-Neyman technique, this result indicates that 
regions of significance exist for all values less than 2.19 and all values greater than 3.42. The 
moderation effect of the CFC psychometric is visualised in Figure 19: 
 
335 Recall, however, that these results had not been previously expected, and in the case of the moderation 
effect involving the dependence psychometric variable, no adequate qualitative explanation for this 
interaction was forthcoming. 
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Figure 19: Moderation Effect of CFC on the Social Norm Nudge 
 
As a person can score below 2.19 and above 3.42 on the CFC scale, both identified regions 
of significance are shown in Figure 19. As the relationship is positive, the social norm nudge 
is expected to be most effective for individuals who score above 3.42, and least effective for 
those who score below 2.19. 
14.2.5.5 Spontaneity and the Social Norm Nudge 
 
The final instance of moderation can be found in Model 5D, where the interaction between the 
dummy variable demarcating the presence of the social norm nudge and the spontaneous 
decision-making style is statistically significant at the 10% level. Again, using the Johnson-
Neyman technique, this result indicates that a region of significance exists between the values 
of -296.62 and 2.85. The moderation effect of spontaneity is visualised in Figure 20: 
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Figure 20: Moderation Effect of Spontaneity on the Social Norm Nudge 
 
As a person can only score between 1 and 5 on the spontaneity scale, the identified region of 
significance, in practice, can be said to exist between the values of 1 and 2.85. Because the 
relationship is negative, the social norm nudge is expected to be most effective for individuals 
who score below 2.85 on the spontaneity scale. 
14.2.5.6 Summary of Moderation Effects 
 
Further discussion of these results will be offered in Chapter 15. At present, these results are 






Table 64: Regions of Significance 
Psychometric Nudge 
 Status Quo Present Bias Loss Aversion Social Norm 
 
Rational 
    
Avoidant     
Intuitive     
Dependent   4.16<  
Spontaneous <2.77   <2.85a 
NFC  <2.33, 3.87<   
CFC    <2.19, 3.42< 
 
a Significant at the 10% level 
 
14.2.6 Empirical Psychometric Map and PTG Survey Design 
 
Using these results, the hypothesised psychometric map given in Chapter 6 is adapted, and 
in the process greatly simplified, to reflect observation. 
Figure 21: Empirical Psychometric Map 
 
As shown in Figure 21, only four of the seven psychometric scales contribute to the map 
following the moderation analysis. Furthermore, each of the four nudges appears to have only 
one statistically significant relationship with a psychometric. The exception is the social norm 
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nudge, which has a statistically significant moderated relationship at the 10% level with the 
spontaneous psychometric, as shown with the dotted arrow in Figure 21.  
Interestingly, all relationships identified in this analysis follow only one predicted route via a 
psychological trait. For instance, several traits were predicted to influence the present bias, 
including risk, but following the moderation analysis, only risk can explain the observed 
statistically significant relationship between NFC and the present bias nudge. Even in the 
instance of the social norm nudge – which, again, was predicted to be affected by several 
psychological traits – where multiple relationships between it and the psychometrics variables 
have been found, only one psychological trait – conformity – would explain these observations. 
Given the psychometric map would predict some relationship between each trait and nudge, 
these moderation effects motivate the induction of the following qualitative considerations: 
1. Low Spontaneity and High Status Quo: A person with low spontaneity is expected to 
make decisions slowly (Scott and Bruce, 1995). This runs counter to some 
explanations of the status quo nudge, namely that the status quo is preferred by 
impatient individuals (Johnson et al., 2012). However, the status quo is also expected 
to appeal to those who are reluctant to make decisions and is postulated to work via 
an implicit recommendation mechanism (Tannenbaum and Ditto, 2011; Johnson and 
Goldstein, 2003; Madrian and Shea, 2001). Patient people may also be understood as 
those who avoid making decisions by taking a long time to decide. Patient people may 
also be able to pick up on the implied recommendation of the status quo. In these 
instances, low spontaneity may explain the appeal of the status quo nudge. 
2. Low NFC and High Present Bias: A person with a low NFC is expected not to evaluate 
the risks associated with their decisions as much as someone who enjoys cognitive 
tasks (Estelami, 2020; Hadj-Abo et al., 2020; Lin, Yen and Chuang, 2006). The present 
bias is expected to appeal to those with a low sense of risk who do not evaluate the 
temporal consequences of their decisions (Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter, 2010; 
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O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999b). Therefore, low NFC does explain the appeal of the 
present bias. 
3. High Dependence and High Loss Aversion: A person with high dependence is 
expected to rely on others and regularly search for the opinions of others (Scott and 
Bruce, 1995). Time is expected to contribute to loss aversion, as people who more 
regularly evaluate and re-evaluate their decisions are expected to be more loss averse 
(Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). High dependence may therefore explain the appeal of the 
loss aversion nudge and highly dependent people regularly search for the opinions of 
others and thus re-evaluate their own decisions. 
4. High CFC and High Social Norm: A person with high CFC is expected to carefully 
consider the future consequences of their actions and decisions (Strathman et al., 
1994). The social norm nudge is expected to appeal to those who conform (Bernheim, 
1994), and the risks and consequences of not conforming are expected to drive 
adherence to the social norm (Sunstein, 1996). High CFC, therefore, would explain the 
appeal of the social norm nudge as people have a greater understanding of the 
potential consequences of not conforming and thus adopt conforming behaviour (i.e. 
follow the social norm). 
5. Low Spontaneity and Low Social Norm: As above, a person with low spontaneity is 
expected to make decisions slowly (Scott and Bruce, 1995). This would allow a person 
time to consider the merits of the social norm, including the potential consequences of 
not following the social norm (Sunstein, 1996). However, the slower decision-making 
may also allow a person to evaluate a decision without the influence of the decisions 
of others, and may lead to low conformity, and thus a low appeal of the social norm 
nudge. The explanation for this relationship is inconclusive. 
 
In each instance excluding the identified relationship between spontaneity and the social norm 
nudge, the relationships appear to be qualitatively robust. The single instance where this is 
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not found should not, however, be seen as a concern, as this relationship was significant only 
at the 10% level and has already been excluded from use in the PTG data collection. 
Using the data collected and the results produced in the primer group, the survey-experiment 
for the PTG data collection can be constructed. Weightings of distributions shown in Figure 
22 are as observed in the PTG data sample. See Figure 22 below:
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For the reader’s benefit, Figure 22 is coloured coded. Blue items relate to functions and 
outputs which utilise choice personalisation only. Red items relate to functions and outputs 
which utilise delivery personalisation only. Finally, purple items relate to functions and outputs 
which utilise both choice and delivery personalisation.  
In practice, the attention check question is embedded within the dependence psychometric 
scale but is shown as a separate item in Figure 22 for visual ease. Participants in the CO 
group, therefore, do respond to the dependence psychometric scale, but only insofar as it 
checks they are paying attention. While omitted for clearer visualisation, participants in all 
groups have an even chance of being shown a nudge-advertisement containing either 
Candidate A or Candidate B. This survey experiment, therefore, continues to follow an RCT 
design. Finally, the reported sample size in Figure 22 (N = 400) follows the removal of those 
who fail the attention check. See below. 
The nudge preference used in the survey-experiment follows the ranking of the modulus of 
moderation term coefficients (𝛽3) discussed in Chapter 8. Following this procedure, the social 
norm nudge (|𝛽3| = 20.732) proceeds, followed by the present bias nudge (|𝛽3| = 19.805), the 
loss aversion nudge (|𝛽3| = 12.710) and the status quo nudge (|𝛽3| = 8.686). Again, following 
Chapter 8, participants who do not score within a region of significance are shown the most 
effective impersonal nudge, which is identified above as the status quo nudge. Advertisements 
shown to members of the choice personalisation only (CO) and choice and delivery 



















































































































14.3 – The Personalised Treatment Group 
 
14.3.1 Data Summary 
 
A sample of 441 participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service and 
were compensated $0.50 for their participation. After removing 41 participants who failed an 
attention check (9.297%), 400 participants remained (female = 32%).336 As the PTG group 
contained only psychometric questions found to be statistically significant moderators in the 
primer group, the PTG survey was relatively shorter than the primer survey, and so 
participants were not removed following rapid completion. 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 66: 
Table 66: Summary Statistics 
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336 Those respondents who failed the attention check were not compensated. The relatively lower rate of 




The demographic breakdown of the PTG sample is very similar to that of previous samples, 
with the average respondent being around 37 years of age, qualified slightly beyond a 
bachelor’s degree, and identifying slightly right of the political centre. No statistically significant 
difference between the control group and three treatment groups is found for age (2 (159, N 
= 400) = 153.4, p = .61), sex (2 (3, N = 400) = 2.2, p = .52), education (2 (12, N = 400) = 9.8, 
p = .64) or political identity (2 (12, N = 400) = 14.4, p = .28). 
14.3.2 Testing for the Presence of Aesthetic Effects 
 
As with previously, an investigation of the usefulness of the RCT design is carried out using 
two-tailed t-tests to identify the presence, or lack thereof, of significant differences in nudge 
effectiveness when Candidate A is in the nudge-advertisement versus Candidate B. These 
results are presented in Table 67: 
Table 67: Aesthetic Effects 











CO 11.475 16.485 -0.782 0.4356 
DO 4.353 2.028 0.427 0.6699 
CD 10.235 17.815 -1.209 0.2288 
     
 * p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Results for the control group are repeated from above. As can be seen, no statistically 
significant difference is found between Candidates A and B for all the groups examined. 
Consistent with previous results, however, Candidate B does appear to produce higher 
effectiveness scores than Candidate A. The exception here is in the DO group. The distribution 
of observations across subgroups are relatively even for all groups. 
Based on these results, there does not appear to be any statistically significant aesthetic 
effects in the PTG sample, and so the RCT design appears to be effective. 




Three-way comparisons of the control and impersonal groups with the choice only (CO), 
delivery only (DO) and choice and delivery (CD) groups are performed using a one-way 
ANOVA. Prior to this test, the assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance are 
examined. 
14.3.3.1 Assumption Testing 
 
Figure 23: Histogram Normality Plots 
 
Figure 23 shows histogram plots for the three personalised nudging groups, the impersonal 
nudging group, and the control group, with the dependent variable (effectiveness) shown on 
the x-axis and the frequency density shown on the y-axis. All groups appear to be normally 
distributed based on a histogram plot. The exception may be the CD group, and so a further 
plot of this group against a normal distribution is produced (bottom-right). This further plot 
would seem to suggest the CD is reasonably normal also, and so a one-way ANOVA seems 
suitable.337 Given the large sample size difference between the impersonal group (N = 451) 
and the other groups (N of around 130), Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance is 
performed. The finding (p = 0.0849) suggests variance may not be homogeneous at the 10% 
 
337 Even excepting the non-normality of the CD group, various authors have demonstrated that the normality 
assumption of a one-way ANOVA can often be relaxed with relatively little impact on the test’s reliability. See 
Glass, Peckham and Sanders (1972), Harwell et al. (1992) and Lix, Keselman and Keselman (1996). 
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level. In conjunction with an ANOVA, therefore, the Kruskal-Wallis test is utilised given the 
possibility of non-normality, and Welch’s test is used to account for a lack of homogeneity of 
variances. 
An ANOVA model (F (2, 688) = 14.53, p = 0.0000) considering the control group, the 
impersonal nudge group and the CO group suggests that at least one of these groups is 
statistically significantly different to another when means are compared, as do ANOVA models 
for the CD group (F (2, 694) = 14.62, p = 0.0000) and the DO group (F (2, 701) = 2.54, p = 
0.0795), though the latter only at the 10% level. Using a Kruskal-Wallis test, a statistically 
significant difference is found for the CO comparison (p = 0.0001) and the CD comparison (p 
= 0.0001) at the 5% level and the DO group (p = 0.0960) at the 10% level. Using Welch’s test, 
a statistically significant difference is found for the CO comparison (p = 0.0000) and the CD 
comparison (p = 0.0000) at the 5% level and the DO group (p = 0.0710) at the 10% level. 
14.3.4 Testing Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 states: 
Hypothesis 1: Personalised nudges will be statistically significantly more effective at 
influencing political decision-making then impersonal nudges, which in turn will be more 
effective than not nudging. 
Given the evidence of a statistically significant difference between the control group, the 
impersonal group and the personalised nudging groups, initial evidence would seem to 
support hypothesis 1. To more formally investigate this hypothesis, Tukey’s post-hoc test is 
first utilised. These results are presented in Table 68 through Table 70. 
Table 68: Tukey's Test for CO vs. Impersonal vs. Control 
Comparison Contrast Standard Error p-value 
 







CO vs. Control 19.848 4.257 0.000*** 
CO vs. Impersonal 16.457 3.307 0.000*** 
 




Table 69: Tukey's Test for DO vs. Impersonal vs. Control 
Comparison Contrast Standard Error p-value 
 







DO vs. Control 8.847 4.069 0.076* 
DO vs. Impersonal 5.456 3.113 0.187 
 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Table 70: Tukey's Test for CD vs. Impersonal vs. Control 
Comparison Contrast Standard Error p-value 
 







CD vs. Control 19.630 4.222 0.000*** 
CD vs. Impersonal 16.239 3.256 0.000*** 
 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
From these pairwise comparisons, consistent evidence can be found that suggests the 
personalised nudging groups are statistically significantly different from at least the control 
group in every case at the 10% level. For the CO and CD groups, this conclusion can be made 
at the 5% level, and extended to also capture the impersonal nudging group. Two-tailed t-tests 
expand on these conclusions: 
Table 71: Two-tailed T-test of Personalised Groups vs. Control Group 











DO -5.690 3.157 -2.246 0.0256** 
CD 
 
-5.690 13.940 -4.584 0.0000*** 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Table 72: Two-tailed T-test of Personalised Groups vs. Impersonal Group 











DO -2.299 3.157 -1.731 0.0840* 
CD 
 
-2.299 13.940 -4.905 0.0000*** 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Two-tailed t-test comparisons find that all personalised nudging groups are statistically 
significantly different from the control group at the 5% level, and all are statistically significantly 
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different from the impersonal group at the 10% level, with – again – the DO group responsible 
for this reduced level of confidence. An examination of the means of these groups suggests 
that this difference is positive, which is to say, the effectiveness of the personalised nudging 
groups is statistically significantly and positively different from both the control group and the 
impersonal nudging group. This is visualised in Figure 24: 
Figure 24: Comparison of Average Effectiveness 
 
 
As there is an a priori expectation of a positive effect from the nudges, however, a one-tailed 
t-test may be used to investigate the difference in groups. These results are presented in Table 
73 and Table 74 below: 
Table 73: One-tailed T-test of Personalised Groups vs. Control Group 











DO -5.690 3.157 -2.246 0.0128** 
CD 
 
-5.690 13.940 -4.584 0.0000*** 






Table 74: One-tailed T-test of Personalised Groups vs. Impersonal Group 











DO -2.299 3.157 -1.731 0.0420** 
CD 
 
-2.299 13.940 -4.905 0.0000*** 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Using the one-tailed t-test, the effect of all personalisation groups is found to be statistically 
significantly different from both the control and impersonal group effects at the 5% level. There 
would seem, then, good evidence to support hypothesis 1; albeit only partially. While 
personalised nudging appears to be more effective than the impersonal and control groups, 
there is little evidence to suggest the impersonal group is statistically significantly more 
effective than the control group, despite having a more positive mean. Tukey’s test, for 
instance, consistently fails to find evidence of statistical significance, and returning to the 
results of the nudge subgroup comparisons in the primer group, only the status quo nudge 
was found to be statistically significantly different from the control group, and only at the 10% 
level. 
Table 75: Two-tailed T-test of Impersonal Group vs. Control Group 












* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
This lack of statistically significant difference is confirmed by a two-tailed t-test shown in Table 
75 between the impersonal group and the control group. 
14.3.5 Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 states: 
Hypothesis 2: Choice and Delivery personalised nudges will be statistically significantly more 




To test hypothesis 2, an ANOVA model comparing the CO, DO and CD groups is estimated. 
This model (F (2, 399) = 4.47, p = 0.0120) suggests that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the means of at least 2 of these groups at the 5% level. A Kruskal-Wallis 
estimation returns the same result (p = 0.0226), as well as a Welch test estimation (p = 0.009). 
To identify between which groups this difference lies, Tukey’s test is again utilised. 
Table 76: Tukey's Test for CO vs. DO vs. CD 
Comparison Contrast Standard Error p-value 
 







CD vs. CO -0.218 4.310 0.960 
CD vs. DO 10.783 
 
4.206 0.011** 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
As seen in Table 76, the DO group appears to be statistically significantly differently from the 
CO and CD groups, while these groups do not appear to be statistically significantly different 
from one another. This conclusion is supported by two-tailed t-tests shown in Table 77 through 
Table 79: 
Table 77: Two-tailed T-test of CO vs. DO 










* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Table 78: Two-tailed T-test of CD vs. DO 










* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Table 79: Two-tailed T-test of CO vs. CD 














As can be seen, the effect of the nudges in the DO group is statistically significantly less 
effective than the CO and CD groups, which are themselves insignificantly different.338 
Hypothesis 2, therefore, must be rejected. While the hypothesis would appear to hold true 
when only considering delivery personalisation, when choice personalisation is also 
considered, the effect of the nudges in the CD group is not so different as to be statistically 
significant and – by the slightest of margins – is actually less than choice personalisation 
alone. Again, these results can be seen visually in Figure 24.  
 
338 Hypothesis 2 holds that the effect of the nudges in the CD group will be more positive than either the CO or 
DO groups, and thus, again, a one-tailed t-test can be used. This does not substantially change the conclusions 




















Chapter 15 – Discussion 
 
15.1 – Introduction 
 
For the most part, Chapter 14 is structured to present results with little space available for 
drawing out connections between the findings and the wider literature, or indeed, 
contextualising the findings within the wider literature. This chapter expands on the preceding 
analysis. 
15.2 – The Implications of Hypothesis 1 
 
Based on the results in Chapter 14, hypothesis 1 is partially accepted. The evidence does 
seem to support the postulate that personalisation – in both the choice and delivery varieties 
– does produce more positively effective nudges, when compared to both impersonal nudging 
and not nudging at all. However, the evidence suggests that the adverts using impersonal 
nudges were not statistically significantly more positvively effective than adverts seen by the 
control group. 
The basis for postulating that the impersonal nudges would be more positively effective than 
not nudging at all stems from the basic claim of nudge theory, namely that changing choice 
architecture should affect change in human behaviour. Of course, this basic claim is highly 
generalised and couched in theory. As considered in Chapter 2, the realities of applied 
nudging are often less definitive. For instance, Thunström, Gilbert and Jones-Ritten (2018) 
find that a nudge which overall appeared to effectively discourage spending was actually 
harmful when the sample was stratified and re-analysed (which is to say, when heterogeneity 
was considered).  
Equally, nudges are often ineffective when used impersonally, but appear to be effective when 
heterogeneity is considered (Ruggeri et al., forthcoming). A rather contemporary example of 
this is in COVID-19 messaging. Kraft-Todd et al. (2020), for instance, have found various 
nudges embedded within public-safety information messaging in Italy to be ineffective across 
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the population examined, but effective amongst subsamples constructed along age and 
gender specifications. Staying in the world of health, Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) argue nudges 
used in healthcare are often ineffective because the health outcomes being targeted often 
impact only part of the population – not everybody is obese, for example. For these authors, 
the notion that a nudge might be ineffective when used impersonally, but effective when 
personalised, is a rather obvious conclusion. This is very much the conclusion to be drawn 
given the evidence provided in this thesis. 
Notably, choice personalisation is found to make the nudges statistically significantly more 
positively effective than impersonal nudging at the 5% level, with delivery personalisation also 
producing this result but at the 10% level. These results are based on application of a two-
tailed t-test. Given hypothesis 1 holds that personalised nudges will induce a positive effect, a 
one-tailed t-test can also be used. When this procedure is undertaken, both choice and 
delivery personalisation are found to make the nudges statistically significantly more positively 
effective than impersonal nudging at the 5% level. When both choice and delivery are used 
together, this result is also found at the 5% level. Qualitatively, all personalisation groups 
produce absolutely positive effectiveness scores, compared to the impersonal group for which 
the score is only positive relative to the control group, and is not statistically significantly 
different from the score of the control group. 
The difference between the delivery personalisation group compared to the impersonal group 
is statistically significant at the 5% level using a one-tailed t-test. As hypothesis 1 expects a 
positive effect resulting from the personalised nudges, a one-tailed t-test is the appropriate 
and more powerful test to use. Here, the statistical evidence supports the conclusion that 
delivery personalisation is effective.  
Nevertheless, it is notable – even when effective – that delivery personalisation appears to be 
a statistically significantly less effective personalisation strategy than choice personalisation. 
Furthermore, the effect of delivery personalisation does not seem to appear in the choice and 
delivery personalisation group. These observations will be considered shortly. 
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Immediately, these results allow hypothesis 1 to be partially accepted: inconsistent statistical 
evidence is found to suggest impersonal nudging is effective – with only the status quo nudge 
being effective at the 5% level – but consistent statistical evidence is found to suggest both 
choice and delivery personalisation are effective at the 5% level. This latter result suggests 
that the problem of heterogeneity may be resolved by personalising the outcomes to which a 
person is nudged (i.e. choice personalisation) as well as personalising the method by which a 
person is nudged (i.e. delivery personalisation). Furthermore, the benefits of personalisation 
are maintained when both choice and delivery personalisation are used in tandem. 
15.3 – The Implications of Hypothesis 2 
 
However, when these methods are used in tandem, the resulting effect is not statistically 
significantly different from using just choice personalisation. On this basis, hypothesis 2 cannot 
be accepted. Alternatively, combining choice and delivery personalisation did produce a 
personalisation strategy which is found to be statistically significantly different from using just 
delivery personalisation, with the effect being positive. On this basis, an argument could be 
made for accepting hypothesis 2, though given the wording of the hypothesis, this argument 
is not compelling. 
There are two possible explanations for these results, which are not mutually exclusive. The 
first explanation is that delivery personalisation in this instance is not as effective as one might 
hypothesise. This notion has been alluded to above and is considered in more detail below. 
The second explanation is that choice personalisation in this instance is overwhelmingly 
effective to the point that it is dominating other effects. 
The apparent effectiveness of choice personalisation cannot be denied; by simply nudging 
participants towards candidates who appear to advocate policies which are important to them, 
the average effectiveness of the nudge-advertisement is found to be statistically significantly 
different from the control group advertisement, and the adverts seen by the impersonal group 
and the DO group. One explanation for this result is a lack of information.  
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A frequent idea within the literature on information leakage is the notion of information search 
(Tannenbaum and Ditto, 2011; McKenzie et al., 2006; Sher and McKenzie, 2006). This idea 
contends that people search for information when making decisions, even going so far as to 
infer information based on the framing of a prospect (Tannenbaum and Ditto, 2011; Sher and 
McKenzie, 2006). A lack of meaningful information, for instance, may explain the occasional 
evidence of an aesthetic effect during the pilot studies and in the primer group. Consider 
Praino and Stockemer (2018), who find the attractiveness of political candidates can be a 
significant factor in election outcomes (with the more attractive candidate usually winning), but 
only in marginal elections, where – one might expect – few factors differentiate the 
candidates.339 
Further evidence to suggest that the political advertisements which were not choice 
personalised were informationally equivalent can be found from the survey-experiment 
respondents. Two respondents communicated,340 without prompt that: 
Respondent A, in the DO group of the PTG data sample: “I would need some actual 
information about things like policies and positions before deciding who to vote for.” 
Respondent B, in the primer group data sample: “I vote based on issues and policy, not 
random ads.” 
These comments are, of course, subjective. Furthermore, the analytical approach adopted 
here is not a qualitative one. But equally, these comments come directly from respondents 
known to have completed the survey-experiment and interacted with the nudge-
advertisements (albeit a tiny minority). Given this, these comments reinforce the notion that 
the non-CO advertisements were quite informationally similar. 
 
339 The role of aesthetic differences is discussed in more detail below. 
340 In MTurk, respondents must enter a completion code generated by the requester to demonstrate they have 
completed the task. As this is done manually via a text box, respondents can write anything they like. It was via 
this medium that these comments were communicated. 
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Accepting this notion supports several implications. Firstly, it suggests information search 
rather than behavioural bias was driving participant choices, which may explain why the 
impersonal nudges were not statistically significantly different from the control group. 
Secondly, extending this explanation offers an explanation for the relatively poor performance 
of the delivery personalisation group, as that form of personalisation primarily sort to appeal 
to behavioural bias which was itself not a primary driver of participant decision-making.341 
Thirdly, that when choice personalisation was used, this greatly tipped the balance of 
informational content towards the choice-personalised advertisement, and, as information 
search is hypothesised as the main phenomena driving participant response, this led to choice 
personalisation appearing to be overwhelmingly effective. 
Furthermore, in response to hypothesis 2, the notion of information search would explain why 
the data reject the hypothesis. If information search – which choice personalisation in this 
instance appeals to – is driving most of the participants’ behaviour, and behavioural bias – 
which delivery personalisation in this instance appeals to – is driving little of the participants’ 
behaviour, one would expect the effectiveness scores of CD group to very closely resemble 
the effectiveness scores of CO group, which is observed. 
Knowing this, future studies might adopt one or both of two adjustments to the survey-
experiment used here. Firstly, the policy might be embedded into the control slogan also, such 
that the CO advertisement and the control advertisement are more informationally 
equivalent.342 Secondly, as the advert shown to the CO group uses an impersonal method of 
nudging, so too might the DO group advert use an impersonal policy within the slogan.343 
 
341 This is only one explanation, but accepting it, one may conclude that the effects of delivery personalisation 
were actually rather more compelling than they initially appear. 
342 To what extent informational equivalence is desirable, however, is unknown. Nudges frequently involve 
providing more information to decision-makers (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), and thus endeavouring to achieve 
informational equivalency may simply come to stymieing the effect of the nudge. 
343 Again, to what extent this is permissible can be debated. The generic slogan is also an impersonal outcome, 
so simply adding an impersonally assigned policy slogan may just increase information without needing to, 
perhaps obscuring the effect of delivery personalisation. 
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These adjustments may make the groups’ outcomes more comparable, and allow the effects 
of each method of personalisation to be more accurately measured. 
Accepting the results as they are, however, would lead to a clear implication for those seeking 
to personalise nudges in the future. Namely that, while delivery personalisation (on its own or 
with choice personalisation) appears somewhat effective, choice personalisation is a 
significantly more effective method, at least in this instance. Furthermore, the benefits of using 
both choice and delivery personalisation are no greater than just using choice personalisation. 
15.4 – Delivery Personalisation 
 
While statistical evidence would suggest delivery personalisation is also an effective 
personalisation strategy, other evidence shows delivery personalisation is statistically 
significantly less effective than both of the other personalisation strategies. Some space is 
now given for considering why this may be the case. To an extent, an answer is provided by 
considering why choice personalisation seems so effective. But again, an alternative – if not 
additional – perspective to adopt is one which considers why delivery personalisation seems, 
relatively, less effective. 
15.4.1 Not Enough Personalisation 
 
A primary reason may actually be a lack of delivery personalisation. Figure 22 in Chapter 14 
details the survey-experiment flow for the PTG sample. Included in this figure are percentage 
distributions of the sample. For instance, Figure 22 shows that 31.75% of the sample (N = 
400) were assigned to the CO group, 35.00% to the DO group and 33.25% to the CD group. 
Figure 22 also provides more detailed information, showing for instance how many participants 
within the DO and CD groups experienced the present bias nudge (2.14% and 4.51%, 
respectively). Furthermore, recall that those participants who did not score within any region 
which would suggest a significant, positive moderation effect were defaulted into the best 
impersonal nudge – the status quo nudge. 
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Figure 22 therefore indicates that anywhere between one-third (32.86%) and one-half 
(54.55%) of participants in the DO or CD groups did not receive a delivery personalised 
nudge.344 Of course, these participants did receive the best impersonal nudge – a form of 
delivery personalisation – but this is a sizeable number of participants receiving a default 
delivery personalised nudge.  
This thesis is not alone in presenting such results, however, and given this result, one might 
come to reinterpret and recontextualise the findings of Peer et al. (2019). They note: “Our 
simulations estimated that the Crack-Time nudge would be optimal for 85% of the sample, 
whereas the Meter nudge would be optimal for 15% of the sample” (Peer et al., 2019: 12-13). 
In Chapter 8, this comment was taken as a weakness of Peer et al. (2019), interpreted as 
evidence of over-simplification. However, one may speculate that, of those 85% shown the 
Crack-Time nudge, a sizeable proportion are shown it simply because it is the best impersonal 
nudge.345 Certainly, in light the results presented in this thesis, this seems a sensible postulate. 
Methodologically, the implications of a large proportion of the sample not receiving delivery 
personalisation suggest that relevant heterogeneity is not being captured by the four 
psychometric tests used in the DO and CD groups. Furthermore, given the lack of moderation 
effects associated with the other psychometric variables, one can conclude relevant 
heterogeneity is not being captured by the seven-psychometrics used in the primer group 
either. In other words, there may be heterogeneity in decision-making contained within the 
one-third to one-half of respondents who receive the best impersonal nudge which is not 
captured by any of the psychometric scales used here. Therefore, future studies may need to 
utilise a significantly larger number of psychometric tests, and indeed, the small data approach 
taken here may speak to the limitations of ‘crude’ personalisation and the advantages of big 
 
344 32.86% represents the percentage of respondents in the DO group who experienced the status quo nudge 
but did not score within a region of significance on the spontaneity psychometric scale – the scale found to 
statistically significantly moderate the effect of the status quo nudge. 54.55% is the largest percentage of 
participants from the CD group who also experienced the status quo nudge as the best impersonal nudge from 
the four subgroups contained within the CD group. In ascending order, the other subgroup figures are 35.00%, 
38.19% and 51.85%, with a CD group average of 44.90%. 
345 Peer et al. (2019) report the Crack-Time nudge was the best impersonal nudge. 
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data commonly discussed in the personalisation literature (Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014; 
Sunstein, 2013; Thaler and Tucker, 2013). 
An implication of this explanation for why delivery personalisation appears disappointing 
relative to choice personalisation is that, omitting those who receive delivery personalisation 
only via the best impersonal nudge, this adjusted DO group should be found to produce more 
positive effectiveness scores, which are indicative of more effective nudging. With the current 
data, this hypothesis can be tested. These results shown in Table 80 and Table 81: 
Table 80: One- and Two-tailed T-tests of Adjusted DO Group vs. Impersonal Group 


















Levene’s test = 0.4544 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Table 81: One- and Two-tailed T-tests of Adjusted DO Group vs. Best Impersonal Group 


























Levene’s test = 0.0414 
Welch’s adjustment shown in brackets. 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
 
Omitting those who receive the best impersonal nudge from the DO sample (Adjusted DO 
Group) does, as would be expected, increase the DO group mean from 3.157 to 4.404. 
However, there is no substantial change in the results, with the DO group being statistically 
significantly different from the impersonal group at the 5% level under a one-tailed t-test. 
Furthermore, when the DO group is split into those who experience a delivery personalised 
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nudge (i.e. the adjusted DO group) and those who experience the best impersonal nudge, and 
these subgroups are compared, no statistically significant difference in effect is found.346 
As such, while the trends in group averages suggest a lack of delivery personalisation owing 
to missed heterogeneity may be a factor, this explanation alone cannot account for the poor 
performance of delivery personalisation relative to choice personalisation. 
15.4.2 A Mixed Bag 
 
An alternative explanation for the relatively poor performance of delivery personalisation 
compared to choice personalisation may simply be that delivery personalisation is a less 
effective strategy than might initially be expected. Peer et al. (2019), for instance, report that 
delivery personalisation was significantly more effective than impersonal nudging. However, 
they also note that there was no statistically significant difference between their Meter nudge 
when it was personalised or delivered impersonally. Similarly, consider Lipman (forthcoming), 
who also supposes delivery personalisation may be a means of personalising behavioural 
incentives but fails to find any significant difference between behavioural traits and incentives 
preferences. By comparison, this thesis presents good statistical evidence which supports the 
theorised use of delivery personalisation – but delivery personalisation remains a relatively 
poor strategy compared to choice personalisation. 
One should be cautious on two counts. Firstly, the theoretical promise of delivery 
personalisation (Mills, forthcoming; Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; Peer et al., 2019; Benartzi, 
2017) may not exist quite so effectively in practice. Secondly, there is limited research into 
delivery personalisation,347 and thus methodological and theoretical considerations may be 
missing from both Peer et al. (2019) and this thesis. For instance, almost all authors within the 
personalised nudging literature comment on the emergence of personalisation given the 
advancement of big data technologies (Mills, forthcoming; Ruggeri et al., forthcoming; Yeung, 
 
346 Though the best impersonal nudge (the status quo nudge) does appear to perform slightly worse than when 
impersonally delivered in the primer group (0.609 vs. 1.936). 
347 Peer et al. (2019) attest to be the first, and to this author’s knowledge, they are. 
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2017; Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014; Thaler and Tucker, 2013; Sunstein, 2013) and digital 
choice environments (Peer et al., 2019; Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019; Benartzi, 2017; 
Yeung, 2017).  
It may be the case that the principle of delivery personalisation is correct – as some evidence 
presented here and presented by Peer et al. (2019) would suggest – but that future methods 
of investigation and application will need to utilise more sophisticated data resources, more 
detailed measures of heterogeneity, and larger samples to establish statistical significance.348 
For instance, the final formulation of delivery personalisation presented here is one which is 
algorithmic in nature, taking in an input (i.e. psychometric score), and running this input 
through an if/else statement to determine which output (i.e. nudge-advertisement) to present. 
But there is no reason, in principle, why the input in future investigations may not be a vector 
of data, allowing the implicit assumption present in the current model that two people who 
score the same on a single psychometric measure should necessarily be treated the same to 
be relaxed, if not abandoned.349 As Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) argue, machine learning 




Such complex tasks, within the context of Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming), are medical tasks, but 
healthcare outcomes are not the only situations which can be expected to benefit from 
personalisation but are simultaneously complex. Complexity, here, takes a narrow definition 
with which others may disagree – namely, complexity is taken here to mean any decision 
where more than one measure of heterogeneity may be necessary to effectively personalise 
 
348 For a recent discussion of these challenges, see Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming). For a discussion of how data 
challenges may be resolved, see Mills (forthcoming). 
349 This view, for the most part, ignores their scores on all other psychometric measures, as well as 
innumerable other differences between them which may be relevant.  
350 Moderated regression may also be a valid means of analysis, though models which are more complex than 
the SLM model used here and by Peer et al. (2019). 
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interventions.351 For instance, recall the quote by Benartzi (2017) in their discussion of website 
personalisation and digital choice architecture: “The logical endpoint is an internet in which 
the best Web sites and apps customize their appearance based on our demographic 
background. Are we an educated senior citizen from Poland? Then take away all the colors 
and give us plenty of text and links. Are we a young Thai man? Then give us lots of bright 
color and imagery” (Benartzi, 2017: 50). While Benartzi (2017) chooses to emphasise 
demographic data, he also emphasises multiple measures of heterogeneity, from education 
to age to geography. 
Another example of a complex decision, which in turn may entail more complex 
personalisation, may be political decision-making. By way of demonstration, consider previous 
studies: Peer et al. (2019) and Guo et al. (2020) examine personalised nudging and password 
creation; Page, Castleman and Meyer (2020) consider personalised nudging and FAFSA 
applications; Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) examine personalised nudging and the 
disclosure of personal health information; and Hirsh, Kang and Bodenhausen (2012) and 
Moon (2002) investigate personalisation and advertisements for products.  
In each instance, previous studies have investigated fundamentally pro-self decisions – 
decisions where the costs and the benefits of an outcome are borne, primarily or entirely, by 
the individual making the decision (Korn et al., 2018; Barton and Grüne-Yanoff, 2015; Hagman 
et al., 2015). Political decision-making, notably voting, is simultaneously a pro-self decision – 
as a person votes for the candidate whom they would like to win – and a pro-social decision – 
as the candidate who wins is based on collective choice. 
The consequences of this difference may be substantial. Consider the decision surrounding 
the creation of a password. The password itself is – by definition – a private, personal decision, 
with a person possibly thinking about how they will remember it and how secure it is (Guo et 
al., 2020). Voting, by contrast, may invoke personal considerations such as whether a given 
 
351 This notion applies to both delivery personalisation and choice personalisation. 
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candidate’s victory would be in that person’s personal interests (Downs, 1957), but may also 
invoke considerations about whether that candidate’s victory would be in the interests of 
others, or society as a whole. This, in itself, adds complexity to the decision.352 But this also 
ignores the interplay between pro-social and pro-self tendencies. For instance, Capraro et al. 
(2019) argue that pro-social behaviour does not just manifest as acting for the benefit of others 
but can also be a used as an attempt to control the selfishness of others who exhibit pro-self 
behaviour (Kesberg and Pfattheicher, 2019). Examples of such behaviour in the political 
context can be seen in the UK General Election in 2019 (GE19), when various websites and 
online services were created to facilitate tactical voting (Casalicchio, 2019; Sabbagh, 2019) – 
the act of voting for a political party or person that you would not usually support in order to 
prevent another party or person from winning (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020). Crucially, such a 
strategy only succeeds if one adopts a pro-social position of voting against one’s personal 
interests and in conjunction with the actions of others. 
No such interplay can be expected to exist in any of the previous studies of personalisation – 
an individual purchase or choice of password, typically, is not done with a wider sense of 
society in mind, let alone a notion of antagonism or coordination with others in society. 
Accepting that the decision with which personalised nudging is applied here is a more complex 
decision than the contexts investigated by previous research may explain, partially, the 
underperformance of delivery personalisation. As above, information is speculated to be 
playing a larger role than bias in affecting individual behaviour; but so too may several 
considerations regarding the implication of one’s decision on oneself and others.353 With 
choice personalisation, the addition of information may work in tandem to make these 
 
352 Following the definition of complexity given here, one might imagine individuals being modelled by a vector 
containing two values, one capturing their pro-sociality and another capturing their pro-selfishness. 
353 Very recent research from Kozyreva et al. (2020) examining public attitudes to personalisation algorithms 
supports this idea. Kozyreva et al. (2020) find personalisation algorithms are more accepted when used to 
personalise individual experiences – such as recommendations of products – than when used to personalise 
shared experiences – such as news, comments from friends and politics. They suggest this is because people 
value exposure to what they consider within the public domain, and that personalisation may operate as a 
kind of enclosure. See below for a similar discussion of this idea. 
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considerations easier, while once more, delivery personalisation may be targeting behavioural 
bias which – in this context – has a relatively small effect on the ultimate decision. 
15.5 – Moderation Effects 
 
One result which is consistent throughout both pilot studies and the primer group is the lack 
of moderation effects, at least in comparison to Peer et al. (2019). As a baseline for 
comparison, Peer et al. (2019) investigate five nudges and eight psychometric scales, and so 
have 40 opportunities to identify statistically significant moderation effects, which they do in 
19 instances (at the 5% level), or around 47.5% of the time. Recall that in the first pilot study, 
no statistically significant moderation effects were identified; in the second pilot study, two 
statistically significant moderation effects were identified out of 28 (7.1%); and in the primer 
group, four statistically significant moderation effects were identified at the 5% level (14.3%). 
It is interesting to consider why the disparity in the number of statistically significant moderation 
effects between this thesis and Peer et al. (2019) has occurred, especially given all the 
psychometric tests used here are also used by Peer et al. (2019).354 Several explanations may 
be induced. 
Firstly, as discussed above, the decisional-context investigated by this project (political 
decision-making) seems to be more complex than the context investigated by Peer et al. 
(2019) – password creation. Given the simplicity of the latter, the SLM model utilised both here 
and by Peer et al. (2019) may be better suited to identify simple moderation effects (i.e. a 
single moderator and a single interaction with a focal variable), while a more complex 
moderated regression model – or indeed, means of analysis – may be needed to identify more 
complex interactions. 
Secondly, while Peer et al. (2019) identify 19 statistically significant moderation effects, they 
do not utilise 19 moderation effects, nor do they discuss the qualitative validity of any of their 
 
354 The additional psychometric scale utilised by Peer et al. (2019), the abbreviated numeracy scale, 
contributes to only 2 of their 19 identified moderation effects. 
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identified interactions. Addressing the first point, as Peer et al. (2019) only utilise the Crack-
Time and Meter nudges in the (delivery) personalisation stage, only 10 of the 19 moderation 
effects originally identified are actually utilised. As discussed in Chapter 8, the nudge-
preference method utilised by Peer et al. (2019) appears to be greatly simplifying, removing 
nudges from the analysis without any clear explanation as to why.355 The result is that, despite 
evidence to suggest significance, nearly half of all the moderation effects identified by Peer et 
al. (2019) are ignored. Regardless, accepting that only 10 out of the 40 possible interactions 
are relevant to further investigation, this brings the percentage of possible effects closer to 
that found in this thesis, though the difference is still sufficient to warrant further consideration 
(25.0% vs. 14.3%).  
Addressing the second point, the lack of behavioural underpinnings in the study undertaken 
by Peer et al. (2019) mean they are unable to draw on past research to inform whether any of 
their identified moderation effects make sense from a qualitative perspective as Hayes (2018) 
encourages. Thus, although Peer et al. (2019) identified 19 statistically significant moderation 
effects, it remains unclear how many of these moderation effects make sense given 
behavioural theory and past research, and how many may simply emerge as anomalous 
results or quirks of the sample. Providing such scrutiny may lead to a reduction in the number 
of identified significant moderation effects on a qualitative ground. By contrast, while notably 
fewer statistically significant moderation effects are identified in this thesis, all which are 
identified can be grounded in theory and previous behavioural findings. 
Thirdly, there may simply be few moderation effects to be identified. Consider Lipman 
(forthcoming), whose recent work on the possibilities of personalised behavioural interventions 
found no statistically significant heterogeneity effects between those who preferred different 
behavioural incentives. Lipman (forthcoming): “tailored preferences were not systematically 
 
355 Again, Peer et al. (2019) only attribute their decisions to an unspecified simulation model. Of course, there 
may be reasons to remove a nudge if one is attempting to maximise the effectiveness of the nudge. For 
instance, the moderation effect might suggest that all possible values of the moderator would produce a 
negative effect. Peer et al. (20190, however, do not state this as a reason for removal. 
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related to any of the behavioral insights often used to motivate the implementation of 
behaviorally inspired incentives in practice… Hence, although autonomy is likely increased by 
allowing individuals full freedom to design their own financial incentives… the results reported 
here provide no insight into why individuals would prefer particular incentive schemes” 
(Lipman, forthcoming: 10).  
Lipman’s (forthcoming) methods can be criticised: they only investigate four psychological 
(behavioural) variables and four behavioural incentives, producing only 16 instances to identify 
significant heterogeneity effects; they do not consider the effectiveness of the intervention 
itself, instead only considering why a person choose an intervention; and they use only simple 
tests of difference and do not engage in methods such as moderated regression or more 
complex analytical procedures. Yet, Lipman’s (forthcoming) findings also serve as an 
interesting counter to the generally compelling findings of Peer et al. (2019), and in contrasting 
both studies, the results presented here fall somewhere within a middle ground.356 
Fourthly, the problem of a high proportion of the sample being shown the best impersonal 
nudge has been explained with the suggestion that the psychometric scales used were simply 
not capturing all the relevant heterogeneity. The implication of this explanation is that 
additional psychometric measures (or additional measures of heterogeneity in general), may 
be needed to improve from the current study. Relatedly, one would expect that more measures 
of heterogeneity would identify more statistically significant moderation effects. It cannot, 
therefore, be overlooked that one explanation for the relatively low number of moderation 
effects identified here is because of an incomplete set of measures of heterogeneity. 
15.6 – Was the RCT Design Successful? 
 
A recurring consideration throughout this thesis has been the presence (or lack thereof) of 
significant aesthetic effects. As discussed in Chapter 7, the aesthetic differences between 
Candidates A and B were identified as a potential additional source of variance in the 
 
356 Also see Schöning, Matt and Hess (2019) and Guo et al. (2020), both of whom find mixed results. 
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effectiveness variable, potentially obscuring the effect of the nudge. The identified solution to 
this problem was an RCT design. By assuming no aesthetic effect should persist across the 
sample, and by randomly assigning participants to one of two aesthetic groups (nudge-
advertisements featuring Candidate A versus nudge-advertisements featuring Candidate B), 
the overall effect of aesthetic differences (aesthetic effect) could be assumed to be 
insignificantly different from zero. 
In several instances, this would appear to be the case. Setting aside the PTG data sample for 
a moment, in all tests of aesthetic differences, statistically significant aesthetic effects were 
identified in one or two subgroups per sample. Given the small sample sizes (both generally 
in the case of the pilot studies and in comparison to some RCTs in the case of the primer 
group), these results are encouraging, as they suggest the RCT design did work to prevent 
aesthetic effects confounding the study. This is not to say that apparent trends in aesthetic 
differences cannot be identified. While the effect is statistically insignificant, Candidate B would 
seem to be more preferable to Candidate A; a trend identified in both pilot studies, the primer 
group and the PTG group. Furthermore, the presence of some statistically significant aesthetic 
effects in conjunction with this trend suggest that the presence of aesthetic effects should not 
be discounted entirely. Prior research by Praino and Stockemer (2018) and Lawson et al. 
(2010) suggest candidate image (i.e. how a candidate looks) can be significant in predicting 
election outcomes. This expectation would also be congruent with the hypothesis of 
information search given above – where participants are seeking additional information from 
which to base their decision, obvious differences – even if “superficial” (Lawson et al., 2010: 
561) – may be expected to be drawn upon in the decision making process (Praino, 2018). 
Equally, Little et al. (2007) argue that while aesthetic differences (specifically attractiveness) 
may predict the outcome of elections, there is no robust standard of attractiveness which can 
be applied across different cultures and constituencies. As such, even where an aesthetic 




Returning to the PTG data sample, no evidence of statistically significant aesthetic effects is 
identified. Paradoxically, this lack of significance is itself potentially quite significant in the 
context of personalisation. Where previously, when no personalisation was used, some 
statistically significant aesthetic effects were identified (and the identification of some 
statistically significant aesthetic effects was rather consistent), when personalisation is used, 
no statistically significant aesthetic effects are identified. One conclusion which may be drawn 
from this, is that the use of personalisation is each group (CO, DO and CD) rendered the 
nudge effective enough so as to reduce to statistical insignificance any potential aesthetic 
effects. It is noted, however, that the general – though statistically insignificant – trend of 
Candidate B being preferred to Candidate A remains. 
15.7 – The Role of Other Factors 
 
In Chapter 9, three outstanding factors were identified which, it was suggested, may impact 
this research. These were the COVID-19 pandemic, the rise of populist politics, and the 2020 
US presidential election. 
It is likely not possible to evaluate the effect of the current epoch of populist politics, nor the 
impact of an election year, using this study alone. Indeed, it seems likely the effect of these 
macro trends – if, indeed, any effect is present at all – may only be understood following a 
broader analysis of all research into political decision-making during this period. However, 
hypotheses were made regarding the role of COVID-19 and the nudge preferences, which can 
be considered in hindsight. 
Following Chapter 9, the uncertainty and risk associated with COVID-19 were hypothesised 
potentially to encourage more loss averse behaviour, and more searching for certainty. The 
most immediate manifestation of this hypothesis, if correct, would be an apparently more 
effective loss aversion nudge. However, across both the pilot studies and the primer group, 
the loss aversion nudge was not found to be especially effective – in fact, only in one instance 
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was the advert utilising the loss aversion nudge even statistically significantly and positively 
different from the advert seen by the control group.  
On the question of certainty, one might look to the status quo nudge. The status quo nudge is 
expected to convey certainty as it appeals to an outcome which is already known (Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler, 1991). The search for certainty in uncertainty times, therefore, may spark 
appeal for the status quo. There may be some evidence for this hypothesis, with the status 
quo nudge being found to be the best impersonal nudge following an analysis of the primer 
group. Unfortunately, this is likely the extent to which any conclusions can be drawn. Insofar 
as all moderation effects identified match concepts previously established in the literature, and 
insofar as the broad results of this study match expectations, one cannot confidently conclude 
that COVID-19 is exerting any influence on the data as there is simply a lack of a ‘no-COVID’ 
control. 
15.8 – General Implications of Personalised Nudging as a Strategy and Research 
Endeavour 
 
There are multiple implications which emerge from this research. The finding that both choice 
and delivery personalisation may be effective means of nudging – at least when impersonal 
nudging is ineffective – raises several considerations. Some of these considerations pertain 
to the implications of personalisation and personalised nudging in general. Furthermore, there 
is a pertinent methodological consideration which should be addressed, namely, which 
heterogeneity should be utilised in personalised nudging. Addressing this question requires 
one to return to the relevancy principle first proposed by Sunstein (2012), but in light of this 
thesis, a proposed adjustment to the relevancy principle is offered. 
15.8.1 Cohesion and Understanding in a Personalised Environment 
 
The first discussion draws from an argument initially developed by Mills (forthcoming). Here, 
the antagonism between universalism, on the one hand, and personalisation, on the other, is 
explored. In many domains, a universal approach is desirable, if not absolutely necessary. For 
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instance, criminal justice or civil litigation demands universality – a person who commits a 
crime should, in principle, be judged solely on the conditions relevant to that criminal act and 
identically to anyone else accused of and prosecuted for a crime.357 Equally, in a civil dispute, 
two identical lawsuits or claims of mistreatment should typically be resolved in the same 
manner. The notion of universality underpins, in part, Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice. 
One can imagine, for instance, personalised contract law (Porat and Strahilevitz, 2014). In 
principle, such measures seek to promote equitable outcomes by accounting for relevant 
differences between parties before, rather than after, any dispute arises. Porat and Strahilevitz 
(2014), for instance, advocate the use of personalised default rules to this end. An issue may 
arise, however, in that the substance of any such contract is identical to any other contract,358 
but the behavioural interpretation of one person’s personalised contract (utilising personalised 
nudges) may be very different to another’s. This is an issue Benartzi (2017) identifies 
specifically when considering the interpretation of information in digital spaces (which, 
following Porat and Strahilevitz (2014), law will increasingly come to be provided through), and 
eloquently summarises: “function follows form” (Benartzi, 2017: 52, original emphasis). In 
personalised contract law, but in principle in other areas such as regulation, the function of 
these agreements follows the form of these agreements. Where the latter is increasingly 
personalised, and the behaviour of parties altered accordingly, the former may come to be 
undermined. 
Two ideas related to this discussion are transparency and relevancy (the latter of which more 
will be said in due course).  
Returning to Rawls (1971), they argue that laws and regulations should be sufficiently 
transparent so as to be easily scrutinised by the public and rejected if necessary. Such an 
argument is known as the publicity principle (Hansen and Jespersen, 2013; Rawls, 1971), and 
is commonly invoked in discussions of nudging and transparency (Hansen and Jespersen, 
 
357 Within the limits of their criminality. This, again, returns to the notion of heterogeneity. 
358 In the same way that a default option does not necessarily reduce the options available to a decision maker. 
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2013). An advantage of universality, following the publicity principle, is comparability. 
Universal laws and regulations (and indeed nudges) which afford common experiences to all 
those who are subject to them can more easily facilitate discussion and thus scrutiny. For 
instance, a choice architect might wish to increase retirement saving and change the default 
option for workplace pensions from opt-in to opt-out (Service, 2015). If all employees 
experience this change, which is to say, if the nudge is introduced impersonally, the effect of 
the nudge is more obvious because all those subject to the nudge experience the same effect. 
A by-product of universal or impersonal nudging, therefore, is greater transparency, which 
should aid scrutiny and thus allow the nudge to be evaluated, accepted or rejected. 
By contrast, imagine a nudge to increase workplace pension saving, but the decision to 
automatically enrol an employee, or to leave them unenrolled, is based on each employee’s 
circumstances (i.e. choice personalisation). In comparing experiences, some employees 
might remark that they suddenly started paying into a pension plan, while others may remark 
that their take-home pay has remained the same. This may spark confusion and make it hard 
for employees to understand why some have been enrolled into the plan and others haven’t. 
The obvious solution, therefore, is transparency, and as such, transparency in how nudges 
are personalised may be of great importance.359 
Finally, consider relevancy.360 Yeung (2017), in their work on the implications of big data and 
nudging, argues that personalisation often occurs along obvious lines. For instance, an idea 
popularised by Negroponte (1995) and further deliberated on by Sunstein (2001) is that of the 
‘daily me,’ an information feed built on individual preferences (i.e. personalised). This idea is 
not unlike that discussed by Thaler and Tucker (2013) or the notion of the echo chamber also 
discussed – amongst others (Quattrociocchi, Scala and Sunstein, 2016; Massa and Avesani, 
 
359 This is to apply a Rawlsian principle to nudging, rather than to describe a Rawlsian nudge. The latter may be 
described as something to the effect of changed choice architecture designed to provide the most benefit (or 
least cost) to those already disadvantaged. This is an interesting idea, but one which is not of relevance to this 
discussion. 
360 Again, relevancy from a slightly different perspective will be discussed shortly. 
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2007) – by Sunstein (2001).361 The issue with personalisation based on obvious, revealed 
differences is it, “[does] not just reproduce traditional social fault lines but also… exacerbate[s] 
them” (O’Shea, 2019: 75). This prompts Yeung (2017) to worry that personalisation may lead 
to ever-more homogenised groups, with personalised nudging – paradoxically – nudging 
people towards similar experiences, rather than new experiences which allow people to 
develop a sense of their own identity and autonomy (Verbeek, 2006). 
A tendency for this is present in this research. Notably, choice personalisation was facilitated 
merely by asking participants to reveal that which was important to them and directing them 
towards a nudge which would support that outcome. Even delivery personalisation as 
demonstrated here may be guilty of the same sin – merely trying to predict preferences in 
decision making and construct a model to accommodate these decisional preferences, rather 
than necessarily challenging them. Of course, such a criticism is also contained within context. 
If one considers, say, the arguments of Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) and personalisation within 
a healthcare setting, or indeed Peer et al. (2019) and personalisation in password creation, 
the dangers of relevancy in this specific sense seem minimal.362 
15.8.2 Returning to the Relevancy Principle 
 
In a 2012 essay on personalised nudging, Sunstein (2012) argues that, because of the large 
data resources which could be expected to be associated with personalised nudging, choice 
architects should ensure that any and all data they are utilising is relevant to the development 
and administration of the nudge. Sunstein’s (2012) primary concern is personal privacy. 
 
361 An echo chamber is, according to Quattrociocchi, Scala and Sunstein (2016), the result of “users’ tendency 
to promote their favored narratives and hence form polarized groups. Confirmation bias helps to account for 
users’ decisions” (Quattrochiocchi, Scala and Sunstein, 2016: 1). 
362 Indeed, in terms of personalised healthcare, one probably wants a very self-centred experience. This is not 
to say that these contexts are immune to all the issues discussed. For instance, a lack of transparency in 
healthcare or cybersecurity could still cause tremendous social difficulties if a patient is aggrieved at their 




In Chapter 2, it was suggested the relevancy principle has another implication: because there 
is seemingly a limitless amount of heterogeneity data which could be collected or imagined, 
the relevancy principle places restrictions on choice architects who may be tempted to stratify 
and re-stratify their sample in the search for a significant effect. But this notion is easier stated 
than realised. One might be tempted, for instance, to argue that relevancy should stem from 
prediction – where a piece of heterogeneity is predicted to be relevant in the literature, one 
can claim it is relevant in whatever project is being undertaken. Certainly, the benefits of a firm 
grounding in the behavioural literature and the creation of predictions via a psychometric map 
have been shown to be advantageous when qualitatively interrogating the identified 
statistically significant moderated effects.363 
However, this leads one into something of an epistemological quandary. Heterogeneity which 
may need to be addressed via personalisation is, by its very nature, heterogeneity which has 
not previously be integrated into whatever standard is under scrutiny (be it a law, a regulation, 
or a nudge). It is not clear how one might be expected to address heterogeneity from a 
predictive perspective when the presence of heterogeneity itself suggests it has not formally 
been addressed. As Yeung (2017) argues, this problem can become even worse as the 
number of data being considered grows; Yeung (2017) goes so far as to suggest in a great 
many cases, humans simply cannot know what data will ultimately be relevant in personalised 
nudging.364 
This issue, furthermore, invokes the problem of transparency highlighted above. While 
Sunstein (2012) does not consider the role of transparency in their formulation of the relevancy 
principle, it certainly seems to be a valid component. It seems reasonable to ask: To what end 
should the relevancy of data in personalised nudging be demonstrative if not to enlighten 
 
363 Equally, the lack of this grounding seems to be to the detriment of Peer et al. (2019). 
364 By way of a somewhat more lucid argument, Biddle (2018) invokes the science fiction writer Ian Banks’ 
notion of infinite fun space, a place inhabited only by computers engaging in calculations far beyond the 
understanding of humans, and thus to the exclusion of humans. One can imagine the difficulties that 




others in an act of transparency? But where choice architects may simply be exploring 
possibilities, attending to the relevancy principle seems difficult. 
Two solutions present themselves. The first is to adopt a marginal approach to personalised 
nudging. Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) highlight the importance of considering the margins – 
where an impersonal nudge is generally effective, the various problems associated with 
personalised nudging can be reduced by focusing personalisation efforts on those at the 
margins who exhibit the undesirable behaviour.365 This would, of course, have notable cost 
benefits also – something Sunstein (2012) argues should also be a consideration of 
personalisation. 
The second approach may follow the approach adopted here. In this thesis, all personalisation 
has followed from previous findings in the literature, as well as previous methods established 
in that same literature. This has allowed the relevancy principle to be satisfied, as there has 
been clear rationale for the selection of various pieces of heterogeneity data and predictions 
have been formulated prior to personalisation such that the results may be scrutinised 
appropriately. Nevertheless, the data suggest anywhere between one-third to one-half of 
participants in the delivery personalisation groups were still being nudged with the best 
impersonal nudge.366 From this result, it is apparent some heterogeneity is being missed, and 
on the basis of this result, one may be able to justify further exploration. This continuous 
development approach is one advocated by Ruggeri et al. (forthcoming) and Guo et al. (2020). 
  
 
365 For lack of a better word. There is a distinct danger in labelling behaviours ‘undesirable’. 
366 Furthermore, the 100% allocation rate associated with the choice personalisation groups is only the result 
of experimental design. If choice personalisation was based on prediction as delivery personalisation was, 
rather than revealed preference from a finite list, one would not expect 100% allocation in these groups. 
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Chapter 16 – Conclusion 
 
This thesis’ research question, from the outset, was whether personalised nudging could be 
used to significantly influence political decision-making? The results of this thesis would 
suggest, on the whole, that the answer to this question is that it can. Of course, there is a 
degree of nuance with this answer.  
The theory of personalised nudging offered here proposes that nudges can be personalised 
in two ways. Firstly, the method of nudging can be personalised. This is dubbed delivery 
personalisation. Secondly, the outcome which is being nudged towards can be personalised. 
This is dubbed choice personalisation. 
Using seven psychometric variables contained within three psychometric scales – general 
decision making style, need for cognition and consideration of future consequences – and four 
commonly used nudges – the status quo nudge, the present bias nudge, the loss aversion 
nudge, and the social norm nudge – as well as moderated regression analysis and the 
Johnson-Neyman technique, four statistically significant moderation effects between each of 
the nudges and four of the seven psychometric variables were identified. As discussed in 
Chapter 15, this result is rather less than the number identified (47.5%) or used (25.0%) by 
Peer et al. (2019) in their analysis of personalised nudging, but remains broadly consistent 
with other results (Lipman, forthcoming; Guo et al., 2020; Schöning, Matt and Hess, 2019) and 
robust when interrogated using behavioural theory and literature. 
Using these results, nudges were personalised via delivery personalisation. This process 
produces nudges which are statistically significantly and positively effective in promoting 
choices which differ from the choices of a control group and an impersonal nudging group. 
However, the observed preferences of the impersonal nudging group are not statistically 
significantly different from the observed preferences of the control group. The evidence, 




Choice personalisation was also investigated. An investigation of both choice and delivery 
personalisation together represents a novel contribution of this project. To personalise the 
outcome towards which a person was nudged (i.e. choice personalisation), participants were 
asked to choose a political policy most important to them, from a range of four policies. This 
chosen policy was then integrated into a political advertisement which also used a nudge – in 
effect, choice personalisation. 
Once again, this personalisation strategy is found to be effective. Choice personalised nudges 
were statistically significantly and positively effective in influencing observed preferences 
when compared to the preferences of both a control group and an impersonally nudged group.  
Comparing both the choice personalisation and delivery personalisation strategies, the 
statistical evidence suggests that the former is a more effective strategy than the latter, despite 
both producing a statistically significant and positive effect. 
In Chapter 3, it was suggested that the use of choice and delivery personalisation combined 
may produce nudges which are significantly more effective than either choice personalised or 
delivery personalised nudges separately. This hypothesis, however, is not supported by the 
results presented here. While combining choice and delivery personalisation produced 
personalised nudges which were statistically significantly more effective than impersonal 
nudges and delivery personalisation nudges, these nudges were not statistically significantly 
different from simple choice personalised nudges. 
Overall, this thesis has demonstrated that personalised nudges can be effective strategies for 
influencing political decision-making. Furthermore, the results presented here would seem to 
support the choice/delivery framework for personalised nudging. However, these components 
do not appear to be equal, and choice personalisation appears to be a significantly more 
effective strategy than delivery personalisation. Of course, in some situations, one may not 
wish to personalise outcomes (i.e. choice personalisation). This being so, the problem of 
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heterogeneity which personalisation seeks to resolve can still be tackled, as delivery 
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